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Chapter 1
The Place of Civil Society in the Creation 
of Knowledge
Laura Suarsana, Heinz-Dieter Meyer, and Johannes Glückler
This interdisciplinary volume addresses the relations between civil society and 
knowledge from a social, institutional, and spatial perspective. As knowledge and 
civil society are co-constitutive (any voluntary civic agency would seem to require 
a minimum of knowledge and the kinds of civic agency shape the production and 
use of knowledge), we approach their relationship from two viewpoints: (a) what 
we know and how we think about the civil society shapes our action in it; (b) the 
particular relations between knowledge and civil society shape how knowledge in 
civil society becomes actionable. Adhering to the first imperative, we should care-
fully reflect and occasionally reconsider our assumptions about civil society. In line 
with the second imperative, we should carefully distinguish the ways in which civil 
society impacts knowledge. These range from knowledge creation, its interpreta-
tion, and its influence on societal and political discourses to its dissemination 
through civil society.
This book’s authors contribute to the discussion on these relations through con-
ceptual reflections on the role and current developments in civil society as well as 
through empirical research that yields new insights into these relations. Also, they 
invite readers and researchers to take new and unconventional perspectives on civil 
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society and offer some outside-the-box perspectives on how civil society can be 
conceived and analyzed. Conceptual and empirical approaches go beyond the tradi-
tional division of the three sectors—market, state, and civil society—to offer inclu-
sive frameworks, and take a broader and more integrative view on civil society and 
civic agency. In this introduction to the volume, we review selected strands of the 
contemporary debate and invite readers to examine the role of and relation between 
civil society and the creation, interpretation, and reproduction of knowledge, fol-
lowed by a reflection on contemporary perspectives on the civil society concept. 
Finally, we will outline the book’s structure and sketch out the individual contribu-
tions to the questions raised in this volume.
 Knowledge and Civil Society
Knowledge has been the focal concept in this book series. Beyond the many con-
ceptualizations of and ascriptions to this term, knowledge denotes the human under-
standing of concrete and abstract phenomena of the world in which we live. Human 
understanding differs from data and information in that it is built and rests in peo-
ple’s minds. Whereas bits of data or parcels of commodity can be transferred, 
knowledge requires comprehension to be translated from one person to the other 
and from one place to the other. Though being bound to the individual, the creation 
and interpretation of knowledge remains a relational social process, often collabora-
tive and situated within the confines of symbolic, cultural, and institutional frames 
(Glückler, Herrigel, & Handke, 2020; Meusburger, 2008). Hence, learning and 
knowing are geographically situated and contingent social practices (Bathelt & 
Glückler, 2011).
Similarly to the notion of knowledge, the concept of civil society is also con-
tested (Jensen, 2006) and has received contributions from various disciplines in a 
broad field of study. Researchers of civil society generally address “the diversity 
and richness of institutions, organizations and behaviors located between the ‘mar-
ket’ and the ‘state’” (Anheier, Toepler, & List, 2010, p. V). Civil society encom-
passes the so-called third or nonprofit sector, which, according to the widely used 
functional and operational definition of the “Johns Hopkins Third Sector” project, 
includes organizations that are formal or “institutionalized to some extent,” private 
or ”institutionally separate from government,” nonprofit-distributing, self- 
governing, and voluntary, “involving some meaningful degree of voluntary partici-
pation” (Salamon & Anheier, 1992, pp. 136–137). Beneath this societal landscape 
of organizations, practices, and institutions, the concept of civil society is further 
connected to the public sphere (Calhoun, 2011; Habermas, 1991, 1996), to civic 
modes of behavior, social movements, or, as an “utopian project,” to self-governing 
democratic coexistence (Adloff, 2005, pp. 8–9).
The relation between civil society and knowledge has several dimensions. Civil 
society organizations and civic practices are deeply involved in the creation, inter-
pretation, and dissemination of knowledge.
L. Suarsana et al.
3
First, civil society has a role in the creation of knowledge. Through financial or 
material support and programming priorities, grant-making foundations and asso-
ciations as well as further nonprofit-organizations are strongly involved in the fund-
ing of higher education institutions and research activities (Warren, Hoyler, & Bell, 
2014). Civil society organizations serve as spaces for knowledge production and 
“democratic innovation” (della Porta & Pavan, 2017, p. 198). Further, civil society 
organizations and formally and informally organized individuals themselves are 
active in innovative social practices and in knowledge creation through research 
activity and the development of new conceptual approaches and solutions for soci-
ety, addressing societal challenges in the field of social innovation (Domanski, 
Howaldt, & Kaletka, 2020; Howaldt & Schwarz, 2010; Moulaert, 2016) as well as 
technology. Researchers increasingly recognize civil society organizations as co- 
creators of knowledge in regional innovation processes and as elements of innova-
tion systems (Asheim, Grillitsch, & Trippl, 2017). Scholars in regional governance 
as well as in international development work consider the local embeddedness and 
knowledge of civil society actors to be key success factors for locally adapted 
problem- solving (Christmann, Ibert, Jessen, & Walther, 2019; Latulippe & Klenk, 
2020; Mistry & Berardi, 2016). This has led to post-colonial debate on issues of 
legitimization and power structures as well as to discussions on the relations 
between different forms of knowledge (Antweiler, 1998; Briggs & Sharp, 2004, 
pp. 661–676; see Chap. 10 by Fouksman). In recent decades, new organizational 
forms such as innovation communities of interest (Brinks & Ibert, 2015, p. 363), 
open labs, and makerspaces have emerged as an infrastructure, enabling individuals 
to independently develop technical solutions, innovations, and prototypes, and to 
learn through cooperation (Brinks, 2019; Maravilhas & Martins, 2019). In citizen 
science, individuals are actively engaged in the advancement of empirical research, 
collectively collecting or analyzing data (Strasser, Baudry, Mahr, Sanchez, & 
Tancoigne, 2019).
Second, civil society actors actively affect and intervene in the interpretation of 
knowledge, sense-making, and political and societal agenda-setting, hereby influ-
encing public debate and opinion. Civil society as a “locus of political activity” 
(Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. XVIII) serves “the articulation, aggregation, and repre-
sentation of interests” (Diamond, 1994, p. 8). In the conception of civil society as 
the public sphere, a place of deliberation (Calhoun, 2011; Habermas, 1991, 1996) 
and an “arena in which political ideas are raised, debated, and decided” (Bob, 
2011, p. 216), civil society serves “to inform its members, and potentially influence 
the state and other institutions” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 321). With the globalization of 
communication and digitalization, the public sphere has increasingly shifted from 
the national to a global level (Castells, 2008). Associations and lobbies bundle 
interests as well as they advocate in pre- or non-political contexts and within politi-
cal process (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Fung, 2003; Hendriks, 2012; Warren, 2011), 
thereby framing knowledge and (re)interpreting it (Benford & Snow, 2000, see also 
Chap. 11 by Chan). Hendriks (2006) distinguishes between formalized fora at a 
micro-level, where deliberation occurs through “participants from civil society 
who have relatively unformed and flexible preferences,” on one hand and the public 
1 The Place of Civil Society in the Creation of Knowledge
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sphere at the macro-level on the other, as an informal space of “unconstrained com-
munication [. . .] where public opinion is formed, shaped and contested” (Hendriks, 
2006, p. 502). Dodge (2010) finds dualistic strategies of deliberation and transmit-
ting ideas both in cooperation with government within deliberative fora as well as 
staying critical and autonomously outside of these fora. Further, civil society actors 
can be elements of epistemic communities, with experts on often global geographi-
cal scales sharing a common understanding of knowledge and a “common cogni-
tive framework” (Cohendet, Grandadam, Simon, & Capdevila, 2014, p. 929; Haas, 
1992). From here, actors interpret and transmit knowledge into policy and distrib-
ute it into external local contexts (see Chap. 10 by Fouksman). International non-
governmental actors “directly influence domestic educational policies and as they 
construct a global interpretation of, and set of responses to, worldwide educational 
‘needs’” (Meyer & Benavot, 2013; Mundy & Murphy, 2001, p. 85). Further, phi-
lanthropists and grant-making civil society organizations exert influence on soci-
etal debate with regard to which societal problems they address through their 
funding, and in their decisions on which topics and selected fields of research they 
actively support (Clarke, 2019; Frickel et al., 2010; Tompkins-Stange, 2020, see 
also Chap. 4 by Hess).
Third, civil society organizations are involved in education and the dissemina-
tion of knowledge. Worldwide, NGOs and other nonprofit educational institutions 
offer education and training, providing basic and higher education and adult learn-
ing (Meyer & Boyd, 2001; Priemer, 2015). Cooperation and networks between the 
state, market, and civil society in the field of education policy have gained increas-
ing importance in the field of global education policy, where they have also raised 
critical concerns about an emerging deficit of democratic accountability (Ball, 
2012; Meyer & Boyd, 2001; Meyer & Powell, 2020; Meyer & Rowan, 2006). In this 
way, civil society may play constructive roles as innovator in the field of education, 
but also faces the risk of educational privatization and filling the gaps left by the 
governmental education system, with philanthropy towards educational institutions 
covering an increasingly large share of educational finance and thus sometimes 
gaining asymmetrical influence on educational structures (Archer, 1994; Ball, 2012; 
Meyer & Zhou, 2017). Apart from their role in formal education systems, civil soci-
ety and civic action are expected to provide opportunities to practice, develop, or 
build civic and citizenship skills, convey democratic values and knowledge of polit-
ical processes, and to enable and motivate citizens to further political activities 
(Cohen & Arato, 1992; Dekker, 2009; Eikenberry, 2009; Foley & Edwards, 1998, 
pp.  11–12; Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014; Putnam, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & 
Brady, 1995). However, the scope and impact of civil society associations as schools 
of democracy in a Tocquevillian and neo-Tocquevillian sense, emphasizing the 
“educative, skill-building, and psychological contributions of associations” (Fung, 
2003, p. 517), is subject of discussion (Dekker, 2014, see Chap. 2 by Meyer).
Civil engagement has a geographical dimension as well. The numerous types of 
organizations and activities discussed in this volume range from activities in spe-
cific local and regional contexts to organizations that are integrated in global net-
works and communities. Apart from the spatial scales of actions and their impacts, 
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this volume’s authors also illustrate the richness and context-specificity of particular 
types of civil society, and thus contribute novel insights into civil society’s practices 
and organizations in their relation to knowledge.
 Looking for Civil Society in Unexpected Places
Several authors in this volume have utilized unconventional, innovative, and broader 
perspectives of civil society, addressing its ephemerality, fragility, and intermedial-
ity. In a tradition with a two-century-long pedigree, researchers typically conceive 
civil society as a place of organizations and associations between market and state, 
characterized by clearly discernible structures and high amounts of persistence and 
durability. They also often conceive it as unfolding in the agora of the public sphere, 
that unambiguous social and physical space in which private actors meet to carry 
out their business of shared interest. This was particularly obvious when civil soci-
ety reclaimed widespread intellectual attention in the wake of the events associated 
with the fall of 1989. Thus, it was two large, formal organizations—the Catholic 
Church and Solidarnosc in Poland—that supplied the crucial infrastructure in which 
the cracks of the Soviet Union’s empire first became obvious. Likewise, the call 
“Wir sind ein Volk” [We are one people] was first heard in the former GDR’s 
Protestant churches, the only large social space uncontrolled by a dictatorial gov-
ernment. In both cases, it was large-scale formal organizations that provided arenas 
of civic associations and energy that played a crucial role in the events leading to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and, eventually, the Soviet Empire. In a similar vein, research-
ers often equate the “third sector”—a frequent connate of the civil society—with 
“non-governmental and nonprofit organizations.”
In this volume, we are attempting to expand the optic on the civil society by 
foregrounding those less expected and unexpected spaces and geographies in which 
civil society energies unfold, are blocked, and may re-organize and regroup. In par-
ticular, several contributors in this volume suggest that an understanding of the full 
range of civil society action (and its obstacles) should comprise how civil associa-
tions and mobilization takes place in spaces of ephemerality, such as:
• networks, fields, and epistemic communities;
• types of knowledge and ways of doing (or not doing) science;
• by means of often unseen small-scale, grass-roots philanthropy, collective action 
groups, or rural (but quite “unprovincial”) women’s associations;
• and through social movements that can be harbingers of civility, but can also 
overshoot their goal and turn violent and uncivil.
The easy fragility and easy reversal of civility into incivility, and hence, the great 
fragility of civil society are another theme of this collection of papers. While 
researchers of civil society have previously tended to emphasize its progressive and 
democratic potential, the last two decades have brought in their tow many social and 
political reversals that, we may consider today, have grown into spaces of increased 
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inequality and normative and moral heterogeneity that civil society made possible 
in the first place.
Civil society space, in this perspective, is pre-eminently a social space that may 
manifest with equal probability as institutional space, virtual space, or physical 
space. Given the dramatic changes associated with the digital revolution, this is not 
surprising. Mobilization, organization, and communication—while not limited to 
the virtual world—are severely hampered if they do not also unfold in cyberspace. 
Intermediality—both in the sense of multi-mediality (for example, physical and vir-
tual mobilization) and of in-between-ness (e.g., between market and government, or 
between formal organization and movement) is rapidly becoming a lasting charac-
teristic of civil society. In short, we propose that a useful expansion of our gaze to 
take in the full range of civil society activities is facilitated by paying greater atten-
tion to the ephemeral, fragile, and intermedial nature of civil society processes. 
Rather than viewing these characteristics as defects or negations of civil society, we 
may see them as essential aspects and staging grounds of civil society action. In 
what follows, we flesh out this perspective and offer a brief overview of the chapters 
included in this book.
 The Book’s Structure
The authors of Part I of this volume, (Re-)Thinking Civil Society, reflect on the role 
of civil society in contemporary societies. Scholars have formulated a broad range 
of normative expectations towards civil society’s role in democratization and delib-
eration, with sociologists and political scientists intensively discussing this relation 
both conceptually and empirically (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Diamond, 1994; Katz, 
2006; Walzer, 1995; Warren, 2001). One often finds “the classical liberal, the repre-
sentative democratic, and the participatory” visions of democratic governance are in 
contest (Fung, 2003, p. 517). “Contrasting positions highlight that different political 
theories call on particular kinds of actors within civil society to promote democ-
racy—from individuals, to oppositional groups and social movements, to apolitical 
associations” (Hendriks, 2006, p. 490). This is accompanied by arguments that civil 
society’s democratic functions are “contingent rather than necessary” (Warren, 
2011, p. 378). Undemocratic and uncivil manifestations of civil society are debated 
(Bob, 2011; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Clarke, 2019) as well as possible contra-
dictions between deliberative democracy and civic activism within civil society as a 
“site for deliberative politics” (Levine & Nierras, 2007; Young, 2001, p. 689), all the 
way to the suggestion that civil society is “a mere abstraction without substance” 
(Fine, 1997, pp. 7–28).
Heinz-Dieter Meyer (Chap. 2) contributes to this debate, reflecting on the dialec-
tics of civil and uncivil society. Drawing on Tocqueville, he addresses fragilities and 
vulnerabilities of the civil society and its inherent risks of tipping towards a “gilded” 
or “bourgeois” society, tending towards despotism. Meyer suggests that we distin-
guish more carefully between the structural and the normative face of civil society, 
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noticing that the two do not necessarily vary together (a structurally robust third 
sector of the civil society may coexist with a normatively uncivil society). He con-
cludes with a reflection on the possibility that civil society does not generate the 
kinds of normative constraints and forces needed to maintain it, and points to rele-
vant parallel concerns in the thought of Tocqueville and contemporary theorists like 
Böckenförde.
Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Chap. 3) discusses the role of civil society as a change 
agent in contemporary societies, marked by a crisis of capitalism, democracy, and 
the nation state, as well as growing inequalities. He outlines potentials and limita-
tions of civil society with regards to its possible role in societal development in a 
globalized world and examines ways by which the interplay between civil society, 
the state, and the market may be improved. He supports a value-based approach to 
civil society and emphasizes the necessity of normative principles when looking at 
civil society organization, as well as the relevance of trustworthiness of civil society 
organizations as a prerequisite for their functioning as agents for social change.
David J. Hess (Chap. 4) reflects on the relation between knowledge, technology, 
and civil society. He explores industrial transition movements in the field of energy 
as a contemporary form of civil society, and discusses subdivisions in this type of 
social movement. Hess explores the absence of knowledge as “undone science” in 
emerging technologies, with regard to research on privacy and health risks for the 
case of smart cities and smart meters. Regarding civil society’s connections with 
politics of knowledge, he outlines how civil society actors may identify areas of 
undone science, mobilize resources that allow for research in the identified fields, 
and enable democratic political processes.
The chapters in the second part of this volume, Analyzing Civil Society 
Organizations, contribute to the knowledge of specific forms of contemporary civil 
society organizations and offer different approaches to their analysis. Laura Suarsana 
(Chap. 5) focuses on the LandFrauen organization, a national association of local 
clubs and associations in Germany. She analyzes the local diversity of civic prac-
tices and examines their role in social innovation. Empirically, she illustrates that 
the LandFrauen make social, cultural and educational offers to address local wom-
en’s needs in locally specific ways and that they often stimulate social change in the 
rural areas of Germany. She discusses how the LandFrauen activities are organiza-
tionally enabled within vertical and horizontal associational structures and how they 
are able to adapt to local needs and to initiate social change by interconnecting with 
the local contexts in which they operate. The deep integration of a large and diverse 
base of members in rural society empowers the LandFrauen to enact functions as 
local initiators, catalysts, and multipliers in regional development.
Angela M. Eikenberry (Chap. 6) presents empirically based insights on giving 
circles as an individualized and informal form of collaborative philanthropic giving 
and on their influence on their members’ civic and political participation. She dis-
cusses the role of this emergent form of voluntary associations as schools or pools 
of democracy, as promoters of civic and political participation, and she discusses 
how voluntary associations enable their members to develop their skills.
1 The Place of Civil Society in the Creation of Knowledge
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Johannes Glückler and Jakob Hoffmann (Chap. 7) explore the workings of time 
banks as a new organizational form of exchanging voluntary services within local 
communities. Whereas researchers of time banks have often focused on their nor-
mative aspects and design principles to strengthen democracy or to facilitate co- 
creation and reciprocity, the authors observe a lack of knowledge about the 
processes, mechanisms, and dynamics through which the civic practices as well as 
the organizational form of time banks actually evolve and operate. Previous 
researchers have observed an empirical puzzle: Why are time banks so often volatile 
and short-lived organizations? Based on a detailed case study of a time bank in 
Southern Germany over a period of 11 years, Glückler and Hoffmann illustrate how 
using dynamic social network analysis helps convey an understanding of the dynam-
ics of organizational life through the lens of the structure and trajectory of individ-
ual practices in a time bank.
In Part III of this book, Spaces, Networks and Fields, the contributors adopt per-
spectives on civil society with which they challenge common sector-based concep-
tualizations of civil society or the third sector (Salamon & Anheier, 1992) as lying 
between market and state. This perspective has been challenged through empirical 
observations and conceptualizations that integrate overlaps and hybridization 
(Anheier & Krlev, 2014; Evers, 2020; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Lichterman & 
Eliasoph, 2014), as well as theoretically through approaches such as neo- 
institutionalism and network perspectives, contributing to a broader understanding 
of civil society and extended the research field (Adloff, 2016; Brown & Ferris, 
2007; Burt, 1983; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Diani & Pilati, 2011; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Evers, 1995; Faulk, Lecy, & McGinnis, 2012; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 
1991; Guo & Acar, 2005; Johnson, Honnold, & Stevens, 2010; Krashinsky, 1997; 
Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; Marshall & Staeheli, 2015, see also Chap. 8 by 
Diani, Ernstson, and Jasny).
Mario Diani, Henrik Ernstson, and Lorien Jasny (Chap. 8) propose an approach 
with which they integrate conceptualizations of civil society as a discursive and 
associational space, combining perspectives on both communicative practices and 
actors. They provide evidence of civil society as networks of issues and associations 
for the case of food-related issues in the three urban settings of Cape Town, Bristol, 
and Glasgow. Firstly, they analyze the structure of networks of issues within three 
civil society organizations in this field, to gain information on their agenda struc-
tures and on how they shape public discourse. Secondly, through empirical explora-
tion of inter-organizational civic networks, they focus on the question if and to what 
extent the prioritization of food-related issues shapes the structure of alliances 
within civil society networks, and if this increases the probability of collaboration 
among two organizations.
Johannes Glückler and Laura Suarsana (Chap. 9) draw on the neo-institutional 
notion of organizational fields and propose the concept of the philanthropic field to 
conceptualize the geography of giving and the interrelations of benevolent activities 
across the domains of private, public, and civic sectors. Empirically, they adopt a 
multimethod approach including a media analysis of reported acts of giving in the 
German region of Heilbronn-Franconia and provide evidence on the geography of 
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giving in this region. Based on their analysis, they suggest that the philanthropic 
field is constituted by diverse actors from all sectors of society who engage in spe-
cialization, division of labor, and collaboration. Moreover, practices of giving 
spread across geographical scales, though the majority of activity concentrates on 
the local and regional level.
E. Fouksman (Chap. 10) addresses the formation of epistemic communities and 
the production of knowledge through discursive geographies and identities with two 
multi-sited case studies in development-focused civil society organizations in Kenya 
and Kyrgyzstan. She offers insights into how NGOs adapt and use the categories of 
local and expert knowledge to defend and promote ideas in order to gain both global 
authenticity and local authority. She demonstrates how these categories provide 
positions of power for the individuals which are mobile within development net-
works and within the organizations, and how knowledge and their positions are used 
to legitimize local project activities as well as to set agenda in global development 
discourse.
The authors of Part IV of this book, Doing Civil Society, provide insights into the 
practices and challenges of contemporary civil society, utilizing theoretical reflec-
tions, scientific analyses, and in-depth ethnographic fieldwork on civil society 
practices.
Kin-man Chan (Chap. 11) draws on his participant knowledge of the pro- 
democracy Umbrella movement in Hong Kong to discuss how social movements 
produce and disseminate alternative knowledge as counter-knowledge to dominant 
discourses. He analyzes the mobilization period from March 2013 to September 
2014 and illustrates how the movement set and changed the public agenda. It mobi-
lized public attention to the issue of constitutional reform through creative actions 
as well as its ability to provide “repertoires of knowledge practices” (della Porta & 
Pavan, 2017, p. 300) that allowed for “a common orientation for making claims and 
acting collectively to produce change” (see Chap. 11 by Chan, p. 237).
Jen Sandler (Chap. 12) offers an approach to broaden the conceptualization of 
civil society. She argues that civil society is organized and analyzed around silos 
along lines of organization type, topical focus, and scale, as well as along disci-
plines. She proposes an integrated perspective of civil society as a set of practices, 
and hereby focuses on “epistemic activism” projects as cross-field and silo-cutting 
efforts to produce knowledge and truth and “making it matter.” She draws on pri-
mary ethnographic fieldwork into civic project meetings of two types of organiza-
tions—a civic reform coalition and a social anti-displacement movement—to map 
epistemic and relational practices and trace the epistemic dimension of civic action.
In his reflection on the #FeesMustFall movement, Adam Habib (Chap. 13) con-
tributes to the understanding of social movements and the lessons to be learnt 
regarding the effectiveness of protest and social mobilization for social justice. As 
the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in 
South Africa during the protests, he illustrates the process of violence increasingly 
becoming an accepted means within the movement, and interrogates the framing 
and outcomes of the struggle as well as the associated decision-making processes. 
He raises the importance of ethical conduct by leaders and activists, concluding that 
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social movements must internalize and adapt ethical goals and social justice for 
sustainable success in social change.
Finally, Heinz-Dieter Meyer (Chap. 14) addresses the question: can there be a 
civil society without an education that reliably instils norms of civility in the young? 
What would that education look like? In his chapter on “Civility, Education, and the 
Embodied Mind—Three Approaches” he argues for a rethinking of education that 
moves beyond rationalistic conceptions of “head over heart” to one in which head 
and heart, sentimental and cognitive capacities are in better balance.
 Conclusion
This volume reflects the diversity of civil society-knowledge relations—which we 
have discussed as knowledge creation, interpretation, and dissemination—and the 
broad variety of knowledge-related civil society practices and organizations within 
their specific spatial and socio-economic contexts. The authors adopt different 
angels to reflect on the reframing, analyzing, and doing of civil society, with some 
offering new conceptualizations and research perspectives.
Beyond that, this book’s contributors reveal the reflexivity of this relation: Civil 
society plays essential roles in the creation of new knowledge, in the invention of 
innovative social practices, as well as in education and knowledge dissemination. 
Enactors of civic practices and civil society organizations generate and reinterpret 
existing knowledge and introduce it into societal debate or larger epistemic net-
works. At the same time, civil society is highly dependent on knowledge and infor-
mation in order to perform its functions. Access to knowledge and information, civil 
society’s capability to gain access, acquire, and create knowledge, as well as to 
process and reinterpret it, are essential for civil society and civic action and to pur-
sue their objectives.
Present developments that affect contemporary civil society open a perspective 
on new and perhaps unprecedented ambiguities, ranging from rising concerns about 
incivility, the emergence of new autocratic regimes, increased hurdles for democ-
racy movements (such as in Hong Kong) and shrinking spaces for civil society 
(Alscher, Priller, Ratka, & Strachwitz, 2017; Anheier, Lang, & Toepler, 2019) to 
new opportunities through digitalization and new media and the emergence of civil 
society in unexpected spaces of fields, networks, and communities. There is, also, 
the still imponderable influence of the coronavirus on everyday life, organizational 
practice, and civic action: Will our coping with this unprecedented challenge stimu-
late or chasten and freeze civil society? With regard to what will follow next, we 
would be glad should this volume contribute to new perspectives and future research 
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Chapter 2
The Dialectic of Civil and Uncivil Society—
Fragility, Fault Lines, and Countervailing 
Forces
Heinz-Dieter Meyer
 Fragility: The Civil and Uncivil Society
Since its inception at the pen of Locke, Montesquieu, Ferguson, Tocqueville, and 
J. S. Mill, and notably since its revival during the Eastern European anti-totalitarian 
uprising of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of the civil society has raised 
hopes, excited social reforms, energized social movements, and inspired writers and 
activists for whom the term conjures up free association, self-organization, and non- 
coercive governance. It has been an idea that empowered the overthrow of dictators, 
the resistance to totalitarian rule, and the protection of minorities. Yet, time and 
again, and especially in the past several decades, the civil society has also been an 
arena which has dashed hopes, and disappointed expectations, a sphere where old 
dictators were overthrown, but new ones were readily installed; where xenophobic 
rallies replaced the celebration of crumbling walls of repression; where indicators 
showing that social inequality was being ameliorated turned sharply to signal the 
reemergence of the gilded society; and where arenas that had witnessed the emer-
gence of independent institutions of educational excellence began to bear witness to 
the reemergence of oligarchic structures of exclusivity and privilege.
In this paper, I submit that the dialectics reflected in the above zig-zag of the civil 
society invites us to rethink the civil society in two ways:
• first it requires that we come to terms with the civil society as an inherently frag-
ile institution;
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• secondly, it demands that we engage more squarely and deliberately the moral 
countervailing forces capable of arresting the slide into incivility.
I address the first task in the first part of the essay, where I plead for an appraisal 
of the civil society that acknowledges its potentials as well as its pitfalls, ambiva-
lences and tipping points. We need to better understand the features that can make 
the two superficially homologous and the tipping points at which one morphs into 
the other. For example, both, civil society and gilded society are open for the public 
role of philanthropy and independent associations. They both harness, in their fash-
ion, the energy of people’s particularistic attachments. They both encourage bot-
tom- up self-government through foundations, endowments and charitable giving. 
Both allow for private citizens to shape public life beyond the casting of ballots on 
election day, and for decentralized private-public partnerships to assume important 
roles in public life. Both exalt the benign effects of private initiative and self- 
organization, the important role of self-regulating markets, and their potential to 
assume some of the governance functions of bureaucratic states.
But against a backdrop of steep socio-economic inequalities and with nation 
states rocked by the challenges of globalization and mass migrations, these similari-
ties and affinities may also obscure distinctions where differences of degree morph 
into differences of kind: where, for example, moderate inequality that often acts as a 
spur to diligence, entrepreneurialism and a scaffolding for upward mobility tips into 
extreme inequality that dashes, discourages and demoralizes hopes of collective 
advancement and breeds distrust and resentment; where the freedom to form asso-
ciations and create foundations may empower the many under one condition, but 
also disempower them when a few of these associations become astronomically 
well-financed and influential. As the civil society gives way to the gilded or bour-
geois society it may not only pass tipping points where markets turn from agents of 
empowering choice to arenas of corrosive inequality. It may also facilitate the mor-
phing of cultural pluralism in a religiously neutral public sphere into normative 
indifference in a morally anesthetized public square. Or it may see the change of 
philanthropic giving from cultivating generosity and benevolence to a tool that 
allows a handful of mega-rich foundations to pursue their policy utopias as they 
bypass democratic accountability (see, e.g., Collins & Flannery, 2020). As individu-
als loose sight of the moral foundations of democratic civility, there may be no 
amount of self-organized associations or philanthropically funded projects to save 
the civil society.
We can appreciate these ambivalences more thoroughly if we explore the possi-
bility that these changes are not mere aberrations from the default of the civil soci-
ety, to be repaired by smarter social policy. Rather, we might see the civil society as 
an inherently fragile, vulnerable and corruptible institution that easily morphs into 
its opposite. Such a dialectical view is aware of democratic civility’s association- 
strengthening effects as well as its community eroding and dissociative potential, its 
power to energize and as well as to corrode civility. This view may ultimately be 




But this dialectical view gives rise to a crucial question that is at the center of Part 
II of this paper: What, if any, are the countervailing forces that exist or can be mobi-
lized to keep the civil society from wildly oscillating between strong bottom-up 
associative impulses and equally strong top-down oligarchic impulses? The view 
that sees both faces of the civil society—its association-strengthening and its asso-
ciation undermining, its bowling together and bowling alone (Putnam, 1995), its 
community-building and its “lonely-in-the-crowd” (Riesman, 1969) potential—
finds precedent in established social theory. I draw here mainly on Tocqueville who 
had a keen sense of these ambivalences, and who believed in the need for counter-
vailing moral and spiritual forces capable of checking the corruption of the civil 
society.
Ultimately, this is an essay to restore faith in the civil society by better under-
standing its vulnerabilities and fragility and by placing the question about counter-
vailing forces more squarely on our intellectual and political agenda.
The essay thus cuts against several rival conceptions:
• The civil society is in reality “nothing but” a bourgeois society, a cosmetic and 
ultimately ineffective dressing of the wounds systemically cut by capitalism. 
This, the Marxist position, has gained a lot of face-validity in the past 20 years 
and David Harvey is one of its most effective contemporary proponents: “NGOs 
have grown and proliferated under neo-liberalism, giving rise to the illusion that 
opposition mobilized outside of the state apparatus and within some separate 
entity called ‘civil society’ is the powerhouse of oppositional politics and social 
transformation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 21; see also Hunt, 1987). This is the view of 
the civil society as a thin veil of bourgeois society. Although I believe that the 
civil society can indeed morph into its uncivil, bourgeois antipode, I believe the 
reductionist view of it as “nothing but” a veil on capitalism to be ultimately mis-
guided. I also believe that pinning the blame for the most recent failures of the 
civil society on the new oligarchy (Krugman, 2011; Picketty, 2014; Rosen, 2014) 
is correct, but not sufficient. For while it seems that the civil society is being 
upstaged by the untamed market as the righteous heir of self-organized social 
activity—Piketty: “the risk of a drift towards oligarchy is real and gives little 
reason for optimism about where the United States is headed” (2014, p. 28)—we 
ought not ignore that for the civil society to trade places with the gilded society, 
the idea of virtue-civility and moral restraint more broadly first had to be aban-
doned en masse.
• The second view that this essay challenges is that the civil society can do no 
wrong. This, the romantic conception of the civil society, assumes that the more 
self-organized associations, the more and the wealthier the philanthropy, and the 
less state intervention, the better. This, too, is a one-sided view of things that 
ignores the many ways in which incivility, illiberality, and despotism can grow in 
the cracks between self-organized associations and in the gaps between classes 
of formally equal but politically or economically unequal citizens. It also ignores 
the by now patently obvious fact that a strong associational life per se is no guar-
antee for civility. I’ll return to this below.
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• Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly: if it is true that the civil society is inher-
ently fragile, we need to reengage the crucial problem of what kinds of counter-
vailing forces can be mobilized to keep the project on track? As Alan Kahan 
(2015) recently reminded us, Tocqueville believed that countervailing forces 
capable of doing that are necessarily moral and spiritual. Although he was a 
master-analyst of the providential institutional design features that the nascent 
American democracy inherited, and although these design features were impor-
tant and necessary to keep the project of liberal democracy on track, they were 
not sufficient.1 Institutional design alone cannot save the civil society. But how 
can moral and spiritual forces be effective given our experience with the civic 
divisiveness of religion and our decision to coral it into the sphere of private 
choice carried out behind high walls of separation? I’ll suggest that any practi-
cable answer today must include a more effective navigation of the three-fold 
fault lines of the civil society.
 The Inherent Fragility of the Civil Society
 The Liberal Account
At the heart of the civil society tradition is the idea of an intermediate social space 
lodged between citizens and government, and state and market. For John Locke, one 
of the earliest exponents of the idea, society is both morally and politically prior to 
the state. For his “Two Treatises on Government” (1689/1988) to effectively reject 
the Hobbesian Leviathan Locke needed effective instruments of self-government in 
addition to and beyond the control of the central government. A half century later 
(1748), Montesquieu emphasized the role of the corps intermédiaires to maintain 
liberty in the face of centralized power (Montesquieu, 1989, pp. 17–18). He did so 
in response to the rise of centralized monarchical governments of proportions 
unthinkable for the city-states of antiquity. Montesquieu, like Locke, was concerned 
that a society squashed between central government on the one hand and an unorga-
nized mass of atomized individuals on the other would inevitably fall victim to the 
rulers’ untrammeled despotism. Intermediate social bodies could check this danger. 
The author of the “Spirit of the Laws” derived his remedy for government 
despotism from the experience of pre-monarchical France, where the power of the 
king's house had once been limited and counterbalanced by the power of rivaling 
1 Peter Breiner, in an instructive recent essay (2019), considers how both Rousseau and Tocqueville 
seek to identify the kinds of virtuous cycles that can be engendered by good institutional design to 
prevent the corruption of democratic government. He demonstrates the affinity in their thought and 
Tocqueville’s largely unacknowledged debt to Rousseau. But to this reader he leaves open the 
question whether the virtuous cycles thus engendered can carry the full weight of keeping liberal 
democracy on track. I’ll suggest below that neither of the two authors believed that virtuous cycles 
could succeed without important moral supports.
H.-D. Meyer
23
aristocratic families and municipalities. One of his most famous followers, Alexis 
de Tocqueville, was later to reconceive this idea based on the new realities of life in 
modern democracies.
The distrust that Montesquieu expressed vis-a-vis the illiberal tendencies of cen-
tralized government was shared by many other European writers. One of the earliest 
was Wilhelm von Humboldt. His essay on “Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des 
Staates” [“On the Limits of the Effectiveness of the State”]2 still stands as one of the 
earliest manifestos of civil society thinking. In the essay, von Humboldt limits legit-
imate state action to a very few necessary domains such as national defense and 
internal security. Education, in particular, was off limits. Two decades before he 
became Prussia's chief architect of education, von Humboldt rejected the idea of 
“national education,” which he believed to lie “wholly beyond the limits within 
which the State's activity should properly be confined” (von Humboldt, 1851/1969, 
p. 54; see also Meyer, 2016, Chapter 4).
In the hands of these writers, the civil society idea is shot through with an abiding 
distrust in the unfailing benevolence of central government, a rejection of the feasi-
bility of the philosopher-king or the Leviathan model, and an understanding that 
“even under the best forms, those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow 
operations, perverted it into tyranny . . ." (Jefferson, 1779/1984, p. 365). Rather than 
placing their trust in the reason and benevolence of an exalted few at the helm of the 
machinery of government, the civil society thinkers place their trust in the ability of 
an associated citizenry to govern themselves.
 Alexis de Tocqueville
Alexis de Tocqueville is the writer who has, more than any other author, developed 
and elaborated that idea for the new condition of democratic equality. In “Democracy 
in America”, Tocqueville famously observes that “nothing . . . more deserves atten-
tion than the intellectual and moral associations in America” (1835 & 1840/1969, 
p. 517). Voluntary associations were key institutions for democratic vitality (Villa, 
2006). “In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you 
would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United 
States you are sure to find an association” (1835 & 1840/1969, p. 513). According 
to Tocqueville, civil society represents a tradeoff between the benefits of top-down 
administrative organization and the benefits of vigorous bottom-up participation:
In America the force behind the state is much less well regulated, less enlightened, and less 
wise, but it is a hundred times more powerful than in Europe. . . . I know of no other people 
who have founded so many schools or such efficient ones, or churches more in touch with 
the religious needs of the inhabitants, or municipal roads better maintained. So it is no good 
looking in the United States for uniformity and permanence of outlook, minute care of 
2 von Humboldt’s clunky but exacting title “Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit 
des Staates zu bestimmen” [“Ideas to an Essay to Determine the Limits of the Effectiveness of the 
State“] has typically been shortened to “On the Limits of State Action” in English translations.
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details, or perfection of administrative procedures; what one does find is a picture of power, 
somewhat wild perhaps, but robust, and a life liable to mishaps but full of striving and ani-
mation. (1835 & 1840/1969, pp. 92–93)
The American civil society experience and especially the ubiquity of voluntary 
associations inspired Tocqueville to adapt Montesquieu's idea of intermediate orga-
nizations to the conditions of modern democracy. In Tocqueville's view, liberty was 
threatened not only by centralized monarchies, but also by rule of the majority in 
democratic societies, which conceivably could produce a similarly unmediated jux-
taposition of centralized power and unorganized masses. The mere fact that demo-
cratic government was elected by the majority did little to alleviate this problem. 
Tocqueville's lasting discovery was that, under democratic conditions, the role of 
intermediate bodies could be played by civic associations that could be at once 
independent of government and provide great numbers of people with an opportu-
nity to learn and practice the art of self-government.
One of the happiest consequences of the absence of government (when a people is happy 
enough to be able to do without it, a rare event) is the ripening of individual strength which 
never fails to follow from it. Each man learns to think and to act for himself without count-
ing on the support of any outside power which, however watchful it be, can never answer 
all the needs of man in society . . . . (Tocqueville, 1831–1832/1971, p. XI)
But Tocqueville famously warns:
But one must say it again, there are but few peoples who can manage like that without a 
government. Such a state of affairs can only exist at the two extremes of civilization. The 
savage with nought but his physical needs to satisfy, he too relies on himself. For the civi-
lized man to be able to do the same, he must have reached that state of society in which 
knowledge allows a man to see clearly what is useful for him and his passions do not pre-
vent him from carrying it out (emphasis added). The most important concern for a good 
government should be to get people used little by little to managing without it. (Tocqueville, 
1831–1832/1971, p. XI)
 The post-1989 revival
Although highly influential in the United States, in continental Europe the civil 
society has long been eclipsed by a different narrative, that of the welfare state. For 
many decades the public seemed more deeply preoccupied with socio-economic 
equality to be ameliorated by the welfare state than by self-government facilitated 
by self-organized initiative and associations. This trend, if it was one, seems to have 
been broken by the fall of the Soviet empire and the events of 1989.
In the wake of these events, the idea of the civil society (or any of its synonyms, 
such as civic associationism or third sector), generated much intellectual and politi-
cal excitement (see, e.g., Anheier, Lang, & Toepler, 2019; Berger & Neuhaus, 1996; 
Dahrendorf, 1990; Diamond, 1994; Dionne, 1998; Ehrenberg, 1999; Glendon, 
1991; Keane, 1998; Putnam, 1995; Shils, 1991; Walzer, 1995). It promised to be 
useful not only in resisting the Soviet Union’s totalitarianism but also in reframing 
and reconceptualizing some vexing problems of social reform which often pitted 
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pro-government against pro-market advocates, sometimes superimposing another 
long-standing controversy between communitarians and libertarians (Walzer, 1995).
That the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of communist collectivism in 
1989 should have re-energized the civil society, is, in retrospect, not surprising. For 
Eastern European dissidents, who had lived their lives under a regime that routinely 
and zealously squashed all social action independent of the state, the collapse of 
communism left the public square for the first time free for individual citizens to 
associate voluntarily. A further spur of excitement came from a newfound skepti-
cism with the bureaucratic bloat of the welfare state and excitement over market- 
based alternatives. At about the time that the Soviet Empire began its terminal 
decline, the Western capitalist economies were swept up in a trend toward deregula-
tion and privatization prompted by a reaction against “big government” and a wide-
spread reexamination of the proper responsibilities of government spurred by hopes 
in a “new public management” that would borrow management ideas from the pri-
vate sector and adapt them for public sector use (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).
A further impetus for the resurgence of the idea of civil society was the opening 
to an ethnic and cultural pluralism that characterized societies changed by global-
ization and immigration. The notion of civic pluralism was revived by writers like 
Isaiah Berlin (2013), Nathan Glazer (1997), Charles Taylor (1992, 1996) and 
Michael Walzer (1983; 1995). They argued that the earlier idea of a dominant cul-
ture or ethnicity organized around a core of shared values and surrounded by a few 
dissenting voices on the fringe (duly tolerated by the majority), was and should be 
giving way to the idea of a thick pluralism that sees divergent creeds, beliefs, and 
worldviews as matters of first importance in a group’s self-understanding. Isaiah 
Berlin saw the new pluralism as a long overdue correction of a rationalist view of 
humans as creatures of reason and reason only, a view in which shared feelings and 
beliefs—the stuff of culture—are relegated to a marginal corner in the life of com-
munities. In the new pluralism, the cultural commitments of groups and communi-
ties are viewed not as obstacles to be overcome, or as residual remains of an obsolete 
past, but as durable attachments from which different groups weave their tapestry of 
collective understanding.
By the mid-1990s, and as a result of these confluences of deep political, ideologi-
cal, and cultural shifts, the civil society had been re-established as a vital energizing 
force of liberal democracy (Dionne, 1998; Taylor, 1996; Walzer, 1995).
 Democratic Despotism
Near the end of “Democracy in America”, Tocqueville (1835 & 1840/1969, p. 690) 
asks a critical question that has received a far fainter echo from interpreters and 
advocates of democracy and civil society than his positive and optimistic espousal 
of the civil society’s liberal potential in the earlier parts: “What Sort of Despotism 
Democratic Nations Have to Fear”.
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In this section, Tocqueville returns to an idea that had already occupied him in 
his thinking about the tyranny of the majority: that the equality of conditions may 
also contain the seeds of despotism. For Tocqueville, the condition of democratic 
equality, while it may spur civic cooperation and the development of the skill of 
self-government, also engenders a love for egalitarian conditions and for material 
comfort and convenience. As a result, people withdraw from the public sphere and 
into the small circle of family and friends in the spirit of “individualism” which he 
famously defines as “a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to 
isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family 
and friends” (1835 & 1840/1969, p. 506).
As their self-governing energies weaken, an expanded central government and/
or a few oligarchs that untamed markets have thrown up the Nasdaq, move in to pick 
up the slack. This opens the door for democratic despotism, a new political condi-
tion, a kind of tyranny different from the one ubiquitous in the ancient world. The 
burdens of ancient tyranny “fell most heavily on some,” but “never spread over a 
great number.” Democratic despotism, by contrast, is “more widespread” but 
“milder.” It “degrades” rather than “torments.”
The slide into despotism can be surprisingly smooth. “[A]n innumerable multi-
tude of men, circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures” (pp. 691–692) 
facing each other in a society whose power is “absolute, thoughtful of detail, orderly, 
provident, and gentle” (p. 692). The individual becomes a self-centered person who 
exists only “in and for himself, and though he still may have a family, one can at 
least say he has not got a fatherland” (p. 692).
Democratic despotism is administered by officials who rule more like “school-
masters” than “tyrants.” They preside over a regime which “gladly works for the 
happiness of its people” so that subjects enjoy themselves, if only because they 
think “of nothing but enjoyment.” Under such a condition the “vices of those who 
govern” may combine with the “weaknesses of the governed” to bring the American 
experiment to “ruin.” While free choice is still possible, “it daily makes the exercise 
of free choice less useful and rarer, restricts the activity of free will within a nar-
rower compass, and little by little robs each citizen of the proper use of his own 
faculties.” The result is a description of a new kind of servitude that even Kafka 
would have found it hard to improve upon:
Having thus taken each citizen in turn in its powerful grasp and shaped men to its will, 
government then extends its embrace to include the whole of society. It covers the whole of 
social life with a network of petty, complicated rules that are both minute and uniform, 
through which even men of the greatest originality and the most vigorous temperament 
cannot force their heads above the crowd. It does not break men’s will, but softens, bends, 
and guides it; it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits, action; it does not destroy anything, but 
prevents much being born; it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, enervates, sti-
fles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is no more than a flock of timid and 
hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd. (p. 692)
The state thus turns into an institution that could not more fully deserve the “iron 
cage of servitude” moniker that Max Weber was later to pin on it.
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Tocqueville’s fear regarding the soft despotism face of democracy echoes a similar ambiva-
lence expressed by other writers who saw capitalism capable of engendering both, greater 
degrees of civility and greater self-centered individualism and, as in Marx, despotism. A 
case in point is A. O. Hirschman’s (1992) analysis of this two-faced nature of capitalist- 
commercial society, that showed up as early as in Montesquieu’s doux commerce thesis, as 
well as in Marx’ bourgeois society’s self-destruction thesis. (Hunt, 1987)3
 Individualism and untamed markets
Tocqueville thus sees democratic equality harboring two opposing tendencies or 
potentialities: the tendency for democratic self-government and the tendency for a 
new form of despotism. One reason for this seeming paradox is that the decentral-
ization that is associated with strong civil society can also provide a protective 
shield for rising inequality. As individuals withdraw from the public sphere, the 
pursuit of private wealth becomes all consuming.
In democratic countries, no matter how rich a man is, he is almost always dissatisfied with 
his fortune, because he finds that he is less wealthy than his father was and he is afraid that 
his son will be less wealthy than he. So most wealthy men in democracies are dreaming of 
ways to increase their riches, and naturally their eyes turn to trade and industry, for these 
seem the quickest and best means of getting rich. In this respect, they share the poor man’s 
instincts without his necessities, or rather they are driven by the most imperious of all 
necessities, that of not sinking. (Tocqueville, 1835 & 1840/1969, p. 552)
As the few winners and the many losers of the economic game engage in dissonance 
reduction, resentment grows on both sides of the divide. The more numerous middle 
and lower classes resent the upper classes for the inordinate, out-of-proportion gap 
that separates them from one another. And the super-rich resent and fear those on 
the other side of their gated communities for engaging in “class warfare.” As 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) impressively demonstrated, the result is an epidemic 
of distrust that leaves both groups worse off as corrosive effects wreak havoc on the 
mental and physical health of all.
Inequality is thus a key switchman determining whether the aggregate effects of 
associative self-organization are positive or negative. Under conditions where a 
country’s socio-economic and moral center rests in a flourishing middle class, char-
acterized by high degrees of social mobility, and easy interaction across dividing 
3 Tocqueville’s contemporary Marx, for all the divergences in their diagnosis of capitalism and 
democracy, saw some forms of despotism in ways Tocqueville might have recognized. Here is 
Marx describing the 1851 dictatorial coup of Louis Bonaparte in language which a contemporary 
of the year 2020 reads with wondrous recognition:
“Driven by the conflicting demands of the situation to keep the public’s eye as on a sleight-of-
hand conjurer through constant surprises on himself as Napoleon’s substitute, hence to carry out 
daily coup d’etats en minitiature, [Louis] Napoleon throws the whole civil economy into chaos, 
violates everything that seemed inviolable to the revolution of 1848, renders some tolerant of revo-
lution and others lusting for it, creates anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time strip-
ping the entire machinery of the state off its halo, profaning it and making it at once loathsome and 
ridiculous” (Marx, 1852/1960, p. 207; own translation).
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lines of status and wealth, the associative effect may trump the withdrawal effect. 
Under conditions of high socio-economic inequality, the withdrawal effect trumps 
the associative effect. The rich become fearful; the poor hopeless.
The withdrawal from public life that Tocqueville observed earlier is further has-
tened by the rise of an “industrial aristocracy”—one of the few places where 
Tocqueville’s commentary veers into the sphere of economics. He observes that 
ordinary people’s withdrawal from the public sphere is not only a result of the grow-
ing illusion of mutual independence as their material prosperity grows. It is also the 
result of a growing class of people degraded by the conditions of work in the facto-
ries of the owners of gigantic enterprises who lack the resources and energy for 
engaging in public life. While democracy makes “men grow more alike,” the newly 
emerging industry spurs the development of separate classes: “inequality increases 
in the less numerous class in the same ratio in which it decreases in the community.” 
Therefore:
[T]he friends of democracy should keep their eyes anxiously fixed in this direction; for if 
ever a permanent inequality of conditions and aristocracy again penetrates into the world, it 
may be predicted that this is the gate by which they will enter. (Tocqueville, 1835 & 
1840/1969, p. 558)
Paradoxically, as Smith (2010) points out, government attempts to combat inequal-
ity or injustice can add a further source of corrosion in that it leads to increased 
political centralization. In the United States, for example, the fight against slavery 
and for civil rights engendered a vast expansion of the machinery of central govern-
ment and paved the way for similar expansions in other spheres, notably education.
 Inequality and tyranny
At this point it is helpful to recall that Tocqueville’s view of the importance of rela-
tive equality and a civic virtue minded middle class has deep roots in the moral and 
political thought of the Greek founders. Aristotle, in particularly, firmly believes 
that self-government flourishes best with a strong middle class. To him it was evi-
dent that gross inequality obstructs self-government:
. . . in the case of the goods of fortune . . . a middling possession is the best of all. [A person 
of moderate wealth] is readiest to obey reason, while for one who is [very wealthy or very 
poor] it is difficult to follow reason. The former sort tend to become arrogant and base on a 
grand scale, the latter malicious and base in petty ways; and acts of injustice are committed 
either through arrogance or through malice. (Aristotle, 1941, p. 1222, Politics 1295b4)
A political community that has extremes of wealth and poverty “is a city not of free 
persons but of slaves and masters, the ones consumed by envy, the others by con-
tempt. Nothing is further removed from affection and from a political partnership” 
(Aristotle, Politics 1295b22).
Aristotle’s teachers had weighed in on this point as well. In “The Republic” 
(Book VIII) Plato describes how, the love of lucre creates a class system in which 
both the wealthy and the poor lose interest in virtue. The rich “care only for making 
money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue”. “One, seeing 
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another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become 
lovers of money” (Plato, 1968, p. 317).
And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less 
they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the bal-
ance, the one always rises as the other falls. […] And in proportion as riches and rich men 
are honoured in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured. […] And what is hon-
oured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected. (Plato, 1968, p. 317)
The ruling laws and ruling individuals are bound to fall victim to the love of money:
. . . men become lovers of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and 
make a ruler of him, and dishonor the poor man. (Plato, 1968, p. 318)
Clearly, both Tocquevillian (e.g., Smith, 2010) and contemporary criticism of 
oligarchy and untamed market policies (i.e., Krugman, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Rosen, 
2014; Stiglitz 2015; see also Meyer & Zhou, 2017 for oligarchic tendencies in US 
higher education), are standing on the tall shoulders of the Greek founders.
 Summary: Associative and Dissociative Effects 
in the Civil Society
Under conditions of democracy as described by Tocqueville, civil society is an 
arena of two opposing effects, an associative and a dissociative effect. The former 
strengthens participation and engagement. The latter triggers civic disengagement 
and withdrawal from the public sphere. The former energizes and invigorates the 
public sphere; the latter creates apathy and indifference. We can expect the dissocia-
tive effect to be particularly strong when great economic growth in untamed mar-
kets causes inequality to rise and all are pre-occupied with safeguarding their 
economic status in a winner-take-all competition. Under those conditions, the moral 
bonds and moral obligations are weakening; the confidence, will, and skill for self- 
government wanes, and the readiness to abandon public affairs and self-government 
to a strong central authority grows (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Strengthening and corrosive effects in the civil society effects
Strengthening versus Corrosive Effects in the Civil Society
Strengthening (Associative) Effects Corrosive (Dissociative) Effects
➔ ripening of individual strengths ➔ flourishing 
of decentralized networks of associations which 
do real work of governance ➔ ordinary citizens 
develop the ‘skill to be free’ and realize the 
potential benefits of self-organized 
cooperation➔ stronger self-interest properly 
understood ➔ invigorating civil society ➔ 
effective checks on central government
➔ increasing affluence and well-being ➔ 
nourishing the illusion of individual 
independence ➔ withdrawal from public life 
➔ “lonely crowd” / “bowling alone”➔ 
inviting greater role for central government 
➔ greater self-interest improperly understood 
➔ weakening willingness to participate in 
checks on central government
Note. Source: Design by author
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In sum, the civil society is not self-sustaining. The skill of associative self- 
government and public sphere participation does not, in and of itself, generate the 
full set of skills needed for democratic civility. Moreover, as we’ll see presently, 
even where associational life is strengthened, it may not be the kind that sustains a 
civil society.
 The structural and normative dimension of the civil society
Based on the above discussion, it is useful to distinguish two dimensions or “faces” 
of the civil society: the structural and the normative. In the structural dimension we 
would register the strength of a given society’s associational life, the degree to 
which the sector between state and markets is replete with bottom-up energy of 
associations, foundations, charities, partnerships, and “third sector” organizations, 
facilitative of independent participation of individuals and groups in the public 
sphere. This dimension of the civil society may empirically be weakly or strongly 
developed. As we saw above, the liberal account takes its strong development to be 
a hallmark of the civil society.
In the normative dimension we would register the strength of a given society’s 
civil and moral life, the degree to which groups and individuals conduct themselves 
peacefully, with a measure of self-restraint, a measure of empathetic caring for and 
about the other, and an abhorrence of and rejection of violence. In this dimension, 
we again may observe weak and strong states of public life.
It suffices to make this distinction to observe that these two dimensions of the 
civil society need not vary together (see Table 2.2, below). Put differently: a strong 
associational life is not the only worry of those interested in a vigorous civil society. 
We can have strong associational life, along with rather weak normative restraints 
on how and for what ends those associations operate. The failings here may be of 
two kinds: on the one hand there may be a significant portion of associations espous-
ing (or silently tolerating) violence and hatred. This is the case importantly dis-
cussed by Chambers and Kopstein (2001). On the other there may be a significant 
number of organizations which, thanks to an extraordinary degree of wealth and 
resources, are able to command an inordinately strong voice in the public square to 
a point where they overshadow and discourage public involvement and debate.
We may also encounter the reverse condition: a society with limited or weakly 
developed associational life, in which a few large private or semi-public organiza-
tions play a key role in a society’s moral and spiritual life (cell 3, Table 2.2). Such 
Table 2.2 The structural and 
normative dimension of the 
civil society
Structural Dimension
Normative Dimension Weak Strong
Weak Anomie Oligarchy
Strong Corporatism Civil Society
Note. Source: Design by author
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moral corporatism may effectively shape civic life through an array of charitable, 
educational, and social welfare-oriented organizations and activities. Germany, with 
its long tradition of harnessing Christian charity for public ends, may be a case in 
point. In fact, Germany has, in many ways, cultivated a tradition that harnesses and 
encourages cooperation between governmental or quasi-governmental and reli-
giously rooted organizations in sectors from health-care, education, to social wel-
fare and disability services (see Glenn, 2002; Meyer, Minkenberg, & Ostner, 2000).
While these kinds of organizations may well leave an imprint of charity and vir-
tue on public life, they are doing so in a way that does not require widespread asso-
ciational participation. In fact, these organizations, although technically independent 
of government, are often perceived as part and parcel of a large state-controlled 
bureaucratic welfare structure.
Finally, the case where neither associational life nor civic morality are strong, 
might be best described by Durkheim’s condition of “anomie,” a state where order 
is either non-existent or merely the result of a state’s coercive power.
The purpose of distinguishing the two faces of the civil society is to emphasize 
that civic and moral vitality does not automatically follow from a strong associa-
tional life; it can, especially under conditions of stark socio-economic inequality, 
even be defeated by it. As Chambers and Kopstein (2001) point out, we may well be 
joining and bowling together, but our thoughts and discussions might be dominated 
by prejudice, hatred, and resentment.
 The Need for Countervailing Moral Forces
When seen in the context of its inherent fragility in general and the inevitable ups 
and downs of a market economy in particular, the civil society looks more like a 
roller coast with its peaks of civic renewal and valleys of incivility, than like the 
pre- ordained progression towards self-government and civility as which it has often 
been portrayed (including by this author4). This more sober view of civil society 
does not mean we give up on it and its potential to buttress democratic political 
forms with civic energy of self-government. But it would seem that we need to work 
harder in seeking to understand which, if any, countervailing forces can help stay 
the corrosive tendencies that seem to grow so easily in the heart of the civil society.
4 See, for example, my “The Return of the Civil Society” (in Meyer & Boyd, 2001) which expounds 
a one-sidedly optimistic view of the civil society.
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 The Tocqueville-Kahan Thesis
Alan S.  Kahan’s (2015) recent masterful and compelling reconstruction of 
Tocqueville’s ideas on this point goes a long way to do that. From Kahan’s analysis 
we can infer that Tocqueville—although he was a master-analyst of institutional 
design (Elster, 2009; Meyer, 2003)—was convinced that institutional design alone 
would not save liberal democracy. Rather, he (Tocqueville) insisted on the vital role 
of a moral and spiritual foundation for democracy and the civil society. Kahan 
shows that Tocqueville’s reference to the fundamental role of moral and spiritual 
forces in general and Christianity in particular cannot be dismissed as an idiosyn-
cratic (and architecturally inessential) attempt to reconcile his private beliefs as a 
practicing (albeit often reluctant) Catholic with his hopes for a liberal democracy. 
Rather, for Tocqueville a liberal democracy without moral and spiritual checks and 
balances was an impossibility. Liberal democracy needs not only political, but also 
moral and spiritual checks and balances. This part of Tocqueville’s meditation on 
democracy has, indeed, been the least acknowledged (but see Fradkin, 2000). This 
may be because, as Kahan suggests, it clashes with the rationalist and secular dispo-
sition of much of Western academia. Another reason may be that in our collective 
experience with religion’s civic role the potential for organized religion to unite and 
uplift seems not securely dissociated from its potential to divide and separate.
Kahan’s careful reconstruction makes it clear that Tocqueville the practicing 
Catholic never forces the hand of Tocqueville the social scientist. His analysis is 
nuanced enough to demonstrate the vital role of a moral and spiritual tradition that 
is capable of checking what Tocqueville sees as the inevitable moral entropic ten-
dencies of democratic equality. According to Tocqueville it is essential that there are 
forces to help people realize the limitations and ultimate unsatisfactoriness of the 
pursuit of happiness understood as a pursuit of wealth and pleasure and the need to 
tap into sources of inner peace and well-being that are independent of the fluctuat-
ing fortunes of the market place or the iron-caged certainties of the rational state. 
One might say, that while Tocqueville’s personal horizon was limited in this regard 
to Christianity (him having only limited, selective and rather distorted awareness of 
non-Christian religious traditions like Islam and Hinduism), his intellectual penetra-
tion of the problems of civil society leaves us with an open invitation to probe any 
kind of spiritual tradition or practice that can arrest the relentless but ultimately 
hollow pull of commerce and upward mobility as main source of meaning and suc-
cess in democratic society.
Tocqueville arrives thus at what Kahan calls his “spiritual checks and balances 
thesis” because of an assumption about basic human dispositions that most modern 
social scientists are loath to make. Tocqueville believes that for humans, freedom is 
unattainable lest we transcend the strictures of materialism and the shallow pursuits 
of sense pleasure that many of his contemporaries deemed a sufficient basis for 




– humans will not be relieved of the great causes of human suffering—uncertainty 
and doubt, illness and death—by means of knowledge or material well- 
being alone;
– for that reason humans are propelled to act from a need for both material and non- 
material satisfactions (Kahan, 2015, pp. 50–51).
With the first principle Tocqueville cuts against Descartes’ rationalism and casts 
his lot with Pascal who knows that there is an element of belief and wisdom that 
transcends rational knowledge. With the second principle Tocqueville cuts against 
the utilitarian idea that satisfying material desires alone can lead to lasting satisfac-
tion and happiness.
These two basic assessments of human nature—the impossibility to arrive at 
inner peace by means of rational knowledge alone and the impossibility to limit our 
aspirations to the satisfaction of material desires—imply that people under condi-
tions of democratic equality face two possible fates: the first, resulting from aban-
doning democracy “to its wild instincts” is a degrading path leading to tyranny and 
servitude where men come to “know society only by its vices and miseries” 
(Tocqueville, quoted in Kahan, 2015, p. 13).5
The second is a path where our attachment to material well-being is kept in check 
by the need for non-material growth. Spirituality and religion are universal cultural 
forces uniquely helpful in this regard:
Man’s instincts constantly push his soul toward the contemplation of another world, and it 
is religion that leads him there. So religion is only a particular form of hope, and it is as 
natural to the human heart as hope itself. [. . .] [T]o believe that democratic societies are 
naturally hostile to religion is to commit a great mistake. (Tocqueville, quoted in Kahan, 
2015, p. 69)
In contrast to some of his contemporaries, who believed in the possibility of build-
ing a stable civil society on nothing more than the orientation toward the satisfaction 
of material desires, Tocqueville sees an insuppressible spiritual need in humans and 
wants to harness it for the project of liberal democracy.
Kahan summarizes Tocqueville’s assessment thus: “Religion instills loftiness 
and spiritualism in the democratic soul, rescuing it from the materialism, pettiness, 
and individualism that threaten to monopolize it. Religion is the spiritual antidote to 
democracy’s flaws.” As to the type of religion, Kahan describes Tocqueville’s ecu-
menical stance thus: “Almost any religion (provided it is sufficiently democratic to 
maintain its hold on democratic people) will do” (Kahan, 2015, p 72).
There is thus little hope for a stable civil society unless non-violence in our exter-
nal affairs is coupled with and buttressed by non-violence internally—in the hearts 
and minds of people.
5 Since Kahan relies on the new Nolla/Schleifer translation/edition of Tocqueville’s Democracy 
(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Editor: Eduardo Nolla; translator: James 
T. Schleifer. Indianapolis: Liberty, 2012) and since this translation sometimes differs noticeably 
from the G. Lawrence translation I use, I provide the Nolla / Schleifer page quotations in this 
section.
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 Böckenförde and Habermas
Ironically, Tocqueville’s understanding of the need for countervailing moral and 
spiritual forces is witnessing a recent comeback, if from a somewhat unlikely (and, 
as far as I can tell, unconnected) source. In 1967, the German federal judge Ernst 
Wolfgang Böckenförde published a lecture containing what since has become 
known as the Böckenförde “dictum:”
“The liberal, secularized state is nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself 
guarantee.” [Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er 
selbst nicht garantieren kann.] (Böckenförde, 2006, p. 112).
Böckenförde describes this as “the great risk into which the [secular] state has 
entered for the sake of liberty. As a liberal state, it can be sustained only if the free-
dom that the state grants the citizens regulates itself from the inside, from the moral 
substance of the individual and the homogeneity of society”6 (ibd).
Böckenförde’s main question is our ability to reconcile the political imperative 
of a secular, religiously non-aligned “state” (the German “Staat” is often encom-
passing of both “government” and “society” and hence only imperfectly translated 
by either “government” or “state”) with the sociological truism of society’s social 
integration through shared moral bonds that keep particularistic tendencies from 
over-boarding. Without such moral bonds, he suggests, government and society are 
likely to disintegrate into what Durkheim would have called social anomy. Yet, the 
secular state, while depending on these bonds and utilizing them, is unable to guar-
antee and reproduce them, in part because of its obligation to secularism and reli-
gious neutrality. Thus, Böckenförde offers a diagnosis of the secular state in modern 
society as operating under (and contributing to) a condition of moral entropy. The 
center is unlikely to hold and reinforcements seem nowhere in sight. Or are they?
Here Böckenförde (like Tocqueville a Catholic) offers a thesis with strong affin-
ity to Tocqueville. Aware that religious (and that means to him initially Judeo- 
Christian) forces cannot and should not expect official state support, he holds that 
they nonetheless deserve space in the modern civil society because of their positive 
civic role and their contribution to civil cohesion. But, again, like Tocqueville, 
Böckenförde argues that there is no need to limit the compass of those forces to 
Judeo-Christian ones, given, for example, the potential of Islam to similarly serve in 
such a role. Even further: there is no need to limit the compass to religious forces, 
in general. As he suggested in a 2009 interview: moral bonds can be generated 
through social practices other than distinctly religious ones, including through 
social movements like those for ecological or social justice (Böckenförde, 2009).7
6 „Das ist das große Wagnis, das er, um der Freiheit willen, eingegangen ist. Als freiheitlicher Staat 
kann er einerseits nur bestehen, wenn sich die Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von innen 
her, aus der moralischen Substanz des Einzelnen und der Homogenität der Gesellschaft, reguliert.“
7 Böckenförde, Ernst W., „Freiheit ist ansteckend“. TAZ (Tageszeitung), 23.9.2009
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In addition, government policy, while it cannot guarantee moral bonds, can facil-
itate their cultivation where they spring up spontaneously in society, in a variety of 
other ways. Instruments of such policy include:
• education;
• an open stance towards all religion and religious movements (as long as they are 
willing to operate within constitutional legal bounds);
• community-oriented social movements like ecological and labor unions;
• social policy that supports and facilitates bottom-up movements and institutions 
that contribute to the common welfare.
In general, while the state cannot be pro-religious, it need not be anti-religious. 
In this way, Böckenförde seems to hope that from this diverse interaction of sponta-
neous forces protected and encouraged by proper policy, a kind of shared under-
standing (he calls it “homogeneity”—a more fraught term) that emerges to bond the 
diverse members of a community and encourages their maintaining their “inner 
moral substance.” Referencing Ralf Dahrendorf, he calls this a “sense of belonging” 
that can be generated by means of a sense of shared language, history, and traditions 
up to and including those bonds generated by having a national soccer league.
But are these forces strong enough to reliably counteract the morally corrosive 
forces of individualism and narrow self-interest improperly understood? There is 
reason to doubt that. Not only would a truly pluralistic conception of society allow 
for multiple languages and traditions. The problem here is that in a secular and plu-
ralistic society the only truly binding shared conceptions are largely or exclusively 
procedural: recognizing the other’s right to practice and conduct themselves accord-
ing to beliefs and rules that are foreign to me. This is clearly necessary. But the 
problem here is that such a principle, while supporting the individual’s consent to 
leave the other alone, does not, in itself, provide a positive desire to cooperate and 
bond with the other, let alone to help and learn from her. Tolerance, if it is merely 
born from a reciprocally self-interested will to be left alone, is not compassion. It 
does not involve the heart.8 Hence, it is not clear whence the “state-supporting” 
(staatstragendes) ethos may reliably come. We are back to the start: the liberal state 
needs a degree of voluntary moral bonding that it cannot generate.9
8 There is a peculiar “Continental” (as opposed to Anglo-American) way in which Böckenförde, 
unlike Tocqueville poses the problem. Rather than beginning with individuals in society, he begins 
with “the state”. The problem then becomes how the state can contribute to creating moral citizens. 
By contrast, in Tocqueville we begin with the social individual and the notion that humans cannot 
long ignore the fact of their mortality. This individual, aware of their “sickness onto death” and the 
impossibility of rising above that fatal condition through rational knowledge is inherently inclined 
to seek moral and spiritual counsel and to develop forms of moral and spiritual cultivation before 
the state ever gets to worry about society’s cohesion. In Böckenförde, by contrast, the problem is 
from the first framed as a problem of social order: “the state” needs to recruit moral citizens.
9 „Der Staat ist darauf angewiesen, dass die Bürger gewisse Grundeinstellungen, ein staatstragen-
des Ethos haben, sonst hat er es schwer, eine am Gemeinwohl orientierte Politik zu verwirklichen. 
Wenn alle seine Ziele nur mit Zwang durchgesetzt werden müssten, wäre der Staat bald kein frei-
heitlicher Staat mehr“ (Böckenförde, 2009).
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 Conservative and Liberal Readings of the “Dictum”
The sense of the limited power of procedural norms of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and liberty has given rise, in some quarters, to a call—sometimes in reference 
to Böckenförde—for a “guiding culture” (in Germany, a Leitkultur) that, it is argued, 
should recognize and give a privileged role to those particular moral forces that have 
historically carried much of the burden of moral integration in a given place and 
geography. For Europe in general and Germany in particular, this would be repre-
sented by the religions of Judeo-Christian heritage. Representatives of this view 
have, thus, argued (to give one example) for the constitutionality of displaying the 
Christian cross in public schoolrooms. Some have, on similar grounds, called for a 
ban to the Hijab, the female head covering that is part of Islamic belief and culture 
considered to be foreign to the guiding culture (see Gordon, 2013).
But such a narrow, traditionalist reading of the idea of countervailing forces is 
not required by Tocqueville nor Böckenförde. Jürgen Habermas, for example, 
rejects the idea of a Leitkultur in terms that indicate his embracing of the 
Böckenförde dictum:
[T]he democratic state should not overhastily reduce the polyphonic complexity of the 
range of public voices, for it cannot be sure whether in doing so it would not cut society off 
from scarce resources for generating meanings and shaping identities. Especially regarding 
vulnerable domains of social life, religious traditions have the power to provide convincing 
articulations of moral sensitivities and solidaristic intuitions. (Habermas, 2009, in Gordon, 
2013, p. 192)
Böckenförde’s dictum is explicitly invoked by Habermas in his historical exchange 
with then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (the later Pope Benedict XVI) at the outset of 
his statement on the “pre-political moral foundations of the liberal state” in January 
2004.10 Habermas agrees that the liberal state requires a political integration of citi-
zens that goes beyond a mere modus vivendi (Habermas & Ratzinger, 2018, p. 34). 
Habermas argues that it’s not necessary to decide whether the secular state is, in 
principle, incapable to generate the solidaristic value-based bonding that is required 
for its peaceful operation. It is, he suggests, in any case evident that our historical- 
empirical condition, where expansionist markets and large, rational-administrative 
states are marginalizing value-based action, pre-political moral forces, including 
religious ones, can and should be allowed to play a cohesion-strengthening role: 
“markets and administrative powers are increasingly crowding out societal solidar-
ity—understood as coordination of action by way of values, norms and communica-
tive action—of ever more domains of the lifeworld” (Habermas, in Habermas & 
Ratzinger, 2018, p. 32).
10 Following an invitation by the Catholic Academy of Bavaria (Germany), the “philosopher and 
the pope” famously engaged in a discussion on the “pre-political moral foundations of the liberal 
state” in January 2004. In their respective statements, both writers agree that “reason” and “reli-




Under such conditions, religiously motivated solidaristic action can play an 
important corrective and constructive role. Given this potentially constructive role 
of religion (and the simple fact that a significant number of citizens interpret their 
role in the community in religious terms) the secular citizen can legitimately be 
expected to practice (einüben) a self-reflexive awareness regarding the limits of 
enlightenment (Habermas & Ratzinger, 2018, p. 35).11 Secularists can concede to 
religious conviction a status that is not simply irrational. (p. 35). Similarly, secular 
citizens cannot deny their religiously oriented co-citizen the right to couch their 
contributions to public debate in religious language (Habermas & Ratzinger, 2018, 
p. 36).12
The above discussion easily articulates with Tocqueville’s notion of moral and 
spiritual countervailing forces. The ultimate conclusion is that government cannot 
be more moral than the citizens in their un-coerced voluntary inclinations. Here, we 
seem to return to the starting point: does a civil society that fosters materialistic suc-
cess and the illusion of independence not inevitably corrode citizens’ moral intu-
itions? Does it not inevitably lead from self-interest properly understood to 
self-interest improperly understood? From solidarity and compassion to egotism 
and indifference? In other words: if all that bonds us is a reciprocal will to be left 
alone in our myriad private ways, then nothing of much force would seem to bond 
us; community would seem fragile, and civility mere politesse.
Alasdair MacIntyre has expanded the scope of reflection on this condition:
[U]nless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the 
good of a whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it will both be 
the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the moral life and that we shall be 
unable to specify the context of certain virtues adequately. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 203)
Reaching past the tradition of organized religion that figures so prominently in 
Tocquevillian and post-Tocquevillian thought on countervailing forces, MacIntyre 
suggests that we tap Aristotelian ethics as a source of countervailing moral develop-
ment. His “After Virtue” (1981) has become the springboard for a renewal of inter-
est in the virtue ethics around the central thesis “that the Aristotelian moral tradition 
is the best example we possess of a tradition whose adherents are rationally entitled 
to a high measure of confidence in its epistemological and moral resources” 
11 As Gordon (2013) notes, Habermas’ embracing of Böckenförde’s dictum, implies a noticeable 
distancing from Habermas’ earlier view that posited that “an ambivalent modern age will stabilize 
itself exclusively on the basis of the secular forces of a communicative reason.” (Habermas, in 
Habermas & Ratzinger, 2018, p. 38).
12 Ratzinger, in his parallel statement, suggests that there are pathologies of organized religion that 
benefit from the checks and balances of secular reason (for example the experience of religiously 
motivated terror). Likewise, there are also pathologies of reason (the hubris that deems everything 
doable worth doing, including the building of nuclear bombs or the artificial cloning of human 
beings) that benefit from the checks and balances of religiously founded belief. Reason and reli-
gion are co-relationally called upon to engage in a “process of mutual cleansing and healing” 
(“Korrelationalität von Vernunft und Glaube, Vernunft und Religion, die zu gegenseitiger 
Reinigung und Heilung berufen sind)” (Habermas & Ratzinger, 2018, p. 57).
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(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 277). He also reminds us that virtues are not merely about 
external conduct:
“Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular 
ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclination; it is to 
act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 149).
The above discussions of the moral and religious supports of democratic civility, 
point not only to the societal and external but also to the social-psychological and 
internal roots of the fragility of the civil society. We can learn from them that our 
thinking about the civil society is often hampered by an externalist focus, a perspec-
tive that sees civility only as a problem of external order and neglects the necessary 
inner dimension of civility. This line of thought suggests a richer sense of civility 
that comprises external and internal dimensions. In fact, I believe that the question 
of civility as an embodied virtue holds the key to some of the most pressing prob-
lems of the civility—incivility dialectic we face today. To heed the lessons this 
holds requires that we move past a conception of civility as mere outer non-violence 
and reflect seriously on how peace becomes embodied and obtains a foothold in the 
human heart. 13
 Arresting the Slide to Incivility: Recovering the Politics 
of the Mean
To conclude, I’ll submit that the civil society is an institutional artifice erected over 
three fault-lines. The first two of these have long been recognized and discussed in 
the work of classic social theorists. These are
• the socio-economic fault-line demarcated by untamed markets on one end and 
various forms of coercive collectivism on the other;
• the political fault-line of an iron cage bureaucracy on one end, and of oligarchic 
despotism on the other.
• The less well reflected moral fault line of untrammeled individualism on end and 
of moral and religious fundamentalism on the other.14
For politics to steer a course through this landscape of rocks and hard places remains 
perhaps the key governance challenge our time, rivaled only by the ecological sus-
tainability challenge. Both of these would seem to have all the ease of keeping a 
tractor trailer on a tightrope. But difficult or not: civil society politics would seem to 
be best understood as the politics of moderation, a mean between extremes, cultivat-
ing the center around tamed markets by means of social democracy, civil-minded 
13 For one interpretation of an emerging confluence of relevant ideas and their compatibility with 
early Greek thought see Chap. 14 by Meyer.
14 An important exception is Jonathan Haidt’s extraordinary “The Righteous Mind: Why Good 
People are Divided” by Politics and Religion. New York: Vintage, 2012.
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self-organization, and facilitative of moral toleration, inclusion, and flourishing. 
Above all, they must be the politics of non-violence.
But here it is worth pointing to a new development, something that might assist 
in a renewed effort to cultivate the mean between extremes:
One result of the rapid cultural globalization going on before our eyes has large 
numbers of people in the West now encountering traditions of moral cultivation that, 
while not original to Western culture, are compatible with longstanding Western 
predilections for rational-secular forms of moral thinking, a reality not available to 
writers of Tocqueville’s time. This, the West’s intellectual and social opening to 
non-theistic moral practices and traditions, notably those of Confucianism and 
Buddhism, may offer what Kahan called “alternative forms of spirituality” and 
moral cultivation. “Twenty-first century democracies may find alternative forms of 
spirituality useful as well—as Tocqueville did—and they may well take forms unfa-
miliar to Tocqueville” (Kahan, 2015, p.  211). This may prove significant. For 
whereas Western democracies have a good deal of experience with centrist politics 
of moderation regarding the socio-economic and political fault lines (especially in 
the form of European social democracy and American limited government), the 
cultivation of moral and spiritual community that is safe from tipping into religious 
fundamentalism is much less developed.
 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −  
I began this essay by considering the civil society’s inherent fragility—a fragility 
that can result from some of its very successes, some of which foster material well- 
being, but also encourage individualistic withdrawal, breed the illusion of indepen-
dence and hold moral and spiritual cultivation to be the optional pursuits of private 
citizens. These changes may not only give rise to dramatic gaps in wealth and 
income among classes. They also readily start a slide down the slippery slope of 
callous indifference to one’s fellow citizen and, ultimately, open the space in which 
distrust, suspicion, incivility and the longing for benign despots grows. To check 
these tendencies, the remedies that have traditionally been proposed are necessary 
but not sufficient. Rather, there seems reason to take seriously the idea of the culti-
vation of moral and spiritual forces as a necessary, but independent countervailing 
factor that take us out of the narrow orbit of our mundane concern for material well- 
being and keep alive the care for our better angels.
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Chapter 3
Civil Society as an Agent of Change
Rupert Graf Strachwitz
A random choice of indicators may provide ample evidence that the 21st century is 
marked by exceptional and substantial societal change:
• the revolution in communication,
• the supposed takeover by secret and artificial powers beyond our control,
• the shift of political and economic power away from Europe and North America,
• the surging worldwide interdependence of the human race,
• population growth,
• the fact that our planet might become uninhabitable,
• the resurrection of the individual, not least in a gender context, and
• the reintroduction of religion into public discourse.
These indicators are not necessarily coherent with each other; on the contrary, 
they appear to represent a mounting uncertainty regarding all our traditions of liv-
ing, learning, and governing. To add to this, the 2020 COVID-19 crisis will most 
certainly lead to a fundamental reassessment of the very fabric of society. Our social 
order is crumbling. Yet, those creating models and plans for innovation tend to focus 
on technical issues, hoping that the fabric will remain the same. However, a realistic 
assessment of the world will necessarily produce the result that social change with-
out a change of fabric cannot be sustainable. We should be addressing three issues 
that determine the public sphere:
 (1) the crisis of capitalism,
 (2) the crisis of democracy,
 (3) the crisis of the nation state.
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And if this were not enough, a growing divide between privileged and under-
privileged members of society at large and of nearly every national and regional 
community leaves these communities with insurmountable problems of social 
unrest and indeed of survival. The legitimacy of any form of governance is at stake 
(Aziz, 2020, p. 60), and preserving this legitimacy and reinstating trust is certainly 
not made easier by the COVID-19 crisis and the way some governments have been 
handling it.
Most recently, the majority of the British and American people and increasingly 
substantial minorities in France, Germany, Italy, and many other European coun-
tries have demonstrated that all this is not really true. They lament the disappearence 
of the way of life of a bygone age, wish to hang on to customs of old, and fail to 
realize that preserving essentials will require a number of fundamental changes. 
Most people would be at a loss to say what merits saving and what must undergo a 
change so substantial that one cannot even imagine the outcome. What is certain is 
that political leaders are failing to face the real issues, resorting instead to mistrust 
and control mechanisms—although they should be aware that no society can be 
based on mistrust, and that more controls precede going under. The demise of East 
Germany in 1989/90 is a case in point.
Although Western theorists in the 1990s were quick to proclaim “the end of his-
tory” (Fukuyama, 1992), representative democracy and statehood of the type devel-
oped over the past 300 years seem to have had their day. The combined overbearing 
power of state bureaucracies and multinational corporations needs to be replaced by 
some kind of post-democracy, as some would argue, or by a more participative, 
citizen-orientated system. The dignity and uniqueness of the individual is endan-
gered by menacing collectivities; encouraging and nudging these individuals to 
think in categories of we rather than of I, to put some brakes on excessive competi-
tiveness, might provide a sensible way forward. The snag is that a market economy 
that relies on competition has proven to be more successful in supplying the citizens 
with goods and services than a government-organized non-competitive economy. 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that governments are regularly underperforming,
today many scholars still hold that political boundaries are the most fundamental man-made 
lines on the map due to a bias toward territory as the basis of power, the state as the unit of 
political organization, an assumption that only governments can order life within those 
states, and a belief that national identity is the primary source of people’s loyalty. (Khanna, 
2011, p. 46)
Even in the inner circle of governmental responsibilities, supra-, trans-, and 
international governance structures have taken over as decisive players in a global 
governance system, as have regional and local communities, international corpora-
tions that are seemingly more and more successful in evading government supervi-
sion—and communities of choice, which are attracting more loyalty and are 
seemingly crowding out communities of fate in determining people’s more-often- 
than-not multiple identities.
Thus, village squares, debating networks of the metropoles, parliaments, and 
assemblies seem old-fashioned in an age where communication works by very 
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different rules. Raghuram Rajan, who argues in favour of “a devolvement in power 
from federal government through the regional government to the community” 
(Rajan, 2019, p. 325), is wrong in supposing that shifting executive powers from 
one level of government to another could solve the problem of how to remodel the 
public sphere. It seems highly doubtful whether any of this can prevent the funda-
mentals of society, democracy, human and civil rights, the rule of law, and cultural 
traditions being destroyed. The “Twilight of Democracy” (Applebaum, 2020) seems 
all too apparent.
All this could be seen as a gloomy picture. While we seem to know so much, we 
apparently do not know how to effect social change. Our governors firmly believe 
technical innovation will solve our problems and refuse to recognize the need for 
societal change. Think tanks abound—which in itself is a clear indicator that some-
thing must be wrong—and yet, although some of them aspire to tell us what to do, 
none seem to come up with the solution. And what is more: As Charles de Gaulle 
famously quiopped, politics have become too serious a business to allow us to leave 
them to politicians—let alone to government officials!
While many ideas have been put forward over the past two generations, nothing 
substantial has been achieved in providing a practical solution to this fundamental 
dilemma. Habermas’ model of discursive democracy that connects democratic 
political processes to a normative concept of institutionalising the interplay between 
diverse societal arenas, has been widely received in academic circles, but seems to 
have had little impact on societal development, the crisis of democracy in recent 
years, and the slow erosion of traditional political processes (Habermas, 1994, 
pp. 361–363).
In reviewing this set-up, I will look at societal forces that for the last few centu-
ries have been crowded out by domineering nation states, and that are now reassert-
ing their right to be actively involved in shaping society. In particular, I will focus 
on the role of civil society, and discuss to what extent civil society players may be 
instrumental or at least helpful in developing a new world order. In so doing, I will 
need to sum up the knowledge base regarding the potentials and limitations inherent 
to civil society, and examine the ways by which interplay between civil society, the 
state, and the market may be improved.
 The Domain of Civil Society
Over the past generation or so, the existence of civil society as an arena of collective 
action in the public sphere that will cooperate or compete with players in the state 
and market arenas has become blatantly apparent (Dahrendorf, 1995). The civic 
space, on occasion but not always used as a synonym of the space for civil society, 
has seemingly grown considerably since Arato and Cohen argued that “the concept 
of civil society is more than a mere slogan” (Arato & Cohen, 1988, p. 40). Clearly, 
the notion of a civic space touches on the human and civil rights of individual citi-
zens as much as it does on those of associative bodies and philanthropic institutions. 
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But the unclear definition also shows how much nearer the citizen is to civil society 
than to the modern state, notwithstanding the fact that political theory defines liberal 
democracies as ruled by the people. It is therefore reasonable to assume that civil 
society is in many ways the civic space, provided spontaneous civic action and indi-
vidual public-mindedness are counted.
Civil society has existed in one form or another at least since the time of “The 
Great Transformation” (Polanyi, 1944), the “Axial Age,” elaborated by the German 
philosopher Karl Jaspers in 1949 (Jaspers, 1953) to mean a period between the 
eighth and the second century B.C., when a worldwide, nearly simultaneous trans-
formation of thought and subsequently of society took place. However, over the past 
two generations or so, a novel concept of civil society has emerged that differs from 
previous concepts, including the one put forward by Adam Ferguson (1767/1995). 
It may be seen today as an arena of collective movements and organisations, which 
are in many ways hugely diverse, but do bear some common traits that allow us to 
distinguish them from organisations and institutions that form part of the state or the 
private business sector. If, contrary to Margaret Thatcher’s famous quip (Keay, 
1987), society is something that exists and is not synonymous with the state or the 
nation, relevant collective action takes place in all three of these arenas, the term 
“arena” being preferable to “pillar” as it denominates areas of movement, action, 
and change.
Civil society may be described as the place where citizens engage by their own 
free will, participate directly in affairs to do with the common good, and voice their 
concerns, ideas, criticism, and agreement. For the purposes of the Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Lester Salamon and his colleagues defined a 
number of principles by which one may decide whether an activity, a movement, an 
organization, or an institution should be considered part of this particular arena 
(Salamon, Anheier, List, Toepler, & Sokolowski, 1999, pp. 26–28)1:
• Access should be voluntary.
• The organisation should not be engaged in core government business.
• Profit should not be a prime objective.
• The governance structure should be autonomous.
• Any profits accruing may not be distributed to members or owners.
Though civil society organisations (CSOs) command a considerable full-time 
and part-time workforce, the arena as such is based and relies heavily on volun-
teerism, and thus on philanthropy in its widest sense. Philanthropy in the true sense 
of the word is not just what donors of funds are practising, let alone what founda-
tions do; philanthropy is the spirit in which gifts of empathy, time, ideas, know-how, 
reputation, and financial resources are put at the disposal either of individuals in 
need, or of organisations deemed able to use these gifts to perform their self-allotted 
tasks. In philosophy, the first mention of philanthropy is most probably found in 
1 Salamon and Anheier offered a definition to be used more or less internationally throughout the 
Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector project. This has since been expanded and under-
gone certain variations, but may still serve as an acceptable working base.
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Plato, who, in his dialogue “Euthyphron” (1924), lets Socrates call himself a philan-
thropist because he lets others partake of his wisdom free of charge. In 1960, the 
French political economist Francois Perroux (1960) described giving as the attri-
bute of what we call civil society, whereas force is associated with the state, and 
exchanges are associated with the market.
The division between civil society, the state, and the market is necessarily con-
ceptual (Anheier & Seibel, 1993), and overlaps and unclear edges exist in reality. In 
1999, Salamon et al. concluded there was a
vital need to improve the general awareness of . . . [the nonprofit sector] in virtually every 
part of the world, and to monitor the trends affecting it on a more pervasive, and more sus-
tained, basis. The existence of a vibrant nonprofit sector is increasingly being viewed not as 
a luxury, but as a necessity, for peoples throughout the world. Such institutions can give 
expression to citizen concerns, hold governments accountable, promote community, 
address unmet needs, and generally improve the quality of life. Putting this sector firmly on 
the mental map of the world is therefore a matter of some urgency. (1999, p. 38)
While many people believe civil society can achieve what the public and the 
private sector cannot, that they are destined to be agents of change, this proposition 
will be refuted by others—particularly those in government and business. They will 
receive academic backing from traditional economists who firmly believe in the 
power of the market, and will rely on the state’s superior power and vastly superior 
financial resources to demonstrate its ongoing position in the driver’s seat. However, 
Amitai Etzioni, one of the forefathers of civil society research, was certainly right 
in saying: “Actually, this third sector may well be the most important alternative for 
the next few decades, not by replacing the other two, but by matching and balancing 
their important roles” (Etzioni, 1973, p. 318).
Both academia and public opinion, and not least the agents of civil society in the 
field, have continued to engage in a discussion over definition. This is decidedly 
unfortunate, as it renders it more difficult to make a conclusive case for civil society 
as an arena and most particularly for the involvement of this arena in discussions 
over societal development and change. Even the pioneering work undertaken by 
Salamon and his many associaties since the 1990s in mapping the empirical evi-
dence in a comparative fashion worldwide, while highlighting the sheer size of civil 
society, has not achieved one of its purposes—that is, presenting a standardized and 
universally accepted notion of what civil society is, and who is part of it.
Since the American economist Richard Cornuelle first spoke of an independent 
sector beyond the state and the market in 1965, the discussion about the overall 
function of this sector or arena has never stopped. Cornuelle (1965) argued that 
associations of volunteers could effectively solve social problems without recourse 
to heavy-handed bureaucracy, whereas governments would commonly prefer to see 
these associations and foundations support their own work in a subservient fashion 
and neither question government decisions nor adopt any degree of independence. 
Little wonder that service-providing and intermediary organisations are popular 
with governments, while the self-help, self-fulfilment, and community-building 
roles are habitually overlooked and advocacy, watchdog, and political discourse 
roles are viewed with suspicion. Responding to pressure from the citizens, advocacy 
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has found its way into tax exemption, and the watchdog role has gained acceptance 
for watching over excess market behavior. But Colin Crouch’s (2011) insistence 
that given the parliaments’ failure in fulfilling that role, civil society’s main task is 
to act as watchdog in public affairs, has not to date made government theorists and 
practitioners rethink the interplay between the various contributors to the develop-
ment and execution of policy. On the contrary, the public sector, and, somewhat 
strangely, the media, tend to belittle the role of civil society and use arguments to do 
with the rank of representative democracy to enhance their own role, at the same 
time accepting the private sector—business—as a driving and quite regularly deci-
sive force in determining policy.
In the eyes of those caught up in the present system of government, the most 
obnoxious role models of civil society are those demanding to be heard as contribu-
tors to public discourse—with one notable exception: In countries whose govern-
ments are seen as undemocratic in the sense that they have not taken on and/or said 
goodbye to principles Western democracies uphold, civil society that opposes the 
government is hailed as the expression of the people’s will. We have seen this hap-
pen in the past, not least in the Central and Eastern Europe transformation process 
in the late 1980s. To put it very bluntly: Civil rights fighters in China are considered 
heroes, while civil rights protests in Hamburg at a G20 conference are seen as a 
criminal disruption of public order, and civil liberties activists in Catalunia are 
quickly labelled as terrorists (Strachwitz, 2018, pp. 17–30).
Though philanthropic giving is by no means the prime source of civil society 
funding, it is most certainly a major driving force in empowering its agents. 
Empowered in this way, as Albert Hirschman rightly established (1970), CSOs may 
engage in tasks that support existing societal systems (“loyal”), may distance them-
selves from mainstream society (“exit”), or become an opposing force (“voice”). 
Under all three of these headings, we may see eight distinct role models; many 








• political discourse, and
• self-fulfilment (personal growth).
The last two are perhaps the most interesting. Whereas Europeans have long 
argued that enabling personal growth, self-fulfilment, and a fulfilled and happy life 
is arguably the prime obligation of any community to its members, Asian political 
theorists would challenge this view, contending that society takes precedence over 
the individual. Yet, even then, civil society is probably the arena where personal 
growth through voluntary involvement may be achieved. That civil society should 
have a permanent and undisputed seat at the table when matters of society at large 
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are debated is far from universally accepted, notwithstanding the lip service those in 
power pay to the importance of civil society when it so pleases them—most com-
monly when these debates take place far from home. Habermas and others have 
argued the necessity of a “deliberative democracy” to explain the existence of an 
arena beyond the state and the market (Habermas, 1994, p. 363). These role models 
have developed over the past thirty years or so, both in practice and in theory, and 
obviously, many civil society players follow several role models simultaneously. 
This entails not only having a problem of defining civil society itself, but also one 
of defining its activities—a fairly academic debate when it comes to deciding 
whether a hospital managed by a not-for-profit organization is part of civil society 
or not, but a very real issue when talking about terrorism, civil liberties, and indeed 
social change.
The resources in volunteer work and donations that civil society can command 
are near to nothing compared to what governments obtain from the citizens by way 
of taxes, and what the business community makes by selling goods and services. In 
this respect, civil society, while being responsible for a considerable portion of any 
country’s gross domestic product, is yet the smallest of the three arenas; this will not 
change in the foreseeable future. What, then, can civil society bring to the table?
 The Unique Contribution
Beyond any doubt, a sizeable number of CSOs today have an important public func-
tion. Sports clubs, welfare and health organisations, protest movements, and watch-
dogs are part of societal life, and their members have learnt to voice opinions in the 
public sphere. They can on occasion be extraordinarily powerful in setting the 
agenda, moving issues, nudging lawmakers, or restraining them. Some find this 
easier than others. Traditional CSOs tend to be caught up in a neo-corporatist 
arrangement with the state and depend on public money to perform their services. 
They find it more difficult to shed their subservient attitude than do the younger 
advocacy organisations that rely on the support of their members and donors. The 
power of example is nudging more and more citizens everywhere in the world to 
actively contribute to public affairs and to do so in more ways than just by going to 
vote for a political party or leader once every few years. “Much of what Tocqueville 
saw as the reasons for modern democracies being lively and diverse and having the 
potential to integrate (the importance of associative life, of a community culture, 
and of religion) is just as important in 21st century society as it was then” 
(Kronenberg, 2013, p. 6).
This is because empathy, friendship, and engagement with emotional needs are 
at the very core of what constitutes a healthy societal arrangement. Communities 
depend on emotions, which modern governments horribly fail to convey. The senti-
ment of compassion, as described by Adam Smith (1759), is often connected to the 
solidarity deemed to be essential to keep a community together. Be this as it may, 
the failure of the state is not restricted to the examples chosen from serious 
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deficiencies in pursuing the day-to-day business of government, but should be seen 
as a general systemic phenomenon that requires corrective action.
In some instances, the growth in coherence, power, and strength that civil society 
has accomplished over the past generation or two, its ability to post societal needs 
and drive the issues, has been decisive. Care for the environment, gender issues, 
individual liberties, and indeed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the process of transi-
tion in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/1990, were driven by civil-society 
action, by determined activists and philanthropists. This will most certainly happen 
again. The Fridays for Future movement, started by a single teenage Swedish girl, 
is a case in point. The heterogenous, heterarchical, and more often than not overtly 
chaotic structure of a CSO may on occasion be better suited to become a hotbed of 
new ideas and both creative and potentially disruptive innovation than an orderly 
government agency and/or corporation.
Beyond these narratives, civil society’s impact and legitimacy rest on a norma-
tive theory. Evaluators need normative principles to decide whether or not an organ-
isation may be considered “good” or, in other words, acceptable to society. Among 
them, one may determine some very general ones, such as
• a basic belief in the human being as the supreme principal of society,
• respect for other human beings, their distinct and possibly very different ways of 
life and convictions,
• adherence to basic societal principles such as human and civil rights, the rule of 
law, and government by the people for the people, and
• a belief in a pluralist society that allows for each and every individual to lead the 
life she or he wishes, provided this does not infringe on the life of others.
Furthermore, some principles are specific to civil society, for example:
• a fundamental empathy for fellow men and women,
• a strict priority for ideals and ideas rather than for personal material gains,
• a commitment to accounability to the citizenry at large,
• an acknowledgement of everyone’s right to assemble and associate, and
• an endorsement of a political role for civil society.
Civil society is by no means inherently good. Just as there are good and bad 
governments, and honest traders and crooks in business, there exist, of course, 
CSOs we do not approve of, be this in a fundamental sense or simply because they 
have differing views. The Ku Klux Klan, the National Rifle Association of America, 
and, to name a German example, Pegida, are examples of the first, whereas a pleth-
ora of associations and foundations whose goals do not correspond to other people’s 
may be among the second. This will not allow us to simply disregard or disqualify 
organisations the views or goals of which we do not approve of. On the contrary, 
respect for others carries the obligation to listen most carefully to opposing state-
ments and to consider positions we do not embrace. Furthermore, this respect will 
make us exercise caution and restraint when it comes to playing the power game. 
Large foundations and other CSOs face a particular challenge here. But in doing so, 
they will join an ever-growing number of smaller, very often minute CSOs and 
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become what in other arenas is proving to be virtually impossible: agents of change. 
Agents of change—and indeed all CSOs—are never legitimized by size, nor by 
election procedures. They are legitimate by the quality of their proposals. A fairly 
novel and increasingly important and attractive subsector of civil society has proven 
to be particularly well suited. It is what may be termed informal civil society, move-
ments without much—or even any—structure. They convene around one issue, one 
thought, one philanthropic impulse. During the refugee wave that hit Germany in 
2015 and 2016, it was individuals who assembled their friends, small groups of 
volunteers called up over social media, responsible citizens who, in the light of a 
failing government bureaucracy, lived up to Angela Merkel’s famous “Wir schaffen 
das [We can do this].”2 It was they who enabled Germany to cope with one million 
refugees in less than six months. It is they who will most probably be the most influ-
ential agents of change.
It seems that governments are losing their monopoly of the public sphere, are 
trying to save what they can, and are leaving the possible outcome to providence. 
They profess to be set on innovation, and refuse to take into account that innovation 
in technical matters implies an innovative solution to the dilemma of an antiquated 
political order. Whether this solution can be disruptive and at the same time evolu-
tionary rather than repeating the mistakes of the 20th century and attempting to 
create a new man by way of revolution, remains an open question. It will depend on 
how widespread a readiness for change may be, and on how many centres actively 
develop models and ideas for a new order. It is a total misconception that new orders 
have come about as a result of a singular revolutionary act and an ensuing one-off 
brainstorming session. In each and every case, new arrangements had a longish his-
tory of preparation, of civil society at its very best designing and discarding compet-
ing ideas to a point where consensus could be achieved over a compromise. In this 
sense, more than in any other, civil society may truly be considered an agent of 
change. Taking to the streets can be extraordinarily effective, and is a civil right as 
much as it is a civil society prerogative. But moving issues by convening and debat-
ing is arguably the more sustainable contribution that civil society can bring to 
the table.
 The Trust Issue
All this said, there exists a highly relevant caveat to be considered. For social change 
to be sustainable, it seems all-important that it should be underpinned by trust. This 
alone presents the present Western political order with a considerable dilemma. In 
Europe and North America, the majority of citizens do not trust political parties, the 
government, the state as such, business corporations, or large institutions in general. 
2 German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel first used this phrase on August 31st, 2015, at a press 
conference following a visit to a refugee camp near Dresden where local opponents of her refugee 
policy booed and heckled her.
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This has much to do with the fact that “the system” has actively engaged in a grow-
ing mistrust of its citizens. Rules and controls have crowded out all previously 
entertained conventions of interaction between citizens and public bodies. For 
many, the logic is clear: If they are not trusted, why should they trust others? The 
downside of this is that “findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be 
exploited show self-serving, and hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves” 
(Weiss, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2018). The 19th Annual Edelman Trust Barometer 
(2019), while reporting an overall modest rise in the level of trust, shows it still to 
be far removed from satisfactory. In the “general population” bracket, 56% trust 
business and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 47% trust government 
and the media. In the “informed public” bracket, the figures are 69% for NGOs, 
68% for business, and 58% for government and media (Edelman, 2019, p. 5). One 
cannot envisage the roughly 50% of citizens who do not trust business, nor NGOs, 
nor the state becoming more trustful if these three arenas were to cooperate on a 
more level playing field. On the contrary, civil society in particular will have to be 
careful not be seen as part of the system, or as having finally succumbed to govern-
ment (and potentially business) pressure. Its reputation as the civic or citizens’ arena 
is at stake. If the idea of a new public sphere is to catch on, all concerned, and most 
specifically civil society, urgently need to improve on the trust placed in them.
Rebuilding trust may be seen as a prime goal to restabilize society. Society can-
not possibly exist on the basis of control mechanisms, but needs to contain a core of 
mutual trust. Mechanisms to restore this trust have been put on the table; they need 
to be discussed and adopted (viz., Alter, Strachwitz, & Unger, 2019). The criteria 
were assembled in answering the question what value-added philanthropic institu-
tions can bring to the table.
Strengthening the value-based approach of civil society implies respecting com-
mon societal principles such as the rule of law, human and civil rights, and democ-
racy, as well as specific civil-society principles, such as respect for the individual, 
refraining from using force, accepting plurality, and others. Along with my col-
leagues Alter and Unger, I have developed a set of criteria that may act as guidelines 
in determining whether a civil society actor may be deemed to be trustworthy:
 a) Commitment: to address the question whether a CSO is living up to the essen-
tials of the eco-system of civil society. Its underpinning qualities are compas-
sion, understanding, and respect.
 b) Public purpose: to specify that action has to be tailored to principles of benefit to 
society. Its supporting qualities are goals, responsiveness, and integrity.
 c) Relevance: to underline the necessity that action is conducted to make a differ-
ence and leave a mark. Its underpinning qualities are sustainability, effective-
ness, and impact.
 d) Performance: to refer to internal stakeholders acting in a professional manner. Its 




 e) Accountability: to accentuate the existent consciousness of a responsibility to 
society. Its supporting qualities are transparency, responsibility, and compliance. 
(Alter et al., 2019, pp. 4–6)
If civil society is to perform as an agent of change, obeying these standards of a 
trustworthy movement, organization, or institution in a satisfactory manner is an 
obligatory prerequisite. If civil society is to make a difference, its behavior must be 
above reproach. The disruption affecting civil society, civic action, and philanthropy 
as much as other sectors of society is largely due to failing in this respect. Institutions 
of social interaction and participation, religious communities, trade unions, political 
parties, and other traditional membership organisations have lost critical ground.
 The Iconic Turn
Disruptive dynamics have been accelerating since the end of the 20th century, pro-
ducing significant transformations of social, economic, and political structures. 
Globalization, new communities of choice, and high-speed technological innova-
tion are reducing the role of previously dominant actors, notably the state, whereas 
the private sector has become a major player in many sectors, from infrastructure 
and transport to pensions and health-care systems. Technological inventions have 
transformed the pace of communication, revolutionized the way one works, and 
individualized how one spends one’s leisure time. Disruption as the new normal is 
here to stay.
In order to render a contribution of civil society to social change a viable and 
sustainable proposition, an “open government partnership,” citizen participation, 
and corporatist models of civil society involvement in public affairs most certainly 
will not suffice. To achieve a paradigm shift, “raising citizens” (Mounk, 2018, 
p. 245) rather than specialists is the essential first step. Adapting educational curri-
cula to include the knowledge base for performing well in the public sphere is a 
precondition to changing attitudes. However, education alone is not enough—par-
ticipation and finally responsibility must also evolve (D’Ambrosio, 2018, p. 44).
The survival of the fittest is as little suited to governing the market’s contribution 
to society as are Friedman’s notions of stakeholder value. Reining in extreme capi-
talism requires refocussing it towards stakeholder value, sustainable and responsi-
ble development, and measures to bridge rather than widen the divide between the 
rich and the rest of society. The expectation that the very rich “will transform the 
character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion, and widening the 
scope of private control over resources” (Davidson & Rees-Mogg, 1999, p. 256) 
cannot—and should not—persist.
Given the crisis of democracy, the failures of constitutional arrangements and 
procedures after long periods of seemingly good or at least adequate functioning, 
some are looking with interest at systems that combine a market economy with an 
authoritarian government. Little do they realize that a China-type political order 
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will not favor those who believe they can exert more influence in such a system. But 
to avoid democracy drifting in that direction, it must acquire a new licence to oper-
ate, a new lease of life.
The notion of three arenas into which the individual may move at his or her free 
will, to be part of whichever collectivity he and she wishes to belong for a certain 
task or time, is worth taking up for this reason if for no other. With it, one underpins 
the supremacy and unique dignity of the individual human being, while not forget-
ting each human being’s responsibility for the community he or she happens to 
belong to by fate or chose to belong to by choice, and for society as a whole. 
According civil society adequate and permanent representation therefore seems to 
be a logical step, all the more so as civil society actors bring presents of empathy, 
ideas, know-how, reputation, time, and resources to the table. The state may well be 
expected to relinquish powers in favor of a level playing field that embraces non- 
governmental and non-business players.
Given the elements of a contemporary paradigm, it seems that a global world 
order is not to be avoided, even if many citizens feel terrified at the thought. 
However: “Globalization is almost always written about in terms of how it operates 
within the existing order, rather than how it creates a new order” (Khanna, 2011, 
p. 48). In order to be acceptable and indeed workable, the new global world order 
will have to contain a massive measure of subsidiarity, to read a very careful assess-
ment of cultural differences and traditions, and a clear view as to which problem 
needs to be discussed, decided upon, and solved at which level of a multi-tier and 
multi-arena societal order.
All this said, there is a bright side to disruptive innovation. Civil society can and 
indeed should never be reponsible for setting rules that affect every citizen. This is 
the government’s core business, and in a liberal democracy, these decisions should 
exclusively be taken by those elected by the people as a whole. Indeed, this is what 
we pay our governments to do. The famous battle cry of “no taxation without repre-
sentation” still stands today as it did in 18th-century North America. But if we can 
achieve a situation in which everyone realizes that taking the final decision is not the 
equivalent to preparing for them by offering analyses, ideas, arguments, and solu-
tions, this would indeed be an iconic turn. There is no reason to assume that govern-
ment officials—or indeed business executives—are any wiser than other citizens. If 
they could be made to realize that, on the contrary, social change emerges from 
chaos rather than from order, society could develop in a fascinating way.
We are seeing that some governments and most international governmental 
organisations are developing a taste for citizen participation, open government part-
nerships, and otherwise labelled formats of direct contact between rulers and the 
ruled. While this may be a good way of overcoming the increasing divide between 
a political class and increasingly frustrated citizens, it should not be overlooked that 
it may easily be manipulated in order to project openness and dialogue in public, yet 
using events with uninformed citizens to keep those who have real knowledge on 
particular issues out of the debate. It remains to be seen whether this policy will 
ultimately succeed or whether the citizens concerned will undergo a gradual 
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educational process and become an informal civil society movement and eventually 
a formalized CSO.
Issues of legitimacy and relevance are still being discussed—by professional 
politicians who continue to cherish the notion that they are in the drivers’ seats, by 
mainstream academia, by the media who still prefer to report on the occasional 
scandal or local events rather than offering civil society full participation in the 
debate on public affairs. If, however, we can consistently demonstrate that we will 
only reach striven-for goals by adopting principles embraced by civil society, it will 
become clear that, as Parag Khanna (2011) put it, the “dotgov-, dotcom-, and 
dotorg-worlds” will interact on a level playing field.
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Chapter 4
Undone Science and Smart Cities: Civil 
Society Perspectives on Risk and Emerging 
Technologies
David J. Hess
Planning is currently underway for the development of a new urban infrastructure 
that will underlie the smart city. The envisioned future includes developing a smart 
grid, transforming buildings with the “internet of things,” monitoring transportation 
remotely, commercializing air space for drones, and connecting vehicles to each 
other and the digital “cloud.” The development of this digitized urban space is based 
on wireless communications that will increasingly connect and integrate the urban 
technological systems of electricity, transportation, and buildings. The smart city 
will require new research fields in engineering, computer science, and the social and 
behavioral sciences to guide technological innovation, regulatory policy, manage-
ment strategies, and consumer interfaces that accompany the transition. Yet, this 
future smart city will be no different from past cities in at least one respect: it will 
be a contested space with different views about the design of the new technological 
systems and different knowledge claims that accompany controversies over design.
Because the world of connected and automated vehicles, digitized energy, and 
the “internet of things” has not yet arrived in full force, the contestation that will 
accompany its arrival has not yet crystallized, and the new urban space has not yet 
gained sustained attention from public-interest civil society organizations. One 
exception is the smart grid, which is already partially implemented in many parts of 
the world and has been accompanied by an emergent politics of knowledge and 
design. The smart grid is understood here as the application of digital technologies 
and computer software to a previously largely analog electricity system. Of special 
interest for the present discussion is the smart meter, which is the consumer inter-
face of the smart grid. The smart meter is a digital electricity meter that enables the 
remote reading of a building’s electricity consumption. In many countries, these 
digital meters have replaced the older analog meters. The new technology often 
makes it possible for the utility to engage in the direct management of internal 
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appliances such as air conditioning and heating systems. With the building owner’s 
permission, the utility can send a signal to alter the setting on the heating and air 
conditioning system in order to control daily changes in the electricity load. The 
smart meter can also be used to provide time-of-use and real-time pricing to help 
manage peak load, to pinpoint power outages, to provide more effective responses, 
and to facilitate the adoption of distributed energy resources.
By studying how civil society organizations have reacted to the advent of the 
smart meter, one can begin to get a picture of the role of civil society in the broader 
transition to the future smart city. In this sense, the smart meter may be treated as a 
“harbinger technology” (that, is, a technology that serves as a forerunner of much 
greater levels of cyberphysical infrastructure) and used to foreshadow the as-yet 
unknown and emerging politics of the smart city. At the same time, the study of civil 
society and smart meters can also contribute to general social science knowledge 
about publics, science, and technology.
 Background Concepts
In the study of knowledge, technology, and civil society, it is useful to begin with a 
distinction between social movements and civil society. The term civil society is 
understood here as a broad category of social organization and social relationship 
that is distinct from the family, the government, and the private sector. It is based on 
associational activity and can include clubs, religious groups, churches, charities, 
and political civil society; frequently, civil society organizations also have a special 
nonprofit tax status. In contrast, a social movement is a sustained mobilization of 
“challengers” (individuals and organizations) that are located in the subordinate 
positions of a social field (such as the electricity industry or the political field), that 
seek fundamental changes in the social field, and that encounter resistance to those 
changes from the “incumbents” located in the dominant positions of the field. 
Frequently, the leading organizations and individuals in a social movement are non-
governmental organizations that can be characterized as political civil society, but 
movements often include coalitions with elected and appointed political officials, 
scientists, religious groups, and segments of the private sector.
Researchers who study social movements have tended to build theory based on 
empirical research on mobilizations in the political field. Many such movements 
can be characterized as having a universalistic goal of achieving justice for disad-
vantaged groups based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, age, and other 
dimensions of structural inequality. Many also have the universalistic goal of 
enhanced democratic governance, especially in conditions of dictatorship and cor-
ruption of governments. In contrast, the industrial transition movement can include 
these societal change goals, but it also has the goal of bringing about a fundamental 
change in an industry and/or an associated technological system (Hess, 2016). 
Adding this type of movement to the field of social movement studies reveals new 
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areas of research for a general theory of social movements, most notably the rela-
tionship between movements and science and technology.
The industrial transition movement can be further subdivided into a set of four 
ideal types, of which actual movements frequently represent an amalgam (see 
Fig. 4.1). The central distinction is between aspirations that involve societal change 
and those focused more narrowly on technological systems and industrial change. If 
the primary goal is societal change, there are two main subtypes: enhancing democ-
racy, such as transforming governance processes for the industrial system (e.g., 
more democratic regulatory processes) or developing new ownership patterns and 
organizational forms in the industry (e.g., municipalization, cooperatives, or com-
munity solar); and remediating situations of inequality, unfairness, and lack of 
access, such as mobilizations in favor of low-income energy assistance, price con-
tainment, and green job development. Likewise, if the goal is a sociotechnical tran-
sition, one can distinguish between the industrial opposition subtype—which has 
the goal of ending a technology, such as coal, or remediating its harmful effects, 
such as coal-ash spills—and the subtype of alternative industrial development, 
which has the goal of helping to bring to scale desirable innovations, such as renew-
able energy or energy efficiency.
The concept of an industrial transition movement, with these four subtypes, can 
be applied across a range of spatial scales and with a topical scope that suits the 
researcher’s needs. For example, a researcher might examine opposition to natural- 
gas fracturing technologies at the continental scale or in a much smaller geographi-
cal region within a country. Likewise, the scope may include a range of subtypes of 
industrial transition movements in a demarcated spatial area. For example, a study 
of New York State electricity politics and policy since 2000 compared four mobili-
zations that mapped roughly onto the four subtypes to show how the mobilizations 
are networked through distinct coalitions of civil society and other organizations 
that exist in silos with relatively low overlap and communication among them 
(Hess, 2018). The project also showed a trend toward integration, and with the 
Fig. 4.1 Types of industrial transition movements (energy). Source: Design by author
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integration, the development of new organizations and frames, especially the broad 
frame of energy democracy.
This study will examine the emergence of the industrial transition movement 
associated with smart meter development in the US. As a constituent element of the 
smart grid, the smart meter has received attention because it represents the interface 
between the increasingly digitized electricity system and the customer-citizen. To a 
large extent private-sector actors developed the technology with little democratic 
deliberation and participation in its design and implementation. Members of the 
utility and the information-technology industries have assumed that the technology 
is beneficial because it will increase energy efficiency, reduce costs to the utilities 
and potentially to consumers, improve resilience in the event of power outages, and 
enable the integration of distributed energy resources such as rooftop solar. Yet, the 
implementation of the technological change raises a wide range of questions that 
are likely to become emblematic of challenges that will occur with the broader tran-
sition to smart cities.
The analysis that follows will focus on civil society, smart meters, and mobiliza-
tions in the United States and especially in California, where the mobilizations were 
the most intense and widespread. Public mobilizations and participation in smart- 
meter policy will be approached through the lens of industrial transition move-
ments. Using this lens, one can discern all four subtypes:
 1. Anti-smart-meter networks have emerged in some countries, and their members 
frequently criticize the lack of democratic process in the decision-making that 
led to the adoption of smart meters. These criticisms come from both the politi-
cal left and right (Hess, 2014). In North America, smart-meter opponents some-
times link their action to the democratic goal of community or public control 
over energy generation, a goal that has appeared throughout the history of the 
electricity industry and that currently appears in movements to municipalize 
utilities or to shift to a form of local control known as community choice 
(Hess, 2019).
 2. Members of anti-smart-meter networks have also expressed concern about the 
equity dimension, based largely on the unequal distribution of expenses that 
emerges with time-of-use pricing (Hess, 2014). The digital technology of smart 
meters can enable options for consumers to save on energy costs if appliances 
such as clothes dryers are used during off-peak hours. But such advantages are 
more readily available to households with time flexibility and with advanced 
technologies, and the technological change consequently becomes associated 
with an affordability and price-equity problem. Another example of an afford-
ability problem occurs when regulators or utilities have allowed opt-out provi-
sions to wireless smart meters, but they have charged prohibitively high monthly 
fees for consumers who wish to exercise the option (e.g., The Utility Reform 
Network, 2012).
 3. Members of smart-meter mobilizations also show concern about technical and 
design issues such as the possible health effects of smart meters and about pri-
vacy and security. The former concern is rooted in health risks claimed to be 
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associated with low-level microwave radiation, and the latter with the potential 
to know what people are doing inside the home because of the unique signature 
of appliances and even movies.
 4. The mobilizations can involve support for a wide range of technological innova-
tions, such as support for design innovation that ensures privacy for the new 
technologies or support for an emerging industry that has produced a wide range 
of products and services that provide shielding from non-ionizing electromag-
netic radiation.
This study will focus on the third and fourth types of industrial transition movement 
subtypes, that is, efforts to address the sociotechnical change goals of health and 
privacy-security, both in the oppositional and pro-alternative variants. In the US for 
each of these issues, there is a moderately developed network of civil society orga-
nizations that can provide a basis for the exploration of knowledge, technology, civil 
society, and undone science.
In addition to bringing to the study of knowledge and civil society the lens of 
industrial transition movements, this study also draws attention to the diversity of 
goals among civil society organizations. Three basic types of organizations will be 
discussed here. First, anti-smart meter groups tend to be informal, grassroots orga-
nizations that emerge during the installation period. There is not enough research 
yet to understand the conditions for their mobilization and demobilization, but it is 
possible that achieving an opt-out rule at an affordable cost may be the condition 
that leads the groups to go into abeyance. These groups raise a wide range of con-
cerns with respect to smart meters, including democracy and equity goals, but fre-
quently in North America the groups focus especially on risks to health, privacy, and 
security. Second, privacy organizations have a broad range of concerns about pri-
vacy and are generally more formal and well-established organizations. They may 
be considered as a subset of the broader movement of consumer organizations, and 
they occasionally become active in the field of smart-meter politics. Third, EMF 
risk organizations are sometimes formal nonprofit organizations, but in some cases, 
they are only information-providing web sites that are linked to EMF remediation 
businesses. Thus, these organizations can represent a combination of civil society 
and entrepreneurial business organizations. The three sections that follow will dis-
cuss each of these three types of civil society and their responses to smart meters.
With respect to the question of knowledge and ignorance, these three types of 
civil society actors draw attention to the need for different types of knowledge. 
Some of the knowledge is future knowledge that utilities and other industrial orga-
nizations accept as necessary, such as the computer science and engineering knowl-
edge needed to provide assurances of privacy that are necessary for consumer 
acceptance. However, some of the knowledge is also what I and others have termed 
undone science. The concept of undone science is situated in the broader field of 
research on knowledge and ignorance as one of the many forms of ignorance (Gross 
& McGoey, 2015; Hess, 2020). Among the different types of nonknowledge, undone 
science has two main elements. First, it is a specified absence or low quantity of 
scientific research; in other words, it is a possible future knowledge that can be 
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identified as needed or wanted. Many actors in the state, industry, science, and civil 
society frequently identify future research agendas of desired but as yet incomplete 
knowledge. However, undone science is more specific than simply a formulation of 
desired future knowledge. The second aspect of undone science is that it is a situ-
ated knowledge that is identified by reformers who claim to speak for a broad public 
interest, such as members of public-interest civil society organizations, who think 
that the public would benefit from knowing more about a topic. In the context of 
emerging technologies, undone science often refers to research on health, environ-
mental, privacy, safety, or other kinds of risk. Industrial actors and allied groups that 
are supporting the new technologies have rejected research that documents risk, 
safety, or other public interest concerns as unwanted, and, in some cases, they have 
worked to suppress or defund the research.
When this situation occurs, some researchers may still take up the challenge, but 
they often do so in marginalized settings such as unfunded work by independent 
scientists. Thus, undone science refers to a specification of what is unknown but 
potentially knowable and that if known, might help advocates of the public interest 
to defend better regulation, innovation, and public protections. It is knowledge that 
can be positioned to have potential effects in the political field.
 Grassroots Anti-Smart-Meter Mobilizations
Grassroots anti-smart-meter networks emerged throughout North America, but the 
most concentrated mobilizations were on the West Coast from California to British 
Columbia (Hess, 2014; Hess & Coley, 2014). These networks generally were not 
comprised of formal, nonprofit organizations, but they sometimes included partici-
pation from formal organizations, including the EMF organizations to be described 
below. The reasons given for opposition varied substantially. Analyses of testimony 
and media reports indicate that health concerns from wireless microwave transmis-
sion were paramount (Hess, 2014; Hess & Coley, 2014). The mobilizations tended 
to attract a wide range of political perspectives, from conservatives who were con-
cerned about “big brother” to progressives concerned about democracy, process, 
and precautionary politics.
The grassroots mobilizations resulted in many local government resolutions and 
ordinances as well as extensive public testimony and some protest. Although the 
anti-smart meter advocates were unable to stop the smart-meter deployment or to 
gain a design shift to wired meters, in 2012 the California Public Utilities 
Commission approved an opt-out program that allowed customers to retain an ana-
log meter for a fee, and other states and provinces offered similar concessions. In 
the case of California, anti-smart-meter advocates supported the measure in general 
terms, but some program issues remained controversial. An investor-owned utility 
argued that in addition to the option to switch back to an analog system, customers 
could also opt-out by accepting a modified smart meter with the radio turned off. 
The utility maintained that the radiofrequency emissions from the “radio off” smart 
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meters were well within the federal government’s safety standard and that leaving 
the already installed smart meters would allow greater flexibility for future custom-
ers. However, opponents as well as a number of local governments continued to be 
concerned about the health effects of the meters even with the radiofrequency turned 
off, and they fought for the right to remove the meters rather than rely on modifica-
tion of the already installed smart meters (California Public Utilities Commission, 
2011). The anti-smart-meter groups also advocated against opt-out fees because the 
charges for customers far outweighed the costs for utilities to reinstall the analog 
meters. In 2014, the Public Utilities Commission agreed to cap the monthly opt- 
out fees.
The grassroots anti-smart-meter networks did not generate new scientific knowl-
edge. Some proponents created citizen science in the form of YouTube videos that 
measured radiofrequency emissions from smart meters and provided testimonials 
from people who claimed to have experienced health effects. The main relationship 
with scientific knowledge was the circulation of knowledge, that is, explaining to 
the public and to local governments why a moratorium was needed while more 
safety research was conducted or why an opt-out policy should be required in the 
absence of a moratorium. The arguments included references to scientific research 
on potential health effects of living in proximity to constant wireless emissions from 
smart meters.
 Privacy Organizations
An important reason why the advent of the smart meter has raised concerns from 
consumers and public-interest civil society organizations is that each appliance has 
a unique electronic signature. Thus, it is possible to know when people are home 
and what they are doing there, a prospect that conjures up images of Orwell’s 1984 
(1949). As with other internet-based technologies, privacy standards are vital to 
guide what kind of information will be collected, the degree of granularity of the 
information, how the information will be used, when it will be deleted, and who has 
access to it. Furthermore, there are closely connected security issues based on the 
risk of breaches of private information or the possibility of assembling information 
into detailed pictures of each person. Criminals could use records to determine 
when people are at home or away from home, and they could potentially also cause 
fires by hacking into heating units. Thus, privacy and security issues are closely 
interwoven.
Whereas governments and industry tend to dismiss health concerns, they are 
much more willing to entertain the need to develop good privacy and security stan-
dards. Industry recognizes that without public confidence, resistance will rapidly 
mount and lead to the discrediting of smart meters and the “internet of things.” In 
the United States, recognition of the importance of the problem has grown with each 
new major privacy breach, and the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation also affected privacy practices on the North American continent. Thus, 
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the relationship between civil society organizations that advocate for privacy and 
industrial incumbents such as the utilities is much less oppositional than for the goal 
of opt-outs or moratoria. Nevertheless, in the US there is considerable public aware-
ness that government legislators and regulators are captured by industrial interests. 
In response, privacy advocacy organizations have played a public-interest role by 
pressuring the federal and state governments to adopt better privacy standards and 
implementation.
As for many issues involving energy and new technologies, California has been 
a leader in the United States. The state government’s constitution includes a privacy 
provision, and a state law (Senate Bill 17 of 2009) authorized the California Public 
Utilities Commission to enact privacy provisions. Two civil society organizations, 
the Electronic Privacy Frontier Foundation and the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, provided comments in the regulatory process for privacy and smart 
meters in the state (Lynch & Tien, 2010). The organizations carefully opened their 
comments by discussing the benefits of smart meters; hence, the position of these 
civil society organizations was not in opposition to smart-meter installations.
In contrast with the grassroots anti-smart-meter mobilizations, the privacy orga-
nizations did not argue that smart-meter deployment should be halted or that afford-
able opt-out provisions should be immediately implemented. Rather, they asserted 
that the California Public Utilities Commission should adopt regulatory policy that 
follows the general fair information practices principles (Lynch & Tien, 2010). 
These principles exist in various versions, and the organizations’ testimony included 
the following: transparency of data management practices, individual participation 
with consent, purpose specification for data use, data minimization, use limitation, 
data quality and integrity (accurate, timely, complete), data security, and account-
ability and auditing. (These principles also appear in the European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation.) The organizations also advocated for a prohibition on 
nondisclosed use by third parties and for a requirement of data destruction when the 
specified use is no longer operational.
In 2011, the privacy organizations claimed that the California Public Utilities 
Commission had accepted their recommendations (Jeschke, 2011). Senate Bill 
1476, which legislators enacted that year, prohibited utilities from sharing, disclos-
ing, selling, or otherwise making accessible to third parties a customer’s data, which 
includes information about electrical and gas consumption, without the consent of 
the customer. The measure also required utilities to use “reasonable security proce-
dures and practices” to protect these data (Senate Bill 1476 of 2010). In 2014, the 
state government approved Assembly Bill 1274, which expanded the earlier smart 
meter privacy law by putting the same restrictions on businesses that work with 
smart meter data, such as internet service providers and financial institutions.
The approval of privacy principles and regulations is only part of the story; with 
the advent of these regulations, there must be effective implementation. The effec-
tiveness of privacy implementation depends in part on the willingness of utilities to 
follow through with the legislators’ and regulators’ intent, but it also requires new 
knowledges and technologies to ensure privacy. Privacy technology assurances need 
to be developed. For example, how frequently should a customer’s electricity 
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consumption be sampled? Does a less frequent rate of sampling, such as once per 
day, ensure privacy, or is it still possible to figure out home activities? Should cus-
tomer data be aggregated, and if so, what rules of aggregation should be followed? 
The utilities can bring together readings from multiple smart meters to reach a total 
energy reading but without obtaining any data on a specific household’s energy 
consumption (Cavoukian & Polonetsky, 2013). Researchers are still developing pri-
vacy aggregation protocols for smart meters that are tolerant of communication fail-
ures or smart-meter malfunctioning in order to avoid privacy breaches (e.g., 
Hoepman, 2017; Won, Ma, Yau, & Rao, 2016). However, aggregation may also 
make it difficult to use real-time pricing programs, and other ways of protecting 
privacy may be preferable. These questions and problems help to motivate the 
development of a new knowledge associated with the management of privacy for 
the smart grid. In turn, this area of privacy research is a subfield of the emerging 
field of “privacy engineering,” for which graduate education is now becoming 
available.
In summary, the mobilization of privacy organizations has generally operated 
within the framework of acceptance of the technological transition. Civil society 
organizations have articulated privacy principles and privacy guidance, and the push 
for good privacy practices has helped to stimulate the development of new knowl-
edges and technologies (even a new research field) in privacy engineering. Many 
questions remain unanswered, and many problems remain unsolved, but the devel-
opment of privacy science and technology for the smart grid is a developing scien-
tific research field rather than undone science. The utilities and related companies 
recognize the need to implement the technology in order to ensure the overall public 
acceptance of the technological transition, and the implementation of the General 
Data Protection Regulation in Europe in 2018 is having significant spillover effects 
on North American policies and practices. In other words, resources are already 
forthcoming to develop the science and technology needed to meet policy goals and 
guidelines for privacy standards, and the field of privacy research is untroubled by 
industry-based attacks on its credibility. Such is not the case for the third type of 
civil society mobilization.
 EMF Risk Organizations
EMF risk (or safety) organizations include informational web sites run by individu-
als, small businesses, and formal nonprofit organizations. They have existed for 
decades, and they have been involved in a wide range of public controversies involv-
ing risk from non-ionizing EMF. This category of EMF includes high-voltage power 
lines and electricity transformer sites near homes and schools, faulty wiring and 
dirty electricity inside buildings, the use of radar on military bases near civilian resi-
dences, the safety of radar for military and police workers, microwave ovens, com-
puters, cell phone towers (mobile phone masts), wi-fi, cell phones, and cordless 
phones. In North America, the primary intersection of the EMF risk organizations 
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with the politics of smart meters involves the potential health risks from exposure to 
wireless transmission.
An informal survey by a smart-meter organization indicated that common com-
plaints include sleep disturbances, stress and anxiety, headaches, and tinnitus 
(Halteman, 2011). The peer-reviewed research tends to come from the related field 
of research on the effects of microwave radiation associated with cell phones and 
towers (mobile phones and masts). In other words, there is very little direct research 
on the health effects associated with wireless smart meters. However, the research 
on wi-fi and cellular phones is relevant because it involves a similar frequency of 
EMF radiation to the one used for wireless smart-meter transmissions.
Because the power density of the EMF radiation declines rapidly with distance, 
a person’s exposure is affected by the location of the meter installation on the out-
side wall of the building, the size of the building, and how much time the person 
spends in the room near the meter. A meter bank in an apartment complex where the 
inside space is a bedroom or office would expose occupants to much higher EMF 
emissions than a single meter located on the outside of a garage and away from 
sleeping areas. (High levels of exposure may also apply to people who sleep with 
their wi-fi routers next to their beds and cell phones under their pillows).
Researchers who study health effects of EMF radiation have recommended pre-
cautionary standards, and some areas of the world have enacted standards close to 
these recommendations. Whereas the US standard is set at a non-precautionary level 
of 10,000 μW/cm2, which is based on thermal or tissue-heating effects, other areas 
of the world recognize standards based on nonthermal biological effects. The 
Council of Europe (2011) has recommended a maximum indoor exposure level of 
.6 V/m (.1 μW/cm2) and a medium-term goal of .2 V/m (.01 μW/cm2). A group of 
experts in Norway recommended a whole-body exposure limit of .17 μW/cm2, with 
a potential precautionary limit of .017 μW/cm2 (Fragopoulou et  al., 2010). In 
Germany, the Institut für Baubiologie + Ökologie (2008; Institute for Building 
Biology and Ecology) designated .001 μW/cm2 as the boundary between slight and 
severe concern. The BioInitiative Report (BioInitiative Working Group, Sage, & 
Carpenter, 2012), which was written by an international network of EMF health 
experts, recommended a precautionary indoor exposure limit equivalent to .0003–
.0006 μW/cm2.
Although the standards are helpful guidelines, they can be confusing in practice. 
For example, using the relatively accurate Acoustimeter, a smart meter installed on 
the outside wall of the garage of the house of the author generates an average inside 
power density of .0001–.0005 μW/cm2 at three meters with one layer of aluminum 
foil shielding on the inside wall, and it has spikes or peak frequencies of .01–.06 
μW/cm2. The evaluation of safety or risk depends partly on which standard is used, 
whether one uses average or peak power densities, and how far one is from the smart 
meter. Moreover, the health effects literature, which includes hundreds of studies, is 
not always calibrated to the power density units used in measurement devices.
Nevertheless, by the twenty-first century, radiofrequency meters have become 
widely available and marketed through the network of EMF safety and remediation 
companies. In addition, an industry of EMF consultants and businesses, with 
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certification and training, has emerged to help building owners to evaluate and 
remediate high emissions. Thus, it is possible to have a building evaluated and to 
measure exposure, as well as to remediate exposure just as is done for radon risk. 
But doing so requires some knowledge and financial resources, a problem that leads 
to intersections with the equity goal that sometimes emerges in the EMF health-risk 
organizations.
Although the level of risk associated with microwave transmissions remains 
unknown, every year the public health and subclinical peer-reviewed research con-
tinues to document more health effects. This situation is an example of undone sci-
ence, whereby the incumbent actors of an industrial regime view additional research 
as potentially threatening to the current configuration of the technological system, a 
view that is backed by systematic underfunding and a history of some attacks on 
scientists who have documented risk. In the case of research on the health effects of 
wireless technologies, there is little government-sponsored research in the US, and 
scientists who engage in research in this field risk their careers. Journalists and sci-
entists have documented the systematic reduction of funding from the government 
to independent scientists that began to be evident by the early 1980s, and they have 
also documented the campaigns by the military and industry to discredit or bury 
independent research that demonstrates health effects (e.g., Becker & Selden, 1985; 
Brodeur, 1977; Marino, 2010). Rather than seek answers to these questions and 
develop low-emissions technologies and shielding, industry members have instead 
sought to reassure consumers about the safety of EMF radiation and to support a 
view of the research field on health effects of EMF radiation as in a permanent state 
of inconclusive knowledge. This approach to the research field is similar to the one 
that industry members have adopted toward research on climate change, some 
chemicals, and tobacco, where the goal is to prevent regulatory intervention by 
arguing that the science is unsettled and that there is no basis for the regulation 
based on an industry definition of “sound science” (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; 
Rampton & Stauber, 2001).
The other side of undone science is the generation of incumbent science. A sys-
tematic review of research has documented how industry-funded science tends to 
produce negative findings about health risk from EMF at a significantly higher rate 
than independent science (Huss, Egger, Hug, Huwiler-Müntener, & Röösli, 2007). 
Incorrect information about health risks then circulates through public relations 
campaigns. An example of the utilities’ approach to safety concerns appears on the 
web site of the Smart Energy Consumer Collaborative, an industry group that edu-
cates consumers about the benefits of smart meters. With respect to health concerns, 
the website had the following quote: “It would take 375 years of direct contact with 
a smart meter to equal the same amount of radio frequency exposure from a daily, 
15-minute cell phone call over the course of one year” (Smart Energy Consumer 
Collaborative, 2020). This quotation appears on other websites used to reduce the 
concerns of customers about health effects. The authority for the quotation is a 
study by the California Council on Science and Technology (2011), which various 
independent EMF researchers have criticized for accuracy (Carpenter, 2011; Hirsch, 
2011; Maret, 2011). Civil society organizations generally do not enter directly into 
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the scientific controversy, which is best left to researchers, but EMF risk organiza-
tions such as the Center for Electrosmog Prevention (2011a) have publicized the 
flaws of the study. Moreover, smart-meter groups have raised additional questions 
about the credibility of other experts employed by industry (Burke, 2015).
In addition to challenging industry assertions that there is no scientific basis for 
health risks that customers and smart-meter groups raise, EMF risk organizations 
also participate in government regulatory proceedings by providing knowledge and 
information. For example, the Center for Electrosmog Prevention participated in the 
California Public Utilities Commission rule-making, and the EMF Policy Institute 
participated in federal rule-making procedures. The organizations defended opt-out 
provisions and pointed to the need to provide protection for persons with health 
conditions and disabilities that may require special consideration with respect to 
exposure to EMF fields. Without invoking the disputed category of electrosensi-
tives, these organizations cited studies that medical implants may malfunction with 
exposure to wireless smart-meter emissions (Singer, n.d.). They argue that current 
safety policies fail to protect these groups of people and that policies such as opt-out 
fees violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, a connection that links the socio-
technical goal of emissions reduction with the equity goal of remediation of rights. 
The Center for Electrosmog Prevention (2011b) stated that to charge these vulner-
able populations for opt-out rights is “similar to denying a person in a wheelchair 
any access to services, with the exception of a ‘for-fee ramp.’”
As in the case of privacy-related mobilization, health concerns can also be the 
basis for the development of new technologies. In this case, the most obvious alter-
native technology is wired technology that would connect the meter to the utility 
through fiber-optic cables. This feasible technological substitution makes it possible 
to avoid the entire question of the health effects of wireless transmission, but it 
would require cooperation with the cable or land-line industries, and it could mean 
cost increases for the utilities. (Wired technology also does not eliminate health-risk 
concerns, which have occurred in some parts of Europe even for wired technology). 
In the absence of wired technology, there is an industry of companies that offer a 
wide range of products designed to reduce exposure: fabrics, clothing, and paints 
that reduce EMF exposure; shielding devices for smart meters, cell phones, routers, 
automobile cabins, and computers; books and videos; and a wide range of devices 
that can measure exposure.
Some countries and subnational regions have wired systems, and some countries 
have also restricted wi-fi for the most vulnerable segments of the population. For 
example, in France wi-fi has been banned in nursery schools and minimized in ele-
mentary schools. But the main way of achieving the goal of reduced exposure to 
microwave radiation is to develop and use wireless technology at levels of power 
density below which health effects have not been demonstrated. Numerous techni-
cal design solutions could be developed to reduce emissions, just as has been done 
for emissions from power plants and vehicles, but unlike privacy research, this topic 
is largely one of undone science and industrial non-innovation.
On the whole, EMF risk organizations face an uphill battle. People are unlikely 
to give up the convenience of wireless technology, especially for cell phones, and 
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the primary way to resolve public health concerns is likely going to be through the 
design of a next generation of technologies that has lower microwave emissions. At 
this point, it is not possible to say with assurance what the acceptable minimum 
level of exposure to wireless microwave radiation should be because researchers 
have not yet found a threshold minimum dose. Whereas this question is one for the 
natural and health sciences, a social science perspective can point to another type of 
conclusion: there is a policy collision looming ahead. On the one hand, public- 
health researchers continue to generate knowledge about health risks at low expo-
sures, and the lowest observed effect level at which health effects are evident 
continues to decline. On the other hand, the wireless industry continues to push new 
technologies in the home, the workplace, the transportation system, and even on 
lamp posts, which is generating more, not less, cumulative exposure. It is possible 
that future research and policy will establish a minimum threshold level below 
which biological effects are not detected, and it is possible that this level will still 
allow a next generation of wireless technology to function adequately. But no one 
will know if the research is not being done.
One example of the potential collision course ahead is the fate of California’s 
Senate Bill 649 of 2017. Had it been approved, the bill would have required local 
governments to lease out public property, such as streetlights and traffic signal 
poles, to the wireless industry for the installation of “small cell” telecommunica-
tions facilities. The bill would have also capped the fees local governments can 
charge these companies, and it would have restricted cities’ ability to gather public 
input and negotiate leases. Proponents of the bill argued that the measure would 
expand the state’s connectivity, bring it closer towards the 5 GHz future of telecom-
munication, and boost the economy. Unsurprisingly, local governments opposed the 
bill because it would have eliminated their discretion over how to use public prop-
erty. Activists and scientists also argued that the radiation and electromagnetic fre-
quencies emitted by cellular towers in public buildings and utility poles would 
create a public health risk. Governor Edmund “Jerry” Brown vetoed the bill in 
October 2017.
 Conclusions
Several general implications emerge from this review of different aspects of one 
industrial transition movement in one country. First, with respect to the general 
social science problem of understanding the connections between civil society and 
the politics of knowledge, this analysis points to the value of tracking differences 
across civil society organizations and coalitions even where they may have mostly 
consistent objectives (Hess, 2018). Grassroots networks were focused mostly on 
gaining moratoria and opt-out provisions; electronic privacy organizations drew 
attention to the implementation of good privacy principles; and EMF safety organi-
zations underlined health-related risks, potential violations of disability law, and the 
value of remediation technologies.
4 Undone Science and Smart Cities: Civil Society Perspectives on Risk and Emerging…
70
Second, although some connections with the equity goal were flagged, this study 
has focused more on the sociotechnical side of industrial transition movements than 
on the societal change goals that sometimes emerge in the context of the smart grid. 
The advantage of a broad typology is that it enables questions about what other 
types of politics might have been left out of the analysis. Examples of societal tran-
sition goals that sometimes emerge in the context of smart grid politics include 
democracy goals (e.g., improved democratic participation in rule-making and stan-
dards and the broader question of public ownership of electricity systems) and 
equity goals (e.g., the cost of opt outs and the effects of wireless exposure on per-
sons with chronic health conditions and pacemakers). But even within the category 
of sociotechnical change goals, this study shows how goals often overlap in prac-
tice. For example, oppositional goals—such as a moratorium or opt-out policy—
will tend to coincide with generative goals—such as support for the remediation 
industry. The mobilizations help to create the conditions that favor the generation of 
new types of knowledges and technologies, such as privacy engineering and EMF 
remediation. Older technologies, such as wired transmission systems, receive new 
valuation from a safety perspective.
Third, these movements draw attention to the politics of research priorities and 
agendas. Although mobilizations of civil society organizations can help to motivate 
the generation of new research fields and associated technological innovation, the 
position of these research fields with respect to the incumbents of the industrial 
fields can vary dramatically. The utilities seem willing to swallow the pill of privacy 
restrictions in order to reap the gains of time-of-use pricing, grid resilience, load 
stability, and reduced labor costs. But the prospect of a return to analog meters is a 
much more fundamental threat to the future electricity grid, and the shift to a wired 
system may entail competitive risks from the telecommunications industry. 
Moreover, although wired systems are feasible for smart meters and for computer 
connections in buildings, they pose an existential threat to the future world of con-
nected transportation and mobile connections. Thus, one type of knowledge—pri-
vacy engineering—is merely part of the terrain of a complex digital world in which 
almost anything about individuals is potentially knowable, whereas the other type of 
knowledge—health risks from wireless communications—poses a potentially 
deeper set of challenges. One type of knowledge is merely a future and emergent 
research field, whereas the other suffers from loss of government funding, industry- 
funded counter studies, and other mechanisms that create a situation of undone 
science and non-innovation. Social movements can play a vital role in the demo-
cratic politics of technology by helping to identify undone science, to mobilize 
resources to help get the science done, and to open up policy decisions to demo-
cratic political processes that include industry perspectives but are also insulated 
from industry pressure.
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Chapter 5
Specialists for Crumble Cakes? 
The German LandFrauen Organizations 
in Social Innovation, and as Educational, 
Social, and Political Institutions
Laura Suarsana
The LandFrauen clubs and associations1 as contemporary civil society organiza-
tions are spread widely across Germany, with a focus on the rural areas. Strongly 
locally embedded and interconnected nationwide, they address local needs and the 
interests of women and women in agriculture, and contribute to social and cultural 
infrastructure and the development of rural regions. They engage in education, 
knowledge transfer, and political interest representation, and address societal chal-
lenges. Despite these activities and their size of about 500,000 members in more 
than 10,000 local clubs, 22 state associations, and one federal association (DLV 
e.V., 2020a), the German LandFrauen are to a large part neglected by social sciences 
and often reduced to “specialists for crumble cakes” (Int. 02, see also Icken, 2002, 
p. 9; Sawahn 2009, 2012).
In this chapter, I present empirical results on the LandFrauen and illustrate that 
their activities go far beyond baking, as they, in manifold dimensions, contribute to 
societal change and the development of rural areas. This case study contributes to 
the debate on civil society’s role in societal change and social innovation: I will 
discuss how the LandFrauen organizations as an institutional frame enable these 
activities, which are highly reliant on their diverse and strongly locally rooted base 
of members. I analyze the diverse practices from the conceptual perspective of 
social innovation as an approach whose practical dimension is expected to hold 
particularly high potential for rural areas, which are often affected by infrastructural 
and socioeconomic deficits and structural weaknesses. The empirical results on the 
German LandFrauen clubs and associations show that LandFrauen are highly 
1 Throughout this chapter, I use clubs for the very local organizations with individual members. I 
use associations for the higher organizational levels with—regularly—organizational members 
(apart from exceptions with individual memberships also on higher associational levels).
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engaged in initiating change and development in rural Germany by uniquely 
addressing women’s needs through social, cultural, and educational offers: The 
members’ social interactions thereby function as a ground and starting point for 
further activities that set impulses in local development.
Based on the empirical research, I argue that the LandFrauen activities are, on 
one hand, integrated into specific local fields and highly adaptive to local needs and 
interests through the deep integration of the large and diverse base of members in 
their local villages and rural society. In parallel, they receive support from higher 
associational levels, providing them with knowledge, ideas, and institutional sup-
port. The interwoven local and interregional activities, cooperation, and the 
exchange of knowledge and ideas, and a broad internal and external network—
across horizontal and vertical levels as well as across geographies—can be high-
lighted as a key feature of the LandFrauen associations, and as the base of their 
societal engagement.
This chapter is structured as follows: I will first discuss social innovation as con-
ceptual background and underlying research perspective, followed by a discussion 
of the LandFrauen as an object of research and an element of associational life in 
Germany. On this basis, I will derive my research questions and provide an over-
view on methods, in order to then elaborate my empirical findings on the LandFrauen 
practices related to societal change, and how they are organized within the associa-
tional structure. I reflect upon these results in a discussion of how the discussed 
practices relate to the concept of social innovation, and of prerequisites that facili-
tate the explored practices. The chapter closes with a conclusion.
 Social Innovation as a Research Perspective
 New Solutions for Society, Unfolding in Practices
The notion of social innovation is diffuse and contested (Domanski, Howaldt, & 
Kaletka, 2020, p. 458; Howaldt & Schwarz, 2010, pp. 2–3) with regard to its ana-
lytical status as well as its use in policy practices (Moulaert, MacCallum, & Hillier, 
2013, p. 13). Key commonality in the variety of understandings of the term is the 
connection to societal change and the meeting of social problems and needs through 
new societal solutions (Domanski et al., 2020, pp. 460–462; Howaldt & Schwarz, 
2010; Moulaert & MacCallum, 2019, p. 31; Mulgan, Tucker, Ali, & Sanders, 2007, 
pp. 1, 8; Wendt, 2016, pp. 10–12; Zapf, 1989). Social innovation is related to nov-
elty and innovation as conceptualized by Schumpeter (1912, 1942), with processes 
of diffusion and implementation as relevant criteria (Wendt, 2016, p. 11)2 that “a 
novel idea was put into practice and became institutionalized,” or that existing 
2 Authors further refer to the process of “creative destruction” as “disruption of existing institu-
tions” (Howaldt & Schwarz, 2016, p. 58).
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elements have been innovatively recombined (Christmann, Ibert, Jessen, & Walther, 
2020, p. 4), or transferred into new contexts or spatial settings (Christmann, 2020a, 
p. 426).
Moulaert and MacCallum (2019, pp.  32–37) identify two, partly contrasting, 
paradigms in the research field on social innovation: One they refer to as “Anglo- 
American,” instrumental and technocratic and related to business and organizational 
management sciences, its proponents often considering social innovation as com-
plementary to market activity (p. 32). As a second thought line they identify the 
more interdisciplinary “Euro-Canadian social economy literature,” connected to 
regional development literature and to normative and emancipatory expectations, its 
proponents relating social innovation to “empowerment, solidarity, socio-political 
renewal and institutional transformation” (p. 34): They argue that it improves social 
relations on the micro-level between individuals as well as on the macro-level 
“between classes and other social groups” (Moulaert et al., 2013, p. 16). Further, it 
is expected to “collectively [empower] people (especially marginalized people) to 
act” (Moulaert & MacCallum, 2019, p. 4). In this view, social innovation unfolds in 
processes and practices and in joint action from different societal actors “beyond 
business and government routines” (Brandsen, Evers, Cattacin, & Zimmer, 2016b, 
pp. 6–7). It relates to social transformation (Wendt, 2016, p. 13) and includes citi-
zens and larger parts of society as agents of innovation (Domanski et al., 2020).
 Social Innovation as Embedded 
and Contextualized Phenomenon
Relational conceptualizations of innovation processes discuss the relevance of 
social interaction, embeddedness, proximity, and institutional context for the cre-
ation and transmission of knowledge, understanding the latter as “embodied social 
practice” (Amin & Cohendet, 2004, p. 11; Bathelt & Glückler, 2011; Boschma & 
Frenken, 2010; Glückler & Bathelt, 2017; Rutten, 2017)—which unfolds locally 
(Asheim & Gertler, 2005, p. 293), as well as independent of locality, for example, 
within virtual or temporal knowledge communities (Bathelt, Feldman, & Kogler, 
2011; Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004; Grabher & Ibert, 2014; Growe & Henn, 
2020; Lambooy, 2010; Rutten, 2017, p. 159). Researchers have raised communities 
of practice and epistemic communities as contexts and grounds for learning, knowl-
edge creation, and innovation among groups and collectives (Amin & Roberts, 
2008; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Müller & Ibert, 2015, p. 339; Punstein & Glückler, 
2020, pp. 546–548; Wenger, 1998). Accordingly, social innovation is perceived as 
contextualized “territorial phenomena, embedded in spaces, social relations and 
institutions that are defined by particular cross-scalar and cross-sectoral dynamics” 
(Moulaert & MacCallum, 2019, p. 77) and integrated into “socio-economic struc-
tures, institutions and practices” (p. 35).
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Social innovation is always related to collective social action aiming at social change. The 
institutional perspective sees social innovation as a result of the exchanges and application 
of knowledge and resources by agents mobilized through legitimization activities. (Cajaiba- 
Santana, 2014, p. 43)
Global economic dynamics result in particular localized and spatially concen-
trated needs, which are addressed within communities through solutions and 
innovative practices beyond economic concepts. Whereas the addressed problems 
are place-based, the developed solutions also require and mobilize non-local and 
trans- local actors, networks, and relations (Moulaert & MacCallum, 2019, 
pp. 79–80). Researchers have increasingly discussed social innovation’s relevance 
for local and regional development, its potential for rural areas, often in reference 
to its local and institutional contextualization (Christmann, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; 
Christmann et al., 2020; Domanski et al., 2020, p. 455; Füg & Ibert, 2020; Howaldt 
& Schwarz, 2018, pp. 6–7; Richter, 2019; Schermer & Kroismayr, 2020). Here, 
local contexts are spaces in which “societal challenges become obvious as con-
crete social demands and in which problems are tackled by new social practices, 
often in unlikely collaborations” (Domanski et al., 2020, p. 468), while “institu-
tional embedding—including taking to scale” is perceived as essential factors of 
success for “socially innovative policies and collective strategies” (Moulaert 
et al., 2013, p. 18).
 The LandFrauen Organizations in German Civil Society 
and as Object of Research
By examining the German LandFrauen organizations, I am investigating a rather 
traditional form of associational life in Germany, with a long history and predeces-
sors stretching to the end of the 19th century (Sawahn, 2009), and a spatial focus in 
Germany’s rural regions. The spectrum of members is nearly entirely female—apart 
from sponsorship and honorary memberships, and some regional exceptions.3 The 
largest share of members is above 60 (Suarsana, 2017; Int. 01-18). The general 
organizational goal is
. . . more justice and equal opportunities for women who are at home in rural areas. This 
includes the perception and recognition of achievements and equal participation of rural 
women in work and family, in society and politics, in education, economy, and culture. 
(DLV e.V., 2020b, own transl.)
In this context, the LandFrauen are involved in diverse activities on all geo-
graphic and associational levels, which are linked horizontally and vertically 
through exchange and cooperation, such as in committees, cooperation, and com-
mon events (DLV e.V., 2020a, pp. 23–36; Suarsana, 2017; see Fig. 5.1). More than 
10,000 local clubs and the 437 district and 22 state associations are an active 
3 Such as in Brandenburg, where also men can become regular members (own research).
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element of associational life in Germany, which since 2016 in total comprise more 
than 600,000 registered associations as the “dominant legal form” of German civil 
society—that structures, as well as it is based on, civic engagement (Priemer, 
Krimmer, & Labigne, 2017, p.  5). The organizations are broadly represented in 
external boards, directorates, and committees, such as the German Women’s Council 
and Agricultural Associations, and in various ways cooperate with partners from 
politics or the fields of education, agriculture, nutrition, and consumer protection, as 
well as within local or regional policy or regional development initiatives (DLV 
e.V., 2020a, pp. 24–26, Suarsana, 2017).
Research on the German LandFrauen has so far mostly focussed on their roots 
and history (Bridenthal, 1994; Helmle, 2009; Krieg, 1999; Sawahn, 2009, 2012; 
Schwarz, 1990). As contemporary organizations of German civil society, they can 
be considered as somehow “hidden figures” that only to a small degree are subject 
of discussion in the social sciences. Scholars have included them in broader analy-
ses of the German associational landscape, women’s and agricultural networks, and 
lobby organizations (e.g., Biegler, 2001; Icken, 2002, p. 9; Rudolph & Schirmer, 
2004, p. 145). As associations, they can be expected to play essential roles in build-
ing social capital and contributing to social cohesion (Putnam, 2000), serving as 
spaces of political socialization and schools of democracy, a “link between micro- 
and macro-levels and an integrative element for state and society” (Zimmer, 2007, 
p. 88, own transl.). In this, they “promise other ways of getting things done, from 
Fig. 5.1 The German LandFrauen associations’ organizational structure. Based upon Suarsana 
(2017, p. 532). Organizational Data and information on cooperation and network partners: DLV 
2020a, pp. 24–28 
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supporting pub[l]ic spheres and providing representation to cultivating the virtues 
of citizens and providing alternative forms of governance” (Warren, 2001, p. 3). 
Suarsana (2017) highlights the relevance of the German LandFrauen organizations 
as an element of rural civil society and regional development. Their role in rural 
areas is discussed as a “driving force of village development” (Rosa-Luxemburg-
Stiftung, 2005) in their addressing of “basic questions of rural development”, in 
their  spectrum of members and broad representation of women in rural areas 
(Krambach, 2005, pp. 5–6), in their functions as local multipliers as a potential for 
“the economic, social, and cultural development in the country” (pp. 6–8), or as 
participants of LEADER-projects (Ebeling, 2017). Further, scholars have to a lesser 
degree included the LandFrauen in studies on adult education (Ambos & Greubel, 
2012; Baumgart, Becker, Borsch, Merre, & Maas, 2004; Beetz, Bender, & Haubold, 
2018; Kaschuba, 1996), and with regards to their project work in fields such as 
health (Jackisch et  al., 2020), employment (Putzing, 2003), tourism (Kistemann, 
2003), and biodiversity (Lütt, 2007).
 Method and Research Questions: Analysis 
of the LandFrauen’s Role in Social Change and Innovation
Based on the above, I perceive social innovation as societal solutions—new con-
cepts or recombinations—that have a procedural component, are related to imple-
mentation in practice and collective agency, are based on exchange of knowledge,4 
occur institutionally, are socially embedded, and are related to processes of transfor-
mation, empowerment and mobilization.
My central research focus in this chapter is to explore how the LandFrauen in 
their activities and engagement contribute to societal development and serve as car-
riers of social innovation, and how these activities unfold locally and are influenced 
by the institutional and organizational structure: To what extent do LandFrauen 
practices and organizations relate to societal change and promote social innovation? 
To what extent do they relate to processes of empowerment and “reconfigured social 
relations”? Which organizational and infrastructural prerequisites enable/further the 
development of societal solutions and social innovation through LandFrauen? In 
what follows I will illustrate the results of this empirical assessment of the 
LandFrauen activities and analyze their societal functions in (rural) society.
The empirical basis of this chapter are 18 qualitative interviews, 17 with leading 
representatives of 22 LandFrauen Associations in total on the federal-state and 
national level in Germany, as well as with the president of the national LandFrauen 
association. I conducted interviews with the German LandFrauen Associations in 
4 Knowledge thereby understood as in the introductory chapter of the Knowledge and Space vol-
ume “Knowledge for Governance” as “human understanding of concrete and abstract phenomena 
of the world in which we live”; see Glückler, Herrigel, and Handke (2020, p. 4). For a more detailed 
reflection on knowledge in its relation to space, see Meusburger (2008).
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Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony (Hanover), Lower Saxony (Weser- 
Ems), Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland, Rhineland-Nassau, 
Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Westphalia-Lippe, Thuringia, Schleswig- 
Holstein, Württemberg-Hohenzollern, and with the LandFrauen Group in the 
Bavarian Farmers’ Association.
Most interview partners were, and mostly still are, in parallel to their voluntary 
or vocational associational work, integrated as active members into their local home 
club/association. Some are further engaged within the intermediary regional asso-
ciations, or are elected members of the board of the national association (see 
Table 5.1). Thus, the interview partners could provide deep insights not only on the 
higher aggregated associational activities, but also on local clubs’ activities. 
Interviews were conducted between June and September 2020 via phone with mem-
bers of the president boards and with managing directors of the associations all over 
Germany, with an average length of 50 minutes.
All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed using the digital transcription 
service  F4x and the qualitative text analytical software MAXQDA.  Further, all 
interviews were analyzed following qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2015). 
The results of this analysis are presented in the following chapter on findings, and 
they form the base of argumentation if not stated otherwise. All direct citations were 
translated from German into English and linguistically smoothed regarding dialect, 
colloquial language, and non-thematic fillers.
Table 5.1 Interview details
Total number of Interviews: 18
Organizational structure:
Registered federal association: 1
Registered federal state associations:a 14 (of 19)
Federal state associations incorporated into the state’s farmer’s association: 3 (of 3)
Interview partners:
President/Chairwoman of the board (honorary): 11
Managing director (vocational): 5
Board member/Vice president: 2
Interview partners represented in the board of the national federal association: 5 (of 8)
Regional distribution of the interviewed associations (state level):
Associations in Western Germany: 12 (of 17)
Associations in Eastern Germany: 5 (of 5)
Representation of members through interviewed associations:
Total of (paying) members represented:b 314,814 (76.3%)
Total of (paying) members represented (Eastern Germany) 5,979 (100%)
Total of (paying) members represented (Western Germany): 308,835 (76.0%)
aFor historical reasons (see Sawahn, 2009), there are 22 federal associations in the 16 German 
federal states
bMembership data from DLV e.V. (2019, p. 42)
Note. Source: Design by author
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Further, I conducted participatory observation during the nationwide LandFrauen 
Days that took place in Erfurt in 2016 and in Ludwigshafen in 2018 with 5,000 and 
3,000 participants, events that are organized by the German association for all mem-
bers of the LandFrauen clubs and associations in Germany. I also draw on primary 
sources, such as the websites and annual reports of the LandFrauen associations.
 Findings: LandFrauen Organizations and Practices in Societal 
Change and Social Innovation
 Diversity, Geography, and Local Contextualization 
of the LandFrauen Organizations and Activities
The associations and clubs differ highly across Germany.5 The interviews revealed 
large differences and different foci of activities, although I could identify a number 
of core activities throughout all interviews that relate to the general goals of address-
ing and representing the interests of women, families in rural areas, and specifically 
women in agriculture, engaging for good conditions of living in rural areas.
As key characteristics of the LandFrauen organizations, several interviewees 
highlighted the wide range of members, which includes women across all profes-
sions, generations, confessions, political affiliations, and social classes, which they 
attributed to bridging societal functions. They thereby named the overall diversity 
across regions and members as a quality of the organizational structure. Each club6 
develops an annual program following the interests and perceived local needs of the 
local members. Local social activities and regularly organized meetings thereby 
form the ground for a broad range of further educational and also political activities 
on local as well as higher associational levels. Vice versa, higher associational levels 
influence local club activities through setting lead or annual topics, suggesting top-
ics or referents for the education programs, or through central and nation- or state- 
wide projects, or further offers addressed to all associational levels.
The breadth of activities across the clubs and associations is reflected in Table 5.2, 
which lists all activities by number and subject for 2017 (last data available). The 
largest share of activities relates to the everyday life and interests of the members in 
fields of health, sports, arts and culture, consumer policy, home economics, and 
nutrition. Further activities form a smaller proportion of the overall spectrum, but 
nevertheless the yearly numbers range into several thousands. These include work 
for the common good and social work, activities related to agriculture, societal and 
economic policy, as well as competence-related activities in the fields of communi-
cation, association management, media competence, and IT.
5 Accordingly, the activities and examples illustrated below surely do not apply to all clubs or 
associations.
6 As well as the district and federal state associations.
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Regarding associational structure and activities, broad differences exist horizon-
tally—across the state and district associations and the local clubs—as well as verti-
cally: The higher associational levels fulfil broader and more political functions 
than the community-oriented local clubs. Horizontally, differences exist in internal 
organization as well as with regard to the activities, foci, and goals. The variety of 
clubs reflects the variety of members (see Table 5.3), and interviewees illustrated 
the influence of local institutional context and structure (see Cajaiba-Santana, 2014) 
on the clubs and associations. They referred to the associations’ differing statutes 
and the local clubs’ strong autonomy, as well as to the specific local conditions, 
including social infrastructure—local population, identity of the local members, 
further associations in the villages, and support from politics and potential part-
ners—and material and public service infrastructure, such as the existence of pub-
licly open space, or premises that can be used for meetings and events. Interviewees 
raised varying political support across the federal states. They especially described 
the eastern associations as highly regarded and supported, perceived as “important 
players,” by politicians (Int. 04). In urban settings in which the LandFrauen are also 
represented, interviewees stated less need for social infrastructure in comparison to 
peripheral regions. All interview partners considered the identity of local individu-
als who are board members and/or engaged in coordinating their local club, define 
topics and set the annual programs, to be highly influential on the local activities.
East and West German LandFrauen organizations differ regarding member struc-
ture and their historical background. The eastern associations were founded after 
German reunification, “more top-down” (Int. 13), with crises and growing unem-
ployment especially in agriculture in the eastern states. The newly founded associa-
tions offered support and exchange, and partly functioned as an institutional frame 
Table 5.2 LandFrauen activities (all associational levels) by subject area in 2017




Share of Activities 
(%)
Health, sports 44,239 37.4
Art, culture, creativity 24,418 20.6
Consumer policy, home economics, nutrition 11,206 9.5
Activities for the common good, social work 8,060 6.8
Family, social issues 6,958 5.9
Agriculture, rural area, environment 5,674 4.8
Communication, association management 5,233 4.4
Societal and social policy 3,714 3.1
Media competence, IT 1,009 0.9
Economic policy 891 0.8
Other 7,009 5.9
Total 118,411 100.0
aData for Bremen not included. No data available in the category Activities for the Common Good, 
Social Work for Bavaria and Rhine-Hesse. No data available in the category Other for Hamburg, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhine-Hesse
Note. Source: Design by author. Data from DLV e.V. (2018, p. 42)
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for measures of public employment. In addition, the share of women in agriculture 
varies, so the extent associations address agricultural issues in their offers accord-
ingly does as well. Institutional structure differs with regard to cooperation with the 
state farmer’s association, ranging from the clubs’ and associations’ complete inde-
pendence to close cooperation and organizational integration of the associations as 
sub-organizations into the farmer’s associations.7 In Bavaria, LandFrauen member-
ship results exclusively from company-related affiliation to a farm with membership 
in the farmers’ association. In the further state and regional associations, the propor-
tion of women from agriculture was estimated to range between about 10% to 20%.8
7 This is the case in Bavaria, Rhineland-Nassau, and South Baden.
8 These numbers could only be estimated by the interviewees, as data is not available.

















51,521 51,512 9 523,611
  Teaching hours: 125,444 125,252 192 15,646,263
  Participants/
Enrollments:




19,448 19,441 7 n.d.
  Teaching hours: 66,038 66,001 37 n.d.
  Participants: 564,077 563,599 478 n.d.
Study Trips/
Excursions:
10,763 10,762 1 8,204
  Days: 27,519 27,518 1 n.d.
  Participants: 302,234 302,177 57 174,319
Exhibitions/
Markets:
3,991 3,990 1 n.d.








1,556,030 1,555,339 691 8,162,146
aLatest data available for 873 of total 894 in 2018
bIncludes contractual measures and individual events not listed above
Note. Source: Data on the LandFrauen organizations (totals re-calculated) from DLV e.V. (2020a, 
pp. 28–32), adult education center statistics (2018) from Lux (2020, p. 1)
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Despite these regional specifics, “goals and interests are similar” (Int. 15), and 
intense exchange and cooperation occurs within the LandFrauen’s broad personal 
and organizational network.
 Community-Building, Togetherness, and Local Social 
Embeddedness as a Ground for Further Activities
Community is what women look for and find with us. And our large network that we have 
throughout Germany is something that really sets us apart. (President, German LandFrauen 
Association)
Interviewees named classic associational activity, the building of social capital 
(Putnam, 2000) and functions as “social glue” (Int. 12) through social activity, 
togetherness, community building, and contributions to local village life as core 
activities on the very local level. According to them, creating opportunities to come 
together and meet within the community on a regular basis and to exchange about 
personal as well as local and societal problems9 are the very element and heart of the 
LandFrauen. Through their programs and activities, the LandFrauen create condi-
tions and a context for women and local people to meet, engage in social, creative, 
or educational activities, and to come together, exchange, and interact socially—for 
example in choirs, reading clubs, sports courses, or seasonal festivities. In this, they 
contribute to local social and cultural infrastructure in the villages and to social 
integration, for example, of elders suffering social isolation or newly moved resi-
dents. Further, the institutionalized and formally organized activities are broadly 
accompanied by informal togetherness and interaction, supporting and “appreciat-
ing” (Int. 08) each other, and the provision of neighborhood assistance (Int. 13) and 
“taking care of each other” in the villages (Int. 09). The individual members’ social 
integration thereby creates a basis for the local club’s activities.
This sense of community and togetherness and belonging among LandFrauen on 
the local level is continued inter-regionally and state- and nationwide, and seems to 
exist across all geographical and associational levels. This is reflected in wide inter-
action and formal as well as informal exchange among clubs and associations (see 
Section 5.4.5). A strong sense of togetherness was also a key observation during the 
national LandFrauen Days in which I participated: I noted a cheerful and open 
atmosphere and willingness to communicate, interact, and exchange between the 
women’s groups who arrived from all over Germany. Many of the women I spoke to 
during the events expressed how much they appreciated the event character and 
visiting the event together with their local group, as well as meeting further 
LandFrauen from across the country. In Erfurt, for example, the day ended with the 
9 They include infrastructural problems regarding childcare, internet connections, and right-wing 
populism in peripheral rural regions.
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thousands of participating women standing and singing together with the band 
on stage.
 Local Engagement, and Functions as Initiators, Catalysts, or 
Multipliers in Rural Areas
Integrated into their social contributions, the LandFrauen address further issues 
related to the quality of life in rural areas through practical local engagement and 
project activities with which they handle deficiencies in public service provision 
and rural infrastructure (Suarsana, 2017). Infrastructure, provision of healthcare, 
internet, and mobility were named as essential issues necessary to “provide perspec-
tives for families in the rural area” (Int. 14). Hereby, I could identify different func-
tions in their regional activity:
Firstly, as local initiators, LandFrauen often spring into action when local infra-
structure is to be shut down. “It starts with a petition and ends with ‘we’ll run your 
house in,’ or we’ll be very pragmatic and tackle the problem on site” (Int. 16). In 
Lower Saxony, LandFrauen initiated a public mobility bus project (Bürgerbusverein 
Badbergen e.V., n.d.). In Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, they pro-
vide a local kindergarten (LFV Mecklenburg-Vorpommern e.V., 2020). Federal 
associations, such as in Bavaria, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westphalia, initiated sup-
port hotlines for women or people from agriculture as a solution to provide anony-
mous exchange and support, addressing issues of social isolation in rural areas. In 
Saxony, for example, the ministers of education and the arts as well as regional 
television were invited to take part in a bus ride for a second-grade elementary 
school student from a small rural village in order to highlight the consequence of 
planned school closings that would lead to very long bus rides for primary school 
pupils. Secondly, interviewees stated that LandFrauen, with their broad base of 
female members deeply rooted in the rural society, often function as multipliers in 
rural areas (Int. 04). Several associations engage for democracy—in Saxony, for 
example, they educate local democracy consultants. Through campaigns and infor-
mational activities, the women mobilize others within the villages/regions. Several 
interviewees highlighted a sense for practical solutions and life management skills 
as a capability of the LandFrauen in their local engagement, which they stated 
makes them “very well recognized, by politics, by the mayors and district adminis-
trators” (Int. 09). Interviewees described that local clubs build local partnerships 
and support the establishment of new connections among further actors within the 
villages, and as a connecting local institution bring together various groups. Thirdly, 
LandFrauen can be attributed catalyst or supporting functions in external projects 
or in joint activities—with further partners, such as from local civil society, admin-
istration, or politics—that meet local needs and problems or help shape the local 
public space. In Schleswig-Holstein, for example, LandFrauen support Market 
Meeting Places, initiated by the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein (Markt-Treff 
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Schleswig-Holstein, n.d.). Cooperative projects are partly publicly funded, and 
activities are often integrated into regional development initiatives such as 
LEADER10 (Ebeling, 2017).
 LandFrauen as Institutional Frame and Social Spaces 
for Learning, Education, and Knowledge Diffusion 
in Rural Areas
 Central and de-central coordinated education activities
Activities of knowledge dissemination occur on every associational level. The local 
clubs, district associations, as well as federal associations pursue manifold de- 
central as well as joint or centrally organized educational activities. They offer 
courses, lectures, workshops, and informational events, in order to “bring knowl-
edge and education into the country”—with course education as a “key activity for 
the state association,” as well as through the local associations on site, which “have 
this educational mandate in addition to their social issues and being involved in the 
village structures” (Int. 07). In this, education is brought into peripheral areas where 
further structures and offers in adult education do not exist. While “in cities, women 
visit adult education centers to further educate themselves”, they “stay in the village 
structures” (Int. 07) and thus provide locally specific offers.
In total, in 2019 more than 50,000 courses and seminars were conducted, 19,500 
discussion events, and more than 10,000 educational trips or excursions (Table 5.3), 
with altogether 1.5 million enrolled participants.11 In comparison, the 873 adult 
education centers in Germany offered a total of 637,701 educational events in 2018, 
with 532,611 courses and 8,204 study trips (Lux, 2020, p. 1).
In their local offers and their annual programs, the local clubs can rely on offer-
ings and inspiration from higher associational levels: State associations offer top-
ics and internal and external speakers that the local clubs can draw on—partly 
financially supported through the state association. Many activities, selected edu-
cational fields, activities, and course offerings are highly locally specific and orga-
nized by the local clubs autonomously and independently from higher associational 
levels. On higher association levels, the selection of programs and topics is based 
on decision processes within the boards and committees, including the feedback, 
expressions of interest, and perceived needs and problems from lower associa-
tional levels. Joint projects across the associational levels are partly financed by 
federal and state ministries or/and supported through further partners. In some 
federal states, such as Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, educational activity is 
carried out through specially set up educational facilities (Bildungswerke), which 
10 “In two-thirds of all 15 regional action groups in [federal state], a LandFrau has a seat” (Int. 06).
11 Participants counted by enrollment, not by participant identity—thus double counting may occur.
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as organizational entities receive governmental funding. In part, educational activ-
ity is integrated into nationwide programs or projects, coordinated by the federal 
association.
Educational activities are often based on the training of multipliers who then 
share their knowledge on the lower associational levels, in the respective regions, or 
within local clubs. Regional or local specialists are trained as multipliers in central 
levels and then “disseminate knowledge” (Int. 16) or offer coaching and support in 
their respective regions, for topics such as digitalization, nutrition, consumer pro-
tection, and agriculture-related issues.
Many educational activities relate to “everyday skills” (Int. 02): “[n]ew knowl-
edge . . . relevant for everyday life” (Int. 07). This includes informing on issues like 
powers of attorney, care, criminal prevention, insurance, law, pension notices, and 
rent, as well as nutrition, cooking, or gardening. Educational and societal topics are 
addressed in a way suited to the target group of women in rural areas. Complementary 
to their local, regional, and national engagement, the federal association as well as 
the state associations of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria also disseminate knowl-
edge in international development work, for example, providing agricultural train-
ing and support as well as female empowerment in Kenya and Ghana.
 Addressing contemporary societal challenges
Educational offers, informational events, and campaigns, especially of the federal 
and state associations, address broader contemporary societal problems and “pro-
mote such new topics” (Int. 07) as sustainability and avoidance of food and plastic 
waste. “We try to take up socially relevant topics and deal with them in such a way 
that they are transported down to the local clubs and the members” (Int. 07). From 
there, issues are spread further within the rural population and through the mem-
bers’ personal networks.
In cooperation with state medical associations, health insurances, or universities, 
LandFrauen disseminate knowledge on new medical developments and engage to 
prevent myocardial infarction, breast cancer, hearing problems amongst the elderly 
and children, or injuries through falls. Digitalization, the usage of modern digital 
media and communication technology and how to communicate via the new media, 
is broadly addressed in many associations and also within projects of the national 
association. LandFrauen have implemented several projects that provide training 
and seminars, especially for elderly women, in topics such as the use of tablets, 
smartphones, and new media. In Baden-Württemberg, for example, Senior 
Technology Ambassadors are trained (LFV Württemberg-Baden e.V., 2020b). In 
Schleswig-Holstein, the project e-LandFrauen provides computer education. 
Associations have set digitalization as leading themes for several years, through 
initiatives such as Baden-Württemberg’s Digital without limits!? (LFV Württemberg- 
Baden e.V., 2020a) and Württemberg-Hohenzollern’s LandFrauen 4.0, in which the 
associations bring digitalization-related knowledge to its members and inform them 
about the potentials, as well as risks, of digital technology. Reacting to the Corona 
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pandemic, many associations have offered courses for the local boards on how to 
hold online seminars and organize online meetings. Several clubs further engage in 
the external nationwide project digital neighborhoods, which “came from the fed-
eral level” and has been “very well accepted” on the district level (Int. 03).
This image, the LandFrauen always bake cakes and knit and crochet and sew. Yes, because 
we can. But we are also open to topics such as dealing with PCs, dealing with tablets, deal-
ing with telemedicine. We have just started a new qualification of digital mentors. In 
 cooperation with a Department of the Ministry of Energy and Agriculture. . . . And these 
LandFrauen, six to eight, are trained to use smartphones and tablets over several days. And 
they then go back as multipliers to the LandFrauen associations, to their clubs, to make their 
older women fit in this. (Int. 07)
Further, central activity on the federal, state, and also district and local levels 
centers around education in the field of nutrition and the origins of food, and in 
consumer education and engaging in consumer-producer dialogue. Apart from 
external activities, such as in schools or kindergartens, this also includes internal 
activities to build understanding and appreciation among the members (Int. 04).
 Preservation, dissemination, and recombination of “traditional” knowledge
LandFrauen engage in, disseminate, and contribute to the preservation of local, 
historical,12 and traditional knowledge and pass it within their institutional and 
social structure. They engage in activities related to regional customs such as knot-
ting carpets, spinning wool, crocheting, and speaking in dialect, such as Plattdeutsch 
(Low German)—“many things from harvest festivals to traditional costume groups, 
folk dance groups to Easter fountain festivals” (Int. 16). Members disseminate 
related knowledge in the course and event program, partly coordinated on the state 
associational level, but also intensively carried out autonomously by members at the 
local level: “The women want that and organize it for themselves” (Int. 18). This 
partly entails recombinations of traditional knowledge. For example, LandFrauen in 
several, especially eastern, federal states, pursue binding of harvest crowns as a 
local custom. The necessary knowledge is taught in commonality and transferred in 
practice as non-codified knowledge, as well as taught explicit in workshops. 
Thereby, LandFrauen developed new modes of tying as “freestyle harvest crowns” 
(Int. 02), innovatively reinterpreting traditional practice. Further, LandFrauen uti-
lize tradition-related events to address contemporary issues: “They can bring across 
political demands wonderfully at such a harvest festival, and the women have 
understood that you can combine it well to keep the traditional, but to make demands 
at that point” (President, German LandFrauen Association).
12 LandFrauen archive historical knowledge, such as by “writing down life stories” (Int. 05). In 
Schleswig-Holstein, the state association established, in cooperation with a museum, an historical 
archive to document former rural life from a women’s perspective (LFV Schleswig-Holstein e.V., 
2020). Further, they author or publish books on regional traditions and specialities.
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 Learning and exchange among the diverse base of members and reaching 
different societal groups as a source for societal change
Several interviewees perceived bridging functions through including and addressing 
the interests of women of all ages, professions, confessions, and political affilia-
tions, and described processes of exchange and relation-building between the indi-
vidual members. Apart from social integration and creating an understanding of the 
respective life situations, this leads to learning and transfer of knowledge and expe-
riences. During educational trips and excursions across Germany, LandFrauen orga-
nizations create new personal connections among the LandFrauen interregionally, 
as these often include exchange visits of the district association within the tar-
get region.
According to the interview partners, the elder generations above the age of 60 
form the major share of members. Aspirations to institutionally integrate a larger 
number of young women have in recent years proven successful in many associa-
tions. Interviewees reported that younger women explicitly address and highly 
value the elder generation’s practical and traditional knowledge, such as crafting, 
cooking and baking skills, while further highlighting the relevance of the young 
LandFrauen learning about the life problems of elderly women in rural areas. Vice 
versa, younger women bring “new and innovative ideas” (Int. 01) into the clubs, 
provide insights into their generation, and introduce elders, in an informal and open 
manner, to contemporary societal and technical topics—a development that is as 
well supported through institutionalized educational offers, such as “combined 
courses, knitting and computer courses. One teaches using the mouse, and the other 
teaches how to use the knitting needle” (Int. 16).
 Exchange and diffusion of ideas across regions and throughout 
the associational structure
Intensive exchange that allows for the diffusion of ideas between the individual 
members and across regions and associational levels can be highlighted a general 
characteristic of the LandFrauen organizations. Between all organizational levels, 
intensive horizontal and vertical communication occurs, as well as cooperation and 
exchange on the respective ideas, activities, and projects. Several interviewees 
reported having taken over “sparkling ideas” (Int. 02) from other clubs or associa-
tions, and that they actively seek information, knowledge, and ideas from other 
regions, following a “pragmatic approach. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel” 
(Int. 05).
Exchange occurs, firstly, formally organized within the associational structure. 
This includes representation in boards, working together in expert groups, commit-
tees, and planning days, as well as conferences and meetings on specific topics. At 
the delegate assembly on the federal level, delegates report positive and successful 
activities from the respective regions. In addition, at the state level, the local and 
district associations send representatives to committees for exchange. Activities 
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allow for the physical or—especially since the beginning of the Corona pandemic—
increasingly digital co-presence of representatives or members from the different 
regions or districts. Neighbor associations are also often invited to events like the 
LandFrauen Days on the regional or district level. District associations organize 
visiting tours to each other across regions in Germany, and local clubs organize 
meetings or share events or courses together. Secondly, this formal exchange is 
accompanied by informal exchange. Personal contacts overlap formal organiza-
tional structures and support the interassociational exchange across regions. Several 
interviewees reported informal activities of exchange and interaction, based on per-
sonal and social relations that have emerged in the course of organized exchange or 
joint activities.
Organized and informal exchange is supported through several communication 
channels that allow for further sharing of ideas, good practices, innovative projects, 
ideas for events and speakers, new concepts, and developed solutions. Associations, 
clubs, and members receive information on each other’s activities through annual 
programs and reports, newsletters, websites, and further means of digital communi-
cation. During the Corona pandemic, internal communication has become increas-
ingly digitalized, and members have developed and spread among the associations 
new organizational practices and formats to bring women together, such as digital 
wine tastings, in which women from different regions digitally met and got to know 
each other (Int. 01).
Several interviewees described an example for the diffusion of ideas within the 
organizational structure with regards to the Corona pandemic. One association, dur-
ing lockdown, started sending postcards to the members in order to “keep contact 
and say, hold on, we are with you” (Int. 17). Across several interviews, I could 
reconstruct how this idea was started within one association and from there diffused 
among regions and was copied by several further associations, who, through formal 
or informal contact channels, had learned about it and took over the concept, as well 
as partly extended it through further elements.
We had a very spontaneous idea to design this postcard during the Corona period. And we 
had to reorder them three times. And then a friend from Westphalia wrote to me: Man, that 
is a great idea. I said, just imitate it. And then they copied it in their own way. And now 
they’re doing it in Nassau too, and they want to do it in Saxony too. I say it’s wonderful. So 
of course, you can spread that and join in. (Int. 01)
Although this is just a small example, it illustrates the close contact among the 
LandFrauen representatives, as well as the permeability for idea transmission 
among the organizations. Further, apart from the internal network as a source of 
ideas, interviewees named the dense network to other associations and partners as 
inspiration for ideas and sources of knowledge.
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 Advocacy work, Interest Representation, and Setting Public 
and Political Agenda
Interest representation, raising topics to the societal and political agenda, and influ-
encing public debate is pursued in different qualities and quantities. “The core task 
is to demand attractive living conditions in rural areas from politics” (Int. 18). 
Topics range from equal pay and further gender equality issues to services of gen-
eral interest, such as digitalization in rural areas. LandFrauen associations can be 
considered highly relevant in their function to give voice to and represent females in 
the field of agriculture, as women are strongly underrepresented: In the presidential 
boards of the farmer’s associations, women have a total share of 11.9%13 (18 of in 
total 151 seats). In the federal association and in five of the 18 state/regional asso-
ciations, women are not represented on presidential boards at all.
On the local level, interest representation occurs partly and often in a smaller 
dimension, frequently relating to specific local problems and as reactions to infra-
structural deficits or cutbacks regarding topics such as offers of childcare, broad-
band coverage, or provision of health- and midwifery care. The described activities 
are oriented towards current problems within the villages. Members identify and 
name these problems and look for ways to solve them. Interviewees brought up that 
these activities are often not considered political or “classically feminist” (Int. 16) 
activities, and that regular club members rather have an “everyday understanding” 
(Int. 12) of politics. Local communication activity differs highly, as it depends on 
the voluntary engagement and identity of local board members (Int. 11).
Higher associational levels address broader societal issues in their political work. 
Activities include communicating LandFrauen demands to politics and range from 
information campaigns, public relations work and press releases, entering into dia-
logue with political actors or further nonprofit actors in national and federal minis-
tries, to demonstrations and collection of signatures for petitions, taking positions 
and communicating political demands to federal and state ministries before elec-
tions or legal initiatives, and organizing informational events on women and agri-
cultural issues. For this, the federal association, as well as the state associations, 
offer support and training to their members (see Section 5.6). The higher associa-
tional levels, and increasingly the district and local organizations, engage in social 
media activity and allow for low-threshold information on their activities and posi-
tions. The associations are broadly represented and engaged in external committees 
and networks, especially in the fields of education, gender equality, nutrition, and 
agriculture, and are represented in the German Women’s Council.
13 Own survey, as per 27.10.2020. Included were the presidents or presidential board of the member 
associations of the federal farmer’s associations as published on the association’s websites. For 
Bavaria, the presidential conference was included.
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 Mobilization and Empowerment for Politics, Associational Work, 
and Entrepreneurial Activities
The  LandFrauen’s14 political engagement—for example, in their city or district 
councils or as mayors—is supported and promoted throughout the associational 
structure, for example, through informational events and initiating local discussion 
rounds or inviting successful female politicians as role models. The federal associa-
tion and several state associations offer training and qualification in skills such as 
rhetoric and communication for political and associational work. Apart from moti-
vating women to take up institutionalized functions in political processes, clubs 
inform and gather LandFrauen in “classic” associational functions as “a pre- political 
space,”, “mobilize at a very low threshold and motivate women to get involved” 
(Int. 3).
Several associations promote democracy and empower women to engage towards 
preventing racism and right-wing extremism, to address populism and to engage in 
politics, for example, in eastern Germany, and in two state associations of Lower- 
Saxony in a joint project Democracy means you!—Are women fairly represented in 
rural areas? (own transl.).
Further, federal associations and several national associations focus on mobiliz-
ing and supporting women with regard to entrepreneurial activities. Offers include 
vocational training to provide women with knowledge and capabilities to become 
self-employed or to set up their own businesses. State associations, partly, offer 
coaching and education, or provide further support through their network, e.g. train-
ing women as local guides or ambassadors for regional products. In a nationwide 
project Selbst ist die Frau [Women do it themselves, own transl.], the federal asso-
ciation initiates networks to support and encourage female founders. Women with 
start-up experience are trained as start-up coaches and offer workshops on self- 
employment (Int. 04). To improve working condition for women in the country, in 
Lower-Saxony, Hanover, co-working spaces are tested as a means for women to 
better balance work and family life (Niedersächsischer LandFrauenverband 
Hannover, 2020). In addition, qualification and vocational training is offered for 
women in agriculture, and “that they can get their voice heard in local politics, also 
in the public space” (Int. 16). Moreover, during the national LandFrauen Days in 
Erfurt (2016) and Ludwigshafen (2018), political mobilization, as well as the sup-
port of women, and promoting female entrepreneurship, especially in agriculture, 
were central elements.
14 One interviewee stated that she knew villages where the combination of political activity and 
LandFrauen engagement was institutionalized in such a way that the LandFrauen board members 
were in principle engaged into regional politics (Int. 12).
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 Discussion: LandFrauen as a Case Example for the Promotion 
of Social Change Through Civil Society—Practices 
and Prerequisites
 Practices—The LandFrauen’s Role in Social Innovation
The LandFrauen in their manifold activities are a case example of how civil society 
contributes to social innovation and can function as an agent of societal change—
with new ideas and concepts, political involvement, as well as through practical 
engagement as initiators, catalysts, or local multipliers. They relate to criteria and 
expectations towards social innovation as discussed in Section 2:
 (1) Firstly, LandFrauen pursue activities related to “satisfaction of needs” as an ele-
ment of social innovation as stated by Moulaert and MacCallum (2019, p. 4.). 
Interviewees named various innovative projects and solutions for the improve-
ment of rural areas, or to support women and women in agriculture. They bring 
together women of all ages, professions, and generations with specific insights 
into local needs. The large number of women and creative ideas coming together 
was raised as a ground and “important pool” (Int. 03), to quickly find and imple-
ment simple, pragmatic, and often unconventional solutions to challenges and 
infrastructural deficits in rural areas—for example, “converting a residential 
property, . . . or enabling a daycare center to be set up temporarily on one’s 
farm, when the local kindergarten closes” (Int. 03).
Thereby, some interviewees did not consider the development of new soci-
etal solutions and new knowledge and ideas as key activities or general primary 
goal of their organizations. They stressed, though, that—as elaborated above—
the LandFrauen organizations often contribute to societal or local solutions 
through identifying and naming problems and societal needs quite early, and in 
bringing them into political processes and societal debate: “What defines us is 
that we pass on information and network with experts” (Int. 18).
 (2) Secondly, the LandFrauen have bridging functions in their villages and rural 
areas and build new relations among actors in their local and political work, and 
thus contribute to social innovation as “reconfigured social relations” (Moulaert 
& MacCallum, 2019, p. 50). Several interviewees stated that LandFrauen func-
tion as a “motor” (Int. 02) in the country and take initiative for joint local activi-
ties and projects. The interviewees hereby raised the relevance of the LandFrauen 
as politically neutral intermediates, gathering further partners together through 
“an associational structure that networks well with others. They are very cre-
ative in getting women who have often moved here to be involved” (Int. 05). 
The federal-state and national LandFrauen associations are integrated into 
broad networks and cooperation with external partners, as well as they are rep-
resented in external political committees, working groups, and in boards of fur-
ther organizations related to their fields of expertise. Several interviewees 
named good relations to project partners—locally, as well as on the federal state 
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level, such as educational organizations, saving banks, health insurances, as 
well as further associations and clubs or actors from the philanthropic field (see 
Chap. 9 by Glückler and Suarsana), ministries, or politicians:
The State Secretary for Digitalization just said he brings digitalization to [the federal state] 
together with the LandFrauen. Because he also knows what kind of network we have and 
how many we are. (Int. 01)
 (3) Thirdly, in their educational and political activities, as well as in their encour-
agement and mobilization of women to “speak up” (Int. 11) and engage in local 
politics or societal debate, LandFrauen (in the local clubs as well as on higher 
associational and geographical levels) relate to social innovation in the dimen-
sion of “empowerment or political mobilization” (Moulaert & MacCallum, 
2019, p. 4)—be it in single organized events, such as demonstrations for equal 
pay or for mother’s rents, in long-term projects, or in encouraging direct 
involvement of women in political processes. Their raising awareness on topics 
like gender equality and the structural disadvantages women face, racism, or 
ecological issues among elderly and rural women (Int. 02, 04, 11, 18) can be 
especially highlighted, as these women may be expected to only sparsely 
involve into the related societal discourses.
 Prerequisites—What Facilitates LandFrauen Practices Towards 
Social Innovation?
In this second part of the discussion, I address the question how these civil society 
organizations achieve the illustrated—planned, and unplanned—societal benefits as 
valuable outcomes, especially for rural areas. I argue that activities mainly depend 
on two key prerequisites that enable LandFrauen to their activities and creates a 
ground for the promotion of societal change: Firstly, local contextualization—
LandFrauen adapt to local conditions and needs, and activities are shaped and influ-
enced by local and regional conditions and the collective agency of contextualized 
individuals in the understanding of Cajaiba-Santana (2014, see also Subsection 2). 
Secondly, in parallel, the clubs and associations as an institutional frame have 
enabling and structuring functions, with informal, as well as formal cooperation and 
networks across the horizontal and vertical structure. This institutional embedded-
ness has been raised as a success factor for social innovation by Moulaert et  al. 
(2013, p. 18).
 (1) Local contextualization, the diverse and broad membership base, and the orga-
nizational network is a capacity and a ground for local engagement and politi-
cal work.
The LandFrauen members and representatives and their local voluntary engage-
ment are context-specific, deeply rooted in their local village contexts, and inte-
grated into local fields of actors. A large share of activities unfolds at the very local 
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level, with actors adapting the specific needs identified by individual local boards 
and members. Interviewees named the broad network and the high number of rep-
resented women, which the associations reach in their activities, as a strength that 
makes the associations and clubs multipliers and relevant partners for political and 
non-state actors, as well as a basis for the diffusion of innovative practices into rural 
societies. The LandFrauen represent the full diversity of women in rural areas, they 
are politically neutral, and inter-confessional. Due to their broad and diverse base of 
members, they have the capacity to jointly develop quick, creative, and pragmatic 
solutions to local challenges and mobilize local individuals and resources for their 
implementation. Therefore, interviewees stated, external partners perceive and 
appreciate LandFrauen as reliable, pragmatic, and influential. Further, the large base 
of members can function as a source of legitimacy for the associations in their polit-
ical demands and their taking position in public debate.
The interaction within and across the local clubs and groups of LandFrauen can 
be considered as “local buzz”—an “information and communication ecology cre-
ated by face-to-face-contacts, copresence, and colocation” with “intended and 
unanticipated learning processes in organizational and accidental meetings” sup-
porting the “development of shared values, attitudes and interactive schemes typical 
for communities of practice” (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004 p. 38). As dis-
cussed above, these enable the LandFrauen to engage in interactive learning and 
problem solving (p. 45)—supported through the common goals and interests.
Further, interviewees stated that LandFrauen have a strong and noticed position 
in political processes—a statement that can be backed by the fact that on the 
LandFrauen Days I participated, several high-ranking politicians—from Chancellor 
Angela Merkel to the Federal Minister of Agriculture—personally spoke to the 
women and stressed their role and importance for rural areas and society. Regarding 
local activities, interviewees illustrated close relations and good cooperation with 
various local organizations and partners, for example from politics and administra-
tion or the philanthropic field (see Chap. 9 by Glückler and Suarsana).
Interviewees illustrated the relevance of the LandFrauen network as a source of 
institutionalized support, as well as its quick reaction to societal problems, by the 
example of voluntary production of face masks during the beginning of the Corona 
pandemic in places all over Germany, on large scales of often hundreds or thou-
sands. The clubs’ and members’ local networks organized the distribution in coop-
eration “with other organizations . . . You’ve seen it spread like a spider’s web” 
(Int. 15).
 (2) Institutional embeddedness allows for vertical and horizontal cooperation, 
exchange, and access to resources across the associational levels and “beyond 
geography” (Bathelt, Cohendet, Henn, & Simon, 2017, p. 11).
A broad range of diverse perspectives and individuals are joined through a sense 
of community and common understandings and practices. In this, the Land 
Frauen can be considered as institutions, “ongoing and stable patterns of repeated 
social interaction, based on mutual expectations that owe their existence to purpose-
ful constitution or unintentional emergence” (Glückler & Bathelt, 2017, p. 121). 
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The clubs and associations “stabilize interaction and correlated patterns of behav-
iour” (Setterfield, 1993, as cited in Bathelt, Cohendet, Henn, & Simon, 2017, p. 4), 
and “as collective actors . . . align resources and interests in pursuit of a common 
goal” (Glückler & Bathelt, 2017, p. 122).
Despite differences and high heterogeneity, the LandFrauen clubs and associa-
tions form a stable organizational context that pre-structures the local, regional, and 
national common activities and create frameworks for the practices and joint activi-
ties of their members and representatives, as well as the cooperation with external 
partners. The members and representatives are deeply rooted in their local as well 
as specific associational contexts. In parallel, an often-stated feeling of community, 
belonging, and social proximity creates the basis for further activities and is also felt 
on higher geographical/associational levels. This sense of community and the 
underlying social relations and activities support institutionalized exchange and 
form the basis for societal engagement and for educational and political work.
The local clubs, socially rooted in the villages and rural society, are integrated 
into an inter-regional organizational network where ideas, concepts, and knowl-
edge, as well as resources and institutional support are exchanged and diffuse across 
geographical and associational levels. The underlying and permeable vertical and 
horizontal organizational structure allows for the quick dissemination of ideas, 
practices, and knowledge, and to spread information into the rural area. This is sup-
ported and supplemented by underlying social ties and informal exchange.
Further, the higher aggregated associational levels, their broad network, allows 
for the implementation of larger projects, partly government-funded or co-funded 
by external partners. They create access to external resources and support and pro-
vide opportunities for funding, educational offers, as well as they train multipliers 
that reach out to the specific regions.
Not only the local clubs, but also associations on higher organizational levels 
benefit from institutional embeddedness and horizontal and vertical connectivity: 
Through inner-associational representation, formal and informal exchange, and 
connections among the associational levels, issues and topics are transported from 
the bottom up into the higher associational levels. From there, “good connections 
into state politics as well as federal politics” (Int. 16) are used to set agenda in politi-
cal processes.
In their activities and the local and societal functions, LandFrauen—as well as 
their clubs and associations as collective actors—can be conceptualized as “key 
players of socio-spatial change” in the dimensions identified by Gailing and Ibert 
(2016, p. 391): (1) On the micro-level, as “leaders”, they may create a “mood of 
optimism” among local followers and generate or “initiate demonstration projects” 
(p. 400). This applies to engaged individual and board members in the local clubs 
that—as learnt from the interviews—are highly influential on the local activities and 
offerings. Further, this can be related to the manifold context-specific activities indi-
vidual LandFrauen conduct to improve their local villages. (2) As intermediaries or 
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“boundary spanners” on a meso-level15 (pp. 393–394), they mobilize “external, ter-
ritorial rooted knowledge as well as institutional and cultural resources in favor of a 
space” (p.  400). Throughout the inner-associational structure, knowledge, ideas, 
and institutional support are accessible from the higher associational levels as well 
as from further partners from other regions on the same horizontal level. (3) Further, 
on a macro-level, “governance-pioneers” are stated to “prepare ways or modes of 
governance, collective arenas for action, and in changing policy content” (p. 400). 
This may hold for the LandFrauen associations as collective actors in their interest 
representation, political work, and lobby activity on the federal-state and national 
level. In this combination of activities, they may—intentionally or unintention-
ally—contribute to “transition, creativity, innovation, [and] path creation” (p. 400) 
and to societal change.
 Conclusion
By the example of the LandFrauen clubs and associations, this chapter has illus-
trated how civil society practices can relate to social change in rural areas of 
Germany, and how relational connections to many other partners at local and above 
local level enable civil society organizations to further social change and social 
innovation. The results indicate that agents of social innovation need to adapt to 
local needs, while in parallel, this presents associations with the challenge to align 
their often centralized structures and goals with the diversity of local challenges and 
local partners.
The empirics have shown that, although the 10,000 local clubs and regional and 
federal state associations are highly individual and heterogeneous, they can be 
attributed relevant roles in social change and social innovation and as educational, 
social, and political institutions. This case study revealed manifold practices through 
which the LandFrauen, as an element of German associational life and rural society, 
contribute to social change and social innovation—as initiators, as supporters, as 
catalysts in external or joint activities with partners, or as regional multipliers in the 
diffusion of knowledge, debates, or practices directed towards contemporary soci-
etal challenges. Through interest representation, mobilization, and intensively local, 
as well as nationwide exchange, LandFrauen identify and call attention to problems 
of rural communities, and jointly develop and implement related ideas and solutions.
Apart from their traditional associational and social functions (Putnam, 2000; 
Warren, 2001; Zimmer, 2007), the LandFrauen are unique in their spectrum of 
activities and their engagement for women and the rural spaces in Germany. They 
provide social, cultural, and educational infrastructure. They bring issues into soci-
etal debate and into political process through advocacy and identifying and naming 
15 Richter (2019) has identified similar functions for rurally embedded social enterprises, for which 
he, among further aspects, identifies the re-contextualization of ideas as “embedded intermediar-
ies” and information brokers (pp. 185−186) as key functions.
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challenges and problems of women and in rural areas. In this, they contribute to the 
public sphere (Calhoun, 2011; Habermas, 1962/1989) and set societal and political 
agenda. They promote societal change as they diffuse contemporary societal debates 
and solutions, and related knowledge, into rural areas. Through practical local 
engagement, clubs and associations actively engage to improve rural areas and the 
situation of women, and through respective projects and activities they implement 
creative and innovative solutions for rural areas. On higher associational (as well as 
geographical) levels, representation of interests is a focal activity, whereas the clubs, 
associations, and their local activities serve as a pre-political space of debate and 
discussion. They mobilize and empower women as well as represent their interests 
locally, throughout the federal states, and nationwide. They create awareness in the 
rural periphery of broader societal and political issues concerning women and the 
rural areas, and they support female engagement in politics through support and 
coaching in the field of political and associational work. LandFrauen connect, 
empower, and mobilize women for political and associational engagement, and they 
support female (self-)employment.
As prerequisites enabling LandFrauen to pursue their activities, I identified two 
key characteristics: Firstly, the institutional frame of clubs and associations allows 
for support, cooperation, and exchange across the vertical and horizontal structure, 
and provides access to resources and a broad network to external partners. 
LandFrauen organizations create institutional environments that allow for processes 
and practices of joint learning, interaction, and the diffusion of knowledge and 
ideas, as well as providing institutionalized support and encouraging debate and 
joint activities among the organizations, the local members, and its representatives. 
The associations thereby fulfil transmitting functions between the local members 
and higher associational (and geographical levels), as well as representing the mem-
bers in broader political and societal contexts. The stable organizational structure of 
clubs and associations—as social and political institutions—are based on the broad 
representation of their diverse membership base, especially in rural areas, and on 
the specific horizontal and vertical interwoven organizational structure. They create 
temporary as well as timely stable and ongoing spaces for learning and exchange, 
and enable women to engage in practices of social, educational, and political activ-
ity, as well as in activity to improve the living conditions in their rural (or urban) 
surrounding. Secondly, the activities towards social change, especially on the very 
local level of villages and communities, unfold contextualized on the ground of the 
broad, diverse, and deeply locally rooted membership base in the rural areas. The 
local LandFrauen, the individual members and their clubs, are strongly integrated 
and embedded into local fields of actors and rural society.
In this, the LandFrauen as “key players in socio-spatial change” (Gailing & Ibert, 
2016, p. 391) connect the local rural villages and their female members with women, 
internal and external partners, and societal developments from outside the local 
context. On a meso- and macro-level, they enter into political debate and put 
LandFrauen positions and problems on societal and political agenda. Potential for 
further research on the LandFrauen may lie in the debate on criteria of success for 
the implementation of social innovation practices against the background of their 
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external relations from a field-oriented perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; see 
also Chap. 9 by Glückler and Suarsana).
Brandsen, Evers, Cattacin, and Zimmer (2016a) stress that social innovations are 
precarious in that “they are often timely limited and do to a large part not further 
diffuse out of their local context” (p. 307). This study is limited to the LandFrauen 
practices towards social change, and their prerequisites. A deeper analysis of the 
LandFrauen’s external relations, and how their ideas, solutions, and practices unfold 
further among the actors throughout organizational fields, might shed further light 
on the conditions for the successful implementation of social innovation in (rural) 
society.
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Chapter 6
Schools of Democracy? Giving Circles 
and the Civic and Political Participation 
of Collaborative Philanthropists
Angela M. Eikenberry
The New River Valley Change Network, a group of about 12 individuals with vary-
ing backgrounds and experiences, meets once a month in members’ homes and 
offices in Blacksburg, Virginia, to give away money they contribute to a fund held 
at the local community foundation. Each member donates about $10 a month or 
$100 a year. Members decide together, through a consensus decision- making pro-
cess, where to give their money. The group occasionally invites community experts 
and activists to their meetings to learn about projects or organizations in need of 
funding. They prefer to fund small organizations and endeavors that might lead to 
social change.
Washington Womenade holds volunteer- organized potluck dinners where attend-
ees donate $35 to a fund that provides financial assistance to individuals who need 
help paying for prescriptions, utility bills, rent, and so on. “Members” show up 
when they choose, and the focus of time together is highly social. In 2002, a Real 
Simple magazine story on Washington Womenade led to the creation of dozens of 
unaffiliated Womenade groups across the country. This article also inspired Marsha 
Wallace to launch Dining for Women, now a US- based national network of more 
than 400 chapters across the country in which women meet for dinner monthly and 
pool funds they would have spent eating out, to support internationally based grass-
roots programs helping women around the world.
BeyondMe is an expanding network of small teams made up of young profes-
sionals. Members of each team select a charity or social enterprise to support for 
one year after reviewing brief proposals, often requiring a “Dragon’s Den” or 
“Shark’s Tank” pitch by the charity or social enterprise as part of the selection pro-
cess. Members, on average, donate £4,000 and 150 volunteer hours to the chosen 
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organization. Teams support a variety of causes, including jobless young offenders, 
homeless youth, and women who have experienced abuse and sexual exploitation. 
BeyondMe’s staff and most teams are based in London, UK.
The groups described above—called giving circles—are examples of a growing 
movement emerging across the US, the UK, and elsewhere. They are philanthropic 
voluntary associations1 that involve individuals pooling resources to support organi-
zations and individuals of mutual interest. They also include social, educational, 
and engagement opportunities for volunteer members, connecting participants to 
charities, communities, and one another. Although giving circles come in a range of 
sizes and foci, these groups’ key and defining attributes are that they involve indi-
viduals who together decide on support for organizations (and sometimes individu-
als) through giving money (and sometimes time). They also informally or formally 
educate members about philanthropy, charities, and issues in the community; 
include a social dimension; engage members in grant making and running the 
group; and typically maintain independence from any one charity or social enter-
prise (Eikenberry, 2007, 2009). Hundreds of giving circles have been identified 
across the US, and a growing number have formed in the UK and elsewhere 
(Bearman, 2007a, 2007b; Bearman, Carboni, Eikenberry, & Franklin, 2017; 
Eikenberry, 2009; Eikenberry & Bearman, 2009; Eikenberry & Breeze, 2015; John, 
Tan, & Ito, 2013; Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, 2009; Rutnik & Bearman, 2005).
Giving circles are much like the voluntary groups—where individuals volun-
tarily come together to accomplish a purpose—that have been a staple of the 
American and British landscape for some time; one can see similarities in Women’s 
Clubs and Kiwanis, Rotary, or book club or church groups. However, what makes 
giving circles different is their express philanthropic purpose (i.e., they are created 
to give money or other resources to organizations or causes), the environment in 
1 Philanthropy’s meaning and manifestations have changed a good deal throughout history, as 
Merle Curti (1968/1973) articulates. Scholars today have come to broadly define it as the act of 
giving money and other resources, including time, to aid individuals, causes, and organizations. 
Payton and Moody (2008) define it as “voluntary action for the public good.” Philanthropy is a 
term distinct from nonprofit and tax- exempt organizations, charities, and voluntary associations, 
though all are interrelated. Voluntary associations predate (as those described by Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835/2000) in Democracy in America), continue to exist alongside, or sometimes 
become nonprofit and charitable organizations. They are made up of individuals who voluntarily 
come together to accomplish a purpose and range from informal self- help or study groups to more 
formal organized groups such as the Kiwanis or League of Women Voters. A main characteristic of 
a voluntary association is that it is run by volunteers (Driskell & Wise, 2017). Nonprofit organiza-
tions are those organizations designated in the United States by a state as a nonprofit corporation 
and often by the US Internal Revenue Service as tax- exempt. The term nonprofit, then, is used to 
designate a legal and regulatory status for an organization that typically does work related to the 
arts, education, health care, and social welfare. Nonprofit organizations can be quite diverse, rang-
ing from small, human service organizations, such as homeless shelters or arts centers, to large, 
federated organizations, such as the American Red Cross or Salvation Army, to substantially 
endowed universities, hospitals, and foundations. Charity is a legal term used in the UK to define 
organizations established for charitable purposes only and is subject to the control of the High 
Court’s charity law jurisdiction.
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which they have emerged and in which they operate, and their typically informal 
and independent structures. Giving circles represent a transformation in the way 
less affluent people are attempting to address community problems through giving 
and volunteering manifested in the “new philanthropy” environment. They demys-
tify the philanthropic process and enable individuals to do something charitable, in 
their own way (Eikenberry, 2009). This is a response to and reflection of larger 
changes taking place in a society that is increasingly individualized and where tra-
ditional federated associations are losing their grassroots natures (Hustinx, 2010; 
Lorentzen & Hustinx, 2007; Painter & Paxton, 2014).
As the authors of the literature below describe, much has been written or specu-
lated about traditional voluntary associations as “schools of democracy,” teaching 
people civic skills and virtues and serving as avenues for civic and political partici-
pation. Many scholars have questioned and tested the validity of these claims and 
the degree of cause and effect between voluntary association membership and civic 
and political participation, generally finding positive relationships, but with some 
variations by level and length of participation and type of association. Debate con-
tinues about the degree to which voluntary associations cause greater civic and 
political engagement or attract people already prone to such engagement. However, 
the authors of existing research mainly focus on traditional associations and large- -
scale data sets that make it difficult to unpack the “conditions needed to encourage 
people… to develop civic virtues and skills and get involved in politics” (Dekker, 
2014, p. 56); they also tend to put little focus on philanthropy, which is inherently a 
political act but not often acknowledged as such (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2013). This 
is important because policy actors have increasingly looked to philanthropy and 
nongovernmental institutions to address community problems, including support-
ing areas of basic needs and education (Giridharadas, 2018; Henriksen, Smith, & 
Zimmer, 2012; Pharoah, 2011).
Studying giving circles enables addressing some of these issues by asking the 
question: Does participation in these new forms of philanthropic voluntary associa-
tion lead members to increase their civic and political participation? That is, do 
giving circles serve as schools of democracy by providing educational or other fea-
tures that lead participants to become more civically or politically engaged? 
Indicators of civic participation include: giving, volunteering, and participation in 
efforts to address community problems. Indicators of political participation include 
participation in efforts to change government policy and participation in other polit-
ical activities such as voting and contacting public officials (Keeter, Zukin, Andolina, 
& Jenkins, 2002; van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009). To examine the research ques-
tion, I draw on data gathered in the US and the UK through surveys of current and 
past members of various types of giving circles and control groups of donors not in 
giving circles, as well as semi- structured interviews with giving circle members. I 
focused my data collection on the US and the UK because they have the longest 
established and largest number of giving circles globally. Although the two coun-
tries’ philanthropic cultures differ in important ways, as described below, both have 
promoted philanthropy and voluntary association as policy alternatives to public 
social welfare and as a response to public sector austerity.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: First, I provide an overview of the 
relevant literature pertaining to the research focus, starting with a discussion of 
voluntary associations and their relationship to civic and political participation as 
schools of democracy, moving on to the changing social and philanthropic environ-
ment, and finally discussing giving circles. Second, I outline an overview of my 
methodology. Thirdly, I present my findings. I finish the paper with discussion and 
conclusions.
 Voluntary Associations, the Changing Environment 
and Giving Circles
Voluntary associations have long been viewed as important mechanisms for pro-
moting democracy, an idea often attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville’s (1835/2000) 
observations during his tour of America in the early 19th century. Tocqueville 
believed that through engagement in voluntary associations, citizens learned civic 
virtues and skills, participated directly in governance, and improved the quality and 
equality of representation in governance—they served as schools of democracy 
(Fung, 2003; Lichterman, 2006). Building on Tocqueville’s observations, scholars 
see voluntary associations as a means for citizens to achieve the virtues necessary 
for democratic citizenship: trust, moderation, compromise, reciprocity, and skills of 
democratic discussion and organization (Newton, 1997; Warren, 2001). Almond 
and Verba (1963/1989), in their comparative analysis of political culture in five 
countries, showed that voluntary association membership had a positive impact on 
civic and political competence. Putnam (1993, 2000) also suggested members of 
voluntary associations display more political sophistication, social trust, and civic 
and political participation than others. Further, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
found voluntary associations of all types provide opportunities for “the acquisition 
of politically relevant resources and the enhancement of a sense of psychological 
engagement with politics” (p. 4). They note that even when individuals pursue activ-
ities with no direct political content, such as chairing a committee to arrange a 
fundraising event, they have opportunities to develop organizational and communi-
cation skills that are relevant for politics and learn to tolerate and to deal with 
diverging opinions. McLeod et al. (1996) contend voluntary associations can pro-
vide exposure to political cues, social contact, and recruitment networks that facili-
tate civic and political participation; Musick and Wilson (2008) write that 
engagement in voluntary associations can make people more aware of what is hap-
pening in their community and the structural nature of social problems and the need 
for political solutions.
Many have questioned and tested the validity of these claims and the degree of 
cause and effect between voluntary association membership and civic and political 
participation in numerous countries and contexts (e.g., Dekker, 2014; Dekker & van 
den Broek, 1998; Howard & Gilbert, 2008; Jeong, 2013; Newton & Montero, 2007; 
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Parry, Moyser, & Day, 1992; Schulz & Bailer, 2012; van der Meer & van Ingen, 
2009; van Deth, 1997), generally finding positive relationships with some excep-
tions and variations by level and length of participation and type of association. In 
particular, scholars disagree on the importance of “intensity” of participation and 
connection to civic and political participation. Putnam (1993, 2000) highlighted the 
importance of active (face- to- face) versus passive (check- writing) involvement in 
associations’ impact on social capital and participation. Others have found intensity 
to have little or no significant effect (Almond & Verba, 1989; van der Meer & van 
Ingen, 2009; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wollebæk & Selle, 2003). However, 
Wollebæk and Selle (2003) found in relation to social capital a cumulative effect of 
participation when the member belongs to several associations simultaneously.
There is also debate about the socialization effect of voluntary associations—
that associations make citizens civically and politically active—versus a selection 
effect—that certain personality traits stimulate citizens to join voluntary associa-
tions and engage in political activities at the same time, without a causal relation 
between the two (Armingeon, 2007). Through their study of 17 European countries, 
van der Meer and van Ingen (2009) found the additional effects of “active” partici-
pation were marginal and the correlation between associational involvement and 
political action was not explained by the accumulation of civic skills and civic 
mindedness through the association. They concluded that “voluntary associations 
are not the schools of democracy they are proclaimed to be, but rather pools of 
democracy” (p. 281); that is, “voluntary associations do not make citizens politi-
cally active, but bring politically active citizens together” (p. 303). Dekker (2014) 
also surmised based on his analyses of more than a dozen countries’ voluntary asso-
ciation participation data that for some people, involvement in voluntary associa-
tions and voluntary work are stepping stones towards politics, whereas for others it 
offers an opportunity of doing something for the community without getting 
involved in politics. In other words, participation in associations has different effects 
depending on the person. Thus, within the literature on the connection between 
voluntary associations and civic and political participation, there is need for more 
work to “unpack the conditions” that lead people to get involved in community 
affairs and politics (Dekker, 2014, p. 56). Researchers looking at the connections 
between voluntary association and civic and political participation have so far done 
little to account for societal shifts and changes in participation in traditional social 
structures.
Scholars suggest that societies are in the midst of a social transformation from 
“collectivistic” to “individualistic” and “institutionalized” to “self- organized” 
(Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003, p. 168). Social relations have changed from being 
close to loose, permanent to provisional, and thorough to superficial (Gundelach & 
Torpe, 1996, p. 12). Beck describes society as increasingly characterized by the dis-
solution of traditional parameters and “variation and differentiation of lifestyles and 
forms of life, opposing the thinking behind the traditional categories of large- group 
societies…” (as cited in Ellison, 1997, pp.  711–712). In this context, traditional 
“voluntary associations have become optional” (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996, p. 13) 
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and indeed, active membership in such associations, at least in the US, appears to be 
in decline (Painter & Paxton, 2014; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 2002).
Scholars have documented the growing use of informal, self- organized, and 
decentralized initiatives. The emergence of small, self- help support groups and 
peer- to- peer sharing (e.g., Archibald, 2007; Borkman, Karlsson, Munn- Giddings, & 
Smith, 2005; Wuthnow, 1994) as well as “network associations”—looser, more 
informal, and personal forms of association (Fung, 2003; Gundelach & Torpe, 1996; 
Wuthnow, 1998)—are, according to Wuthnow (1994), rooted in both a breakdown 
of traditional support structures—neighborhoods and family—and a continuing 
desire for community; they have “emerged as a serious effort to combat forces of 
fragmentation and anonymity in our society” (p. 40). Within these types of small 
and informal associations, engagement is often directed toward concrete problem 
solving in everyday life. Individuals want (or have) to cope with day- to- day prob-
lems on their own terms and in their own way; unlike previous generations, they are 
uninterested in engagement that is full- time and life- long (Bang & Sørensen, 1999; 
Macduff, 2005; van der Pennen & Schreuders, 2014). Wuthnow (1998) writes that 
“instead of cultivating lifelong ties with their neighbors, or joining organizations 
that reward faithful long- term service, people come together around specific needs 
and to work on projects that have definite objectives” (p. 8).
Giving circles are indicative of this trend in shifting organizational structures and 
desire for more hands- on engagement. Studies of the landscape of giving circles in 
the US and the UK (Eikenberry, 2009; Eikenberry & Breeze, 2015) show that many 
are formed of small groups and networks, and that participants view giving through 
the giving circle as a much more proactive approach to philanthropy than has tradi-
tionally been the case. One of the most often cited reasons people say they join 
giving circles is the chance to become more engaged in the giving process—to be 
doing more than just writing a check and also interacting directly with nonprofit 
organizations. Some also say they appreciate the simple, nonbureaucratic nature of 
the giving circle—it’s fun, and a chance to be social “while doing good” 
(Eikenberry, 2007).
But what do these new forms of association mean for engaging individuals in 
civic and political areas? Based on interviews and document analysis, Eikenberry 
(2009) found giving circles generally provide opportunities for democratic partici-
pation within the group—they provide opportunities for agenda setting, decision 
making and face- to- face deliberative discourse—and they also build members’ 
capacities through education about voluntary organizations, community issues, and 
philanthropy. Many groups in the US emphasize formal donor education (Bearman, 
2007b; Eikenberry, 2009; Moody, 2008). Do giving circles—as new and emerging 
forms of philanthropic voluntary associations— increase civic and political partici-





In this section, I provide an overview of the methodology I used to address the 
research question. I gathered data primarily through surveys of giving circle mem-
bers and control groups of people not in giving circles, supplemented by interviews 
with giving circle members in the US and UK. I describe these methods in more 
detail below.
I focused my data collection on the US and UK because these countries have the 
longest established and largest number of giving circles globally and because both 
countries have in recent years promoted philanthropy and voluntary association as 
policy alternatives to public social welfare and as a response to public sector auster-
ity. However, the UK has a very different philanthropic culture than the US—where 
the US has long touted itself as the most philanthropic of nations and philanthropy 
enjoys historical popularity, in the UK, as Wright (2001) notes, “while it has enjoyed 
a very recent renewal of interest . . . for many in Britain it still carries disparaging 
connotations of Victorian ‘do- gooderism’ and is often seen as elitist, patronizing, 
morally judgmental, and ineffective, as well as old- fashioned and out- of- date. . . . It 
is perceived as an idea whose time came, was proved unworkable, and went—to be 
replaced by a universal, fair, and more efficient welfare- state” (p. 400). This has 
been changing in recent years as there have been a number of efforts to promote 
charitable giving and strengthen the culture of philanthropy in the UK (Pharoah, 
2011; The Philanthropy Review, 2011; Sargeant & Breeze, 2004; Walker, 2014), 
with the emergence of giving circles due in part to these efforts.
Eikenberry and Breeze (2015) outline similarities and differences between giv-
ing circles in the US and UK. Structurally, both countries have similar types of 
groups, including some that are focused on specific demographic groups such as 
young professionals. The UK also has some types of giving circles, such as the live 
crowd- funding model, that are unique to it. In both countries, giving circles are typi-
cally initiated by someone who heard about or had the idea themselves; they are 
seen as an alternative to “mainstream” philanthropy, partially focus on developing 
philanthropy, and many emphasize networking/socializing. In the UK, there is addi-
tional focus on “normalizing” giving in a context that lacks widespread cultural 
affirmation for philanthropy. There is also a larger focus on the pursuit of solidarity 
and social change. In both countries, giving circles mainly give money (and time) 
and feature various decision- making processes and types of events. Those in the UK 
generally appear to place less emphasis on grant- making due diligence and instead 
rely on trust in fellow members and beneficiaries. UK groups also appear more staff 
driven and put less emphasis on formal educational programming. Although mem-
bers in both countries come from a mixture of backgrounds, the total percentage of 
race/ethnicity, women, or other identity- based groups is lower in the UK.
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 Surveys
My colleagues and I administered surveys of giving circle members and control 
groups of people not in giving circles in the US and the UK. We originally adminis-
tered a survey in the US to understand if and how participation in a giving circle has 
changed members’ behavior related to giving, volunteering, and civic and political 
engagement. In addition, we asked if and how participation in a giving circle 
changed members’ awareness or knowledge about philanthropy, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and community issues. Finally, we wanted to know if and how participation 
in a giving circle changed members’ perceptions or attitudes about philanthropy, 
community issues, government and nonprofit roles and responsibilities, and politi-
cal and social values. With our UK survey, we updated and revised the US version 
to address some cultural differences as well as to improve its usefulness for the giv-
ing circles that participated in the survey, while also trying to maintain questions 
that could be used for comparison across countries. In presenting the data reported 
below, I focus on the findings related to civic and political behaviors.2
We constructed and administered the US survey via paper and internet between 
November 2007 and April 2008. The sample included 26 giving circles, drawn from 
the Forum of Regional Association of Grantmakers’ giving circle database, consist-
ing of giving circles that represented various types and sizes and identity groups 
(e.g., women, African- American, young professionals) in order to get a broad cross- -
section of data. The giving circles in the sample also represented a range in terms of 
years of existence and geographic locations. In choosing this sample, we also took 
into consideration earlier studies that had been published on particular giving cir-
cles. We recruited giving circle members and past members through giving circle 
leadership in each giving circle in the sample. The control group included a random 
sample of donors to a University Foundation supplemented with a nonrandom sam-
ple of public administration graduate students and alumni.
We administered the UK survey online between April 2014 and February 2015. 
Seven giving circles or networks of circles participated in the study, including those 
representing a diversity of types of giving circles in the UK, with an oversampling 
of young philanthropist groups. It was fairly reflective of the broader landscape of 
giving circles in the UK, as young philanthropist groups account for the largest 
number of circles and participants. The control group was made up of a UK 
university’s donors and of people who said they were just starting with a giving 
circle (had been members for less than one month).
For the US, we sent surveys to approximately 890 giving circle members and 938 
individuals in the control group—a total of 1,828 people. We estimated the overall 
response rate at 37%. The response rate was 48% for giving circle members and 
23% for the control group. Giving circle respondents in the US sample were 
2 See a copy of the US survey here: https://www.academia.edu/12175637/The_Impact_of_Giving_




significantly more likely to be female, from diverse racial/ethnic groups, and older 
on average than the control group. In addition, giving circle members attended reli-
gious services significantly less frequently than the control group. Regarding politi-
cal orientation, giving circle members were more significantly likely to describe 
themselves as liberal or middle- of- the- road compared to the control group. Finally, 
there was a large difference between giving circle members and the control group in 
the amount they say their households donated to charity over the past year. The 
mean for giving circle members was $7,682 compared to $4,945 for the control 
group. This difference was statistically significant. However, the average annual 
family income of giving circle members was also significantly higher than the con-
trol group: around $106,500 compared to around $90,000. There was no significant 
difference between giving circle members and the control group for educational 
level, years living in current community, marital status, and number of children.
For the UK survey, we emailed about 4,184 people the survey link (through con-
tacts at each giving circle or network) and 507 people answered part or all of the 
survey—an overall response rate of 12.1%. Ultimately, there were 359 useable 
responses—201 giving group respondents and 158 control group respondents. The 
demographic characteristics of the UK giving circle and control group respondents 
were largely similar except for a few areas: Giving circle respondents were signifi-
cantly more likely to be 30 to 39 years old, say they found it “difficult to get by on 
present income,” and to be married. They were significantly less likely to be male, 
from an Asian ethnicity, retired, living in the Southeast of England, living in their 
community less than one year, and single. There were no significant differences for 
mean age, ranges in income, education, or religious attendance. The UK survey did 
not include a question about political orientation.
Dependent variables included in the survey to measure civic and political partici-
pation featured the following (drawing on Keeter et al., 2002; van der Meer & van 
Ingen, 2009):
• Giving: measured by asking all respondents for their best estimate of the total 
amount they contributed during the past 12 months (US) or month (UK). Giving 
circle members were also asked about the degree to which their giving had 
changed due to the giving circle.
• Volunteering: measured by asking all respondents for their best estimate of the 
total number of hours they had volunteered during the past month (asked in the 
UK only). Giving circle members in the US and UK were also asked about the 
degree to which the amount of time they volunteer changed due to the giv-
ing circle.
• Efforts to address problems in the community: measured by asking giving 
circle members in both countries about the degree to which their participation in 
efforts to address problems in the community changed due to the giving circle.
• Efforts to change government policy: measured by asking giving circle mem-
bers in both countries about the degree to which their participation in efforts to 
change government policies at the local, national, or international levels changed 
due to the giving circle.
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• Participation in civic and political activities: measured by asking all respon-
dents in both countries if they had participated in certain activities during the past 
year such as: working with others to solve a problem in the community; voting; 
talking to others about an election or campaign; signing a petition about a social 
or political issue; and other items noted in more detail below.
The above dependent variables were examined in relation to four independent 
variables:
• Participation in a giving circle: measured by asking all respondents if they 
belonged to a giving circle or giving group, defined in the US survey as “a group 
of individuals who pool money and other resources and decide together where to 
give these away. This does not include donor recognition programs that nonprofit 
organizations use to honor donors.” It was defined in the UK survey as: “A giving 
group involves individuals collectively donating money and/or time to support 
charitable organizations, projects or individuals. Participants in the group typi-
cally have input on how funding or other support is spent and often participate in 
discussions and social and educational events about philanthropy and the chari-
table sector.”
• Level of participation within a giving circle: measured by asking giving circle 
members about the degree to which they had participated in certain activities 
within a giving circle in the past 12 months (US) or had participated in as a mem-
ber of the giving group (UK), such as taking part in deciding who received fund-
ing, going on site visits, volunteering with a funding recipient, doing research, or 
holding leadership position(s).
• Length of time participating in a giving circle: measured by asking giving 
circle members how long they had been a member of a giving circle (US) or had 
participated in the giving group (UK). If a respondent indicated being in more 
than one giving circle, they were asked to answer based on the giving circle they 
had participated in the longest.
• Participation in multiple giving circles: measured by asking giving circle 
members how many giving circles they currently belong to (US) or number of 
giving groups in which they had participated in the past five years (UK).
These four independent variables can provide some indication of the degree to 
which giving circles may serve as “schools” increasing civic and political participa-
tion. If giving circles serve as schools increasing civic and political participation, we 
would see not only that people in a giving circle would have higher participation 
than to those not in giving circles, but this participation would rise with more 
engagement (in one or more giving circles) and length of engagement.
To analyze the survey data, we calculated frequencies and percentages for all 
items and means when applicable. We created descriptive statistics based on all 
respondents, comparing giving group respondents to control group respondents, and 
comparing across giving groups. We then created crosstabs using SPSS Custom 
Tables for questions that contained at least one nominal response field. We per-
formed T- tests to determine whether means were statistically significantly different 
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between the giving circle and control group response, and calculated the Pearson 
Correlation to measure the strength of the relationship between level of engagement 
and dependent variables. We utilized the one- way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
determine whether there were any statistically significant differences between con-
tinuous numeric variables, as was the case with length of engagement and number 
of giving circles, and dependent variables.
 Interviews
In the US, we conducted 30 interviews with a purposively selected sample of mem-
bers from 11 giving circles. Giving circle leaders helped make contact with mem-
bers. We interviewed giving circle members with varying levels of involvement in 
the group, length of membership, gender and gender orientation, profession, and 
racial/ethnic identity. They were also members of different types of giving circles. 
Interviews were conducted on the telephone, recorded, and transcribed. They took 
place between December 26th, 2007, and May 23rd, 2008, and ranged from 22 
minutes to 55 minutes, with the average length 36 minutes.
In the UK, we conducted 26 interviews with a sample of members from 14 giv-
ing circles. We selected a sample of giving circles that included a range of charac-
teristics based on size, structure, geographic location, and demographic make- up, 
and mostly engaged with the lead contact in the group; however, in some groups we 
talked to more than one member. There were three group interviews and in two giv-
ing groups geared to young professionals, we talked to multiple members individu-
ally (three in one group; six in another). Interviews took place between April 10 to 
September 9th, 2013, and February 24th to April 21st, 2015, across the UK.
We analyzed transcripts using MAX QDA qualitative data analysis software and 
followed an iterative process of contextualizing and categorizing strategies 
(Maxwell, 1998, p. 90). This process included: listening to the entire interview and 
reading transcripts and other documents completely through to get a sense of the 
whole, rereading and coding segments, and recoding and grouping codes into broad 
clusters of similar topics or nodes, primarily around the research questions though 
allowing for emergent topics. We then iteratively recoded these clusters into more 
specific and simplified codes, creating “trees” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 29).
 Findings
I have drawn the findings described from data from surveys and interviews to exam-
ine the impact of giving circles on members’ civic and political participation in 
relation to each of the dependent variables: giving, volunteering, participation in 
efforts to address problems in the community, participation in efforts to change 
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government policy, and participation in other activities such as voting and contact-
ing public officials. See a summary of the results in Table 6.1.
 Giving
People in giving circles in the US donated more on an annual basis than people who 
were not in giving circles. The mean for giving circle members was $7,681, com-
pared to $4,944 for the control group. This difference was statistically significant. 
However, because the average annual family income of giving circle members was 
also higher than the control group, there was no statistically significant difference 
for average household contributions between these two groups when controlling for 
income. Nonetheless, two- thirds (67%) of giving circle members indicated the total 
amount they contributed each year had increased due to giving circle participation. 
Kahn (2007) and Moody (2008) had similar findings with their studies of Social 





























1.619 .107 0.276 .001** 7.243 .000* 1.114 .331
Participation to Address Problems in the Community
US NA NA 0.251 .000* 0.1323 .0168* 0.0443 .4259
UK NA NA 0.220 .008** 1.114 .356 0.163 .850
Involvement in Changing Government Policy
US NA NA 0.281 .000* 0.0644 .2480 0.1605 .0038*
UK NA NA 0.041 .626 0.642 .668 0.350 .705
Civic & Political Activities
US 5.78 .000* 0.2505 .000* 0.3316 .000* 0.0783 .1707
UK 1.954 .052 0.172 .022* 4.872 .000* 7.160 .001*
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed)
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed)
Note. Source: Design by author
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Venture Partners. This may mean, then, that giving circle members said giving 
increased when it did not, the increased amount was not big enough to make a sta-
tistically significant difference, or they gave less before and are now more like the 
control group. At least one- third of those interviewed in the US said their personal 
giving had increased since joining a giving circle. In addition, a handful of inter-
viewees indicated their giving had shifted from elsewhere to the giving circle or had 
decreased due to retirement and job loss since joining the giving circle.
In the UK, giving circle respondents gave significantly more per month on aver-
age than the control group (£253 vs. £108 per month), even when controlling for 
income. This difference, however, is largely due to giving by those with household 
incomes of £75,001 or above, where giving group respondents gave significantly 
more than control group respondents, on average £353 compared to £103 per month. 
Nonetheless, three- quarters (77%) of giving circle participants said the giving group 
caused them to increase or substantially increase the amount they give each year. 
Similarly, reports on impact done by UK- based The Funding Network (TFN) in 
2012 found that 66% of TFN members said they give more to charity as a result of 
their participation in TFN. A perceived increase or expansion in giving was also 
brought up frequently in interviews with members.
We further examined the effect of giving circle participation on members’ giving 
by looking at association with level and length of engagement in the group, and 
number of groups in which members engaged. The findings for the US show levels 
of engagement within the giving circle were not significantly associated with total 
amount contributed. However, total contributions rose significantly as the length of 
time in the giving circle increased, even when accounting for income. In addition, 
people in more than one giving circle donated significantly more than other mem-
bers, with an average of $13,400 compared to $6,834 for members in one giving 
circle and $4,945 for people in no giving circles. The association between number 
of giving circle memberships and the total amount given was highly significant and 
remained so when controlling for income. This suggests, then, that given enough 
time or participation in several groups, giving circles influence members to give 
more. However, in the UK, the amount given per month was not significantly asso-
ciated with level or length of engagement, nor number of giving groups in which a 
member participated.
 Volunteering
In the US, a little less than half (46%) of giving circle members reported that partici-
pation in a giving circle increased the amount of time they volunteered. In addition, 
at least half of interviewees said that when they joined a giving circle, they already 
had a long history of volunteering, dating back to high school and through pro bono 
neighborhood work, volunteering with the United Way, a church, or elsewhere. 
Thus, it may be that for some, there is an impact on increasing volunteering but for 
many they were already active before joining the group. Studies of SVP found that 
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63% to 68% of respondents noted an increase in their volunteerism after joining 
SVP (Kahn, 2007; Moody, 2008). This higher amount might be explained by the 
fact that SVP focuses much more on member volunteering than many other giving 
circles. It may also be that volunteering increases with engagement level and 
over time.
In the UK, although giving circle members did on average volunteer at a higher 
rate per month than the control group respondents (7.15 vs. 6.30 hours per month), 
there was no significant difference between giving circle members and the control 
group. In addition, only 43% of giving circle respondents said the giving group 
helped to increase or substantially increase the amount of time they volunteer each 
year. The impact report on TFN done in 2012 also found that 29% of respondents 
said they volunteered more or had become a trustee to an organization they had met 
through TFN. A few members also said in interviews that they got involved volun-
teering with charities beyond their giving group.
The US and UK data show members were more likely to say their total time 
volunteering significantly increased as their level of engagement and length of par-
ticipation in a giving circle increased. They also said their volunteer time increased 
as participation in the number of giving circles increased, but the association was 
not significant in either country. Thus, overall, although people may already come 
to the giving circle having been active as a volunteer, as they are more involved in 
the giving circle and for a longer period of time, they increase their rate of 
volunteering.
 Participation in Efforts to Address Problems in the Community
Two- thirds (64%) of US giving circle members said the giving circle led them to 
increase their participation in efforts to address problems in the community. In the 
UK, 53% said the giving group caused them to increase or substantially increase 
their participation in efforts to address problems in the community, whereas 47% 
said participation had not changed in this area. As level of engagement and length 
of engagement increased, US giving circle respondents were significantly more 
likely to say they increased their participation in efforts to address problems in the 
community. This increased for the number of giving circles as well, but it was not 
significant. In the UK, giving circle respondents were significantly more likely to 
say they increased their participation in efforts to address problems in the commu-
nity as their level of engagement in the giving circle increased. There was no signifi-
cant association when it came to length of engagement or number of giving groups. 
It seems in this area, then, level of engagement in both countries, and length of 
engagement in the US, have some kind of effect on increasing members’ participa-
tion in addressing problems in the community.
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 Involvement in Efforts to Change Government Policy
Only one- third (34%) of US giving circle respondents said they increased their 
involvement in changing government policy due to the giving circle; however, as 
both the level of engagement within the giving circle increased and the number of 
these circles increased, respondents were significantly more likely to say they 
increased their participation in efforts to address problems in the community. There 
was also a positive but not significant association between length of participation 
and involvement in changing government policy. In the UK, only 14% of giving 
group respondents said the giving group caused them to increase or substantially 
increase their involvement in changing government policies. There was no signifi-
cant association when it came to level or length of engagement, nor number of giv-
ing groups. In this area, giving circles seem to have little effect in members’ 
participation in changing government policy; in the US, however, these efforts do 
seem to increase with level of engagement in the giving circle and when participat-
ing in multiple giving circles.
 Civic and Political Activities
In both surveys, we created an index to show the degree of overall civic and political 
engagement based on a number of activities in which people might participate (there 
were a total of 14 activities in the US survey and a total of 9 in the UK survey).3 The 
index average for US giving circle members was 8.8 compared with 7.3 for the 
control group. This difference was statistically significant. However, further analy-
sis showed that only some income groups showed a statistically significant differ-
ence between giving circle and control group respondents: incomes of $25,000 to 
$34,999 and $50,000 to $149,999. SVPI also found in their survey of partners that 
3 Civic engagement indicators were created based on the index used by CIRCLE: Center for 
Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement: http://www.civicyouth.org/practi-
tioners/Core_Indicators_Page.htm#1. These include: working with others to solve a problem in the 
community; volunteering; belonging to a group or association; donating money; voting; talking to 
others about an election or campaign; contacting public officials; contacting a media outlet to 
express an opinion on a social or political issue; protesting, marching, or demonstrating; signing a 
petition about a social or political issue; and either buying or not buying something because of a 
company’s social or political values. For the UK survey, we used a revised and trimmed down ver-
sion that included: took part in a protest, march, or demonstration; contacted a newspaper or other 
media to express your opinion about a political or social issue; helped raise money for a charitable 
cause; contacted or visited a public or elected official to express your opinion; belonged to a vol-
untary group or association, either locally or nationally (such as a trade union, professional asso-
ciation, political or social group, sports or youth group); signed a petition about a political or social 
issue; voted in a local, national, or European election; worked together with someone or a group to 
discuss or address a problem in the community; bought or did not buy something because of the 
social or political values of the company that produces or provides it.
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70% of respondents indicated SVP had some, significant, or a primary impact on 
their community involvement as well (Kahn, 2007). In the UK, the index average 
was 4.2 for giving circle members and 3.8 for the control group. The difference was 
not significant. The only significant difference was that a higher portion of giving 
group respondents indicated they had worked together with someone or a group to 
discuss or address a problem in the community.
Furthermore, in the US, as level of engagement in the giving circle increased, the 
civic and political engagement index significantly increased. It was also evident 
from the survey that length of time in a giving circle and number of giving groups 
were positively but insignificantly associated with the index of civic and political 
engagement. In the UK, civic and political activities were significantly higher as the 
level and length of engagement in the giving circle as well as the number of giving 
groups increased.
According to US interviews, the number of members who said they were more 
civically and politically active because of the giving circle was small. However, 
those who did think they had become more active due to the giving circle included 
those who had become motivated by a growing awareness of community problems 
through the giving circle and thus become more involved in local elections, writing 
elected officials, or supporting various groups and paying closer attention to social 
issues, and those who were inclined to be active but were not because they did not 
feel they had previously had a good avenue for such action. For example, since join-
ing her giving circle, one respondent began identifying other ways to effect change, 
including joining the Committee for World Outreach. Another interviewee dis-
cussed how the giving circle meetings enabled her to learn about local issues and 
then take action. Three people talked about how their experience in a giving circle 
inspired them to talk more about political issues with their friends and family and 
helped them figure out where to go to get something done.
Even if civic and political activities did not increase, some indicated giving 
greater thought to the relationship between what they learned through the giving 
circle and their behaviors. For example, one interviewee said the giving circle made 
her question whether she was doing enough. Others saw the giving circle as another 
way to be active. Interviewees in the UK indicated that politics were not a focus of 
the group, although they could come up indirectly. One person in a mentor 
group noted:
In [giving group] everyone’s very polite so you probably won’t get much about politics. I 
guess it doesn’t have a political agenda either. . . . I mean [giving group] is very much kind 
of work out what kind of charity you want to invest in and invest in it. A debate might come 
up like during an initial discussion session when you’re trying to think about different inter-
ests and where needs, what kind of part of the NGO sector needs funding. Maybe that might 





In this study, I have sought to understand whether giving circles—as new and 
emerging forms of philanthropic voluntary associations in the US and the UK—
increase civic and political participation. That is, do giving circles serve as schools 
of democracy? From my findings, I conclude that:
• Amount of giving increases significantly with being in a giving circle in both 
countries, and length of engagement and number of giving circles in the US.
• Amount of volunteering increases significantly with level of engagement and 
length of engagement in both countries.
• Participation in addressing problems in the community due to the giving circle 
increases significantly with level of engagement in both countries and length of 
engagement in the US.
• Involvement in changing government policy due to the giving circle increases 
significantly with level of engagement and number of giving circles in the US.
• Participation in various civic and political activities are positively associated 
with being in a giving circle (significant only in the US), and these increase sig-
nificantly with level and length of engagement in both countries and with number 
of giving groups in the UK.
Overall, then, I find:
• Participating in a giving circle seems to matter for increasing giving in both 
countries, and civic and political activities in the US Membership does not 
appear to affect the amount of volunteering.
• The level of engagement in a giving circle is associated with more volunteering, 
participation in addressing problems in the community, and civic and political 
activities in both countries, as well as more involvement in changing government 
policy in the US. Level of engagement does not seem to have a significant impact 
on giving.
• The length of engagement in a giving circle is associated with more volunteer-
ing and civic and political activities in both countries, and more giving and par-
ticipation in addressing problems in the community in the US. Length of 
engagement does not seem to have a significant impact on involvement in chang-
ing government policy.
• The number of giving circles in which someone participates is associated with 
more giving and involvement in changing government policy in the US, and civic 
and political activities in the UK.
From the data I then conclude that, generally, giving circles do seem to serve as 
schools in several areas, particularly related to volunteering, participation in efforts 
to address problems in the community, and other civic and political activities as 
level and length of engagement increase. However, for some civic and political 
activities, particularly giving and involvement in changing government policy, giv-
ing circles have less of a schooling effect. The findings on the relationship between 
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participation in these voluntary associations and civic and political participation 
seem to align with previous studies’ findings that this relationship is generally posi-
tive for giving circles. On their basis, I also conclude that impact varies by areas and 
country, and the interviews indicate it varies by participant as well (Dekker, 2014).
In this study, I also provide insight into the effect of newer types of voluntary 
associations emerging in today’s environment. As opposed to traditional, bureau-
cratic voluntary associations, giving circles tend to be less formal smaller groups 
and looser networks. The findings indicate that these structures lead to a positive 
impact on civic and political engagement—perhaps more so for volunteering and 
participation in efforts to address problems in the community, and various civic and 
political activities; less so for giving or changing government policy. Thus, although 
giving circles represent more informal, self- organized, and decentralized forms of 
association emerging in a less institutionalized environment, they still seem to have 
a similar effect to more traditional associations. In future, researchers will need to 
examine more closely what particular aspects of participation in the giving circle 
might lead to increased civic and political participation. Through my analysis of 
different models of giving circles in the UK, I have found that different activities 
lead to different outcomes related to giving, volunteering, and learning about phi-
lanthropy and charities (Eikenberry, 2015).
Finally, what do the findings reveal related to the debate about voluntary associa-
tions as schools or pools of democracy? In general, in line with Putnam (1993, 
2000) and Wollebæk and Selle (2003), the findings indicate that more active engage-
ment (measured in this study by level and length of engagement in the giving circle 
and number of giving circles) can make a difference in impact on level of civic and 
political engagement. That is, active and sustained participation in the association 
seem to have greatest impact on civic and political engagement, generally support-
ing a schools thesis. However, the data also show that impact varies for some areas 
and by member—some people interviewed indicated they are already highly 
engaged civically and politically in various activities and the giving circle provides 
another opportunity for them to extend this engagement, supporting the “pools” or 
“selection” thesis (Armingeon, 2007; van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009). One con-
clusion then is that giving circles, as well as other types of voluntary association, 
may serve as both schools and pools of democracy.
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Chapter 7
Time Banks as Transient Civic 
Organizations? Exploring the Dynamics 
of Decline
Johannes Glückler and Jakob Hoffmann
After the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in the US and many European 
countries in 2007, alternative economic practices have become celebrated responses 
to cope with unemployment, precarity, and austerity policies. Yet although the eco-
nomic recession triggered this new call for an “alternative,” diverse (Gibson- 
Graham, 2008) or community (Gibson-Graham, 2014) practices are neither new nor 
are exclusively a response to phases of economic downturns. The relative nature of 
the denominator “alternative” has let its utilizers to conflate a vast variety of atti-
tudes and approaches, ranging from claims to oppose (anti-capitalist), transform 
(neo-capitalist) or overcome (post-capitalist) the conventional market economy 
(Sánchez, 2017). Despite these strong normative claims, empirical knowledge about 
the many forms of alternative practices and their ways of working is still limited, 
especially because a new multiplicity of practices has only started to emerge. 
Therefore, social and geographical research on new civic forms of organizing is a 
timely and valuable contribution to explore the contemporary flourishing of alterna-
tive economic practices.
The contemporary surge in these practices also marks a period of social and 
organizational innovation. The trend of building new forms of organizing coproduc-
tion, local trade, and economic solidarity reinforces the notion of the organizational 
society. Contemporary societies are increasingly configured around (often multiple) 
memberships of individuals in organizations, such as corporations, associations, 
clubs, parties, charities, and other civil society organizations (Perrow, 1991). Hence, 
individual agency hardly occurs without touching upon organizational concerns, 
such as vested interests, normative positions, and the corresponding interdependen-
cies (Lazega, 2016, 2018). Time banks are one organizational expression of the 
wide variety of alternative economic practices. Although their number has grown 
globally (Cahn & Gray, 2015), and especially strongly in Spain in recent years 
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(Valor & Papaoikonomou, 2016), the broader phenomenon of community curren-
cies was already widely discussed before the 2007 economic crisis, for example, in 
the UK (Batchelor, 2003; Boyle, 2003; Gregory, 2009; Seyfang,  2003a, 2003b; 
Stuart, 2003; Thrift, 2002), the USA (Collom, Lasker, & Kyriacou, 2012), and in 
other countries such as New Zealand (Diprose, 2016), Germany (Meier, 2001), Italy 
(del Moral-Espín, 2017), or Japan (Hayashi, 2012).
Researchers have often focused on time banks’ normative dimension and design 
principles to strengthen democracy (Thrift, 2002), or to enhance cocreation and 
reciprocity (Clement et al., 2016). Despite growing empirical research, there is still 
a lack of understanding of the processes, mechanisms, and dynamics through which 
time banks evolve and operate. One empirical puzzle researchers have observed is 
the question why time banks have often been vulnerable and short-lived organiza-
tions. Some suggest that community currencies tend to fall short of their ambitious 
economic goals (Dittmer, 2013; Williams et al., 2001) and struggle with psycho-
logical barriers towards participation (Ozanne, 2010). Others find that time banks 
fail to achieve and retain the critical mass of people to show continuous commit-
ment and long-term engagement (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013). After the beginning 
of the economic crisis in 2007, time banks have blossomed in many Spanish and 
other European cities and regions (Sánchez-Hernández & Glückler, 2019), yet fre-
quently, they began to wither after a few years. How, then, do time banks really 
work and what are the processes through which they grow and decline?
To answer this question, it is necessary to look behind the normative surface of 
these organizations and study the empirical practices that define local exchange: its 
(alternative) economic transactions. It is here that methods of social network analy-
sis are especially helpful (see Chap. 8 by Diani, Ernstson, and Jasny and Chap. 9 by 
Glückler and Suarsana). They facilitate observing not only individual relations or 
transactions, but also enable one to map and analyze the overall network structure 
as well as to trace this structure through time. We argue that the question of how this 
activity is structured through time is essential for understanding the dynamics of 
emergence, reproduction, and demise. In this chapter, we offer a brief introduction 
into relational thinking and the characteristics of social network research, especially 
in human geography. To illustrate the potential of social network analysis for the 
study of alternative practices, we present parts of a more comprehensive case study 
of a time bank in Germany (Hoffmann & Glückler, 2021). Specifically, we illustrate 
how formal network analysis may help one to understand the dynamics of organiza-
tional life through the lens of the structure and trajectory of individual alternative 
economic practices in a time bank.
 Relational Thinking and Social Networks
The analysis of social networks is inspired by a relational view of the social world. 
Relational thinking departs from the notion that social actors are not isolated beings 
who carry out atomistic behavioral scripts. Instead, they are embedded in a social 
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context that constitutes meaning through interaction and institutions: “Relational 
thinking has become an overarching perspective in social theory that shifts the ana-
lytical focus from attributes and categories to context, process, and emergence” 
(Bathelt & Glückler, 2011, p. 240). In geography, for example, a relational view is 
opposed to traditional approaches, whose proponents use spatial structures or spa-
tial variables as a starting point for analyses. Instead, adopters of relational geogra-
phy focus on the actors most relevant to the problem or question under investigation. 
Researchers thus need to study the positioning of actors and agency within broader 
contexts of social and institutional relations. Social action is assumed both to be 
constrained by networks of social relations and at the same time to transform these 
structures in dynamic ways (Bathelt & Glückler, 2018).
The concept of the network denotes a set of nodes that are connected by a certain 
number of ties. Social science researchers focus on social networks, in other words, 
the way in which individuals or organizations are related to one another (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). Beyond this formal definition, social network researchers proceed 
from the assumption that the structure of relationships as a whole conditions the 
opportunities and constraints for individual action in the network (Mitchell, 1969, 
p. 2). In other words, although individuals are embedded into a structure of social 
relations, the network structure itself also has an effect on individual action.
Researchers use the concept of the network on different analytical levels: as the-
ory, as method, and as empirical object (Glückler, 2013). The starting point of a 
theory of social networks is the axiom of the anti-categorical imperative mentioned 
earlier. With it, one postulates that explanations of social phenomena—such as 
power, cooperation, development, or innovation—should not only include the 
actors’ categorical characteristics but also their embedding in manifold social rela-
tions. This relational perspective benefits from both interpretative theories, for 
example, actor-network theory, and formal network theories, whose proponents 
focus on explaining the specific characteristics and effects of networks. Both 
approaches are necessary because network effects depend on the specific meaning 
of the relationships in a social context. Network structures thus do not have univer-
sal, but contingent, social meanings and consequences (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010). 
Depending on the research interest, three classes of theories can be distinguished 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).
First, network theories explain the social consequences of structural network 
properties. The theories of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), structural holes (Burt, 
1992), structural equivalence (Burt, 1988), or the theory of small worlds (Uzzi & 
Spiro, 2005) are well-known approaches used, for example, to link individual 
advantages such as access to information, negotiation potential, or career opportuni-
ties with the increasing centrality of actors. However, specific network structures 
have differential rather than universal advantages. For example, proponents of the 
theory of structural folds (Vedres & Stark, 2010) postulate that it is precisely actors’ 
cohesion that promotes successful innovation cooperation, which stands in opposi-
tion to those theorists focusing on networked resource-access such as structural hole 
theory. Second, and in contrast to relational theories, adopters of theories of net-
works are devoted to explaining structural properties of networks from categorical 
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initial conditions. They show that relationships arise, for example, as a function of 
spatial proximity, similar social status, or common organizational affiliation. Third, 
proponents of network theories of networks attempt to explain network conse-
quences from structural network properties. Those adopting dynamic approaches to 
network evolution, for instance, aim to identify geographically and historically spe-
cific development paths, in which the formation and dissolution of relationships is 
dependent on earlier relationships and in which the change of a development path 
can thus be explained endogenously from the knowledge of earlier structures 
(Glückler, 2007). Due to the low availability of longitudinal network data on social 
or corporate relationships, however, network analytical research on the geographi-
cal evolution of networks is still in its infancy (ter Wal & Boschma, 2009).
Researchers can conduct their analysis of social networks with a wide variety of 
methods, ranging from formal network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 
2013; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) or qualitative to mixed methods of network analy-
sis (Domínguez & Hollstein, 2014). In any case, the unit of observation is relational 
data, that is, information about the existence and quality of relationships between 
actors. In practice, researchers often use already existing (so-called secondary) data, 
such as official statistics of patent applications or research cooperation. They offer 
the advantage of relative completeness of information, depending on the quality of 
the source. On the other hand, primary data collection such as interviews or surveys 
enables researchers to observe otherwise inaccessible relationships such as the 
exchange of information, advice-seeking and recommendations, or mutual support 
and solidarity between persons. With good planning, they also achieve high 
response rates.
The procedures of social network analysis start at different levels. They enable 
the description and analysis of positions of individual actors at the micro level (e.g., 
centrality), of subgroups of actors at the meso level (e.g., coherent clusters or func-
tional roles), and of structural characteristics at the macro level of the whole net-
work (e.g., centralization, fragmentation, role structures). Building on relational 
data and the three scales of analysis (actor, substructure, entire network), there is a 
continuous advance in methodologies and a growing interest in geography to use 
these methods (Glückler & Doreian, 2016; Glückler, Lazega, & Hammer, 2017). 
Three recent examples of interest for geographers are methods for positional 
(Glückler & Panitz, 2016a, 2016b; Prota, 2016), evolutionary (Nomaler & 
Verspagen, 2016), and multi-level (Brailly, 2016; Lazega & Snijders, 2016) network 
analysis. In the context of this chapter, we would like to portray a case study of the 
exchange network of a time bank that is geographically situated in a city in Southern 
Germany.
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 A Network Perspective on Time Banks
The inception of time banking in its current form is most often attributed to Edgar 
Cahn, an American law professor, who conceptualized time banks as a community- 
based measure against poverty in the 1980s (Cahn & Gray, 2015; Cahn & Rowe, 
1992). Time banks respond to a desire for egalitarian economic exchange, which is 
facilitated by providing a locally limited and community-specific currency. The 
value of a community currency is equivalent to the time spent on the provision of a 
service. Participants can valorize their own time through provision of services to 
other members, and, in turn, spend their income on services provided by others. Of 
course, the notion of organizing local exchange through a community currency has 
much older historical roots. Early concepts of community-based economic practices 
are found in the works of John Bellers (1654 to 1725), Robert Owen (1771 to 1858), 
or Silvio Gesell (1862 to 1930) (Polanyi, 1944).
In the relatively sparse academic literature, time banks have been associated with 
community development, social inclusion, and active citizenship (Gregory, 2009; 
Seyfang, 2004). As such, they have become a tool for local policymaking, aimed 
especially at the support of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Despite a rising number 
of empirical studies on time banks, relatively little is known about the structure and 
dynamics of exchanges in time banks. Taking a relational view of this type of orga-
nization, we conceive a time bank as an evolving network of social exchange 
(Whitham & Clarke, 2016). As time banks increasingly use digital accounting sys-
tems (Cahn & Gray, 2015), transaction records enable us to track each individual 
transaction and to reconstruct the entire network’s process of formation and change.
Although some empirical researchers have partially used transaction data 
(Carnero, Martinez, & Sánchez-Mangas, 2015; Lasker et al., 2011; Seyfang, 2001), 
they have rarely exploited it for the analysis of the entire network structure. As an 
exception, Collom (2008) and Collom et al. (2012) collected egocentric data on the 
relational patterns of focal individual members (so-called ego networks). To take 
the potential of network analysis a step further, we aim to overcome the limitations 
of dyadic atomism (Granovetter, 1992) by using the connectivity of the entire net-
work in a dynamic framework. Such an approach offers a unique opportunity to 
study the process of emergence and demise as well as aspects of systemic stability, 
which have been identified as a research frontier in previous studies (Valor & 
Papaoikonomou, 2016).
 An Urban Time Bank in Southern Germany
We focus our research on a time bank (TB) located in Southern Germany (SG), 
called TBSG hereafter to comply with our agreement not to disclose its true name. 
Founded in the late 1990s as a loose coalition of citizens in southern Germany, 
TBSG was established as a mature legal entity of a charitable association by 2008. 
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The main goal of the time bank is to develop a sustainable network for facilitating 
neighbourly help. TBSG facilitates the exchange of all goods and services unless 
prohibited by law or contrary to ethical principles. Offerings are broad and depend 
on the skills and abilities of the individual members. Services, such as massages, 
hair cutting, advice, repairs, gardening or teaching, are mainly exchanged directly 
among members, although the trade of goods, most often self-grown or self-made 
food, is also common at monthly meetings or celebrations. Members may exchange 
within the whole region, and some members live in the surrounding towns and 
villages.
The community currency (so-called ‘talents’) enables members to trade without 
cash and within a closed economic cycle. One ‘talent’ corresponds to 15 minutes of 
work; the time value of each trade can be negotiated among the trading partners. 
Every member registers an account at the beginning of their membership. New 
members must first earn an initial amount of talents through service or goods before 
being allowed to use their account. By statute, the account balance is constrained to 
a lower limit of −20, and to an upper limit of 200 talents (50 hours) to avoid both 
opportunism and accumulation. Furthermore, a monthly membership fee is col-
lected to cover administrative costs, including a semi-annual magazine, which 
members use to advertise offerings and requests.
Today, TBSG counts about 100 registered members, not all of whom are neces-
sarily active. The members’ demographic composition has changed remarkably 
over the last 20 years. Although the average age was 43 years, with only 28% of the 
members being older than 50 years, in 2000, by 2018, a vast majority of 72% of the 
members were aged 50 or older, resulting in an average age of 56 years. In other 
words, the member base generation seems not to have changed very much over the 
observed period. 79% of the members are women. Despite the apparent endurance 
of TBSG since its foundation, the time bank has failed to rejuvenate its member 
base. The base’s ageing points to the organization’s creeping decline, and it rein-
forces calls for research on the transience of time banks, in particular, and organized 
forms of alternative economic practices, more generally.
 A Longitudinal Network Analysis
We use original relational data on over 6,000 transactions over a period of nine 
years between 2009 and 2017 to examine the structural characteristics and dynamic 
changes underlying and shaping the community-building process of TBSG.  As 
members provide a considerable number of services to the time bank itself as orga-
nizational assistance, these services would distort the picture of social interaction 
among members and we have therefore discarded them from the analysis presented 
here. This leaves 4,477 transactions among a total of 192 participants over a period 
of more than eight years. We grouped these transactions year by year to construct 
eight directed networks, which vary in size (number of nodes) as people enter and 
leave the time bank through the years. As only incomplete data was available for the 
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years 2009 and 2018 and a comparison with the other years is accordingly not pos-
sible, we have discarded these years from the dynamic analyses. Although people 
can of course have more than one transaction in a given time period, we have coded 
a tie from A to B as being present (1) if there is at least one account of A receiving 
a service from B and as absent (0) otherwise. Note the encoding of tie directions, 
which here follows the flow of currency: the tie A ➔ B indicates that A paid an 
amount of talents to B in return for a service provided by B to A.
In accordance with previous classifications (Collom, 2012), we distinguish 13 
classes of goods and services that are traded through the time bank, plus a “miscel-
laneous” category for non-classifiable transactions. In Table  7.1, we present the 
distribution of participants and transactions as well as a few network statistics across 
the 14 types of goods and services. In Fig. 7.1, we display the corresponding visual 
graphs for each category of traded services. From a network perspective, the sum of 
Table 7.1 Type, number, and connectivity of traded services and goods
N
Transactions/
Ties Suppliers Consumers Density InCentral OutCentral
Arts and Crafts 
Production
97 186/158 65 75 .017 .11 .10
Beauty and Spa 107 299/222 78 86 .020 .14 .16
Cleaning, Light 
Tasks and Errands
116 338/261 82 103 .020 .12 .10
Computer and 
Technology





119 312/241 92 92 .017 .12 .08
Entertainment and 
Social Contact
96 210/162 65 73 .018 .12 .21
Events and 
Program Support
52 57/54 33 34 .020 .16 .16
Foods 145 881/506 98 128 .024 .28 .12
Health and 
Wellness




70 89/78 45 49 .016 .10 .10
Sales and Rentals 
of Items
89 143/124 54 67 .016 .08 .06
Transportation 
and Moving




79 130/106 49 60 .017 .16 .06
Miscellaneous 125 359/239 86 106 .015 .11 .07
Note. Source: Design by authors
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Fig. 7.1 Network graphs of fourteen types of goods and services exchanged in TBSG. Source: 
Design by authors
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these different category networks represents a multiplex network with 14 layers as 
they represent different types of ties. Considering raw counts of transactions and 
participating members, we observe considerable variation across the different ser-
vice categories. Among the most frequent are exchange of food and other item 
trades and health services, followed by computer-related services. Less prominent 
are event support, office and administrative support, and transportation.
Network density is used to calculate the proportion of the total number of pos-
sible ties that is actually realized in a network. It is thus a measure of overall net-
work connectivity and varies somewhat across the different category networks, with 
food being the most dense and office support and item sales being the least dense. 
More interestingly, degree centralization is used to assess to what extent a network’s 
transactions are concentrated on a single actor. Centralization varies between 0 and 
1, with 1 representing a star-configuration, where all ties are focused on a single 
actor. We distinguish here between centralization of indegree and outdegree as 
proxies for assessing the concentration of supply (indegree centralization) and 
demand (outdegree centralization), respectively. Here again, trade in food peaks 
with high indegree centralization, indicating a relatively small number of highly 
active members who supply food to a larger group of members. Other product cat-
egories, such as health and wellness, have much lower centralization in both inde-
gree and outdegree, a sign of a more equally spread exchange structure. Tutoring 
and personal services are also characterized by a discrepancy in supply and demand 
concentration. Although the number of suppliers is generally lower than the number 
of consumers across all goods and services, differences are moderate and no trade 
category is fully monopolized in that only one or very few people supplied a service 
exclusively.
 Evolution and Demise of the TBSG Network
In the following, we focus on a descriptive analysis of the evolution of TBSG’s 
network structure. Displaying simple aggregate statistics on a year-by-year basis 
reveals that the number of members, ties, and transactions had initially risen to then 
revert to a decline of overall activity by 2012/2013. This demise is also reflected in 
the degree centralization, which started declining equally in 2012 (Fig. 7.2). Gross 
network indicators such as the number of actors and the number and structure of 
transactions thus suggest an evolution from initial rise to creeping decline of overall 
activity, which corresponds with an inverted U-shaped development curve. This 
trend also corresponds Seyfang and Longhurst’s finding (2013) that time banks 
often lack durability. An analysis of the network dynamics allows us to take a deeper 
look into the structural changes to explore potential mechanisms and processes that 
help us to understand such demise.
To further examine the pattern of centralization and decentralization of transac-
tions, we identify different trajectories of individual participation in overall 
exchange. The goal of such an approach is to provide a micro-level analysis of the 
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relational process through which activities decline. Therefore, we consider the 
activity by network position and time rather than by type of transaction. For this line 
of analysis, we draw on methods of positional network analysis as well as methods 
from sequence analysis (Gabadinho, Ritschard, Müller, & Studer, 2011). Positional 
approaches cluster actors into groups if they are located in equivalent positions 
within the network (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005; Faust, 1988; Glückler & 
Doreian, 2016). In contrast to conventional clustering approaches, such groups are 
defined by similarity in relations rather than in characteristics, in other words, by 
similarity in the way actors are connected to the rest of the network. Among the 
most discussed positional structures are core-periphery models (Glückler & Panitz, 
2016a; Prota, 2016). Such structures are composed of a densely connected core and 
a periphery, which is loosely connected internally as well as with the core. We here 
employ stochastic blockmodels (Lazega, Sapulete, & Mounier, 2011; Zhang, 
Martin, & Newman, 2015) to cluster actors into core and periphery positions for 
each of the eight annual networks.
Each of the 192 individuals—due to new entries and exits, the number of mem-
bers exceeds the current number of members in TBSG—can now be assigned to one 
of three positions for any given point in time: core, periphery, and inactive. As we 
have eight years of analysis, we have 192 sequences of length eight, using each to 
summarize a member’s positional trajectory of participation in the time bank 
between 2010 and 2017. We use a hierarchical clustering algorithm and an optimal 
matching distance measure (Gabadinho et al., 2011) to cluster these sequences into 
five types of characteristic trajectories (Fig. 7.3).
Fig. 7.2 Changes in transactional activity in TBSG, 2010–2017. Source: Design by authors
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With each cluster of sequences, we present a distinctive trajectory of involve-
ment in transactions: First, the stable core consists of 13 actors who occupy core 
positions over most of the observation period. Second, in the fading core, many 
members occupy core positions in the beginning of the observed period, yet as time 
goes on, many members reduce their activity and drift to peripheral positions. Third, 
the stable periphery includes 26 loyal but sporadic members who hold peripheral 
positions for long periods of time. Together, these three clusters of trajectories make 
up for the long-term backbone of the time bank but are also a source of declining 
activity, as can be seen by the fading part of the core. Fourth, long-term exits as well 
as, fifth, short-term exits largely consist of drop-outs. Whereas those of the former 
had maintained longstanding membership before finally becoming inactive, the lat-
ter includes people who had entered the time bank and left shortly thereafter. The 
sheer size of the fifth cluster and the corresponding scale of relational turnover 
(Lazega, 2017) reflects the remarkable volatility around the smaller core of long- 
term members. The cluster of short-term drop-outs also holds some newcomers 
(indicated by the dashed line in Fig. 7.3), which are not enough to fully compensate 
for the rate of exits, as can be seen by the declining number of participants.
The decomposition of differential histories of involvement presented here reveals 
several interesting insights into the exchange dynamics of TBSG.  First, most 
exchanges revolve around a relatively small number of core actors who constitute 
the robust center of the time bank. Second, this core has not been durable through-
out the observation period, as can be seen by many members moving to peripheral 
positions or becoming dropouts. Third, the densely connected core is surrounded by 
a relatively stable but smaller periphery of casual members as well as by a large and 
volatile group of short-term and perhaps experimental members. Finally, as 
Fig. 7.3 Types of member trajectories through core-periphery positions at TBSG. Source: Design 
by authors
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researchers have often reported for time banks (Collom, 2005), recruiting new 
members is hard, as can be seen by the relatively low number of newcomers. As a 
consequence, the time bank struggles to replenish itself and risks fading out with its 
long-standing core members.
 Conclusion
We have proposed a relational perspective to study time banks as a new type of civic 
organization to enact alternative economic practices. In seeking to understand the 
mechanisms of such a civic organization’s rise and demise, we applied methods of 
dynamic social network analysis to analyze the relational processes within a 
Southern German time bank over a period of eight years. From dynamic social net-
work analysis, one can gain original insight into the ways in which a time bank 
evolves. Given the repeated observation that time banks and other types of alterna-
tive economic practices are often characterized by considerable volatility and poten-
tial collapse, relational thinking and network analysis are especially suited for 
unpacking the underlying relational mechanisms that shape these outcomes of vola-
tility and demise.
We have illustrated the benefits of formal methods of network analysis, but are 
by no means suggesting that researchers should disregard other ways of studying 
alternative economic practices. We acknowledge that a relational analysis of an 
emergent phenomenon, which may be easily misread from a dominant way of “cap-
italocentric” thinking, will benefit from thick description and interpretative methods 
to capture new logics of action (Gibson-Graham, 2014). In concluding this, how-
ever, we should not sacrifice the value of a detailed micro-relational analysis of the 
social process and the structural dynamics that these practices create. At their best, 
researchers conducting studies on civic organization and their practices should con-
sider mixed-method designs that combine the best of both worlds (Small, 2011; 
Glückler, Panitz, & Hammer, 2020). In any case, it is worthwhile and necessary to 
explore the empirical nature and dynamics of social practices in civic organizations 
more deeply, rather than limiting the debate to normative accounts of their potential 
virtues and liabilities. Relational thinking, quickly advancing methods of social net-
work analysis, and an ever-increasing amount of available relational data are a 
promising offering to complement the diversity of empirical research approaches to 
civic life.
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Chapter 8
Civil Society as Networks of Issues 
and Associations: The Case of Food
Mario Diani, Henrik Ernstson, and Lorien Jasny
 Civil Society: Aggregative Versus Relational Perspectives
In this chapter, we provide an empirical illustration of how to apply a relational 
approach to the study of civil society. By this we mean an approach with which one 
can combine attention to the traits of civil society actors and to the relations between 
them, and use network data to explain and understand civil society, its collective 
processes, and its role in wider society. Such an integrated approach has not proved 
easy to develop, as we are striving to combine two fundamental dimensions of civil 
society, its communicative and organizational ones. In contrast, most analysts have 
either focused on the communicative/ideational elements (e.g., Alexander, 2006; 
Seligman, 1995) or the organizational/associational ones (e.g., Maloney & van 
Deth, 2008, 2010; for more discussions on defining civil society, see Calhoun, 2001; 
Edwards, 2004). Among the former approaches, analysts have portrayed civil soci-
ety primarily as a discursive space, delineated by the communicative practices 
through which core societal values are defined, criteria of civility are established, 
collective goals are formulated, and collective identities are constructed (e.g., 
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Alexander, 2006; Habermas, 1989). In the latter group, researchers have largely 
equated civil society to voluntary organizations’ contributions to the development 
of political capacity, the strengthening of social cohesion and the quality of demo-
cratic life, and the definition and production of collective goods (Anheier, 2004, 
2007; Deakin, 2001; Maloney & van Deth, 2010).
These standard approaches share a further underlying problem for empirical 
research, namely, what we have called an “aggregative approach” to collective pro-
cesses (Diani, 2015, Chap. 1). Researchers have often tended to treat civil society as 
a set of aggregated a priori properties or “traits,” frequently adhering to formal defi-
nitions of civility, by which different actors and organizations are said to be defined. 
Following this logic, they then describe the structure of civil society as the distribu-
tion of such actors’ traits, and gauge the strength of civil society in reference to the 
number of citizens who, for instance, value tolerance, rational debate, and the pur-
suit of the common good over private gain, those who express their trust in institu-
tions (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 2002; Putnam, 2000) or promote collective action on 
public issues (Maloney & Roßteutscher, 2006; Maloney & van Deth, 2010). 
Unquestionably, aggregative approaches have generated important insights. Yet, 
this has often been detrimental to the analysis of how the same actors relate to each 
other in complex patterns (for exceptions, see: Anheier & Themudo, 2002; Knoke 
& Wood, 1981; Laumann & Pappi, 1976).
In this chapter, we sketch the contours of a relational approach to civil society 
with which we attempt to address both difficulties: how to better integrate ideational 
and associational dimensions of civil society, and how to focus on the relational 
structures between civil society actors, rather than simply on their traits. Building 
on our previous work (Diani, 2015; Diani, Ernstson, & Jasny, 2018), we rely on 
social network analysis (henceforth, SNA) to explore civil society as a set of (a) 
multiple networks connecting a multiplicity of collective agents and (b) ideational 
elements that assign a specific meaning to collective action.1
SNA provides a number of methodological tools to explore the connections 
between different elements of a population (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; 
Kadushin, 2012; Knoke & Yang, 2008). In contrast to standard statistical tech-
niques, it does not require independence of cases; to the contrary, its utilizers focus 
on such cases’ interdependencies. Accordingly, civil-society analysts are able to go 
beyond the properties of civic agents to instead focus on the relations between them. 
Not only that: researchers may apply SNA to map the connections between non- 
agentic ideational elements, including symbols, words, concepts, or other cultural 
products (e.g., Carley, 1994; Diesner & Carley, 2011). Even network analysts have 
not commonly linked agents and ideas; most have focused either on networks of 
exchanges between specific organizations, or on networks of ideational elements 
(Ferguson, Groenewegen, Moser, Borgatti, & Mohr, 2017), with less genuine 
1 See Diani (1995), Ernstson (2011), and Bassoli and Theiss (2014) for additional examples of this 
logic of analysis, covering specific civic networks in Italy, Sweden, and Poland.
M. Diani et al.
151
integration of these two levels (for exceptions: Basov & Brennecke, 2017; Oberg, 
Korff & Powell, 2017; von Atteveldt, Moser, & Welbers, 2017).
In our social network study, agents corresponded to large sets of voluntary orga-
nizations in three different cities, which all mobilized around variable combinations 
of service delivery and political advocacy. We conceived the ideational elements as 
issue priorities identified by those same agents. Admittedly, “issue priorities” might 
be regarded as a poor, partial proxy for cultural and ideational elements. However, 
claims about the issues that organizations regard as of primary relevance for them 
should not be dismissed as the mere identification of specific problems or the target 
of fleeting initiatives. Rather, surveying how each actor ranks issues’ relevance pro-
vides a core indicator of how organizations position themselves in the context of 
larger collective action fields—in other words, of how they distribute and prioritize 
scarce internal resources, or represent their activities to members, potential mem-
bers, and the larger public. Furthermore, we approach issue priorities in relational 
terms, unpacking how issues never have single, uncontroversial meanings. To the 
contrary, and following a now consolidated tradition in the study of culture 
(DiMaggio, 1987; Mohr, 1998; Mohr & Duquenne, 1997), issues may be subject to 
different interpretations by different agents, depending on the symbolic context in 
which they are embedded, just like other cultural elements such as attitudes or 
beliefs. For example, concerns about the issue of urban pollution may take a very 
different meaning if actors connect it to global environmental problems than to 
upper-middle class concerns about status and urban lifestyle. By sampling a wider 
set of actors, researchers can unpack such contrasting interpretations through a rela-
tional network approach. Indeed, a strength with our approach is that we can iden-
tify how a sub-set of issues are central to a sub-set of civil society agents, with 
which we can in turn explain how issues are interconnected by those mobilizing on 
them, how single issues are woven into broader agendas, and how cultural frames 
for collective action (Snow, 2004; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) 
emerge out of the interaction between actors and issues.
Although civic organizations may be regarded as connectors between issues, 
issues may likewise be regarded as facilitators or obstacles to the activation of links 
between organizations. Accordingly, one might be led to believe that issues mapped 
on to organizing patterns, with organizations sharing some issues being automati-
cally connected in distinctive, dense clusters of relations. However, reality has 
proven more complicated, with the authors of one study on civic-organization net-
works in British cities suggesting that although the presence or absence of the tradi-
tional traits of protest organizations did characterize specific network positions in 
some cities, this what not the case in others (Diani, 2015). Thus, whether identifica-
tion with a set issues (or lack of it) creates boundaries that facilitate or discourage 
organizational alliances (Tilly, 2005) becomes a matter for empirical investigation. 
With our relational approach, we respond to this task in how we analyze issue pri-
orities and network patterns. Rather than distinct and neat clusters of collaborative 
organizations that all share the same issues, what we can uncover is a more nuanced 
story of how civil society organizations create deeper-lying “modes of 
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coordination” (Diani, 2015) that cut across the boundaries of specific groups or 
associations and develop complex cooperative networks on themes of common 
interest.
Our case study in this chapter is food, as it provides a good starting point to 
explore how civic organizations combine an interest in relatively specific issues 
with attention to other themes. We then explore if and how an interest in food defines 
specific clusters of cooperation within broader civil society networks (Levkoe, 
2014; Levkoe & Wakefield, 2014; Luxton & Sbicca, 2021; Sumner & Wever, 2015). 
In doing so, we draw upon data from urban settings as diverse as Cape Town in 
South Africa and Bristol and Glasgow in the UK. This enables us to conduct a rare 
comparative analysis of organizational networks,2 in contexts that differ substan-
tially in terms of urban inequality as well as in the salience of major political 
cleavages.
 Exploring Civil Society in British and South African Cities
Our evidence comes from two projects, “Networks of Civic Organizations in 
Britain,” conducted in Bristol and Glasgow between 2001 and 2003,3 and 
“Socioecological Movements and Transformative Collective Action in Urban 
Ecosystems,” conducted in Cape Town between 2012 and 2014.4 Admittedly, these 
data are far from recent. As we will point out in the discussion of our findings, the 
specific local agendas may well have changed substantially since data were col-
lected. Still, we do not regard this as a problem, because this article is not an account 
of contemporary urban dynamics and should not be taken as such. Rather, we are 
illustrating an approach—and a method—to integrate the cultural and organiza-
tional dimensions of civil society. In such a context, data at different points in time 
can be useful, if they help analysts to explore network mechanisms in polities that 
differ on theoretically relevant grounds. In our case, this means looking at networks 
in settings with different levels of democratic consolidation and cleavage salience. 
In this regard, an exploration of South African and British cities may be treated as a 
most dissimilar design comparison (Dogan & Pélassy, 1984), despite their sharing a 
relatively similar institutional system by virtue of South Africa’s colonial past as 
part of the Commonwealth. On a smaller scale, significant differences in 
opportunities for civic activism may also be found between British cities, although 
they may appear quite homogeneous by comparison to urban areas elsewhere in the 
world (Diani 2015, pp. 46–47, pp. 194–198).
2 Examples of comparative analyses of social networks include Eggert (2014); Entwisle, Faust, 
Rindfuss, and Kaneda (2007); Fischer (2011).
3 Funded by UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (contract L215 25 2006) with Mario 
Diani as PI.
4 Funded by the Swedish Research Council Formas (contract 211−2011−1519) with Henrik 
Ernstson as PI.
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In relation to our particular focus, three dimensions are worth pointing out. First, 
although inequality has risen consistently across the globe in the last few decades, 
the depth of social divisions and their embeddedness in race and class have histori-
cal and deeper patterns in South Africa (Maharaj, 2020; Seekings, 2000). The coun-
try often scores among the most unequal countries in the world according to the 
Gini index, which has continued to deteriorate under the African National Congress 
(ANC) government, especially since its neo-liberal policy turn in the late 1990s 
(Ballard, Habib, Valodia, & Zuern, 2006b, pp. 13–14), and further under Zuma’s 
presidency 2009–2018.5 As for UK cities, despite a common shift from an industrial 
to a service economy, inequality and deprivation were still more pronounced in 
Glasgow than in Bristol at the time of the study (Diani, 2015, p. 30).
Second, the salience of main political cleavages differed as well: in South Africa, 
proximity to or distance from the dominant ANC party and its partners in the so- 
called tripartite alliance (Sanco, the federation of anti-apartheid civic organizations, 
and Cosatu, the unions’ confederation) shaped the city’s alliance patterns (Diani, 
Ernstson, & Jasny, 2018; this despite ANC having lost Cape Town to its rivals since 
2006). The same applied in a significant way to organizations close to or distant 
from Glasgow’s Labour party (the study was conducted before the growth of the 
Scottish National Party), although this was not the case in Bristol, where lines of 
political identification were multiple and not as consolidated (Baldassarri & Diani, 
2007, p. 752).
The third important element to consider was the variable weight of contentious 
repertoires of action in the three cities. The most significant differences lay between 
the UK and South Africa, with the latter displaying exceptionally high levels of 
radical contention (Ballard, Habib, & Valodia, 2006a; McFarlane & Silver, 2017; 
Mottiar & Bond, 2012). This may be at least partially due not only to the stronger 
salience of cleavages in that country, but also to ANC’s electoral domination, akin 
to a one-party rule, coupled with the legitimacy gained by ANC, given its role in 
anti-apartheid struggles. This has, especially in the early post-apartheid period from 
1994 to around 2010, made it recognizably harder to build wider multi-sectoral 
popular platforms outside the tripartite alliance to link local protests into a broader 
national opposition of ANC’s neoliberal policies (Ballard, Habib, & Valodia, 
2006a).6 Accordingly, the radicalization of repertoires of action may be related to a 
5 The Southern African Labour and Development Research Institute reported that between 1993 
and 2008, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.66 to 0.70, surpassing Brazil, with the income of 
the average black person actually falling as a percentage of the average white person from 1995 
(13.5%) to 2008 (13%), with even worse poverty figures recorded in urban areas (Bond, 2011, 
p. 113).
6 We recognize national one-issue campaigns, such as the successful Treatment Action Campaign 
from 1998 for free access to treatment for HIV/Aids. We also note how the political party situation 
is changing in South Africa; although ANC’s dominance in 2019’s general election was still intact 
at the national and most regional levels, they had lost Cape Town by 2006 and Western Cape by 
2011 to their conservative-liberal rival, the Democratic Alliance, and lost several more metropoli-
tan regions in 2016 and 2019. The emergence of a left-wing opposition in the Economic Freedom 
Fighters is also interesting, gaining almost 11% in 2019.
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lingering lack of political opportunities for challenging groups, and their shortage 
of political resources, beyond the very local level (on radicalization, see e.g., Alimi, 
Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015). As for the UK, the continued perception of Glasgow’s 
civil society as more confrontational than Bristol depended to a large measure on 
the stronger ties between protest organizations in Scotland than in the South-West 
of England (Diani, 2012, 2015, Chap. 9).
The depth of social divisions, the salience of major cleavages, and the variation 
in action repertoires may all affect the structure of alliances within civil society 
(Diani, 1995, 2015). They may similarly influence the way in which issues are 
shaped and connected to each other. Food represents a notable case to illustrate 
these mechanisms. Like many large and multi-dimensional issues, it has been asso-
ciated to quite different agendas and represents a focus of mobilization for highly 
diverse actors and coalitions. It may be part of classic environmental agendas, link-
ing actions on the environmental impact of food production to the protection of the 
natural environment mainly based in a (new) middle class and moderate perspec-
tives; but it may also be strongly connected to approaches focusing on inequality 
and social deprivation within affluent societies, possibly from a “right-to-the-city” 
perspective, as well as to global justice proponents arguing for a radical change in 
the relationship between food corporations and the small producers in the global 
south. Interest in food may drive attempts to transform the behavior of individual 
consumers and consolidate new markets, but it can also provide the basis for collec-
tive actions oriented to the practice of alternative lifestyles, as exemplified by envi-
ronmental groups supporting food-growing allotment gardens in seeking a greener, 
more self-sustaining urban lifestyle. Attention to food as a public issue may be 
found across major political cleavages, involving quite diverse actors, from left- 
wing radical groups—as was historically the case with Black Panthers in US cities, 
who developed the Free Breakfast for Children programs as a mode of fighting 
structural injustice—all the way to liberal, conservative, and religious groups sup-
porting charity “food banks” (Barthel, Parker, & Ernstson, 2013; Battersby & 
Haysom, 2019; Cherry, 2006; Forno, 2019; Halkier, 2019; Herring, 2014; Jallinoja, 
Vinnari, & Niva, 2019).
We collected our data among organizations that combined in a variable measure 
interest in social and ecological issues. In the UK, they focused on three main types 
of issues: environment, social exclusion and inequality, and minorities and migrants. 
Given the impossibility of mapping the whole of civil society, those issues were 
chosen because (a) they provided a sufficiently broad illustration of core urban 
problems and (b) they were distinct enough to be the target of specific campaigns or 
even nimby activism, yet could also serve to link into broader, more encompassing 
agendas. Apart from the major organizations operating on a city-wide scale, groups 
included in the study came from relatively deprived areas of the two cities: the 
Southside in Glasgow, characterized by a massive historical presence of working 
class, including neighborhoods such as Govan, Govanhill, Gorbals, and 
Pollokshields; and the neighborhoods of Easton, Knowles, Withywood, and 
Hartcliffe in Bristol, featuring a strong presence of ethnic minorities. Altogether, 
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124 organizations in Glasgow and 134 in Bristol were included in the study (Diani, 
2015, Chap. 2).
The Cape Town study was part of a larger research program on urban ecology 
and urban political ecology (Ernstson, 2011, 2013; Ernstson & Sörlin 2019; Lawhon, 
Ernstson, & Silver, 2014), in which researchers conceived the urban environment 
broadly to include both ecological as well as social issues. The organizations sur-
veyed ranged from classic environmental groups working on conservation issues to 
action committees addressing fundamental environmental justice themes such as 
access to energy, sanitation, and health, as well as the quality of food and housing. 
Barring the limited attention to migrants’ rights, the themes addressed by civic orga-
nizations in Cape Town are otherwise largely comparable to those addressed by UK 
civic organizations. Complete data were collected for 129 organizations in Cape 
Town, once again located in areas with a very diverse socio-economic status, from 
affluent Constantia to environmentally and socially deprived areas of Cape Flats 
(Diani, Ernstson, & Jasny, 2018).
In all three cities, respondents were asked to identify their priorities out of a long 
list of issues (about 50 issues in the UK, 30  in Cape Town), among which those 
linked to food attracted considerable attention (Table  8.1). In both Bristol and 
Glasgow, about one organization out of five expressed an interest in generic food 
issues, and a similar share combined this with a more specific attention to geneti-
cally modified food (henceforth, GM). In Cape Town, the wording of the issues was 
different, and so was the distribution of responses: 30% of organizations claimed an 
interest in “urban farming and food security,” but only three in GM food. Coupled 
with the fact that two of those groups also claimed an interest in the former, this low 
figure resulted in the Cape Town analysis only differentiating between organizations 
interested or uninterested in food issues, without further qualification.
How did interest in food relate to other issues? As a preliminary step, we submit-
ted the list of items in the three cities to a standard data reduction technique, princi-
pal component analysis (henceforth, PCA). In Bristol and Glasgow, we thus 
identified five underlying dimensions, which we labeled social exclusion, environ-
ment, minority citizenship, global justice, and housing (Diani, 2015, pp. 41–42; see 
also Table 8.11 in the appendix for details); in Cape Town, we identified four dimen-
sions, grouping together issues linked to global environmental justice, urban con-
servation, right to the city, and issues aligned along the alternative between urban 
sustainability (i.e., a managerial approach to urban issues) and social rights (Diani, 
Table 8.1 Interest in food-related issues
Bristol Glasgow Cape Town
No interest 62% 62% 70%
Interest in generic food issues, but not GM food 20% 16%
Interest in both generic food issues and GM food 18% 22%
Interest in urban farming and food security 30%
N 134 124 129
Note. Source: Design by authors
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Ernstson, & Jasny, 2018; see also Table 8.12 in the appendix). We then proceeded to 
build networks of issues. We assumed a connection between two issues if a rela-
tively high number of organizations indicated both among their priorities. We calcu-
lated the link’s strength through the Jaccard coefficient (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, 
p. 421), which takes into account the fact that the strength of the connection between 
pairs of issues, sharing the same number of organizations interested in them, may 
actually be quite diverse, depending on the ties such issues may have to other issues. 
For example, the fact that ten organizations claimed an interest in both GM food 
and, say, animal rights would imply quite a different tie strength between the two if 
there were no organizations claiming an interest in GM food and urban pollution or 
environmental protection (or any other issue) than if many such existed. More spe-
cifically, we concentrated on the strongest ties, defined as those at least one standard 
deviation above the average strength of ties in any specific network. In the figures 
that follow, color and shape of nodes will correspond to the different sets of issues, 
identified through principal component analysis. This will offer us a preliminary 
way to start unpacking the two fundamental dimensions of civil society, its com-
municative and organizational dimensions, which we can now operationalize 
through comparing two criteria of group issues together in our data: correlation in 
the case of PCA, and co-occurrences in the issue networks.
 The Structure of Issue Networks: Insights into the Discursive 
Space Produced by Civil Society
Starting with the Bristol case, the graph of the strongest connections between issues 
(Fig. 8.1) well matches the sets identified by PCA (Table 8.11 in the appendix): a set 
of environmental issues, which includes food along with nature conservation, pollu-
tion, forestry, energy, and transport among others, can be seen on the bottom right 
of the graph (white squares), whereas minority and migrants’ issues are on the left 
side (green triangles) and social deprivation (black triangles) and housing issues 
(white circles) are mostly at the network center. The only set of themes lacking a 
clear network position were those broadly associated with global justice (black 
circles); although correlated, they did not display consistently strong ties to each 
other. Interestingly, organizational representatives perceived GM food issues as 
connected to global justice themes (probably a reflection of their role in conflicts 
between strong corporations and producers in the global South) rather than to envi-
ronmental ones, as was the case with generic food themes. However, even that con-
nection does not appear to be particularly robust, as in terms of strong ties GM food 
was rather distinctive. This does not imply its marginality in local civil society, as 
interest in the theme was quite significant (see Table 8.1). Rather, it illustrates the 
difficulty to locate it within a specific discourse or a specific agenda.
The position of generic food issues was quite different, as we show in Fig. 8.2, 
reporting their ego-network. On the one hand, Bristolian organizations perceived 
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Fig. 8.1 Issue network in Bristol (cut off point 0.41, one s.d. above mean). Green triangles: 
inequality and deprivation issues; black triangles: minorities and migrants’ issues; black circles: 
global justice issues; white squares: environmental issues; white circles: housing issues. Source: 
Design by authors
Fig. 8.2 Ego-network of food issues in Bristol (cut off point 0.41, one s.d. above mean). Green 
triangles: inequality and deprivation issues; black triangles: minorities and migrants’ issues; black 
circles: global justice issues; white squares: environmental issues; white circles: housing issues. 
Source: Design by authors
8 Civil Society as Networks of Issues and Associations: The Case of Food
158
food as strongly connected to a broad range of environmental issues; on the other, 
they also assigned it some significant connections to social issues, such as access to 
higher education and housing, or globalization and migration dynamics. Apart from 
being embedded in distinctive sets of issues, food issues were also highly central in 
the whole issue network. In Table 8.2, we report two standard centrality measures, 
degree and betweenness.7 Out of 49 issues, food ranked eighth in terms of degree, 
with thirteen other issues being strongly connected to it (about one standard devia-
tion above the average of eight); it was even more central in terms of betweenness, 
part of a very small set of issues with particularly high scores on that particular 
measure. As we also show in Fig. 8.1, food was often in an intermediate position on 
the paths connecting other issues in the network. We take this as a signal of how 
food could play a central role in constructing wider frames for collective action.
Based on the structure of the issue network in Glasgow, we believe that foods 
occupies a more distinct and far less central position here than in Bristol, despite its 
overall popularity among civic organizations being very similar (Fig.  8.3). In 
Glasgow, food was part of a distinct component of the network, detached from the 
main one, and only consisting of three other heavily correlated issues: animal wel-
fare, hunting, and science and technology. As for GM food, it was as isolated as in 
Bristol, at least in terms of strong connections, yet in a context in which most themes 
correlated with ideas of “global justice”—and indeed of environmentalism as 
well—were peripheral to the network. The other two components, distinct from the 
main one, again consisted of environmental themes (transport and energy) and those 
linked to global justice (globalization, Third World poverty, and asylum seekers). 
Social issues related to deprivation and community development, housing, and 
minority rights heavily dominated the main component. Similar considerations 
apply to the analysis of issue centrality. In both cities, most central issues referred 
to inequality and social exclusion. However, many central issues in Bristol also 
referred to environmental and global justice problems. This did not happen in 
Glasgow, where food was not among the most central issues (Table 8.3). In a nut-
shell, although similarly relevant in terms of appeal, food issues occupied very dif-
ferent positions in the two cities. In Bristol, they were at the intersection of several 
different agendas, combining different sets of issues; in Glasgow, they were strongly 
related to a small, distinctive set of themes, which combined in a very specific agenda.
Moving to the issue network in Cape Town provides still a different account of 
the position of food-related issues. It is not, it has to be said, a fully comparable 
account, as the list of issues submitted to organization representatives was different, 
and reflective of the project’s focus. In particular, whereas in Britain the reference 
was to generic “food issues,” in Cape Town it was more specific, to “urban farming 
and food security” (GM food was also represented, as in Britain). As a consequence, 
the search for macro-issues generates partially different factors from the ones 
7 “Degree” consists of the number of direct connections (adjacencies) one node in a network has to 
other network members; “betweenness” measures the extent to which one node is located in an 
intermediate position on the shortest paths (geodesics) connecting other nodes (Knoke & Yang, 
2008, pp. 62–69).
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Table 8.2 Centrality of issues in Bristol (network dichotomized at 0.41 cutoff; issues marked by 
an asterisk are central in both UK cities)
Degree Norm degree Betweenness
Privatization of housing* 18 0.37 209.96
Third World debt 15 0.31 100.19
Crime in local neighborhoods* 15 0.31 61.48
Community economic development* 15 0.31 22.87
Access to higher education 14 0.29 177.17
Single parents* 14 0.29 72.15
Women’s issues* 14 0.29 51.15
Food 13 0.27 172.70
Asylum seekers 13 0.27 50.70
Welfare rights* 13 0.27 49.19
Elderly people* 13 0.27 12.01
Minimum wage* 13 0.27 8.50
Gender equality* 12 0.24 48.08
Animal welfare 12 0.24 27.25
Homelessness* 12 0.24 11.23
Energy 11 0.22 27.25
Pollution 11 0.22 23.09
Community services* 11 0.22 7.46
GM food 0 0.00 0.00
Note. Source: Design by authors
Fig. 8.3 Issue network in Glasgow (cut off point 0.451, one s.d. above mean). Green triangles: 
inequality and deprivation issues; black triangles: minorities and migrants’ issues; black circles: 
global justice issues; white squares: environmental issues; white circles: housing issues. Source: 
Design by authors
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identified in Britain (see Fig. 8.4): Whereas “urban conservation” and “global envi-
ronmental justice” broadly correspond to the “environmental” and “global justice” 
factors in the UK, in Cape Town social inequality and community development 
issues combined under two different headings: one labeled “social rights,” address-
ing labor, gender, and youth conditions as well as health, and another labeled “right 
to the city,” combining community development issues with claims for the strength-
ening of urban democracy (Diani, Ernstson, & Jasny, 2018). In Cape Town, the 
issue network was split into two different components, one consisting of “global 
justice” issues, which included GM food (similarly to the UK), and another in which 
“right to the city” seemed to provide a bridge between “urban environmental con-
servation” and “social rights” themes.
The centrality of the “urban farming and food security” issue closely matched 
that of generic food issues in Bristol in terms of the overall volume of connections, 
as the normalized degree scores were very similar (0.27 in Bristol vs. 0.23 in Cape 
Town: Table 8.4). However, the issue’s capacity to connect other types of themes 
and discourses seemed very limited, as its betweenness score was extremely low. It 
was, in fact, even lower than that of GM food, despite the latter’s peripheral position 
within a component limited to global justice issues (Fig. 8.4). The explanation for 
this apparent paradox lies in the structure of the ego-network of food security issues 
(Fig. 8.5): Although it was of a comparable size to the Bristolian one, it was more 
homogenous, consisting almost exclusively of other environmental issues, and most 
importantly, highly dense. This substantially reduced betweenness scores, 
Table 8.3 Centrality of issues in Glasgow (network dichotomized at 0.51 cutoff; issues marked by 
an asterisk are central in both UK cities)
Degree Norm degree Betweenness
Privatization of housing* 25 0.51 50.61
Poverty 24 0.49 16.53
Disability 23 0.47 11.66
Crime in local neighborhoods* 22 0.45 36.28
Community economic development* 22 0.45 14.83
Welfare rights* 22 0.45 13.79
Single parents* 20 0.41 22.68
Health 20 0.41 10.30
Elderly people* 20 0.41 8.26
Women’s issues* 20 0.41 6.64
Citizenship rights for minorities 19 0.39 4.95
Minimum wage* 19 0.39 2.97
Tenant’s rights 18 0.37 19.74
Gender equality* 18 0.37 5.75
Community services* 18 0.37 4.78
Homelessness* 17 0.35 2.79
Food 1 0.02 0.00
GM food 0 0.00 0.00
Note. Source: Design by authors
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suggesting that food issues be primarily contained within a fairly specific environ-
mental discourse.
A few comparative comments may be in order before shifting the focus to the 
relationship between food issues and alliance structures. First, the popularity of GM 
Fig. 8.4 Issue network in Cape Town (cut off point 0.21, one s.d. above mean). Red circles: global 
environmental justice issues; green squares: urban conservation issues; black circles: social rights 
issues; white triangles: right to the city issues. Source: Design by authors
Table 8.4 Centrality of issues in Cape Town (network dichotomized at 0.21 cutoff)
Degree Normalized degree Betweenness
Strengthen direct democracy 12 0.39 22.70
Community development 12 0.39 18.12
Public green spaces 10 0.32 13.38
Youth development 10 0.32 13.12
Environmental education 10 0.32 6.12
Nature conservation 9 0.29 7.55
Cultural heritage 9 0.29 3.42
Welfare and health 8 0.26 6.76
Service delivery 8 0.26 4.00
International tax 7 0.23 10.92
Urban farming and food security 7 0.23 0.93
Transparency corruption 6 0.19 11.40
Against financial capital 6 0.19 2.92
Preserve biodiversity 6 0.19 2.92
Pollution 6 0.19 1.28
GM food 4 0.13 6.00
Note. Source: Design by authors
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food issues differed substantially, being high in the two British cities and very low 
in Cape Town (although the size of that difference may have been partially due to 
differences in research design). When it comes to embeddedness in broader agen-
das, however, the only meaningful cluster of issues comprising GM food was actu-
ally found in Cape Town, in the context of global environmental justice initiatives. 
In Bristol and Glasgow, GM food seemed to stand out as an issue with a peculiar 
profile, that was difficult to connect systematically to one specific agenda. The three 
cities were more similar in the popularity of other food issues (generically defined 
in the UK study, linked to urban farming in the case of Cape Town), with 30% to 
40% of organizations claiming an interest in them. However, the three cities differed 
substantially in the centrality of food issues in relation to broader agendas. In 
Glasgow, these were part of an isolated component. In Cape Town, they had high 
centrality, but this depended largely on their embeddedness in environmental agen-
das, and was not matched by strong links to other issues. Only in Bristol did they 
seem to play a central role in establishing connections between different agendas 
within civil society. The finding about Cape Town is particularly intriguing: given 
the city’s high levels of deprivation, one might have expected a stronger connection 
between food and social inequality issues. This would also be consistent with the 
very high number of groups and organizations that were documented to be active on 
food issues just after our fieldwork (Battersby et al., 2014), a paradox we will return 
to in the conclusions.
Fig. 8.5 Ego-network of Food security issues in Cape Town (cut off point 0.21, one s.d. above 
mean) Green squares: urban conservation issues; black circles: socialrights issues; white triangles: 
Right to the city issues. Source: Design by authors
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 The Structure of Alliance Networks: Insights into 
the Associational Space Produced by Civil Society
In the previous section we explored the connections that organizations create between 
different issues by including them among their priorities. Here we reverse the perspec-
tive and ask if and to what extent organizations interested in food-related issues occu-
pied distinctive positions within civil society networks. In the case of the UK, one can 
differentiate between organizations that did not identify food as a priority, those who 
were interested in generic food issues, and those who combined such interest with a 
more specific attention to GM food. Studying the graph showing inter-organizational 
collaborations in Bristol, of any intensity, one can see that groups with an interest in 
GM food (triangle-shaped nodes in Figs. 8.6 and 8.8) were more densely intercon-
nected. Groups only interested in generic food issues also displayed some level of 
connectedness, but with a higher proportion of unlinked organizations and rather 
engaged in alliances with groups focused on other issues (Figs. 8.7 and 8.8).
A more formal test of the distribution of ties between three types of organizations 
confirms the visual impression (Table 8.5). Ties between organizations interested in 
food but not in GMOs were slightly denser than a random distribution would sug-
gest (the ratio between observed and expected ties under conditions of indepen-
dence was about 1.5), whereas ties between organizations also focused on GM food 
were more than three times above what one should expect if the issue had no effect 
whatsoever on alliance patterns. These differences are highly significant, suggesting 
that attention to food issues actually characterized the local civic network in some 
meaningful ways. This was not the case, however, if we concentrated on the 
Fig. 8.6 Inter-organizational cooperations in Bristol (white circles: not interested in food; green 
squares: interested in food issues, but not in GMO; black triangles: interested in both types of 
issues). Source: Design by authors
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strongest ties, in other words, those that combined exchanges of resources with the 
deeper connections created by shared core members or strong interpersonal ties 
(“social bonds”: Baldassarri & Diani, 2007). Here, no significant discernible pattern 
emerged. If anything, organizations sharing a similar position on food issues seemed 
less, rather than more, likely to be connected by strong ties (Table 8.6).
Fig. 8.7 Cooperations in Bristol between organizations interested in food issues but not in 
GMO. Source: Design by authors
Fig. 8.8 Cooperations in Bristol between organizations interested in both generic food issues and 
GMO. Source: Design by authors
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A broadly similar pattern can be detected in Glasgow, if slightly less pronounced, 
and with a more similar structure of ties among the two sets of organizations with 
interests in food (Figs. 8.9, 8.10, and 8.11). As in Bristol, inter-organizational con-
nections were most likely among groups with an interest in GM food (Table 8.7); in 
contrast to Bristol, the ratio between observed and expected ties remained higher for 
groups mobilizing on GM food also in the case of the strongest “social bonds.” 
However, dense connections also linked these organizations to groups with no inter-
est in food whatsoever, which made it difficult to identify a salient role for food 
issues in the strong ties network (Table 8.8).
It is worth noting that food issues seemed to have the same salience in the two 
cities despite being located in so different positions within the issue network. As we 
described, food was fairly central in Bristol, but quite peripheral in Glasgow. Yet, 
this did not result in differences in the issue’s salience in the inter-organizational 
network. In both cities, this was significant in terms of generic resource exchanges, 
but not in terms of the strongest “social bonds.” As we have shown in our previous 
work, strongest ties are most likely to connect organizations involved in social 
movement dynamics, or social movement “modes of coordination” (Diani, 2015). 
In this case, however, British cities displayed network patterns that suggested food 
was primarily the object of initiatives taking a coalitional form: in other words, rela-
tively dense exchanges of resources, but much lower levels of solidarity and shared 
identity between organizations interested in the issue.8 The low ratio between 
8 Diani (2015) actually suggested that tie multiplexity, in other words, the coupling of resource 
exchanges and deep connections created by joint activists, be the distinguishing feature of the 
social movement way of coordinating collective action, distinct from coalitional, subcultural/com-
munitarian or organizational modes.
Table 8.5 The salience of food issues in the Bristol civic network
Observed/expected ties
1 2 3
1. Not interested in food 0.78 0.94 0.85
2. Interested in food, but not in GM food 0.86 1.46 2.27
3. Interested in both issues 0.49 1.94 3.21
Significance: 0.000
Note. Source: Design by authors
Table 8.6 The salience of food issues in the Bristol civic network (strong ties only)
Observed/expected ties
1 2 3
1. Not interested in food 0.87 0.93 0.87
2. Interested in food, but not in GM food 1.18 0 1.89
3. Interested in both issues 1.39 1.21 0.62
Significance: 0.25
Note. Source: Design by authors
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observed and expected ties among organizations that were uninterested in food also 
points to the fact that food issues had a modest capacity to stir emotions and to gen-
erate strong oppositions. This finding should not be overemphasized: after all, it is 
fairly normal that ties be denser among actors with a specific interest than among 
those who only share their disinterest in that particular issue. However, empirical 
exploration of civic networks suggests that some issues may be more polarizing 
than others. For example, in our work on Cape Town civic networks (Diani, Ernstson, 
& Jasny, 2018) we found “urban conservation” and “global environmental justice” 
issues to be more polarizing than “right-to-the-city” issues.
Fig. 8.9 Inter-organizational cooperations in Glasgow (white circles: not interested in food; green 
squares: interested in food issues but not in GMO; black triangles: interested in both types of 
issues). Source: Design by authors
Fig. 8.10 Cooperations in Glasgow between organizations interested in food issues but not in 
GMO. Source: Design by authors
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Civic networks in Cape Town present a different profile on several grounds. The 
network consisting of all resource exchanges (Fig. 8.12) suggests quite frequent ties 
between organizations that differed in their attention to food. Although the majority 
of organizations interested in food were connected, many others were disconnected 
in that particular sub-network (Fig. 8.13). As it happens, only four organizations 
interested in food (indicated by black triangles) were isolated in the full civic net-
work (left-hand side of Fig.  8.12), but 15 were isolated in the network only 
Fig. 8.11 Cooperations in Glasgow between organizations interested in both food issues and in 
GMO. Source: Design by authors
Table 8.7 The salience of food issues in the Glasgow civic network
Observed/expected ties
1 2 3
1. Not interested in food 0.72 0.95 0.85
2. Interested in food, but not in GM food 0.90 1.23 1.10
3. Interested in both issues 1.13 0.39 2.72
Significance: 0.023
Note. Source: Design by authors
Table 8.8 The salience of food issues in the Glasgow civic network (strong ties only)
Observed/expected ties
1 2 3
1. Not interested in food 0.98 0.80 1.96
2. Interested in food, but not in GM food 0.57 0.73 0.00
3. Interested in both issues 1.17 0.00 2.39
Significance: 0.11
Note. Source: Design by authors
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consisting of actors mobilizing on food (Fig. 8.13). In Table 8.9, we have confirmed 
the impression generated by the visual inspection of the graphs: The propensity of 
groups interested in food to exchange resources or collaborate with each other was 
only marginally above a random distribution, certainly much lower than in the two 
British cities (Tables 8.5 and 8.7).
Fig. 8.12 Inter-organizational cooperations in Cape Town (white circles: not interested in food; 
black triangles: interested in food). Source: Design by authors
Fig. 8.13 Cooperations in Cape Town between organizations interested in food. Source: Design 
by authors
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The effect of interest in food on inter-organizational exchanges in Cape Town 
seems to follow an opposite pattern to what we found in the UK: If we focus only 
on strong ties, we find significant effects of interest in food on the structure of the 
network (Table 8.10). The probability of a strong tie between organizations inter-
ested in “urban farming and food security” was more than twice what one should 
expect in case of a random distribution. Again, it was not a polarizing issue (disin-
terested groups were not strongly connected to each other), yet it seemed to have the 
capacity of shaping the stronger ties, those that imply some higher level of mutual 
solidarity, rather than ties that were less demanding and less symbolically charged.
 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed an approach to better integrate the ideational and 
associational dimensions of civil society, which researchers usually treat disjoint-
edly (Edwards, 2004). In doing so, we have attempted to move from an aggregative 
to a relational view of civil society (Diani, 2015), examining the interactions 
between its different components rather than focusing exclusively on their traits or 
properties. More specifically, taking interest in food as our case study, we have 
explored the relation between ideational elements and associations from two com-
plementary perspectives. On the one hand, we have suggested that by making claims 
about their priorities and combining them, members of civic organizations define 
specific systems of meanings, and shape civil society agendas. We have shown that 
issues do not have an objective meaning, but take different meanings depending on 
the other themes to which they may be related (DiMaggio, 1987; Mohr, 1998; Mohr 
& Duquenne, 1997; Pachucki & Breiger, 2010). On the other hand, we have explored 
Table 8.9 The salience of food issues in the Cape Town civic network (any tie)
Observed/expected ties
1 2
1. Not interested in food issues 0.90 1.24
2. Interested 0.90 1.62
Significance: 0.14
Note. Source: Design by authors
Table 8.10 The salience of food issues in the Cape Town civic network (strong ties only)
Observed/expected ties
1 2
1. Not interested in food issues 0.91 0.83
2. Interested 0.87 2.17
Significance: 0.03
Note. Source: Design by authors
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the extent to which interest in food issues characterized specific structural positions 
within civic organizations’ networks in different local settings.
It is important to be clear about the limits of the exercise. Admittedly, our treat-
ment of food issues was quite superficial. With the exception of GM food, both 
studies relied on generic definitions of the issue. In the UK, respondents were only 
asked about their interest in “food,” without further qualification. In Cape Town, the 
question was more specific, referring to “urban farming and food security,” but still 
broad. A more detailed treatment of the multiple aspects of food (e.g., as part of 
alternative lifestyles, as dimension of domestic inequality, or as a global issue linked 
to multinational corporate capitalism) would have certainly sharpened our analysis. 
Even so, our findings still highlight some of the main differences in the insights that 
an aggregative and a relational approach to civil society may generate.
In particular, we have found that an issue’s popularity (measured by the number 
of organizations that regard it as a priority) does not necessarily correlate with its 
location in broader agendas: highly popular issues are not necessarily central to the 
formation of wider comprehensive frames for collective action. This is an important 
finding because proponents of an aggregative approach would necessarily take a 
popular issue to be central for wider collective action. Indeed, utilizing an aggrega-
tive approach to the interest in GM food shows that its popularity was much higher 
(at least at the time of the surveys) in British cities than in Cape Town. Although this 
is an interesting finding in its own right, suggesting that the topic was more easily 
addressed by organizations operating in more affluent settings, our relational 
approach paints a richer picture. Despite its significant appeal to civic organizations, 
GM food’s structural position in the larger issue network was one of isolation in 
both British cities. Ironically, it was in Cape Town, where its weight was more lim-
ited, that GM food was linked into a distinctive cluster of issues. However, that was 
a set of global themes, isolated from the rest of the issue network—unable, in other 
words, to connect in a significant way to agendas more closely addressing local 
issues, whether from a social or an environmental perspective.
A relational approach is similarly rich in insight if one examines generic food 
issues. Using an aggregative approach, one would conclude that their popularity 
was pretty constant across the three cities. If, however, one looks at the patterns of 
relations between issues—or, in other words, at the structures of civic agendas—in 
different cities, a finer-grained picture emerges. In all three cities, generic food 
issues were primarily connected to broader environmental concerns at the time of 
the surveys, rather than to social inequality and welfare agendas. But the extent of 
such connection differed: in Bristol, namely, in the city closest to a post-industrial 
economy based on high-tech research and an advanced service sector, food issues 
were at the intersection of environmental and broader social agendas; in Glasgow, 
they were far more peripheral, as a focus on deprivation still seemed to influence 
local public discourse in a significant way; 9 in Cape Town, they were firmly located 
within an environmental conservation agenda.
9 On some basic differences between Bristol and Glasgow see Diani (2015, Chap. 2) and Cento 
Bull and Jones (2006).
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If utilizing a relational approach to issues results in a different story from the one 
that utilizing an aggregative perspective would, the same applies to alliance patterns 
between organizations interested in food. We had a similar number of such organi-
zations in the three cities, yet the probability that they worked together was not the 
same but varied depending on the type of relation. In Bristol and Glasgow, the prob-
ability of a collaboration was significantly higher when “collaboration” meant the 
exchange of resources between two organizations, regardless of the depth of such 
connection. However, we found no significant difference when we focused on the 
network consisting of the strongest links, those that also implied sharing core activ-
ists and/or strong personal ties between core members of two organizations. In Cape 
Town, in contrast, organizations interested in food issues represented a distinct clus-
ter within the larger network only when we took the strongest ties into account. 
Cape Town was the only city in which interest in food issues seemed to characterize 
clusters of organizations linked by the strong, multiplex ties that are closest to a 
“social movement mode of coordination” (Diani, 2015).
To further illustrate the power of a network analytic approach, we will close by 
returning to the paradox of food issues in Cape Town. With our combined findings 
about the issue and organizational networks, we have generated a profile of the situ-
ation in Cape Town that people familiar with the area might find puzzling. Given the 
amount of deprivation in some communities within the city, the persistent segrega-
tion across race and class lines, and the role that urban farming might play in 
addressing at least partially the link between inequality and poor diet, one might 
have plausibly expected “urban farming and food security” to be more strongly 
linked to “social rights” or “right-to-the-city” type of issues, and thus for food to be 
part of wider-spanning agendas for collective action. As a matter of fact, there is 
ample evidence that activism on food issues has intensified over the last few years, 
with major civil society, policy, and scholarly activities around food security being 
promoted in the city, including in areas that we already widely covered in our study, 
like the Philippi Horticulture Area (Battersby et al., 2014; Kanosvamhira, 2019). 
This means that our network survey, if carried out today, might show that food has 
become a more integrative issue. However, since our goal was to illustrate a logic of 
analysis, not to provide an up-to-date account of urban politics in specific settings, 
we can make a more useful final point on how one could expand the relational 
analysis further.
The fact that food in Cape Town was most strongly linked to conservation issues 
does not mean that it had no connection to other issues. It simply means that more 
organizations stressed a link between food and environmental conservation than 
between food and social inequality issues. This may be due to deep differences in 
resources within civil society; organizations with a (new) middle-class membership, 
richer in resources, may find it easier to engage on multiple issues, combining atten-
tion to urban farming with conservation issues, whereas grassroots groups repre-
senting the most dispossessed communities may be forced to concentrate on specific 
issues because of their limited resources. To explore this hypothesis within a narrow 
aggregative approach would be difficult, if not impossible. A relational approach 
would simply looking separately at the issue networks created by organizations 
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operating in affluent or deprived environments. If many affluent (mostly white) 
groups indicated food as a priority alongside conservation issues, whereas deprived 
(black/colored) groups focused mostly on single-issues, that might account for 
food’s more solid link to conservation than to “right to the city” issues. Of course, 
this is just a working hypothesis. What we have illustrated in this piece, nonetheless, 
is the power of a network analytic approach to public issues when it comes to iden-
tifying non-obvious patterns and new, challenging research questions.
 Appendix
Table 8.11 Issues addressed by civic organizations in Bristol and Glasgow, and their popularity
Social Exclusion Global Justice
Single parents 39% Genetically modified food 21%
Children’s services 44% Animal welfare 15%
Drugs 40% Third World debt 24%
Welfare rights 47% Third World poverty 27%
Unemployment issues 49% Globalization 26%
Poverty 57%
Health 65% Environment
Disability 50% Pollution 37%
HIV-related issues 30% Nature conservation 28%
Crime in neighborhoods 35% Waste 29%
Homelessness 47% Energy 33%
Access to higher education 39% Environmental education 54%
Community Services 61% Farming, forestry, fishing 20%
Quality of basic education 45% Science and technology 19%
Minimum wage 24% Food 35%
Gender equality 47% Transport 36%
Women’s issues 55%
Minority Citizenship
Housing Racial harassment 42%
Tenants’ rights 35% Minority citizenship rights 35%
Housing quality 38% Minorities’ access to public office 24%
Housing privatization 21% Multiculturalism 42%
Housing developments 40% Asylum seekers 44%
Minority entrepreneurship 23%
N 258 N 258
Note. Reprinted from Diani (2015, pp. 41–42). Copyright 2015 by Cambridge University Press. 
Reprinted with permission
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Chapter 9
The Geography of Giving 
in the Philanthropic Field
Johannes Glückler and Laura Suarsana
Economic geography is a field of research that takes an interest in the spatial diver-
sity of economic activity as well as the specific trajectories along which regional 
economies evolve, and how these trajectories differ between places and across 
space. In this chapter, we look at the geography of philanthropy and explore the role 
of financial giving in regional development. Citizens and wealthy patrons donate, 
foundations and associations engage in and finance benevolent activities, and pri-
vate businesses assume social responsibility for regional, national, and global com-
munities. Mainstream philanthropy research has largely been analyzing charitable 
activities from the perspective of the third sector, and has often pursued actor- 
specific divisions of research into types of giving organizations, such as charities 
and foundations, patrons and wealthy individuals, non-governmental organizations, 
and civic associations. This practice has enabled researchers to explore these spe-
cific types of actors in depth, yet it has somehow inhibited an evolving understand-
ing of the playing field, in which all these activities come together, especially in 
geographical, regional contexts. Therefore, and to overcome the evident boundaries 
of sectorial segmentation, we propose the concept of the philanthropic field to cap-
ture the interdependency and interrelations between all benevolent giving across 
sectors and among diverse types of actors. In this chapter, we seek to explore what 
we can learn about philanthropy when taking a relational and geographical perspec-
tive of fields.
The aim of this chapter is to shift our view from actors to agency of philanthropic 
giving, to identify differences in engagement, and to explore patterns of collabora-
tion and labor division among different actors in joint projects. After 
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conceptualizing the notion of the philanthropic field as an analytical framework, we 
present an in-depth, multi-method case study of the Southern German region of 
Heilbronn- Franconia. In our analysis, we draw on a detailed multi-year media anal-
ysis of published cases of donations and financial giving between regional donors 
and recipients.1 We show that apart from third-sector organizations, private busi-
nesses also play a central role as promoters in the region by offering financial sup-
port to social, educational, and charitable purposes. In addition, different types of 
actors collaborate across the analytic boundaries of public, private, and civic sec-
tors, a key insight that remains opaque when only focusing on one type of actor. In 
Heilbronn- Franconia, for instance, foundations and firms joined financial and 
human resources to make major projects possible in the field of education. In 
essence, our empirical case study serves as a showcase of how using the perspective 
of a philanthropic field emphasizes not the actions of one type of organization, but 
the interaction of all actors involved in the philanthropic field in a specific regional 
context. Finally, we are inviting a conversation about the role of philanthropic 
involvement in regional governance and development.
We begin by developing the concept of the philanthropic field as our analytical 
framework, and then present our case study including data and methods. The pre-
sentation of the findings is organized around four dimensions of the philanthropic 
field: its morphology, the diversity of actors, the connectivity of giving, and the 
geography of benevolent activity. We conclude by reassessing the philanthropic 
field’s potential to capture benevolence and giving in regional societies and by 
exploring the interrelation between philanthropy and social and economic develop-
ment of regions.
 The Philanthropic Field
Researchers of philanthropy in the social sciences have adopted a broad variety of 
definitions. We conceive philanthropy as voluntary, charitable, or welfare-oriented 
action, which takes place through the use of financial means, material resources, or 
time and without expectation of direct compensation (Acs & Phillips, 2002; 
Andreoni, 2001; Glückler & Ries, 2012). With this definition, we imply that philan-
thropic engagement not only applies to nonprofit actors such as foundations or non-
profit associations, but also to those actors who, apart from pursuing their economic 
goals, also act benevolently or contribute to the public good (Phillips & Jung, 2016; 
Wiepking & Handy, 2015). Scholars in the interdisciplinary research field of phi-
lanthropy have studied organizational diversity and the various practices, mecha-
nisms, and modes of philanthropic involvement as well as its social antecedents and 
effects (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Brown & Ferris, 2007; Diani, 2013; Diani & 
1 The empirical findings presented in this chapter are based on work conducted between 2011 and 
2013 as part of the research project “Regional Philanthropy and Innovation in Heilbronn-
Franconia” (Glückler & Suarsana, 2013, 2014; Suarsana & Glückler, 2016).
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Pilati, 2011; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Graddy & Wang, 2009; Herzog & 
Yang, 2018; Maclean & Harvey, 2016; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; 
Ostrander, 2007).
Many researchers have pursued sectoral perspectives or have focused on indi-
vidual types of actors and organizations (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007). Whereas 
researchers focusing on the antecedents of charitable giving and generosity 
(Andreoni, 2006; Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Havens et  al., 2007; Havens & 
Schervish, 2005; Wiepking & Maas, 2009) examine philanthropic commitment and 
the willingness of the population to donate, those studying elite philanthropy have 
a particular focus on wealthy individuals and patronage (Faller & Wiegandt, 2010, 
2015; Glückler, Ries, & Schmid, 2010; Hay & Muller, 2014; Kischel, 2009; 
Ostrower, 1995; Saunders-Hastings, 2018). Researchers studying civil society, the 
third sector, or nonprofit sector (Anheier, 2005; Anheier & Ben-Ner, 1997; Anheier, 
Priller, Seibel, & Zimmer, 1997; Anheier & Seibel, 1990; Hammack & Smith, 
2018; Powell & Steinberg, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1992, 1998; Zimmer & 
Simsa, 2014) compare and assess the characteristics, activities, development, and 
national conditions of civil society and nonprofit organizations, often focusing on 
specific types of organizations such as foundations and associations (Adloff, 2010; 
Anheier, 2003; Birkhölzer, Klein, Priller, & Zimmer, 2005; Hammack & Smith, 
2018; Zimmer, 2007), and on these organizations’ interactions with state and mar-
ket organizations (Salamon, 1995; Salamon & Toepler, 2015). Recently, scholars 
have challenged sectoral perspectives (Salamon & Wojciech Sokolowski, 2016) and 
suggested extending the view, for instance, through concepts of hybridization 
(Anheier & Krlev, 2014; Evers, 2020).
In addition, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Citizenship (CC), 
and Corporate Philanthropy approaches have been established to examine social 
and welfare-oriented activities of economic actors, (Beschorner, 2010; Burt, 1983; 
Carroll, 1999; Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2010; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Gautier 
& Pache, 2015; Henderson & Malani, 2009; Hurd, Mason, & Pinch, 1998; Matten 
& Crane, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003; Wolch & Geiger, 
1985). Philanthropic activities are often considered part of the overall concept of 
CSR or CC (Habisch, Wildner, & Wenzel, 2008; Sasse & Trahan, 2007), whereas 
some authors do not include philanthropic activities in their definition of CSR 
because of their distance to the company’s core business (Schneider, 2012). This 
view is often linked to demands that entrepreneurial social or regional commitment 
should be wedded to corporate strategy and the corporation’s core (Porter & Kramer, 
2002, 2006). Moreover, a number of new approaches have emerged in recent 
decades, their proponents discussing philanthropy from the angle of efficiency and 
strategy, economic and market-oriented perspectives, such as venture or creative 
philanthropy, social entrepreneurship, or philanthrocapitalism (Adloff & Degens, 
2017; Anheier & Leat, 2006; Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997; McGoey, 2012, 2014; 
Moody, 2008; Salamon, 2014).
Although focusing on sectors or organizational types contributes to a differential 
understanding of groups of actors, it entails the danger of neglecting the entirety of 
philanthropic engagement and the interaction among the actors in specific social 
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and geographical contexts. Alternatively, network approaches help researchers 
understand interorganizational relationships and the importance of social capital 
and the institutional embedding of philanthropic actors (Adloff, 2016; Brown & 
Ferris, 2007; Burt, 1983; Faulk, Lecy, & McGinnis, 2012; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 
1991; Guo & Acar, 2005; Harrow, Jung, & Phillips, 2016; Johnson, Honnold, & 
Stevens, 2010; Krashinsky, 1997; Letts, 2005; Marquis et al., 2007; see also Chap. 
8 by Diani).2 Moreover, conducting geographical studies sheds light on the regional 
dimension of fundraising, the “philanthropy market,” and the formative effect of the 
community context on philanthropic donor behavior (Wolch & Geiger, 1985; 
Wolpert & Reiner, 1984). Scholars have found that local contexts and geographical 
disparities set important conditions for regional variations in philanthropy and giv-
ing (Bekkers, 2016; Card, Hallock, & Moretti, 2010; Clerkin, Paarlberg, Christensen, 
Nesbit, & Tschirhart, 2013; Lengauer & Tödtling, 2010; Wolpert, 1988, 1995) at 
various geographical scales (Bekkers, 2016, p.  124; Havens & Schervish, 2005; 
Heinemann, 2010; von Schnurbein & Bethmann, 2010). Cross-national comparison 
reveals the impact of the political, economic, and social and cultural context on 
philanthropic giving as well as on the size and scope of the not-for-profit sector 
(Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Wiepking & Handy, 2015, p.  597)3. Those utilizing 
network approaches have often focused on interrelations between philanthropic 
organizations at the expense of the role of geography, whereas those conducting 
geographical studies have put emphasis on regionalizing the activity of actors typi-
cally of just one sector at the expense of grasping the connectivity between them 
and across a broader set of diverse actors.
To overcome the limitations of these approaches, we propose the concept of the 
philanthropic field (Glückler & Suarsana, 2014). With it, we capture the totality of 
philanthropic activities, diverse actors, and the interconnection amongst all kinds of 
benevolent actors and their recipients in a geographical context. We have based the 
concept of the philanthropic field on institutional theory, in which an organizational 
field comprises the totality of all organizations that form a “recognizable area of insti-
tutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). The 
notion of the field exceeds the narrow boundaries of sectors, markets, and networks. 
First, it exceeds the logic of sectors, which are constituted by homogenous types of 
organizations that offer similar products or services, by looking at diverse actors from 
private, public, and civic sectors. Second, it exceeds markets, which are defined by 
2 In his reflection on philanthropy, Adloff (2016, p. 66) argues that philanthropy “takes place within 
specific social contexts. […] Interaction on the level of face-to-face contacts must also be taken 
into account, as well as cultural, social, and institutional frameworks.”
3 Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, pp. 927−943) identified as mechanisms driving charitable giving 
on the household and individual level: “(1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and ben-
efits; (4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy.” Wiepking 
and Handy (2015, pp.  610−611) identified eight common facilitating factors for philanthropy, 
including “1. a culture of philanthropy; 2. public trust, issues of transparency, accountability and 
effectiveness; 3. regulatory and legislative frameworks; 4. fiscal incentives; 5. the state of the non-
profit sector; 6. political and economic stability or growth; 7. population changes; 8. international 
giving.”
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competition and trade, to include cooperation, collaboration, cocreation, solidarity, 
charity, volunteering, and so forth. Third, it exceeds networks, which are defined by 
connectivity and cohesion, to emphasize the significance of geography, such as the 
political, institutional, and cultural specificity of place or the proximity in space.
In analogy to physics, a field is the spatial distribution of a social (rather than 
physical) force that acts on social actors (rather than physical objects). The funda-
mental idea to be translated into the context of social science is that the force drives 
or affects social actors in similar ways yet in varying magnitude. In social life, such 
a force is found in the institutional pressures on individuals and organizations to 
gain legitimacy by complying with the expectations held in the respective social 
community or society. Accordingly, one of the axiomatic conjectures in neo- 
institutional theory is that those organizations belonging to an organizational field 
will respond to the institutional pressure with isomorphic conversion into similar 
organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Similarly, we conceive the phil-
anthropic field as a spatial distribution of benevolent giving that includes actors 
being exposed to a common set of institutional expectations for legitimacy and who 
are involved in the structuring of this phenomenon of philanthropy in a specific 
geographical context. Consequently, the field does not stop at the boundary of the 
third sector or nonprofit organization; it also encompasses the benevolent giving of 
private businesses and public organizations, as well as individual citizens, who 
together co-constitute the field in their roles as employees or mandated representa-
tives in decision making, or as donors, volunteers, or recipients. In essence, a phil-
anthropic field links the geography of giving with the networks of benevolent 
activities across the domains of private, public, and civic sectors (Fig. 9.1).
Fig. 9.1 Types of actors in the philanthropic field. Source: Design by authors
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To leverage the concept for empirical analysis, we specify any empirical philan-
thropic field along four dimensions. First, field composition comprises the location 
and constitution of the diverse participants who contribute benevolent activity in the 
field. Second, field activity comprises the sources and magnitude of benevolent giv-
ing as well as the diverse uses of philanthropic donations. Third, field connectivity 
encompasses the interactions and interrelations between benevolent actors in the 
field, including direct collaboration on large joint projects and the division of labor 
that emerges from specialization and segmentation into often complementary activ-
ities. Fourth, field geography is the regional specificity, spatial reach, and interre-
gional relations in philanthropic activities and cooperation. Together, these four 
dimensions make up the philanthropic field. One of our central objectives in this 
chapter is to deploy this concept as an analytical framework for empirical explora-
tion in a case study of philanthropy in the Southern German region of 
Heilbronn-Franconia.
 Case Study: Data and Methods
 Study Region
In our case study, we draw on intensive research in the rural region of Heilbronn- 
Franconia, located in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, Germany. With a 
GDP of over €500b, Baden-Württemberg would be number 22 in a world ranking 
of global economies, with a magnitude of economic output similar to Sweden and 
Poland. Heilbronn-Franconia is a planning region in the northeast of Baden- 
Württemberg located between the metropolitan regions of Stuttgart, Nuremberg and 
Rhine-Neckar. It is the region with the second-fastest economic growth in Germany 
since 2000 (Glückler, Schmidt, & Wuttke, 2015). Its economic structure is based on 
an internationally competitive manufacturing industry, a high density of world mar-
ket leaders, and a nationwide above-average income of the region’s 900,000 inhab-
itants (Glückler, Punstein, Wuttke, & Kirchner, 2020). In pursuit of an extensive 
exploration of the composition, activity, connectivity, and geography of the philan-
thropic field in the region, we adopted a mixed-methods research design with which 
we combined qualitative and quantitative methods for the collection of primary and 
secondary empirical observations (Table 9.1). We have based the findings we pres-
ent in this chapter on empirical work carried out as part of the multiyear research 
project “Regional Philanthropy and Innovation in Heilbronn-Franken” in 2012.4
4 For a more detailed discussion of the study design and methods, see Glückler and Suarsana (2013).
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 Identification of Field Actors
To identify the actors contributing to the philanthropic field of Heilbronn-Franconia, 
we consulted official registries from the Land of Baden-Württemberg on the num-
ber of charitable clubs and associations as well as of judicable foundations and 
associations5 with legal capacity. We then decided to take a more detailed look at 
the foundations located in the region as well as at other regional field actors, draw-
ing on two sources of primary data collection (Table 9.1). First, we conducted a 
standardized survey of all the identifiable 186 judicable foundations in the region to 
get information on organizational characteristics and profiles, yet most importantly 
to learn about interactions and cooperation with other foundations as well as addi-
tional partners in benevolent giving. Because our study met high levels of interest 
and acceptance, a remarkable number of 98 nonprofit foundations (response rate 
52.7%) responded to the survey. Secondly, we carried out 33 qualitative interviews 
with representatives of foundations, nonprofit associations, private businesses, and 
public entities to explore additional actors in the field, assess their roles, and under-
stand the diversity of philanthropic practices.
5 Registered associations can be retrieved at the local district courts, whereas we collected the 
number (though not the identity) of charitable associations from the regional tax offices.
Table 9.1 Methods and sources of empirical data collection
Methods Actions and observations Empirical database
Regional 
analysis
• Analysis of regional income and private 
wealth as well as of registered foundations, 
associations, and charitable organizations
• Official statistics on 
income





• Identification of charitable donations by actors 
of all sectors in the region that were mentioned 
in newspapers and magazines, 2004–2011
• 2,297 donations between 
920 donors and 1,234 





• Transformation of the textual data retrieved in 
the media analysis into a network database, 
indicating the direction and value of donation 
relations between actors
• 789 donors and 1,103 




• Survey of all 186 judiciable foundations in the 
region
• 101 responses (response 





• Interviews with philanthropists, recipient 
organizations, and intermediaries from both 
not-for-profit and for-profit sectors
• 33 semi-structured 
interviews
Note. Source: Design by authors
9 The Geography of Giving in the Philanthropic Field
186
 Measure of Field Activity: Donations
We aimed at creating a maximally complete database of philanthropic giving in the 
region to capture the magnitude, structure, and connectivity of philanthropic 
engagement in the field. In the absence of official statistics and due to the limita-
tions of survey techniques regarding response rates and willingness to declare dona-
tions, we conducted a media analysis to capture all “publicized” donations within 
the region. Of course, not all donations are published—for instance, donors may act 
discreetly or newspapers may restrict reports as a matter of policy. With our analy-
sis, we have covered all cases of giving between 2004 and 2011 that were published 
in eight regional daily newspapers, each having partial coverage of selected districts 
in the region (Fig. 9.2). We used a set of 90 keywords and keyword combinations to 
Fig. 9.2 Geographical distribution of newspapers, income, wealth, and civic associations. Source: 
Design by authors
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search the digital archives of these eight newspapers and screened all individual 
reports manually to verify the transaction and avoid double counting of transactions 
in cases of multiple reports. After checking each transaction, we created a database 
on philanthropic relationships between donors and recipients, including the purpose 
and the amount of each donation.6 The database contains a total of 2,297 cases of 
charitable donations and donations between 920 donors and 1,234 beneficiaries, 
amounting to a sum of 129 million euros. Of course, this database only provides 
insights into the activities voluntarily published in the press. The results are subject 
firstly to the selection criteria of the responsible editorial offices of the media 
involved and secondly to our selection criteria in the course of our research.
 Field Composition: Who are the Actors?
The region of Heilbronn-Franconia includes the city of Heilbronn at its core and the 
four rural districts of Heilbronn, Hohenlohe, Main-Tauber, and Schwäbisch Hall. 
As a consequence of our multiple-method approach, we identified the following 
groups of actors who represent the potential for philanthropy in the region: wealthy 
individuals, charitable associations and foundations (funding/grant making and 
operative), and private businesses. In addition, we included cooperative and less 
institutionalized entities such as events and project in the philanthropic field 
(Table  9.3). Together, these constitute a diverse group of donors and sources of 
benevolent activity.
First, identifying private wealth in Germany on the ground of public statistics is 
not without its difficulties. In the mid-1990s, the German government abandoned 
wealth taxes and the state consequently lost transparency over the magnitude and 
distribution of private wealth. Today, researchers only have forward projections or 
surveys of small population samples with which to estimate the magnitude and 
distribution of private wealth. Rather than looking at the assets, we therefore focus 
on the flows of income. In aggregate, the region enjoys an above-average per capita 
income, with a peak in the city of Heilbronn. More specifically—and this one can 
learn in great detail from the official statistics—the region also hosts a great number 
of income millionaires. Although the sheer number of 179 income millionaires 
reflects the mean in the spatial distribution across Germany, the income millionaires 
in Heilbronn-Franconia were, in aggregate, exceptionally rich: The regional aver-
age was about double as high as the German average. These statistics of prosperity 
resonate with the observation of quite a number of patrons and wealthy individuals 
6 We recorded activities for which a transfer of financial or physical resources took place or for 
which we could allocate a monetary value to the grant. With this analysis step one can only draw 
conclusions about actors whose activities were published in the media. However, given the general 
opacity of the field of charitable activities, this appears to be one of the few possible ways to cap-
ture all philanthropic activities in the region. For a detailed discussion of the conception and a criti-
cal evaluation of the method, see Glückler, Ries, and Schmid (2010).
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who have become known for the civic engagement and benevolent giving in 
the region.
Second, regarding associational life and organized civil society, we found 5,131 
publicly registered clubs and associations, of which 1,200 clubs were registered 
under the legal status of a charitable club, a status that exempts them from paying 
corporation tax in return for charitable commitment. Third, apart from the charita-
ble associations, a total of 186 judicable foundations under civil and public law 
were registered with the Stuttgart Regional Council in 2012. There were also 19,551 
legally responsible foundations under civil law alone in Germany and 2,847  in 
Baden-Württemberg (Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen, 2013, pp.  112–114). 
The responding foundations in Heilbronn-Franconia had relatively larger endow-
ments than the average endowments of all German foundations (Table  9.2). 
Although one learns little about actual philanthropic activity from the mere number 
of nonprofit organizations, the structure of household incomes and foundation 
assets is consistent with a solid financial basis for philanthropic commitment within 
the region. The majority of the foundations in the survey (71.1%) categorized them-
selves as funding/grantmaking foundations. A further 20.6% are both operative as 
well as grant-making, whereas 8.2% pursue only operational activities.
Finally, we observed that the regional population had a remarkable level of 
involvement with philanthropy and civic engagement. Based on our analyses of the 
number of organizations and of our foundation survey, we conclude that in addition 
to 1,200 charitable support clubs and associations with an unspecified number of 
tens of thousands dedicated members, another approximately 1,400 citizens regu-
larly volunteered on an honorary basis for almost all the regional foundations. Apart 
from the few hundred people directly involved with a foundation, we counted a total 
of 252 individuals who acted as members of management or supervisory boards, 
thus being directly responsible for decisions about their foundation’s activities. 
Finally, two thirds of all foundations reported sustaining advisory boards with a 
total of 391 board members who typically share their expertise, experience, pres-
tige, and social networks to leverage the work of a foundation.
Table 9.2 Financial equity of charitable foundations in Heilbronn-Franconia (n = 88 foundations)
Equity 2012
Region Heilbronn-Franconia Germany
No. of foundations Share (%) No. of foundations Share (%)
Up to €100,000 21 23.9 2,209 28.4
Up to €1 mil. 44 50.0 3,478 44.7
Up to €10 mil. 20 22.7 1,720 22.1
More than €10 mil. 3 3.4 379 4.9
Note. Values for Germany: Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (2012). Source: Design by authors
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 Field Activity: What are the Practices of Giving?
Drawing on a detailed analysis of published media reports on donations in the 
region, we found that the philanthropic commitment in Heilbronn-Franconia had 
increased significantly between 2004 and 2011. Within this short period of only 
seven years, the annual number of published transactions more than doubled to over 
400. Despite the steady rise of donations, the grant volumes had been volatile over 
time, with an unprecedented peak in 2010 (€42 million). Despite the relative volatil-
ity, there is a trend towards increasingly more donations to beneficiaries. In total, we 
found donations with an aggregate value of 129 million euros through our media 
analysis.
The media analysis not only shows that considering only one isolate type of 
philanthropic donor would be inadequate but also that wealthy individuals and pri-
vate businesses also play a significant role in philanthropic giving. Charitable foun-
dations accounted for the majority share (61.7%) of all funding volume, with one 
foundation making up 45.9% of the total sum (€59.37m).7 Yet the second most 
important group of donors were private business firms who accounted for 10.5% of 
the volume and 20.3% of the number of donations. Excluding private businesses 
from the perspective of the field would thus leave out a substantial share in overall 
regional benevolent engagement. When ranked by the volume of donations, wealthy 
individuals come third. Although individual patrons have a minimal share in the 
number of transactions, their donations amount to the third largest share of 8.4% in 
the volumes of money donated. Although clubs and associations are largest in terms 
of the number of transactions, they fall to only fourth place in terms of the amounts 
of money donated. This diversity of actors is a significant insight to be gained from 
a field perspective. Public organizations and entities were the largest recipients, 
with 55% of the total amount given. Whereas foundations and private businesses 
together accounted for the lion’s share of 70% of funding, clubs and associations 
accounted for the highest number of individual transactions (Table 9.3A). The not- 
for- profit sector received the largest flow of donations, comprising a total of 94.6 
million euros, that is, 73.2% of the total amount of all grants. Cooperation between 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations received the second largest share (€34.5 
million, 26.7%) (Table 9.3B).
One of the fundamental advantages of building a transaction database by using 
media reports is that we could carefully read every news article and thus extract 
more detailed information on the donors, beneficiaries, and donation purpose. 
Hence, we were able to distinguish a variety of different purposes, ranging from the 
most popular purposes of “education, academia, and research” and “charity and 
7 When including this regional actor, the maximum increases from 3.5 to 20 million euros and the 
total funding amount of foundations from 17 to 76.3 million euros. The regional field is therefore 
divided: One organization with very high annual income on the one hand and a larger number of 
smaller foundations on the other. If the largest foundation is excluded, the mean amount donated 
by foundations still exceeds that of companies.
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  Business firms 462 20.3% 13,025,848 10.5% 28,194
  other (events, 
projects, etc.)
10 0.4% 198,386 0.2% 19,839
Cooperation/across 
sectors
  Events, projects, 
groups, etc.
51 2.2% 112,192 0.1% 2,200
Not-for-profit
  Foundations 532 23.4% 76,284,331 61.7% 143,392
  Clubs and 
associations
616 27.0% 9,424,336 7.6% 15,299
  Individuals, e.g., 
patrons
92 4.0% 10,410,470 8.4% 113,157
  Public entities 205 9.0% 8,934,932 7.2% 43,585
  Other (events, 
projects, etc.)
299 13.1% 4,839,844 3.9% 16,187
  Not-for-profit 
enterprises
11 0.5% 444,500 0.4% 40,409
B. Recipients
For-profit
  Business firms 7 0.3% 42,155 0.0% 6,022
  Other (events, 
projects, etc.)
4 0.2% 158,500 0.1% 39,625
Cooperation/across 
sectors
  Events, projects, 
groups, etc.
199 8.7% 33,099,841 25.6% 166,331
  Public-private 
partnerships
10 0.4% 1,360,192 1.1% 136,019
Not for-profit
  Foundations 192 8.4% 6,562,983 5.1% 34,182
  Clubs and 
associations
790 34.4% 7,147,524 5.5% 9,047
  Individuals 35 1.5% 188,890 0.1% 5,387
  Other (events, 
projects, etc.)
321 14.0% 9,067,648 7.0% 28,248
  Public entities 739 32.2% 7,1640,822 55.4% 96,943
Note. We have not included 19 cases (0.8% of all transactions, 4.3% of the total sum), as informa-
tion on the sector was unavailable. Source: Design by authors
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humanitarian aid” to more niche purposes such as “leisure,” “environment and ani-
mal care,” or even “economy” (Table 9.4). The distribution of donations across the 
many purposes was highly skewed. The greatest number of donations fell in the 
area of charity and humanitarian aid, which represents the classic destination of 
philanthropic support. In total, over 1,000 donations, corresponding to almost half 
of all transactions, were dedicated to his purpose, yet these transactions represent 
only 18.3% of the volume of donated money. In turn, whereas education, academia, 
and research received only 17.8% of the number of donations, its cumulative value 
amounted to almost 81 million euros and made up 62.6% of the volume of donated 
assets. These figures may reflect a recent trend that education has become an 
increasingly popular target of philanthropy (Glückler & Ries, 2012), but also 
reflects the impact of the largest regional foundation, with its focus on education, 
that was responsible for 59,273,500 euros of the total amount given.
 Field connectivity: How Does Giving Create a Network 
of Cooperation?
The third dimension of connectivity is used to focus on the network of giving as 
well as the divisions of labor and interactions among donor organizations in terms 
of collaboration in philanthropic projects as well as across the traditional nonprofit 
and for-profit sectors.
Regarding field connectivity, we analyzed the topology of the transactional net-
work generated by the aggregate of philanthropic donations. In our media analysis, 
we retrieved 920 donors who made 2,297 donations to 1,234 recipients worth over 
Table 9.4 Number and volume of donations by purpose, 2004–2011
Volume (EUR) Transactions
Total Mean Share No. Share
Education, academia, & research 80,894,895 198,272 62.6% 408 17.8%
Charity and humanitarian aid 23,631,219 22,722 18.3% 1,040 45.3%
Culture & arts 8,391,146 55.941 6.5% 150 6.5%
Local heritage & traditions 6,694,029 41,321 5.2% 162 7.1%
Health & medicine 3,069,780 15,197 2.4% 202 8.8%
Religion & worldviews 2,010,044 39,413 1.6% 51 2.2%
Other 1,706,217 32,812 1.3% 52 2.3%
Sports 1,290,726 11,628 1.0% 111 4.8%
Leisure (without sports) 701,765 23,392 .5% 30 1.3%
Environment & animal care 377,706 5,104 .3% 74 3.2%
Economy 149,500 24,917 .1% 6 .3%
Interest groups 3,500 1,750 .0% 2 .1%
Politics and public administration 429 429 .0% 1 .0%
Unknown/not specified 347,600 43,450 .3% 8 .3%
Total 129,268,556 56,277 100.0% 2,297 100.0%
Note. Source: Design by authors
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129 million euros. Because some of the donors were nonidentifiable, we were able 
to include a slightly reduced number of 789 donors and 1,103 recipients in our 
social network analysis, amounting to a total volume of 93.4 million euros. Bilateral 
and nonrecurring donor-recipient relationships dominate the network. The main 
component includes 62% of the actors, 75% of the relations, and 42% of the aggre-
gate grant value (Fig. 9.3). A small patronage elite faces a broad civic commitment. 
The small number of large donations is offset by a large number of small donations. 
The median donation is less than 2,500 euros. Using more detailed techniques of 
network analysis (Glückler & Panitz, 2021), such as a triadic census, we revealed 
that giving is spread widely across the field and does not tend to cluster very much. 
Donors mostly supported several beneficiaries, whereas beneficiaries tended to 
receive grants from the same donors.
Although the endowments, objectives, and strategies of public, private, and civic 
organizations differ, we expect all these types of actors to shape and influence their 
philanthropic activities together and to be interrelated in the philanthropic field 
Fig. 9.3 The philanthropic network of Heilbronn-Franconia (main network component). Source: 
Design by authors
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(Glückler & Ries, 2012). From a geographical perspective, therefore, questions 
arise about their interaction and possible forms of complementarity, specialization, 
and cooperation between them with a view to achieving benevolent goals in a phil-
anthropic field. We draw on the notion of the value chain to distinguish different 
stages of involvement in the chain of giving, ranging from original donations and 
financial support, the collection of assets in funding organizations, and operational 
activities to the final recipients. The stages of individual giving, organizational fun-
draising, and operational charity are complemented and interlinked by intermediary 
actors (e.g., public entities, authorities, organized events, interest groups) and sup-
ported by cooperation partners, for example by syndicated donations or operational 
collaboration among operational foundations (Fig. 9.4).
Although the donation network we drew from the media reports comprises a 
large number of financial donations, it does not include the specialization and col-
laboration between the different actors in the division of philanthropic giving. To 
obtain additional information on these relations, we carried out a survey of all 186 
judicable foundations registered with the regional council in Stuttgart. With this 
survey, we focused on how foundations had specialized on certain stages and col-
laborated with other partners in the provision of philanthropic giving. With 98 char-
itable foundations taking part, we achieved a response rate of 52.7% of the entire 
regional population of foundations. More than half of the questionnaires were com-
pleted by a board member; in one third of cases the managing director answered. 
With this survey, we learned that 71% of the foundations acted exclusively as spon-
sors—that is, they only donated money for charitable purposes—whereas 20.6% 
engaged in both funding and their own project operations, and a minor share of 
8.2% exclusively pursued operational activities, depending on financial support 
from other organizational and individual donations.
This pattern of specialization reflects the contours of horizontal and vertical divi-
sions of labor, in which operational foundations seek and receive donations from 
sponsoring organizations that are concentrated on fundraising, including from indi-
vidual donors and citizens. In the horizontal dimension of the chain of giving, two 
types of cooperation emerged from the survey. First, 71% of surveyed foundations 
stated that cooperation with partners consisted of co-financing common charitable 
Fig. 9.4 Flows of giving in the philanthropic field in Heilbronn-Franconia. Source: Design 
by authors
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purposes and projects. Another 49% reported practices of co-operation in that they 
worked together with partners to develop themes and topics, and 38% of the chari-
ties even reported actively collaborating on joint projects. Most foundations agreed 
that cooperating more extensively with other foundations would increase the effi-
ciency of charitable work. However, more than half of the surveyed foundations 
stated that they did not cooperate with partners. In contrast, a large proportion of 
foundations in the survey reported cooperation across sectors, including public, pri-
vate, and other nonprofit organizations as important cooperation partners. The most 
frequent cooperation partners were public entities, named by 27 foundations, fol-
lowed by associations and private businesses. In most cases, the cooperation devel-
oped through existing personal contacts. Nevertheless, a quarter of surveyed 
foundations confirmed that they were also actively seeking new partners.
In the vertical dimension of the chain of giving, we learned from our survey that 
funding relationships largely exist between not-for-profit actors. The majority of the 
foundations were tied up in fixed funding relationships with both donors and recipi-
ents. This pattern of linkages appeared to be quite stable and rather inert, reflecting 
long-term established channels of philanthropy. On the one hand, these established 
channels guaranteed continuous dedication to the same purposes and recipients; on 
the other, this rigidity incurred problems for those foundations that aimed to access 
new donors to expand their activities. Overall, the region’s foundations desired bet-
ter access to and more visibility vis-à-vis potential sponsors. Moreover, they 
reported that they were less visible to potential donors and multipliers than to recip-
ients. From several interviews, we discovered the relevance of connectivity and 
formal as well as informal relations between regional actors for philanthropic prac-
tices, with personal relations bridging gaps between organizational logics of action. 
A representative of a regional business firm, associated with a charitable founda-
tion, characterized the regional division of labor among the regional foundations 
and their relations with regional philanthropists:
We were in conversation with [Philanthropist A] very often and he asked: “What shall we 
do together?” He is also strongly connected within the region, and we are now working 
very closely together with our foundations… . We work together locally, where there is no 
competition. [Philanthropist B], he says he works on the topic “children,” and then we stay 
out of that. Because there is no use if we do that as well. (Representative, business firm C)
The activities of business firms, foundations and other charitable and public 
actors were intertwined in many different ways: The degree of cooperation among 
foundations and between foundations and public and private businesses varied 
widely. The surveyed foundations reported a stronger interest in forms of coopera-
tive regional involvement than business firms. In our set of qualitative interviews 
with selected business representatives, interviewees conveyed that sufficient local 
possibilities for funding existed. We learned from the discussions that businesses 
had their philanthropic strategies well defined and that they counted on sufficient 
regional and local cooperation opportunities through personal and organizational 
networks. In turn, foundations were particularly interested in new, creative forms of 
cooperation, such as opportunities for short-term project collaboration. They also 
welcomed the idea of cooperation being orchestrated by intermediaries who could 
provide support in finding partners, initiating cooperation, or forming consortia for 
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joint funding. Furthermore, some foundations emphasized the social benefit of a 
stronger pooling of funds in order to enable joint funding offers that small or indi-
vidual foundations could not provide. However, not all foundations were so open to 
additional cooperation. For example, interviewees feared the resources required to 
establish new cooperations and the loss of organizational independence.
Despite the independence of most philanthropic actors, several large charitable 
projects had been realized in the Heilbronn-Franconia region, projects character-
ized by the cooperative interaction of business firms, foundations, and other actors. 
One showcase of the complex pattern of intersectorial collaboration among a 
diverse group of actors is the regional Pakt Zukunft [pact for future].
The Pakt Zukunft Heilbronn-Franken was founded in 2007 by regional stake-
holders as a partnership with the purpose of jointly representing regional interests. 
A total of 134 municipalities, private businesses, and civic organizations partici-
pated in this initiative and met regularly for network meetings, lectures, and work-
ing groups. At the same time, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK) 
established the nonprofit enterprise Pakt Zukunft Heilbronn-Franken gGmbH to 
raise money from the largest corporations in the region and to fund charitable proj-
ects in the region. The purpose was to promote the overall well-being of the 
Heilbronn-Franconia region, especially in the areas of education and upbringing, 
youth and elderly care, and science and research. Three years later, in 2010, the pact 
failed, and members withdrew from the original organizational structure. However, 
the shareholders of the nonprofit enterprise relied on their growing solidarity and 
interest in continuing joint activities within the framework of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. From then on, the participating business firms concentrated on 
financially supporting nonprofit projects in the region. Since 2011, when a leading 
automotive manufacturer joined the enterprise as a shareholder, Pakt Zukunft sup-
ported more than 40 regional projects with an increasing focus on education and 
science. Interview partners emphasized several factors of the successful establish-
ment and co-operation in the Pakt Zukunft enterprise. First, the initiative is built on 
existing personal relationships and trust, which provided the glue and confidence to 
engage in joint financial cooperation. Second, the initiative benefited from the 
opportunity for a number of regional entrepreneurs to become more involved in 
their region, actors who thus responded gratefully to such an inclusive nonprofit 
initiative. Third, the shareholders appreciated the serious framework in order to 
jointly promote more experimental projects in fields requiring action in the longer 
term. If merely entrepreneurial commitment had been involved, there would have 
been a risk of attracting negative attention. Fourth, the Pakt Zukunft partners 
acknowledged the Chamber of Commerce’s central role as a trustworthy intermedi-
ary who offered an impartial, serious, and reliable framework needed for project 
sponsors and funding recipients to be able to balance competing interests. In addi-
tion, using the Chamber of Commerce’s existing infrastructure for administration 
and communication provided additional advantages and prevented the implementa-
tion of unnecessary infrastructure:
“Lernende Region Heilbronn-Franken e.V.” [Learning Region, charitable association] and 
“Pakt Zukunft”: These are cooperations that fortunately are set up, controlled, and super-
vised by the IHK [regional chamber of industry and commerce]. In order to achieve an 
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effect, the companies in the region really join forces in order to advance such significantly 
larger projects. That, of course, suits us very well. We don’t have so many employees here 
on site that we can now run such larger projects ourselves and look after them sustainably. 
This really is an institution. And the associations that are behind it are very valuable to 
really make this an investment for us that is pursued consistently and does not have a one- 
time character. (Business firm representative B)
 Field Geography: How Does Geography  
Shape Philanthropy?
Finally, we examine the geographical dimension as the fourth element of the phil-
anthropic field. Specifically, we assess the extent to which geography makes a dif-
ference for the way that philanthropy works. Social commitment is often 
synonymous with local commitment. Most transactions took place locally within a 
county (61.8%) and were dedicated to the immediate local environment within a 
district or the city of Heilbronn. All types of donors focused on the local level as the 
geographic focus of philanthropic grant relationships between donors and recipi-
ents. This finding is consistent with earlier studies on the geography of philanthropy 
(Wolpert, 1988; Wolpert & Reiner, 1984). Business firms, foundations, and other 
organizations such as associations, federations, service clubs, and the like directed 
at least 80% of their activities and financial resources to recipients within the 
region (Table 9.5).
Whereas most donations were made locally, the largest amount of funding, con-
stituting less than a third of transactions, was directed at the regional level. Only 
17.7% of all transactions, but 42.7% of the total volume, crossed a district border 
within the region.
The region is divided into four areas: Heilbronn, Hohenlohe, Main-Tauber, and 
Schwäbisch Hall. Because these areas maintain only limited social and economic 
exchange with each other, we found the probability of a philanthropic relationship 
between two actors from different districts within the region to be no greater than 
that with actors outside the region. One donor located in the city of Heilbronn dis-
trict accounted for 92.5% of grants for the city of Heilbronn and 97.3% of grants for 
other regions in Germany (Fig. 9.5).
Regarding interregional philanthropic relations, we observed a negative balance: 
29.5% of the funds, mostly in the form of large donations, but only 14% of all trans-
actions, went to beneficiaries outside the region. Only 6.9% of donations came into 
the Heilbronn-Franconia region from outside (Table 9.6).
In addition to geographical diversification, there were also differences in the 
governance of the commitment—from simple donor-recipient relationships and 
multilateral divisions of labor between business firms and corporate foundations or 
foundations with associated support associations, to complex interorganizational 
associations, such as the Pakt Zukunft Heilbronn Franken gGmbH (see previous 
section). Further, the geography of giving varied by the type of donor. Business 
firms used a significantly higher proportion of their funds than foundations at the 
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Table 9.5 Geographical distribution of donations
Funding volume (EUR) Transactions
Total Mean Share No. Share
Local level 26,259,737 18,811 20.9% 1,396 61.8%
Regional levela 53,479,011 133,364 42.7% 401 17.7%
Region, outgoing 37,014,782 121,759 29.5% 304 13.5%
Region, incoming 8,618,259 54,203 6.9% 159 7.0%
Total 125,371,789b 55,474 100% 2,260 100%
Note. a Includes 110 transfers totaling €1,368,3445 for which donors or recipients were located in 
the region but we could clearly allocate them to a group, b Because we could not precisely locate 
some donors and recipients, we could classify only €112.9 million of the total of €129 million in 
grants. Source: Design by authors
Fig. 9.5 The geography of the philanthropic field of Heilbronn-Franconia. Source: Design 
by authors
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regional level (Glückler & Suarsana, 2014). In spite of the large number of transac-
tions, they committed only 21.6% of their funds to the local level. Instead, they 
directed almost half of all funds (47.5%) to recipients at the regional level, that is, 
beyond their own administrative district within the broader region. In contrast, 
foundations directed more than half of their financial donations to beneficiaries in 
their direct local surroundings. Although the foundations recorded a similar number 
of grant cases at the regional level, they supported recipients at the regional level 
with only just under 8% of funds. Business firms’ stronger focus on the regional 
level reflects a more diversified philanthropic commitment. For example, firms at 
the local level appeared to be using smaller amounts of money, whereas at the 
regional level they provided significantly larger financial support. A greater diversi-
fication of corporate philanthropy was also reflected in a higher number of activities 
corporations directed from the region to the national or international level 
(Table  9.6). In contrast to the geographical diversification of private donations, 
foundations were often statutorily bound to local purposes or local organizations 
(e.g., schools) as target groups. This is also reflected in the results of our foundation 
survey, from which we gleaned that more than 80% of foundations had their geo-
graphical focus within the study region, and half alone within their respective 
municipalities. Overall, this finding supports the assessment of previous studies’ 
researchers that “most foundations operate primarily at the local or regional level” 
(Anheier, 2003, p. 70).
In addition, through our interviews with representatives of business and founda-
tions we captured the diversity and different significance of the geographical refer-
ence levels for pursuing different strategic goals. The interviewed businesses 
pursued combinations of local, regional, and national activities. They aimed their 
local commitment at gaining acceptance and improving the quality of the local 
environment. Business firms were committed to ensuring good relations in the local 
environment, including a prosperous and attractive labor market. Locally rooted 
Table 9.6 Geographical distributions of donations by organization
Share of (%) Businesses Foundationsa Other Total
Local level Transactions 58.5% 63.7% 65.0% 63.4%
Volume 21.6% 51.3% 47.5% 43.1%
Regional levela Transactions 22.7% 20.5% 12.8% 16.6%
Volume 47.6% 7.7% 33.9% 29.5%
Extra-regional, outgoing Transactions 12.0% 3.8% 17.7% 13.4%
Volume 20.9% 16.0% 10.8% 14.4%
Extra-regional, incoming Transactions 6.8% 12.0% 4.5% 6.7%
Volume 10.0% 25.0% 7.8% 13.1%
Note. a We excluded the largest donor, a foundation, due to the high distortion of the total values. 
This donor spent a total of 59.3 million, or 46% of the total amount raised. For the latter, 7% of the 
activities and 0.4% of the total are at the local level, 79% of the activities and 52% of the total are 
at the regional level and 14% of the activities and 47% of the total are at the national level. Source: 
Design by authors
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entrepreneurs said they wanted to “give back” to their home region and combine 
generosity with economic interest:
And that is really the core belief of [the philanthropist and corporate owner] that it is his job 
to not only to look after the company, but also to look after this region. And not only out of 
gratitude and goodwill, to a certain extent you also have to look at it from the perspective 
of agglomeration, it influences the environment in which he wants to continue to be suc-
cessful as an entrepreneur in the future. (Business firm representative B)
In contrast, nationwide commitment tended to raise the visibility of CSR activi-
ties. This relates to the different logics of the action of market-oriented corporations 
on the one hand and nonprofit organizations such as charitable foundations on the 
other—differences that researchers must account8 for in an integrated analysis of a 
regional philanthropic field. Differences became apparent in the three dimensions: 
organizational purpose, finance, and flexibility.
First, regarding the organizational purpose: From their legal form and profit ori-
entation as well as their market and economic-success-oriented logic of action, one 
can conclude that a business firm’s philanthropic activities are linked to direct and 
indirect benefit expectations, such as positive reputation, employee recruitment, 
and so forth (Hiß, 2006; Maaß, 2009, pp. 27–28). In contrast, foundations—though 
these may also seek legitimacy and public awareness—are constituted by formal 
statutes and the requirements of charitable law for achieving charitable goals. 9
Second, with respect to finance, business firms cover philanthropic donations 
with their profits. Due to the earnings expectations of investors and employees, 
business firms face opportunity costs and are thus pressured to justify activities in 
the public interest. The philanthropic commitment of firms, therefore, must always 
be traded off against alternative forms of profit placement. In contrast, foundations 
are not faced with the question of alternative uses of financial resources for private 
economic purposes due to their statutory obligation to promote public-interest 
objectives. However, because foundations are bound to their income from the exist-
ing foundation assets, they are dependent either on additional donations or the 
increase of the foundation assets through endowments or other incoming funds. In 
this respect, it is to be expected that foundations tend to seek relationships with 
institutional and individual donors or partners if they wish to expand their funding 
performance.
Third, business firms are more flexible in their behavior than foundations because 
they set their goals, strategies, and agendas internally. Although a CSR strategy 
adopted and communicated in the long term can have a binding effect on future 
activities, firms can always adapt and change objectives and practices if necessary 
or if corporate objectives change. On the other hand, foundations have less freedom 
8 The following relates to not-for-profit foundations within the meaning of German nonprofit law 
and to profit-oriented companies.
9 There are also differences within each sector. Existing research, for example, refers to particular 
features of the structure of the commitment depending on the size and form of the business firm 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007; Fischer, 2007). The differences among foundations must also be 
pointed out (Hof, 2003), whereas we apply our argument exclusively to nonprofit foundations.
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of choice and flexibility with regard to their commitment, the topics dealt with, and 
the target group of beneficiaries, due to the statutes’ binding nature and the require-
ments of nonprofit law. It can therefore be assumed that business firms can firstly 
show greater adaptability to new needs of charitable support and secondly promote 
the diversity of these social needs with greater flexibility.
The philanthropic activities of the firms, foundations, and other local actors we 
covered in fieldwork were all affected by social and spatial proximity between orga-
nization representatives, benevolent individuals, and beneficiaries. In choosing top-
ics and projects, they followed locally perceived needs and opportunities to realize 
local projects together with local partners, to whom again often long-term relations 
existed beforehand. Existing personal relations, successful cooperation across sec-
tors in the past, and the integration into local associations and networks were 
referred to as opportunities for the acquisition of partners and donors and as a place 
where new projects and ideas  were developed. From these interviews, we can 
underline the specific nature of the regional context and unique conditions for the 
regional philanthropic field.
 Conclusion: Strategizing the Philanthropic Field?
We have proposed the philanthropic field as an analytical framework to conceive 
and capture the interrelations of benevolent activities across the domains of private, 
public, and civic sectors in a geographical context. The concept of the philanthropic 
field offers a comprehensive view of philanthropic engagement beyond the sectoral 
boundaries of civic, public, and private actors.
Through our exploratory case study of the Southern German region of 
Heilbronn Franconia, we have illustrated that its philanthropic field was territo-
rially constrained, loosely connected, and fragmented, as well as highly diversi-
fied in terms of its actors, and with a certain division of labor between them. 
Through interviews we uncovered close associations between local key actors in 
the field of philanthropy and the influence of their networks on the selection of 
recipients, flows of donations, and their willingness to cooperate on the local or 
regional level.
Moreover, through the field perspective and the use of methods of network anal-
ysis we have conveyed that different actors collaborate on big projects that none of 
the individual actors could have pursued or realized separately. In this way, regional 
philanthropy has had a considerable impact on education and knowledge creation in 
Heilbronn-Franconia. The largest share of all donations we covered in our analysis 
was directed towards science and education and led to the establishment of an 
entirely new university campus in the region. The vast majority of foundations 
reported that they had contributed to the creation of new ideas and concepts in other 
areas of societal development, such as cultural heritage, education, sports, religious 
practices, and so forth.
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Overall, we have used our analysis of the geography of giving in the Heilbronn- 
Franconia region through the lens of the philanthropic field to show that not only 
the isolated work of diverse sets of actors, but also the collaborative engagement 
and interaction of partners from the first (state), second (business), and third sector 
(civil society) can produce successful contributions to solving social challenges at 
the regional level. We found both complementary as well as collaborative practices 
of giving. Coordinated cooperation enables positive economies of scale through the 
pooling of resources or the combination of complementary competencies. One pos-
sible implication for regional development is to include a region’s philanthropic 
field in processes of regional governance (Glückler et al., 2020), on the one hand in 
order to promote charitable commitment, but also to orchestrate this commitment 
more strongly towards public goals and regional development. However, the inte-
gration of philanthropy into network governance requires further reflection 
(Glückler, Herrigel, & Handke, 2020; Jung & Harrow, 2015). Although interview-
ees named personal contacts and integration into regional networks as positive 
opportunities for the collaboration between for-profit and not-for-profit activities, 
we must highlight that individual involvement in local networks may also constrain 
some agency within the philanthropic field. Conflict- or problem-laden personal 
relations may quickly constrain the prospect for joint efforts in collaborative 
philanthropy.
When attempting to use regional commitment as a strategic resource for regional 
development politicians and planners should respect the individuality of the actors 
and take into account the diversity of their goals and strategies, as well as their 
unique combination of field activity and connectivity: In all efforts, it must be 
acknowledged that social commitment depends on the actors’ regional involve-
ment, self-determination, and initiative (Klein, 2015). Individual organizational or 
personal goals range from spontaneous or random motives to long-term strategic 
goals and therefore require broad approaches to governance. Commitment often 
develops over very long periods of time and within specific contexts. Personal rela-
tionships, private initiative, and sympathies and antipathies often determine whether 
business firms, foundations, municipalities, and other organizations in the various 
sectors are willing and able to successfully cooperate. External willingness to con-
trol and the goal of linking it with strategic regional development may stand in 
contrast with the philanthropic practices of business firms, foundations, associa-
tions, patrons, and volunteers. Recognition of this is a central prerequisite for any 
regional initiative aiming at the integration of philanthropic involvement in regional 
development strategies. To use the concept of the philanthropic field is to emphasize 
the interrelations between the diverse actors and may thus help regional stakehold-
ers to discover new linkages and to initiate new forms of cooperation in pursuit of 
realizing large projects.
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Chapter 10
Global Authenticity, Local Authority: 
Epistemic Power, Discursive Geographies, 




Knowledge is both the fuel and the product of international development practice. 
Development interventions are premised on knowledge and ideas—both on under-
standings of the needs of the majority world (the nature of the problem), and on 
ideas of how to engage with and ultimately resolve such needs (how to solve it). At 
the same time, this process inevitably creates new knowledge in its wake, both 
among those who work in the development sector, and those whom the sector 
attempts to help. This is an iterative, interconnected process that is embedded in 
wider epistemic currents and world views (Verkoren, 2010). Out of it arise the para-
digms and ideas that have come and gone in development practice—from micro-
credit to cash transfers, from women in development to gender mainstreaming, from 
resilience to adaptation. This chapter is concerned with the question of knowledge 
sources in development practice—how do ideas and knowledge currents (and the 
people that represent them) find ascendency within development practice, both 
among global epistemic currents and their field-applications? How do development 
actors, particularly development-focused civil society organizations, prioritize and 
legitimize certain ideas? Why do such organizations select, accept, and choose to 
apply certain ideas over others?
To answer these questions, it is crucial to look at the way development practitio-
ners themselves understand, categorize, and utilize ideas and knowledge sources. 
This chapter will use two multi-sited studies of aidland (Fechter & Hindman, 2011; 
Marcus, 1995; Mosse, 2011) to demonstrate the ways in which development profes-
sionals repeatedly create, enact, utilize, and privilege two categories or typologies 
of knowledge: “expert” or global knowledge and participatory or “local” 
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knowledge. Of course, such a binary distinction between expert and local is not 
normative but descriptive. While it has been contested in the academic literature,1 
this chapter will demonstrate that it continues to be used in development practice; 
hence the logic behind its use must be described and understood. I argue that both 
categories are used in international development to give practitioners legitimacy to 
act, and yet that each also plays a separate role in development projects: referencing 
expert knowledge gives development interventions authority, while laying claim to 
local knowledge grants authenticity. Thus, both categories carry power. Yet I will 
argue that this power is more than simply a form of cultural imperialism founded on 
ideas about the professional, the expert, and expertise (Kothari, 2005, p. 427). This 
power is used to produce, co-opt, and justify development work rather than 
only repress or control its subjects—in the words of Lewis and Mosse (2006), it is 
power “that comes from below as well as above, that is heterogeneous, diffuse, 
immanent and unstable” (p. 3).
The category of expert knowledge has a long history in development 
interventions,2 as well as in the colonial administrations that were international 
development’s predecessors.3 It is global in scope and typically Western-based in 
origin. It is technical in its extent and focus, often concentrating on formalized 
methodological approaches to problem-solving, be they log frames4 or survey 
instruments. It is rooted in a common language (not only English, but also the par-
ticular discourse of international development) and its practitioners bear the insig-
nia of authority, such as Western degrees and international experience (Fechter & 
Hindman, 2011; Mosse, 2011). The individuals and organizations that are the source 
of this knowledge are part of what Adler, Haas and others have called epistemic 
communities (Adler & Haas, 1992; Haas, 1990)—“a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). These are consultants (and 
consultancies), foundations, academics, monitoring and evaluation specialists, 
expats, and development nomads (Chambers, 2005) working in the higher rungs of 
the country offices of transnational development institutions. All share “the will to 
improve” (Li, 2007, p. 1) under-developed societies as a core aim.
In short, the sources of expert knowledge are the individuals and organizations 
that act as what John Meyer (1999, 2010) has termed advisors in dispensing their 
expertise to development projects. As will be argued below, expert knowledge is 
used to give legitimacy and authority to already existing development practice as 
much as to develop new knowledge and new ideas. It reproduces the epistemic and 
discursive consensus of transnational movements, and often incorporates academic 
knowledge or credentials. Expert knowledge has its own spaces of consensus 
1 See Aronsson, 2007; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; McKinnon, 2006; Mitchell, 2002.
2 Evans and Stephens, 1988; Ingham, 1993; Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 1998.
3 Adas, 1989; Cohn, 1996; Said, 1978/1994.
4 Log frames, or the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), is used in international development 
projects as a formalized way of organizing project design and monitoring. It largely consists of 
drawing and filling in tables with the details of various project objectives and goals.
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building, such as conferences, workshops, and trainings—indeed, both knowledge 
building and knowledge transfer are important goals of such “experts.” In the words 
of Uma Kothari (2005), “knowledge of development professionals and the Western 
notions of ‘progress’ embodied within them continue to be reinforced through the 
power embedded in the relationship between donor and beneficiary” (p. 428).
Yet expert knowledge is not the only source of legitimacy for development prac-
tice. Over the course of the last few decades, another form of knowledge in develop-
ment has become equally vital: local (also known as “citizen,” “grassroots,” 
“indigenous,” or “traditional”5) knowledge (Briggs, 2005). This pushback is inter-
twined with postmodern perspectives and post-development theory, whose propo-
nents reject development’s universalist aims at global betterment (Escobar, 1995). 
They privilege and emphasize specificity and context-dependence, and promote 
“the validity and salience of local knowledge” (Beinart, 2000, p. 277)—for exam-
ple, emphasizing the value of indigenous conservation systems (Berkes, 1999; 
Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2000), or culturally specific ways of interpreting gender 
relations, such as Islamic feminism (Mahmood, 2005). In development practice, 
such knowledge emerges out of local leaders, participatory rural appraisals, and 
partnerships with grassroots organizations and activists. The development actors 
that prize such knowledge understand it to be locally tied and spatially bound 
(Fernando, 2003), and “time, place and culture specific” (Speranza, Kiteme, 
Ambenje, Wiesmann, & Makali, 2010, p.  296). The people and institutions that 
provide such knowledge are as much advisors and harbingers of legitimacy to 
development practice as the experts, but rather than being part of global epistemic 
communities and movements, they represent the authentic needs and perspectives of 
the individuals and communities with whom development civil society hopes to 
engage. Such “knowledge from below” has come to be increasingly privileged with 
the rise of participatory approaches to development—indeed, discovering and 
implementing local knowledge plays an essential role in such approaches (Chambers, 
2005; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Beyond granting a different kind of legitimacy to 
development practice, local knowledge also grants authenticity to global 
development- focused civil society by seeming to move it out of Western-centred, 
transnational movements and approaches to the perspectives and desires of the sub-
jects of development.
Development practitioners use both typologies to justify their attempts to repre-
sent the “universal” needs and rights of the world’s peoples, and to operate off a 
widely accepted (but not uncontested) assumption of the moral universality of their 
values (Anderson & Rieff, 2005). In this work, I not only examine the ways that 
development-focused civil society uses these two typologies of knowledge to sig-
nify legitimacy and authenticity, but also the relationship between the two. Global 
civil society organizations can invoke both categories simultaneously and at times 
in contradiction, and this chapter examines the way such organizations navigate 
5 I would echo Sillitoe (2010) in dismissing the semantic debates between these various terms as 
peripheral to an examination of the subject itself and the role it plays in the valuing and categoriz-
ing of knowledge.
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such tensions and contradictions. Expert and local knowledge typologies are also 
used by the very individuals and organizations to whom they are applied, often in 
savvy, knowing ways in order to access both global funds and opportunities and 
local trust and cooperation. Yet the distinction between expert and local knowledge 
is itself blurry and contested, and the individuals and collectives to which such cat-
egories are applied often move between the two. Indeed, this chapter subverts these 
categories by pointing out the difficulties and contradictions in the way development- 
focused civil society attempts to categorize and demarcate different types of 
knowledge.
To do so, I draw on data from two multi-sited qualitative case studies of global 
development organizations and their in-country partners. Fieldwork for these case 
studies was conducted between 2011 and 2014, and utilised in-depth semistructured 
interviews (with over 200 interviews conducted in total), many more informal con-
versations and discussions, textual analysis of the written materials produced by the 
networks, and participant observation inspired by ethnographic methodology. I 
spent weeks with each of the organizations, attending meetings, shadowing work-
ers, conducting interviews with as many people in each organization as possible, 
going out for informal social events, and in many cases actually staying as a guest 
in the homes of members of these organizations, often for multiple weeks at a time. 
Often it was the informal interactions that generated far more insight and sparked 
new questions rather than formal interviews. The interviews themselves consciously 
incorporated a variety of voices and vantage points across staff positions in the civil 
society organizations, where I interviewed nearly everyone I could access, allowing 
for a broad and nuanced picture of the organizations, their cultures, and the ways 
they created, took up, privileged, and transmitted ideas. When possible, I have con-
ducted multiple rounds of individual interviews with the same key actors.
As this project examines connections and flows via discourse and practice, I have 
designed its methodological approach to utilize conversations as a window into atti-
tudes, actions, and values. The methodology is thus centred around what Heyl 
(2001) describes as ethnographic interviewing: emphasizing time, openness, and 
repeated interactions with participants in order to build rapport and engage the par-
ticipants in the research process itself. Rather than seeking only specific pieces of 
information and approaching the interview “as a pipeline for transmitting knowl-
edge” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 3), I approached interviews as a two-sided 
social encounter, and the knowledge produced by them as emerging out of the inter-
action between myself as interviewer, the person being interviewed, and any third 
party such as a translator. Thus, I approached these interviews as moments of mutual 
meaning making from both interviewer and respondent. In practice, this often meant 
entering the interview with a preconceived range of topics and questions, and mak-
ing use of an interview guide for interviews at each tier of the process outlining the 
thematic areas I wished to cover, but at the same time actively engaging with the 
content of the interview, challenging answers, asking for depth, allowing the impro-
visation of new questions, adumbrating new interpretations, or privileging the 
development of certain topics over others. Such flexibility allows for a depth and 
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richness of data that is particularly suited to the complexity of mapping such knowl-
edge networks (Beinart, 1991; Wengraf, 2001).
The first of the two case studies encompasses the Christensen Fund (TCF), a 
US-based foundation working internationally with a mandate of supporting and 
promoting biocultural diversity (the intersection of biological and cultural diversity, 
such as the protection of sacred sites or traditional agroecological practices (Loh & 
Harmon, 2005)). The case study includes their partners in Kenya—Kivulini Trust, a 
small nonprofit based in Nairobi, and Waso Trustland, and even smaller NGO based 
in the north Kenyan town of Isiolo. Both organizations were supporting projects 
connected to biocultural diversity in the pastoral communities of the northern part 
of the country, and are examined in the context of a forest conservation project that 
they support in a small village in Isiolo district of Kenya. The second case study is 
of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), a large implementing foundation6 that runs 
development projects around education, health, natural resource management, and 
economic development in a number of regions around the globe. The case study 
looks closely at AKF’s work in Kyrgyzstan, drawing data from immersive qualita-
tive fieldwork with its Kyrgyzstan branch (AKF Kg) and local implementing partner 
NGO (called the Mountain Society Development Support Programme Kyrgyzstan, 
or MSDSP Kg) in the context of their climate-change adaptation programme.
These two case studies provide insights into two very different organizations and 
development networks, with different scopes, approaches, and goals, and two differ-
ent cultural and political contexts for their work. The USA-Kenya network encom-
passes far smaller organizations, concerned less with mainstream development and 
more with indigenous and ecological problems, and with much of the connections 
in the network built on personal relationships and a strong emphasis on empowering 
local leaders. The Swiss-Kyrgyz network involves larger organizations, which are 
deeply embedded in the aidland of international development. While these organi-
zations are interested in ecological issues, they are deeply rooted in more main-
stream development concerns around livelihood, education, and health. Despite the 
contrast, both networks create and utilize the two typologies or categories of knowl-
edge discussed above. In this chapter, I draw on aspects and examples from each to 
examine ways of knowing and of privileging knowledge in development-focused 
civil society. I argue that civil society organizations create this morphology of 
knowledge in order to signal authority and authenticity both to others and them-
selves, thus enacting power. Yet these categories are also fluid and porous, and can 
at different times be used by the same individuals and organizations. This chapter 
demonstrates the way these two typologies are simultaneously used, contested, and 
undermined by both the agents and “beneficiaries” of development. The power their 
use confers is dynamic and complex, and lies beyond simple hierarchies and top- 
down interventions—and can thus be captured by multiple agents, in multiple posi-
tions of power and resistance, within the development project.
6 That is, AKF draws on its own internal funding and runs its own projects—though in fact AKF 
also applies for and uses external funding for its programs.
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 Creating Authority out of Expert Knowledge
 Expert Expats in Bishkek
The Kyrgyzstan office of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF Kg) demonstrates the 
ways in which development-focused civil society seeks and utilizes expertise and 
expert knowledge. This expertise is largely Western, though, as described below, its 
producers prefer to think of themselves as global.7 When I visited the organization 
in 2013, expats held the three top positions in the organization: Karl,8 a German, 
was the CEO; Jack,9 a Canadian, was in charge of fundraising and grant-writing; 
and Nicolle, an American, was the head of the research, monitoring, and evaluation 
unit. All three are development veterans, having worked for many years in Africa or 
Asia before coming to AKF Kg. The organization’s culture was thus dominated by 
expat authority, and by the distinction between the expats and locals working in the 
organization. When I asked Karl how most of decisions, particularly those related to 
creating programs when applying for new grants, were made, he said that this was 
done by Jack in conversation with himself and Nicolle. Karl was not the only one to 
say so: during my interviews, most of the Kyrgyz staff members at AKF Kg stated 
that Jack created ideas around programming, and there was a strong sense in both 
AKF Kg and its implementing partner NGO MSDSP that expats and their networks 
made decisions in Bishkek. This deferral to foreign expertise was also reflected in 
AKF Kg’s climate-change adaptation programming, then a new area for AKF and 
MSDSP. Another expat (Laurie, an American) was specifically hired as a consultant 
to refine, evolve, and shape the program’s implementation.
These positions are all crucial to the way broad trends and global movements are 
transformed into AKF programming, and the way the programming is implemented, 
evaluated, altered, and tailored. The climate-change adaptation program is a case in 
point: both Karl, then the CEO of AKF Kg, and David, at the time the head of the 
environmental fund of the Aga Khan Foundation, called the Prince Sadruddin Aga 
Khan Fund for the Environment (PSAKFE), described the climate-change adapta-
tion program in Kyrgyzstan as pragmatic, and valuable for being able to tap into 
broader interest (and thus funding) within the global development community. Both 
credited Laurie with the main idea and impetus behind the program—despite the 
fact that Talant, the Kyrgyz head of MSDSP, told me that he was one of the pro-
gram’s original instigators. Thus, it is Western experts like Laurie or Jack who are 
given the task of interpreting the interests and trends of the broader development 
community into programming in particular countries. This is not to say that their 
7 Indeed, the very term global civil society carries this conceit (Anderson & Rieff, 2005; Kaldor, 
2003; Keane, 2003).
8 Participants in the case studies were given the option to change their name to preserve anonymity, 
or to use their real given/first name. Most preferred to use their real given or first name; some chose 
to have their full name used, and some names has been changed upon request.
9 Named changed on request.
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motives are purely pragmatic—Laurie is genuinely and deeply concerned with the 
effects of climate change on communities in the developing world. But such genu-
ine concern does not negate the more pragmatic advantages of creating connections 
into global movements and consensus that has funding behind it. Wielders of expert 
knowledge then both adopt norms and create them. Experts become what the soci-
ologist John Meyer refers to as the consultants or others (i.e., not actors or nation 
states) who create and enforce a world polity—collectives that take part in and 
mutually create a world culture, that produce norms and advice by speaking in terms 
of higher truths and moral laws, such as climate change and its moral imperatives 
for development (Meyer, 1999).
These experts are able to exercise power and find legitimacy in part by relying on 
the claim that their knowledge emerges from working in the development sector all 
over the globe and with a variety of different programs. They are part of a develop-
ment epistemic community, in the sense of “networks of knowledge-based experts” 
with “authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Haas, 1992, p. 2–3). Their 
claims to policy-relevance and professionalism lend them authority, and the interna-
tionalization of their knowledge, and their connection to wider development cur-
rents—often through conferences, workshops, and international meetings—grants 
legitimacy by giving a transnational scope to their ideas.
Indeed, this is the corner stone of the epistemic community idea—an interna-
tional consensus in the applicability and the verity of certain forms of knowledge. 
Epistemic communities have a shared way of knowing, which includes shared val-
ues, causal beliefs, and, importantly, shared discursive practices. In AKF’s in- 
country branches, connections to epistemic communities in this sense were created 
and fostered through trainings (discussed below), the hiring of experts, and atten-
dance at conferences. This use of expert knowledge is coordinated by the head 
office of the Aga Khan Foundation in Geneva, which is the key player in integrating 
AKF into a global community, advising country branches, creating connections, 
and following up on funding opportunities. Mark, the head of AKF’s natural 
resource management (NRM) program in AKF’s head office, told me that the 
Geneva office’s main function is to “stay in touch with global best practices” and to 
“engage with international programs”—and to spread these practices through train-
ings for country office staff and by bringing a handful of staff members from each 
country to a few international conferences or events every year.
This alignment with broader, transnational ideas and ways of knowledge gives 
expats in the development arena not only legitimacy but also power. Local staff at 
both AKF Kg and MSDSP would refer and defer to expat expertise, in particular to 
Laurie’s role in the climate-change adaptation program. Pirjan, who ran the climate- 
change adaptation program, Aizada, who was the program coordinator, and Talant, 
the director of MSDSP—all Kyrgyz staff members at MSDSP—repeatedly men-
tioned “the international consultant” or “reports prepared by an international con-
sultant” or some fact “according to the international consultant”—although it was 
clear that I knew Laurie and her role in the program. Mentioning the international 
consultant gave legitimacy and gravitas to whatever fact, argument, or piece of 
work they were discussing, in a way that mentioning the specific person (Laurie) 
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who did the work did not. The fact that this power was granted to a consultant, spe-
cifically in a knowledge- and advice-giving role, echoes Meyer’s (2010) arguments 
about the role of consultants, advisers, and others (that is, non-actors) in creating 
consensus and agreement transnationally. At the same time the use of the very word 
“international” by Kyrgyz staff members denotes a level of authority to the knowl-
edge produced by this figure (and Laurie’s role was largely producing knowledge—
reports, training manuals, syntheses of village assessments).
Thus, the power to decide on what global movements, organizations, and pro-
grams to engage with, as well the power to transform this (initially knowledge- 
based) engagement into action, lies with the international, and in fact Western, 
expats in AKF Kg. When I asked local staff members, both at MSDSP and at AKF, 
whether they had any decision-making power in the selection and design of new 
programs, they largely agreed that they had ceded it to Mark (together with Nicolle, 
Karl, and, in the case of the climate-change adaptation program, Laurie). However, 
they did insist that the programs had to conform to the organization’s current strate-
gic plan, and that they had a role in deciding what that plan contained at the two 
organizations’ annual meeting and retreat. Yet even here it is significant that these 
meetings were attended by Western staff from AKF Geneva, and that the AFK 
Geneva office had to approve the new strategic plan. In short, even when key 
decision- making was nominally given to local staff, it was still controlled, and 
indeed even controlled directly, by the global node of the Kyrgyz network.
 Creating Local Experts: Language, Education, and Training 
Trips in Kyrgyzstan
The weight and authority given to experts is echoed in the background and educa-
tions of the local staff members who are allowed to take on powerful roles in AKF 
Kg and MSDSP. Almost all the staff members of AKF Kg and at MSDSP’s head 
office in Osh are fluent in English, not a common thing even amongst Kyrgyzstan’s 
highly educated. Nicolle once expressed concern that staff hired in Bishkek and Osh 
are selected on their language abilities rather than their knowledge or skills in devel-
opment. Many had English Language as their university degree, and AKF Kg tended 
to prize their ability to connect with expat authorities as well as global partners. 
Many staff members are sent abroad for trainings, which are inevitably held in 
English.
Pirjan is one of the few staff members who did not speak English, whose experi-
ence and abilities overrode this requirement when he was being hired. On several 
occasions, Pirjan mentioned to me that he felt disadvantaged by this fact: He found 
it difficult to communicate with Laurie and to attend joint AKF-MSDSP meetings, 
and in fact the job advertisement both for his job and for the coordinator of the third 
iteration of the climate-change adaptation (a job he applied for and did not get) 
contained an explicit requirement of English fluency.
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By contrast, Rahat, the new coordinator for the third iteration of the climate- 
change adaptation program, has a master’s degree from Manchester. Leila, the 
reporting manager for MSDSP—which is the one position at MSDSP besides that 
of Talant, the director, that involved communicating with donor organizations out-
side of Kyrgyzstan—did her master’s in Washington, D.C., and worked there for 
several years. Molvoda, the communications manager at AKF, lived for several 
years in New York. All three of these staff members are key in the way the interme-
diaries’ actions and ideas are presented to outsiders (Molvoda and Leila), including 
those outside of Kyrgyzstan, or in the way programming is transformed into action 
(Rahat). Again, language is the key denotation of expert knowledge here—both 
English, but also the discourse necessary to communicate to donors and interna-
tional development organizations.
There are occasional exceptions to the power held by expert knowledge in the 
organizations. Over a dozen staff members attended the kick-off meeting for the 
third iteration of the climate-change adaptation program, including several who 
could not speak English and several expats that could not speak Russian. Though 
the meeting started in English, Laurie insisted that it switch to Russian so that all the 
local staff could understand and participate in the discussions, and the discussion 
itself was a lively one, with proposals from MSDSP staff that actually changed 
some of the details in the way the program was implemented. However, multiple 
staff members later informed me that this was the exception rather than the norm, 
and that such meetings were usually dull and achieved little. Also, even in this open 
meeting, the local staff’s suggestions went through a filtering process when they 
were translated by Talant to Laurie (who then actually chose which ones to imple-
ment). Talant privileged some suggestions over others in his translation and fun-
nelled them into his own vision of how the program should look. So, despite (or 
even within) such exceptions, knowledge of English or experience in the West ulti-
mately grants development expertise, as well as the power to transform ideas into 
practice.
Those Kyrgyz staff members without a background or experience in the West are 
sent to trainings and workshops held by AKF global staff from Geneva or other 
transnational organizations (such as the climate-change training held by GIZ that 
Pirjan attended), or even go all the way to Geneva for trainings in the AKF head 
office. For instance, Leonora, the human resources manager at MSDSP, went to 
Geneva during my time there for training. This begs the question: what can be 
taught or transmitted about human resources in Switzerland that cannot be explained 
or understood in Kyrgyzstan? I would argue that the trainings abroad are another 
kind of epistemic glue, creating consensus around expert knowledge and the privi-
leging of the West as the central source of knowledge within development prac-
tice—even (or perhaps particularly) with the managerial aspects of such practice, 
such as managing human resources. Thus, examining the network in Kyrgyzstan 
reveals the creation and privileging of a category of knowledge with the weight of 
authority and claims to a global geography: a knowledge privileged for its expertise, 
and on this basis accorded weight in the creation of development practice.
10 Global Authenticity, Local Authority: Epistemic Power, Discursive Geographies…
218
 Bottom-Up Expertise: Experts Designated by the Local in Kenya
It is not only globally connected institutions that privilege and see the pragmatic 
need for expert knowledge. This privileging of expert knowledge also happens at 
the grassroots. Local people, too, see the advantages that leveraging experts who 
have access to certain tools, ideas, and language can have in the world of develop-
ment projects and funding. This is demonstrated clearly in the second case study of 
this chapter: a forest conservation project in a north Kenyan village called Beliqo. 
The project is funded by the Christensen Fund (TCF), a biocultural diversity- 
focused foundation based in San Francisco, USA, but was instigated and run with 
the help of a small regional NGO called Waso Trustland (WTL), based in the town 
of Isiolo in Kenya’s north. Waso Trustland itself is connected to the Christensen 
Fund through another non-profit, the Kivulini Trust, run out of Nairobi by Dr. 
Hussein, himself a former Program Officer for the Christensen Fund. The develop-
ment organizations in this network are far more independent and loosely connected 
than those of AKF, AKF Kg, and MSDSP Kg. With its biocultural diversity focus, 
the Christensen Fund privileges local knowledge and shies away from designating 
expertise as explicitly as the Aga Khan Foundation. All members of the Christensen 
Fund’s partner organizations in Kenya are actually Kenyans, though Dr. Hussein is 
Western educated (another example of the roots and insignia of expert knowledge). 
And yet, even in a local NGO far closer to the grassroots than MSDSP, expert 
knowledge is privileged and acknowledged.
This can be seen in Waso Trustland’s charismatic founder, head and director, 
Hassan Shano.10 Although Dr. Hussein described Shano to me as a local or indige-
nous elder, Hassan Shano both sees himself and is seen by village communities in 
Northern Kenya as bringing information, knowledge, and skills from the global 
development communities. Indeed, one of Waso Trustland’s main activities is run-
ning “sensitization” workshops in the region’s villages, which educate local people 
about legal and political issues connected to land and natural resource use. This 
includes pragmatic knowledge of the Kenyan state and its legal instruments. Hassan 
Shano brought knowledge of the 2005 Kenyan Forest Act that granted power to 
community groups over local forests to concerned locals at the start of the TCF- 
funded forest conservation project in Beliqo. Shano also provided connections with 
civil society organizations with access to resources (including the Christensen 
Fund) who could help the village with its concerns. Indeed, most people I spoke to 
in Beliqo would tell me the community forest association and its forest conservation 
project was funded and supported by Waso Trustland—they very rarely acknowl-
edged the Christensen Fund, despite the fact that Christensen staff members had 
visited the previous year, and that most people in the village were aware that WTL’s 
funding came from foreigners.
10 Indeed, Waso Trustland is almost a one-man show: Besides Hassan Shano, there is only an 




Shano also brought the model of a Community Forest Association to the village, 
mimicking those started earlier all around Kenya. These ideas and connections 
might not have originated with Shano, but for people in the village, he was the 
expert with national and global links who brought such knowledge. Finally, Shano 
had the specific knowledge necessary for forging access to international support: 
Not only did he speak English, which is essential for access to development pro-
grams and aid, but he also had experience with global civil society, knew how to 
write grant applications, and had access to information technology and a sense of 
international funders and non-profits. As Beliqo did not have electricity or a mobile 
phone signal, its residents also saw Shano’s ability to use the internet as a skill and 
an advantage, a kind of development expertise. As I will discuss below, other devel-
opment actors and organizations Shano interacted with did not see him as an expert. 
Nevertheless, to the people of Beliqo and many other locals in the region, he was as 
much the expert, and the harbinger of expert knowledge, as Laurie was to Pirjan or 
Talant at MSDSP.
 Rhetorics of Local Knowledge and the Claim to Authenticity
 Aspirations towards Local Knowledge at the Aga 
Khan Foundation
While the knowledge, legitimacy, and authority of experts and expertise is privi-
leged in development practice, the rhetoric of international foundations and devel-
opment charities simultaneously privileges the very opposite: the knowledge of the 
grassroots. This can be seen in the rhetoric—if not the practice—at the Geneva 
headquarters of the Aga Khan Foundation. Although AKF’s Kyrgyz office and 
implementing partner NGO seek expertise and expert knowledge, staff members at 
the Geneva headquarters were fully and unequivocally committed to the global 
norms and ideas around participatory development. Participation, local knowledge, 
and local needs repeatedly came up unprompted during my interviews with staff at 
AKF’s Geneva office, and were referenced many times in the Foundation’s public 
discourse. Mark, then the head of Natural Resource Management at AKF, repeat-
edly referred to AKF’s work as “community based” and insisted that AKF focuses 
on what the communities want, that it respects community perspectives, and thus 
that its priorities shift with community priorities. Indeed, Mark characterized AKF’s 
mission as “working with communities to address their needs”—echoing the dis-
course of community-needs-based approaches.11 He said the same of the natural 
resource management program he oversees—its priority is to respond to people’s 
(economic) needs, and in the case of the climate-change adaptation program, “com-
munity is central—climate change is second.” The words “community” and “needs” 
11 See, for instance, Chambers, 1983, 1986, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2004.
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came up frequently in our conversation, and Mark attributed this emphasis to the 
Aga Khan himself, who told the staff at AKF to build on community interests and 
local knowledge and to trust the local people.
Mark applied this participation rhetoric specifically to AKF’s climate-change 
adaptation program. In his words, community participation in program manage-
ment and planning is “done all along,” and AKF does not push fads onto communi-
ties or distort community needs. Mark argued that pushing fads is how one loses 
community support and that this is the danger with climate-change adaptation. For 
this reason, it had to be integrated and “mainstreamed” into “real concerns” such as 
pasture and water management (Conveniently, AKF Kg and MSDSP are already 
well-versed in and have the expert knowledge for these programs). Indeed, Mark 
showed acute awareness of the weaknesses of development organizations when 
working with local communities—he spoke of the danger that development projects 
could distort people’s interests and create local groups that fell apart the minute a 
project ended. Mark reiterated that the climate-change adaptation project should 
engage already existing groups and build on people’s interests by mainstreaming a 
climate-change perspective into key resource management. The ideal of using pre- 
existing CBOs (community-based organizations) as a way of ensuring both partici-
pation and success (indeed, the two seem to be synonymous for AFK Geneva) was 
also echoed by David, at the time the head of AFK’s environmental fund,12 when he 
stressed that the climate-change adaptation program “empowered village organiza-
tions,” and that this is the AKF “mode”—along with bottom-up planning, which is 
a hope if not always a reality.
This vision of participation differs quite strongly from the way the climate- 
change adaption program ran on the ground—though the ideals and the rhetoric of 
participation exist throughout the network. The program’s reality was largely cen-
tred around top-down knowledge, teaching about climate change and adaptation 
through workshops run by MSDSP, followed by an adaptation project which was 
selected and run by the community, but in practice was based on examples given 
during the workshops. The workshops themselves echo MSDSP’s previous pro-
grams and areas of expertise. However, AKF headquarters is ideologically commit-
ted to the idea of participation and participatory development, despite also being 
committed to finding technical solutions to problems it deems largely economic. Its 
promotional material stresses that the foundation gives money to “local organiza-
tions interested in testing new solutions, in learning from experience and in being 
agents of lasting change” (Aga Khan Foundation, 2006, p. 3). This is repeated in the 
Foundation’s annual report, which states that AKF focuses on “inclusive, 
community- based development approaches, in which local organizations identify, 
prioritize and implement projects with the Foundation’s assistance” (Aga Khan 
Foundation, 2007, p. 7).
Such an emphasis on local knowledge directly echoes the language of participa-
tory development, which stresses the importance of local participation and idea 
12 The Prince Sadruddin Fund for the Environment (PSAKFE).
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creation—in other words, local knowledge—as an antidote to the many problems 
and inefficiencies of top-down development (Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mansuri & 
Rao, 2013). Community involvement and input is itself part of a transnational con-
sensus or an epistemic community on development practice. However, I would 
argue that the Aga Khan Foundation is not searching for greater effectiveness in 
their programming, or even for the ideals of democratic civil involvement. The most 
central theme in the above quotes is the search for authenticity for the foundation 
itself. AKF’s claims center around the organizational actors’ awareness of real con-
cerns and their response to real interests and existing problems. The emphasis on 
local reality gives the Aga Khan Foundation claim to authentic knowledge and 
experience—in other words, “street cred.” This is not to say that the organization’s 
emphasis on utilizing local knowledge is cynical. Their belief in its importance for 
development is likely entirely genuine, but it is notable that the higher up the orga-
nizational ladder I went, the more likely staff were to bring up participatory 
approaches and the importance of local knowledge. This points to a philosophical or 
ideological, rather than a practical or applied, concern with grassroots participation 
and input—a search for organizational authenticity.
 Authenticity and Indigenous Knowledge: Funding Choices 
at the Christensen Fund
Much like the Aga Khan Foundation, the Christensen Fund uses the language of 
participation and locally led development. Indeed, because the Christensen Fund’s 
mission is to promote biocultural diversity, privileging and prizing indigenous or 
traditional knowledge is core to the organization’s mandate and aspirational rheto-
ric. Wolde Tadesse, the Program Officer for the East Africa region until 2014, told 
me that decisions must be made from the bottom, with community involvement and 
ownership of projects and project resources, and that the emphasis of TCF’s work 
must be on inclusion rather than marginalization. Ken Wilson, the director of the 
Christensen Fund until 2015, reiterated the point and linked it to the decentralized 
nature of the Fund, telling me that the program officer for every region has their own 
unique strategy for funding distribution that is “shaped by context, by what is 
important to people, and what they’d like to change.”
TCF went so far in emphasizing local needs and participation that it effaced and 
minimized its own role. In Ken’s words, “institutions are essential for mobilizing 
resources, but can make complications and difficulties for movements: movements, 
individuals and issues should be core [to our work], not funding institutions.” This 
is tied to the radical self-vision that TCF cultivates of itself, particularly in compari-
son to other international foundations. Ken stated that in trying to be “responsive to 
the goals and objectives of the leaders of [local] movements,” TCF is “fairly 
extreme” in its decentralized approach: not only are its program officers located “on 
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the ground”—that is, they reside in regions where they oversee funding13—but 
TCF’s programs “involve multiple initiatives and grantees evolving in context,” as 
opposed to the much larger initiatives of other foundations that are centralized. 
Tadesse echoed this when he flatly told me that “we’re not telling [the grantees] 
what to do”—that TCF’s goal is to work with the approaches in indigenous cultures 
to biodiversity, and that TCF thus purposefully does not implement or operate any 
projects to this end, so that, in Tadesse’s words, these are “not our projects.”
Indeed, TCF is not primarily an operating or implementing foundation (unlike 
the Aga Khan Foundation). This seemed a point of pride with Ken Wilson, even on 
pragmatic grounds. He stated that operating foundations such as AKF operate in a 
“closed circle”—they themselves “decide what’s important, how to solve it, try to 
solve it themselves, and then evaluate.” Ken argued that this is inefficient, costs a lot 
more, and lacks critical feedback. He depicted TCF as the opposite of a closed 
loop—by focusing on building capacity, it outsources the task of both finding and 
fixing problems. Fundamentally, TCF sees itself as promoting grassroots inputs into 
the biocultural diversity movements—picking up ideas and giving them voice and 
support. Unlike the Aga Khan Foundation, TCF views the input of local or indige-
nous knowledge as going beyond specific, localized projects. Its staff members 
believe that this knowledge must be fed into global movements and knowledge 
commons—for instance to create and bolster the global indigenous rights move-
ments. The foundation’s role thus becomes not simply to apply local knowledge, but 
to link it to the global or the expert. However, I would argue that the search for 
organizational authenticity and legitimacy is central in the Christensen Fund’s 
repeated insistence on their use of indigenous knowledge. Indeed, it is even more 
fundamental to their organizational mandate, since it is a fundamental part of bio-
cultural diversity. TCF can only be authentic in its claims to promote and support 
biocultural diversity if it promotes and supports indigenous or traditional knowledge.
 Transcending the Categories: Blurring the Lines between 
Global Authority and Local Authenticity
 Hassan Shano at Conferences: Crossing the Lines
In this chapter, I have thus far suggested two categories of knowledge both created 
and prized by development organizations: expert and local. However, although 
development professionals maintain these two categories for difference purposes 
and uses, the distinctions and separations between them are not firm. Not only do 
they sometimes blur into each other—as in the case of TCF and MSDSP staff dis-
cussed below—but they are permeable, and the same individuals can cross between 




being the source of expert and the source of indigenous knowledge based on con-
text. This allows for shifting uses of power, and the occasional decentering of “the 
legitimacy and authority of Western modernity” (Kothari, 2005, p.  443) in 
development.
Hassan Shano, the head of Waso Trustland, is a particularly compelling example 
of this transcendence. As argued above, in the setting of his own organization and 
the communities it serves in the north of Kenya, Shano fulfils the role of the expert, 
bringing the knowledge and skills that can connect these communities both to inter-
national development organizations and trends and to legal knowledge of the 
Kenyan state. However, for TCF or even its Kenyan partner Kivulini, Shano is an 
indigenous elder. Dr. Hussein brought Shano to speak at both the 2005 World 
Conference on Ecological Restoration in Zaragoza, Spain, specifically as an indig-
enous elder on the role of indigenous knowledge in environmental restoration, as 
well as to a number of events around the UN Conference on Indigenous Peoples in 
Geneva. In both of these settings, Shano switched from his expert role in northern 
Kenya to being a representative of authentic indigenous knowledge.
In our conversation about these conferences, Shano seemed to be uncomfortable 
with the switch, preferring his role of expert in Isiolo to representing an indigenous 
elder in Geneva or Spain. However, Shano credits these conferences with making 
him realize the importance of culture and traditional knowledge and their value 
within global development and environmental organizations. Hassan Shano 
described the first time he attended the conference in Geneva, where during a day of 
cultural sharing, Maasai representatives, from Kenya came with “marvellous” tradi-
tional dress and performances. Hassan Shano described how he felt embarrassed 
that he did not have the same cultural artefacts to share, asking himself, “What 
about our Borana culture?”14 Shano credited this moment of shame, brought about 
by the exposure afforded by an international conference, with awakening his aware-
ness of the significance of culture in the global realm, strengthened in turn by the 
Christensen Fund’s emphasis on biocultural diversity. Particularly startling in this 
story is the fact that Shano had to travel all the way to Switzerland in order to be 
exposed to the cultural assertion and strategies of another Kenyan ethnic group and 
to realize the value ascribed to such cultural expressions, and to local or indigenous 
knowledge more broadly, in global forums.
International conferences are not only an avenue for exposure to (both local and 
expert) knowledge—such as seeing Maasai culture presented—but also to the value 
and uses the international community ascribes to such knowledge. Thus, expert and 
local categories fuse and mix, just as Shano himself crossed the boundaries between 
the two depending on context and audience. As Smith and Jenkins (2012) have 
pointed out, “middling NGO activists” such as Shano “can play roles that challenge 
‘either/or’ characterizations of development action, such as in being professional-
ized as opposed to political, elite as opposed to grassroots, and are at the centre of 
14 Borana is both Hassan Shano’s ethnic group and also the ethnic background of the majority of 
village communities he works with. For a classic ethnography of the Borana, see Dahl (1979); for 
more on the political and social place of the Borana within Kenya, see Arero (2007).
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the way such meanings are negotiated and played out through the machineries of 
development” (pp. 646–647). Shano thus complicates the local-expert binary. He is 
able to “exploit the artificial distinction between professional and local knowledges 
to claim authority and exert power” (Nightingale, 2005, p. 600)—both in Beliqo and 
in the global, expert setting of international conferences.
 TCF and MSDSP Staff: Local or Expert?
The staff members of both the Christensen Fund and the Aga Khan Foundation, 
particularly at their implementing NGO MSDSP Kg, also illustrate the fluid bound-
aries between expert and local. As described above, MSDSP and AKF Kg prized 
local staff members who spoke fluent English, had experience in international orga-
nizations, and often had Western degrees. However, the promotional material 
described above, AKF made much of using local organizations and local staff mem-
bers. Thus, AKF and MSDSP could benefit from having staff that simultaneously 
had the authority of experts and the authenticity of locals. This is even more obvious 
with the staff of the Christensen Fund. When I asked Ken Wilson about the gap 
between the foundation and actors on the ground, he went out of his way to depict 
how TCF attempts to forge closer links with the grassroots by employing staff that 
themselves could be considered part of the movements and peoples TCF attempts to 
help. He made the case that program staff members are “tangled up in the move-
ments they fund” and thus are ultimately insiders and participants. Thus, Ken 
Wilson seemed to be presenting TCF staff almost in an intermediary role, a position 
they are able to take up because they claim to belong to the grassroots.
These claims are somewhat tenuous: the majority of TCF staff have a Western 
education and now live in the West. For instance, though Yeshi, then a grant associ-
ate at TCF, is from Ethiopia, she has a master’s degree from the Institute of Social 
Science (ISS) in the Netherlands. Yet what these assertions emphasize is TCF’s 
need to demonstrate its close connection to the grassroots, a connection that would 
legitimize the foundation’s discourse privileging the local as the authentic reposi-
tory of indigenous knowledge and as the crux of the foundation’s work. In an inter-
view two years later Ken reiterated the point, emphasizing the wide diversity of 
world views and perspectives and the “depth of knowledge” held by TCF staff, for 
instance of local languages and contexts, songs, and plants. In Ken’s words, being a 
“staff-rich foundation” meant that TCF is able to “work on complex issues.” Staff 
diversity is thus linked with insider knowledge, and enabled what Ken termed the 
“human relationships between staff and communities,” the closeness and authentic 
knowledge of the grassroots. Just as “indigenous knowledge is becoming profes-
sionalized” (Laurie, Andolina, & Radcliffe, 2005, p. 476), so too can professional or 
expert knowledge become indigenized by way of claims to local authenticity and 
identity. But I would argue that this is more than simply “adverse incorporation” 
(Kothari, 2005, p. 429)—it shows the conceptual power that notions of grassroots, 
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indigenous or local knowledge hold within the development project, even at its most 
globalized spatial levels.
 Holding Typologies of Knowledge in Tension: AKF’s View 
of Climate-Change Adaptation and TCF’s Involvement 
in Programming
How do foundations like the Aga Khan Foundation and the Christensen Fund recon-
cile their simultaneous privileging of the authority of expert knowledge and the 
authenticity of local knowledge? These two typologies of knowledge seem to be 
distinct paradigms for the two organizations. It was only in response to direct ques-
tioning that staff members spoke of the fact that the two must interact, and even 
then, they tended to stress the importance of either one form of knowledge or the 
other. For instance, when asked whether TCF itself brought new knowledge to the 
communities whose indigenous knowledge it prizes, Ken Wilson stressed that TCF 
barely introduces imperatives to the grassroots, but rather presents knowledge and 
offers “new horizons of what can be achieved and ways to achieve this.” Indeed, in 
its mission statement explication TCF depicts the organization as a “buttress”:
The Fund is choosing to ‘buttress’ these [grassroots] efforts, not just fund them—that is, we 
will back them, bolster them, support them and, in a gentle solid way, engaged in co- 
creation at times, but not ourselves seeking to direct the process, just as the ‘buttress’ on the 
wall of an ancient tower or rampart serves to secure and yet not dominate the crucial wall. 
(The Christensen Fund, 2010)
By utilizing this metaphor, TCF is engaging with the tension between local auton-
omy and TCF’s involvement, between bottom-up indigenous knowledge and the 
globalized, expert knowledge of the organization itself. Thus, TCF rejects 
“direct[ing] the process” but acknowledges that its influence and involvement go 
beyond funding. When asked directly if TCF changes its grantees, Ken Wilson’s 
answer was “Yes, definitely.” He termed TCF’s involvement as “thick grant mak-
ing,” that “the program officer influences projects and organizations through dia-
logue, [he or she] probes, asks questions, pushes, brings information.” Yet such 
involvement remains in fine balance with TCF’s protests that the Fund does not 
impinge on local autonomy or ideas. Yeshi TekleMichael, the grant associate at TCF 
who works under Tadesse, told me that Tadesse might push or encourage communi-
ties, but tries not to impose—in her words, he “just gives voice to what they want to 
do.” In short, the Fund attempts to resolve the tension between valuing both its own 
influence and local ideas by insisting that although influence and knowledge might 
come from TCF, autonomy and ownership remains with the local.
The Aga Khan Foundation’s headquarters are also caught between two visions of 
its epistemic approach. Thus, Mark admitted that although His Highness the Aga 
Khan wants AKF to build on local knowledge, this could also be too narrow a per-
spective for its work. He asserted that the foundation is not “slavish” to community 
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knowledge, that it seeks to bring to communities outside expertise and “independent 
channels of information,” and to develop knowledge and reduce ignorance. Both 
Mark and David highlighted the process of spreading knowledge while implement-
ing the ideals of bottom-up development as a challenge that AKF is actively strug-
gling with. In David’s words, using bottom-up planning is a hope for AKF, but the 
foundation relies heavily on Western knowledge. Mark told me that AKF is “look-
ing for new ways that knowledge and ideas are shared”, and that this is a continuing 
struggle for AKF. He argued that filling broad knowledge gaps is a rocky and slow 
process with “high costs of information transfers.” Mark argued that the Foundation 
is doing this by involving local institutions (linking back to its participatory rheto-
ric), as well as by providing overhead for “information transfer processes” that the 
foundation co-ordinates and facilitates.
This tension is particularly obvious in the case of the climate-change adaptation 
program. The climate-change adaptation literature has criticized bottom-up pro-
gramming for ignoring the multiscale nature of climate change: local communities 
cannot easily engage with national or global priorities for adaptation (Thornton & 
Manasfi, 2010). Despite his repeated emphasis on the importance of local needs and 
local ideas, when pressed Mark admitted that the foundation sometimes had to 
“educate” local communities, and that they could not be expected to know about 
issues such as climate change. Indeed, Mark framed knowledge transfers as an issue 
of responsibility in a climate-change adaptation program—he told me that AKF 
does recognize “the responsibility to raise the [climate change] issue with the com-
munity.” Thus, when pushed Mark admitted that both knowledge from above and 
below was vital. How AKF resolves tensions and contradictions between the two—
for instance, if local communities were not interested in or did not believe in climate 
change—was never explicitly explained or addressed.
 Conclusion
The case studies above have demonstrated the propensity of development organiza-
tions to both create and make use of two categories of knowledge: the expert and the 
local. The first brings development organizations not only legitimacy, but also 
authority, and despite its pretensions of global roots it often in fact represents 
Western training, ideas, or consensus. The second connects the development project 
to the (now global) idea of participatory or community-based development, and 
gives global civil society a claim to authenticity through its connections to citizen or 
indigenous knowledge. However, the two are deeply integrated, despite the propen-
sity of global foundations such as AKF and TCF to treat them as distinctly separate 
categories. Not only are the lines between the two nebulous and at times crossed by 
the same actors, but expert knowledge both gains legitimacy from local knowledge 
and local knowledge itself can be constituted by global movements, such as those 
which privilege traditional culture or indigenous rights.
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Civil society knowledge networks (Fouksman, 2017) such as the two described in 
this chapter act as vectors for ideas that emerge from a variety of geographies and 
integrate this knowledge into development interventions. Actors in the networks 
who can claim to be indigenous or local can wield power by granting authenticity to 
global organizations, the way Hassan Shano does with TCF, in the process getting 
local concerns heard or funded—but also shaping these concerns to global interests. 
And sometimes, the very same actors can claim authority by drawing on expert 
knowledge—the way Hassan Shano does in the village communities he works with, 
for instance by his ability to write successful grant applications. Indeed, this need 
not be a cynical transformation or manipulation: not only are the categories fluid, 
but they can in fact be open and accessible, dependant on context, object, and sub-
ject. Thus, civil society knowledge networks allow different ideas, needs, and 
visions of development to interact and shape each other, not in a simple hierarchy of 
global over local, but rather in a complex interaction, often leading to the emergence 
of something hybrid—be it the integration of infrastructural needs into climate- 
change adaptation or a community forest association that allows pastoralists to con-
trol the usage rights of local land.
In theory, a locally-bound, participatory, and context-specific approach has chal-
lenged the Western-based and expert-led modernization approach that characterized 
development practice in the 1950s and 60s. But how deep has this challenge been? 
Alongside the rhetoric of context specificity, local knowledge, and community par-
ticipation, development as both a universal aim and practice has continued to be 
“the central organizing concept of our time” (Cowen & Shenton, 1995, p. 27). For 
instance, although participatory approaches became ever more prominent in devel-
opment practice in the early 2000s, so too did the widespread acceptance of the 
UN’s Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals, 
which set the overall, universal aims of development. The privileging and lauding of 
local ideas, itself a universalizing discourse rooted in Western interest in Romantic 
Orientalism (Washbrook, 1999) and continued in postmodernist cultural relativism 
and participatory approaches to development, coexists alongside a continued search 
for knowledge of universal development aims and solutions, rooted in the 
Enlightenment and then colonial views of progress and shared humanity. As I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, the development project has become the key place of 
negotiation and enactment of these two visions, often held simultaneously by the 
same development actors.
Unpicking this negotiation is vital to understanding the way certain ideas and 
projects are justified and supported over others. The Christensen Fund embodies the 
power of these categories when Ken Wilson speaks about bringing local activists 
and local leaders to international conferences and UN meetings. In so doing, TCF 
sees itself as using its expert status within these international circles to promote 
local knowledge on the global stage. In selecting which local activists and which 
local ideas are brought to and promoted at these global (and largely Western) gath-
erings, TCF utilizes the category of local knowledge to promote the agenda and 
ideas it holds dear, while demonstrating that these ideas are in fact authentically 
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local. Authenticity and authority are tightly interwoven in such an interplay of local 
and expert knowledge categories.
In examining this interplay, I have demonstrated that although the development 
project creates, relies on and privileges both categories, power and knowledge is 
still enacted in the Foucauldian sense—the West is able to exercise power over the 
local in the South. In part, this is simply a distribution of resources and historical 
power, but the West continues to justify and explain this very distribution by laying 
claim to global or universalizing discourse. Thus, expert knowledge becomes global 
knowledge and this global claim is bolstered by the rhetoric of local participation 
and citizen knowledge. This chapter has shown the way development practitioners 
try to lay claim to both knowledge typologies: they see themselves as in touch with 
the local, but as possessing instruments of expert knowledge such as log frames and 
impact assessments to demonstrate that their interventions are objectively correct. 
This brings the argument back to the Enlightenment paradigm of universal, scien-
tific knowledge—now represented as expert knowledge, which continues to play a 
key role in the development project, despite the apologetics of the particularism and 
relativism of the local. And yet the discourse of the local and the participatory holds 
power too, by conferring authenticity as well as legitimacy to the development proj-
ect. Thus, power becomes not a top-down imposition, but rather “individuals… and 
communities absorb, assume, resist, claim and interface with power and they too are 
implicated in [its] character, form and techniques” (Meade, 2012, p. 891).
Of course, as Beinart, Brown, and Gilfoyle (2009) point out, there is real utility 
for both what is categorized as scientific and as local knowledge, and to try to 
divorce and separate the two is simplistic. Perhaps one of the staff members at 
MSDSP Kg highlights the point—the organization has its own in-house civil engi-
neer to plan and help build its infrastructure projects. This is a Kyrgyz man who has 
never left the country, was educated locally, and speaks no English. He has nothing 
to do with international organizations (other than ultimately drawing his salary from 
one) and does not have to speak the language of grant-writing. His does not fit the 
typology of expert knowledge, yet his knowledge of civil engineering is in a sense 
truly global: there is largely global consensus on how to build an irrigation canal or 
lay a pipe. Thus, the categories and their uses in international development lie in 
tension and often in contradiction; yet they play a crucial role in development insti-
tutions’ epistemic search for authority and authenticity.
To critically evaluate the development project now, one must be conscious of the 
way power is deployed; these typologies of knowledge could be the present’s ver-
sion of the orientalism and scientific Enlightenment universalism of colonialism. 
Built implicitly into colonial power structures were troubling assumptions about 
race, geography and culture, be they stereotypes of noble savages or scientifically 
backward primitives. Today’s parallel assumptions might be that there are global 
experts and authentic locals, and that these can be sharply separated. Indeed, both 
academia and society more broadly are struggling to bring together the apparent 
universality of science—and from it, technocratic, evidence-based interventions—
with the insights of poststructuralism, cultural specificity, and indigenous knowl-
edge. But rarely does it matter so much to people’s lives as in the case of justifying 
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the course of development interventions. This is a key battleground of power, and 
the structure within which both the actors and the subjects of development must 
operate.
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Chapter 11
Democracy Movement and Alternative 
Knowledge in Hong Kong
Kin-man Chan
 Introduction: Trial and Alternative Knowledge
I was supposed to write this book chapter in the fall of 2018 after attending the 
Heidelberg Seminar. The writing plan was disrupted by a trial in which I stood as 
the second defendant together with eight activists identified by the prosecutor as the 
leaders of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong in 2014. We were accused of 
committing crimes related to conspiracy and incitement to cause public nuisance. 
After several rounds of pretrial hearings, the formal trial took place in December 
2018 and lasted for three weeks. The “event” attracted enormous attentions from 
local and international media. Hundreds of citizens went to the court to hear the trial 
and chant slogans of support outside the courthouse. The trial’s highlights were my 
testimony, the submission by the first defendant who was a law professor, and the 
mitigation speech by the third defendant who was a retired pastor. There were tears 
and laughter among the audience. At the end, the first defendant and I were sen-
tenced to 16 months of imprisonment and the other two sentenced to eight months. 
I was unable to write this book chapter until I was released in the spring of 2020.
During the trial, I found that the courtroom became a public space to contest for 
different interpretations of history. The prosecutor believed that the prolonged 
blockage of some major avenues during the 79-day occupation was caused by the 
defendants’ provocative speeches, whereas the defendants argued that it was 
Beijing’s denial of universal suffrage that triggered the whole saga. The defense 
lawyers also summoned a respectable professor to prove that the unnecessary use of 
tear gas against peaceful demonstrators was a more prominent factor in bringing 
hundreds of thousands of citizens to the protest, according to the polls his team 
conducted. A documentary film was also shown in the court for the first time, reveal-
ing how young protesters made their own decisions to occupy while refusing to 
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identify some of the senior defendants as their leaders. The court debates, broadcast 
through news and social media, aroused unprecedented reflections on the move-
ment. People accused the government of scapegoating the defendants and reiterated 
their free will in joining the protest. Compared to the extremely depressing mood in 
the movement’s aftermath, the trial uplifted the movement’s spirits by once again 
making the issues of democracy and civil disobedience the focus of public agenda. 
Alternative knowledge, that is, facts and interpretations of social reality beyond 
official prescriptions, such as polls conducted by independent scholars and docu-
mentaries made by independent directors, was disseminated through the court as a 
contested space. This is why the judicial process is deemed a part of the struggle in 
civil disobedience, as it provides a stage for the participants to explain their causes 
to the public. In the historical trials of Gandhi and Mandela, the court provided a 
most dramatized context that critiques the status quo and in which alternative 
visions of society are effectively communicated to the people when their emotions 
are provoked.
My aim in this chapter is then to discuss the production and dissemination of 
alternative knowledge by social actions, using the mobilization of the Umbrella 
Movement from March 2013 to September 2014 as an example. I focus my discus-
sion on the deliberation days and the civil referendum conducted by the organizing 
team of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement led by the 
Occupy Trio, two professors and one retired pastor who later became the first three 
defendants in the Umbrella Movement Trial. Readers need to be forewarned that the 
author of this chapter is also a key player in this case. Although the involvement 
provided insider information and sympathetic understanding of the movement 
actors, constant reflections and cross references of alternative interpretations are 
needed to maintain scientific integrity.
 Production and Dissemination of Knowledge 
in Social Movement
Civil society as a structure of self-organization plays a critical role in holding the 
state accountable to the will of the people. In order to do so, civil society members 
need to control state policies from the viewpoint of their consistency with the 
“socially constitutive value systems” (Frentzel-Zagorska, 1990, p. 760). They must 
also exercise self-defense in cases when this consistency is violated. But how does 
a society develop its socially constitutive values systems? Frentzel-Zagorska argued 
that it is initially through the elaboration of these normative structures that group 
identities and interest are defined. For example, workers could develop a sense of 
belonging to a certain industry and understand the importance of labor rights 
through joining a trade union. Upon this social base, an encompassing collective 




Adopting this analytical schema assumes a certain degree of free communication 
within and across social groups. Unofficial or alternative information and perspec-
tives are also available for civil society to check state policies’ consistency with the 
socially constitutive value systems. In a more mature and responsible civil society, 
social groups will also propose alternative policies. In view of this, production and 
dissemination of alternative knowledge through civil society is an issue deserving 
scholarly attentions. Authors of the scanty studies in this area have found that unlike 
Frentzel-Zagorska’s schematic development, the relationship between knowledge 
formation and self-defense is more complex. Very often, people only pay attention 
to social issues when their emotions are duly aroused. Intuition or elusive moral 
sense plays a significant role in making initial response to an emergent controversy 
in society. Acquisition of information and reflections on personal values will become 
more intense only after people are drawn into the social movement.
In his classic study of learning in informal education, Griff Foley (1999) found 
that “some of the most powerful learning occurs as people struggle against oppres-
sion, as they struggle to make sense of what is happening to them and to work out 
ways of doing something about it”(pp. 1–2). From a Gramscian perspective, Foley 
maintained that the unlearning of “dominant discourses” and the learning of “resis-
tant discourses” is central to this learning. For Foucault, discourses are about “what 
can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what author-
ity” (Ball, 1990, p. 2 as cited in Foley, 1999, p. 15). In view of this, Foley’s task of 
“unlearning” comprises the debunking of ideology justifying the existing arrange-
ments of the distributions of power and resources. The “learning” thus refers to the 
acquisition of alternative or counter-knowledge (against the status quo) produced 
and disseminated through social actions.
With his case study (1999), Foley revealed that these unlearning and learning 
processes could be very painful. Those experiencing them were often disillusioned 
about expertise when professionals could offer no technical solutions (see also 
Heifetz, 1994). They also found that state officials did not always act to protect 
public interest. When they were finally fed up with the bureaucracy’s idiosyncratic 
mode of tackling public issues, they decided to take things in their own hands. This 
awakening enabled people “to make sense of, and act on, their environment, and to 
come to understand themselves as knowledge-creating, acting beings” (Foley, 1999, 
p. 64). But this is only the beginning of another painful journey of working with 
fellow citizens without standard procedures and absolute authority. In response, 
social movement organizations and leadership attempt to give a more durable and 
predictable order to the definition of the situation and formulation of actions 
(Melucci, 1988).
Following this vein of argument, Donatella della Porta and Elena Pavan (2017) 
suggested that social movement provides “repertoires of knowledge practices” 
(p. 300), meaning the set of organizational practices that foster the coordination of 
disconnected, local, and highly personal experiences and rationalities within a 
shared cognitive system from which movements and their supporters can draw a 
common orientation for making claims and acting collectively to produce political 
and cultural change. Della Porta and Pavan named this cognitive system an 
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“alternative epistemology” that produces “counter-knowledge” (p.  298). Citing 
Gramsci (1971), they called this “good sense” (p. 298), in other words, knowledge 
derived from “the popular practice” (p. 298) in everyday life, in contrast to “com-
mon sense” (p. 298) that crystallized the hegemonic system of social relationship.
In past studies of social movement, scholars either paid too much attention to 
resources and organization (old social movements such as labor movements) or 
value and identity (new social movements such as environmental and feminine 
movements) while neglecting that it is also a process of knowledge creation, through 
which “alternative political imaginaries and theories about how to actualize these 
imagined possibilities” (Chesters, 2012, p. 147) are collectively identified. But in 
their study about framing, David Snow and Robert Benford (1988) already pointed 
out the importance of the alignment between the frame and social reality. They 
define framing as assigning meaning to and interpreting relevant events and condi-
tions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to 
garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. One of the core framing 
tasks is diagnostic faming, in other words, the identification of a problem and the 
attribution of blame or causality. In order to effectively perform this framing, move-
ment organizers must take into account its empirical credibility, meaning the fit 
between the framing and events in the world, such as giving evidence when claim-
ing that we are in the midst of the global wave of democracy. Snow and Benford 
also discussed the idea of experiential commensurability, that is, whether the solu-
tions the movement suggests really harmonize with the ways those affected have 
experienced the situations. For example, it would be foolish to treat democracy as a 
panacea to economic crisis when many Western democracies have been struggling 
with austerity since the 2008 financial crisis. Those engaging in these discussions 
demonstrated that social movement organizations need to produce a set of credit-
able knowledge with which one could identify the problematic situation, the cause 
of injustice, and the possibility of change. This set of knowledge will be challenged 
by experts and authorities from the establishment as well as critics in public sphere.
Due to the lack of resources, the alternative knowledge produced by social move-
ment is often represented in the forms of testimony and storytelling rather than with 
systematized data (Esteves, 2008 cited by della Porta & Pavan, 2017). Their strength 
is to provide a thick description of counter examples to challenge the domination 
discourses or common sense. This knowledge is spatially and temporally grounded 
and is also an expression of actors’ reflexivity and accountable to the places they 
aim to affect (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 52). In some cases, however, movement 
activists would engage with existing scientific knowledge with different degrees of 
criticism, addressing controversies in different academic fields or creating profes-
sional counter-expertise that becomes a resource for academic and political debates. 
In the latter situation, academic and professionals play a significant role in altering 
the power imbalance in the production of knowledge by bridging the gap between 
activists and experts in the field (della Porta & Pavan, 2017).
One of the most outstanding cases of the production of counter-expertise is the 
campaign against global warming. Political elites such as Al Gore and experts in 
academia and industry are also involved. They need to debate with experts from the 
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traditional energy sector as well as with political figures and parties supporting the 
firms and workers in this sector. Actors have conducted research to uncover the hid-
den injuries of nature and people due to flood and drought originated from global 
warming. They have held international forums and signed treaties to raise con-
sciousness and reach agreement on reducing carbon emission. Although some activ-
ists criticize that the campaign actors have aimed at the development of green 
business while neglecting fundamental changes in economic development and life-
style, these actors have demonstrated the possibility of social movement to produce 
alternative knowledge on a global scale and make climate change knowledge a field 
of contention (Jamison, 2010).
In this chapter, I will discuss the mobilization process of the Umbrella Movement 
in Hong Kong as a case to show how social movement produces and disseminates 
alternative knowledge. In particular, I will analyze how the movement impacted 
public agenda setting, contested the interpretation of constitution and initiated an 
alternative reform proposal. Klandermans (1992) argues that an issue can spark 
protest only if interested actors gain access to public discourse. Although public 
attention is a scared resource, how to mobilize public attention to the concerned 
issue is the first task a social movement needs to consider. The Umbrella Movement 
was successful in changing the public agenda through numerous creative actions, 
including organizing a series of deliberation days. The movement used social media 
to compete with mainstream news media to disseminate alternative interpretations 
of the Basic Law, the mini constitution of Hong Kong, particularly regarding the 
meaning of universal suffrage. It also used deliberation days and the civil referen-
dum to mobilize a popular initiative in submitting constitutional reform proposals. 
Besides massive mobilization, scholars and professionals were involved in debating 
with progovernment experts and facilitating online and offline platforms to develop 
alternative knowledge and policy proposals. Though movement organizers strug-
gled to handle tensions coming from both external and internal divisions, they 
appreciated the liberating experience of subjectivity through producing alternatives 
in the face of hegemonic discourse.
 Agenda Setting and Alternative Interpretations 
of the Constitution
The Umbrella Movement was a prodemocracy protest in a form of occupying some 
main streets in the central business district (CBD) of Hong Kong. It lasted from 
September 28 to December 15, 2014, following a student strike in late September 
2014 due to Beijing’s decision to impose severe restrictions on the election of the 
Chief Executive (CE) of Hong Kong. However, preparations for the demonstration 
had been in the works since March 2013 by OCLP, a movement led by law professor 
Benny Tai, retired pastor Yiu-ming Chu, and myself, the author of this chapter, who 
the media collectively dubbed the Occupy Trio. Under the Occupy Trio, an 
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organizing committee was established with representatives from different opposi-
tional parties and civil society organizations. Various functional groups for matters 
related to media and communication, fund-raising, social actions, deliberation days, 
and the civil referendum were formed. Hundreds of volunteers were involved, 
including scholars, IT experts, mediators, media experts, and film makers, 
among others.
The movement’s aim was to fight for universal suffrage for the election of the CE 
of Hong Kong. Beijing had already promised to implement universal suffrage 
according to Article 45 of the Basic Law, the mini constitution of Hong Kong, in 
2017. Any constitutional reform proposal, however, must be initiated by the CE and 
approved by Beijing before it can be submitted to the Legislative Council of Hong 
Kong for approval by two thirds of the council members. The approved bill will be 
then vetted by the CE and Beijing before becoming law. As the reform will funda-
mentally change the political system of Hong Kong and involve complex legislative 
processes, OCLP suggested that the government should conduct a public consulta-
tion as soon as possible so that a reform proposal could be submitted to Beijing for 
vetting in 2014 and for further approval by different authorities in 2015.
As Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962) have argued, agenda setting is a 
hidden face of power that the dominant groups exercise to preempt policy sugges-
tions with potential threat to the status quo. In other words, the regime reduces the 
visibility of certain policy issues by avoidance and inaction. On the contrary, public 
attentions will be stirred up when issues are placed on the public agenda, such as 
being mentioned in presidential policy addresses, discussed in government cabinet 
or parliamentary committees, or debated in public hearings, and so forth. In view of 
this, a regime’s responsiveness is always selective and biased. Unless civil society 
is able to contest with the dominant groups in terms of agenda setting, the regime 
tends to set policy priority according to the preferences of its keen supporters, if not 
its own organizational interests. Social movement, however, could impact on public 
agenda setting by creating “repertoires of knowledge practices” (della Porta & 
Pavan, 2017, p. 300) to mobilize public attentions. OCLP was the set of organiza-
tional practices whose utilizers foster the coordination of disconnected views within 
a shared cognitive framework. Its use also provided a common orientation for mak-
ing claims and acting collectively to produce political change.
The OCLP held its first press conference in a small but elegant church on March 
27, 2013. The set was deliberately chosen, as the serene atmosphere helped send the 
message of “love and peace.” The Occupy Trio’s professional backgrounds as 
scholar and clergyman, widely respected in the community, also helped build the 
integrity of the movement as nonpartisan and public serving. Against this backdrop, 
the trio made a polemic claim that any election method of the CE election should be 
open and fair and that the word universal suffrage stipulated in the Basic Law must 
be interpreted according to international standards. If the government refused to 
abide by these standards, the movement would resort to civil disobedience, that is, 
occupying the CBD.
C.Y. Leung, then CE of the Hong Kong government, rejected OCLP’s suggestion 
of holding public consultation on constitutional reform, as he believed that 
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livelihood issues such as housing should be given top priority in the public agenda. 
This avoidance strategy did not work, as a retired senior Chinese official responsible 
for Hong Kong and Macau affairs decided to respond. He maintained that only 
“patriotic” persons should be allowed to run the CE election and also named two 
major opposition leaders as examples of unqualified candidates. He then argued that 
the meaning of universal suffrage should be understood in the context of the Basic 
Law instead of any international standards. Ironically, these exchanges of words 
immediately sparked public debates on the urgency of constitutional reforms and 
the meanings of universal suffrage. The media extensively covered the controversial 
idea of civil obedience, that is, peaceful but unlawful protest, proposed by these 
seemingly moderate figures including a law professor. Vowing that they were pre-
pared to shoulder the legal consequences including imprisonment, the Trio success-
fully mobilized public attentions by dramatizing the urgency of constitutional 
reforms. They were also able to attract incessant media coverage by holding varying 
types of innovative events.
Regardless of the government’s refusal to hold public consultation, OCLP imme-
diately organized a series of deliberation days (D-Day) to gather people’s views on 
the coming constitutional reform. Deeply influenced by Jürgen Habermas’s theory 
of the public sphere and deliberative democracy, as well as the idea of deliberation 
day advocated by Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin (2004), OCLP’s D-Day 
encouraged citizens to discuss matters related to constitutional reform in a fair and 
rational manner. The subjects discussed included the importance of democracy to 
Hong Kong, movement strategies, and a specific reform proposal.
The first deliberation day (D-Day 1) was held in Hong Kong University on June 
9, 2013 with around 700 participants coming from different opposition parties and 
civil society organizations. Before attending D-Day, they were advised to visit a 
website to view articles expressing contending views concerning OCLP’s demand 
for an election method that met the international standards of universal suffrage. 
According to OCLP’s understanding of these standards, not only should the election 
be as inclusive as possible in terms of one-person-one-vote, it should also be suffi-
ciently competitive. No unreasonable restrictions should be imposed to block peo-
ple from different political backgrounds from standing for election. This discussion 
of what constitutes genuine universal suffrage was pertinent because the Basic Law 
stipulates the establishment of a nominating committee to screen candidates for CE 
elections. OCLP argued that unless the constitution of the nominating committee 
was truly broadly representative as stipulated in the Basic Law or the threshold for 
nomination was sufficiently low, the committee would become an obstacle to free 
elections. Pro-Beijing people, however, opinioned that the nominating committee is 
a gatekeeper to safeguard national security by screening out disloyal candidates.
D-Day 1 began with an open session, allowing participants to express their 
views. It was followed by a breakout session in which randomly formed groups of a 
dozen or more participants met, led by a moderator responsible for maintaining fair 
discussion procedures. All group members, regardless of position, were given equal 
time to express their views. The breakout session’s results were then reported during 
a closing session. Given my sociological training, I was assigned to summarize the 
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views expressed in different breakout sessions. I observed that participants were 
very excited to join this form of town meeting. They particularly appreciated the 
equal opportunity for expressing views and the sense of solidarity created by meet-
ing democracy supporters face-to-face. The D-Day’s smooth rundown and the 
involvement of a large number of well-trained volunteers also boosted people’s con-
fidence towards the movement. The event was widely covered by both mainstream 
and social media.
Despite the positive responses, many participants reminded the organizers to 
bridge the idea of democracy with the concerns of different sectors in the commu-
nity. Social worker participants expressed that their clients with working class back-
grounds found the academic setting of the university too intimidating and the 
rundown of the discussion too rigid. A more casual chat in a familiar setting would 
be crucial if the organizers wanted people to fully express their views and emotions. 
In view of this, OCLP decided to change D-Day 2 into a series of discussions held 
in different communities, such as cafes for investment bankers, churches for 
Christians, community centers for women and laborers, public space under foot-
bridges for homeless people, and so forth. D-Day 2 lasted for four months until 
January 2014, resulting in the number of participants growing to 3000.
At the same time, the Occupy Trio was frequently invited to give speeches in 
different communities and debate with progovernment antagonists. The public was 
then exposed to alternative views regarding the constitutional reform. Unlike other 
social movements, OCLP was not supposed to produce counter-expertise because 
they were experts themselves. Among the trio, Benny Tai is a constitutional law 
professor. Kin-man Chan is a political sociologist studying civil society and democ-
racy and was also a leader of a scholars’ group encompassing many prodemocracy 
political scientists. In order to counteract the movement, a group of progovernment 
scholars and businessmen then established Silent Majority to mobilize support for 
the regime. Whereas OCLP advocated the idea of genuine universal suffrage as 
crucial to good governance in a modern society like Hong Kong, Silent Majority 
emphasized the importance of stability in maintaining prosperity. Instead of adopt-
ing Beijing’s xenophobic discourse, such as accusing Western democracy of posing 
a threat to national security, the group mainly targeted the Hong Kong middle class, 
who found the idea of civil disobedience too radical and occupying CBD detrimen-
tal to the economy. One of the economists in Silent Majority warned that the stock 
market would lose billions of Hong Kong dollars in a few days of occupation. They 
also released a consultancy report predicting that traffic across the city would be 
crippled should one area of the CBD get blocked.
Although none of this ultimately happened, these warnings were effective in 
creating fears not just among well-off people but working class people who were 
constantly worried about losing their jobs. Notwithstanding these worries, Radio 
Hong Kong Television conducted a survey and found that people in the lower- 
middle class and with a higher education level were most supportive of radical 
actions. Age was also significant in determining one’s attitude towards these debates. 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a survey and found that although 
the community held divided views of the movement (38% in support and 36% 
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opposed), among respondents aged 15–24, some 62% were in support, 30% were 
neutral, and only 7.7% opposed (Chan & Vitrierat, 2017).
The intervening factor for these relationships can be attributed to the medium of 
information. Working class and elderly people relied heavily on television and 
newspapers to receive information about matters related to the constitutional reform. 
These mainstream media, except Apply Daily, had already been criticized for prac-
ticing self-censorship due to their business connections with China. In view of this, 
OCLP relied mainly on social media such as Facebook and other internet news 
platforms such as House News (renamed as Stand News later) to deliver its mes-
sages. Young and more educated people were more receptive to these media than 
many of their counterparts. The information gap then led to political diversion. The 
controversies over the implementation of a free election and the means to strive for 
it brought Hong Kong into unprecedented splits in different domains of life. In 
churches, people debated whether democracy is central to their faith and whether 
committing an unlawful act is against Christian teaching. In families, husbands and 
wives quarreled over their political stances, and parents pressured their children not 
to participate in the demonstration.
 Formation of a Policy Proposal and Internal Split 
of the Movement
By April 2014, the deliberation days had already lasted for 10 months. The move-
ment then employed D-Day 3 and the civil referendum to draw up a reform proposal 
to be submitted to the government. D-Day 3 was held in five different locations 
simultaneously on May 6, 2014. Before it was held, the School of Law of Hong 
Kong University invited a group of international experts on constitutional laws to 
vet all the proposals made by the political parties and groups from different back-
grounds during that period of time. The criteria these experts adopted to scrutinize 
whether the proposals could guarantee fairness and sufficient competition in the 
election indirectly proved the existence of international standards of universal suf-
frage. Ultimately, 15 proposals, including one from a member of Silent Majority, 
were tabled for selection by 2500 participants of D-Day 3. They were asked to 
select three proposals to be considered by the public in the upcoming civil 
referendum.
The selection process was controversial, with some of the more radical opposi-
tion parties such as People’s Power mobilizing participants to select only those pro-
posals with a provision for “public nomination,” in other words, those specifying 
that a certain number of registered voters could nominate candidates. Moderate 
democrats criticized this provision as a violation of the Basic Law and a measure 
that would be difficult for Beijing to accept. They also complained that the OCLP 
movement had been hijacked by radicals and that the selection process on D-Day 3 
was exactly the kind of political screening that people opposed. At the end, three 
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proposals with a public nomination provision were selected but the democracy 
movement was split.
The moderates, particularly Hongkong 2020 led by former senior government 
official Mrs. Anson Chan, were dissatisfied with the results. Mrs. Chan doubted 
whether the upcoming civil referendum could offer people a genuine choice if pro-
posals without a provision for public nomination were excluded. Students and radi-
cals counterattacked, accusing her of being out of touch with the masses who had no 
trust at all in the nominating committee specified in the Basic Law. When the move-
ment was on the verge of collapse, Cardinal Joseph Zen played a critical role in 
rebuilding solidarity. He urged both sides to stop attacking the other. In order to 
encourage moderate supporters to vote in the referendum, OCLP added an addi-
tional motion to represent the baseline of the movement’s goal: “The Legislative 
Council should veto any proposed election method violating international standards 
of universal suffrage that fails to provide voters genuine choice” (SCMP, 2014).
To urge people to take the referendum seriously, the Occupy Trio pledged to step 
down from the movement’s leadership if they failed to draw 100,000 votes. Led by 
Cardinal Zen, a Democracy March was organized to promote the referendum for 
seven consecutive days and nights across Hong Kong. The march was successful in 
conveying a strong image of solidarity, with opposition leaders from different wings 
urging people to vote while marching through various communities. Right before 
the referendum, however, Beijing issued a white paper on the implementation of 
One Country, Two Systems, proclaiming China’s “overall jurisdiction” over Hong 
Kong (SCMP, n.d.). In Chinese, the term was written as “overall administrative 
power,” and was understood as a move undermining Hong Kong’s high degree of 
autonomy. Furthermore, because the white paper’s authors also referred to judges in 
Hong Kong as “administrators,” a number of lawyers joined a silent march to 
express their worries over the judiciary’s continued independence.
The referendum is described as “civil” because it was purely a civil society ini-
tiative without official status. OCLP commissioned the Public Opinion Program at 
Hong Kong University to operate the referendum. All Hong Kong citizens aged 18 
or above were eligible to vote via an electronic platform or at one of the polling sta-
tions set up in churches, schools, or temporary shelters in various communities. In 
order to avoid duplicate voting, besides checking ID numbers, a unique code would 
be sent to the voter’s mobile phone. Despite the public enthusiasm, the Hong Kong 
government accused the referendum of “having no legal basis,” (Kahon, 2014) even 
though OCLP had never made such a claim.
Before the civil referendum was held from June 20th to 22nd, 2014, the elec-
tronic voting system suffered unprecedented attacks by hackers. The scale of these 
attacks was so large that local network security maintenance companies decided to 
withdraw from the project, claiming that they lacked the capacity to handle such 
large-scale attacks. At the same time, however, the attacks sparked overwhelming 
reactions from the community, because it was widely believed that the hackers had 
been hired by Beijing to deprive the Hong Kong people of their right to free expres-
sion. Fortunately, US-based CloudFlare was determined to defend the voting sys-
tem. Working day and night, the CloudFlare team finally managed to fix the system. 
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In the first few minutes after the referendum started, thousands of citizens scram-
bled to vote. Hearing this exciting news, many people burst into tears while they 
were finishing the last leg of the Democracy March. On June 22nd, citizens who did 
not use the internet lined up in front of the polling stations, creating an impressive 
scene of citizen participation (Chan, 2015).
In the end, around 800,000 voters turned up to the referendum. The proposal of 
a three-track system (nomination from the public, political parties, and the nominat-
ing committee), made by the Alliance for True Democracy, received the most votes. 
Some 88% of voters also agreed that the legislature should veto any government 
proposal that did not meet international standards of universal suffrage. The massive 
turnout for the referendum brought the movement to a satisfying climax, as people 
felt that they had overcome tremendous obstacles to make their voices heard. On 
July 1, around 500,000 people joined the annual rally organized by the Civil Human 
Rights Front to demand genuine universal suffrage. More than 500 college students 
and other citizens stayed behind after the rally to “trial-run” the occupation by sit-
ting down peacefully on a main road in the Central district of Hong Kong and were 
arrested.
To stop the movement’s momentum from accelerating further, the government 
first denied the referendum’s representativeness by releasing a report on the public 
consultation of constitutional reform, depicting the demand for public nomination 
as a view held by “some people” and progovernment views as “mainstream” (Hong 
Kong Government of the Special Administrative Region, 2014). The then Chief 
Secretary Carrie Lam, senior official leading the government’s constitutional reform 
task force, met the Occupy Trio a month after the referendum. She was extremely 
arrogant during the meeting and showed no intention whatever to continue the dia-
logue with the movement. On August 31, 2014, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress in Beijing made a decision (known as the “831 deci-
sion”) with which it basically ruled out the implementation of free elections in Hong 
Kong. With this decision, it laid down three significant hurdles to democracy: The 
nominating committee’s constitution would be modeled on the existing election 
committee, in other words, comprise 1200 representatives from four sectors of soci-
ety; support from 50% of nominating committee members would be required for a 
candidate to qualify for election; and the number of candidates would be restricted 
to two to three persons. As Beijing has been able to control the results of past CE 
elections, its stipulation that the CE nomination system be modeled on the existing 
election committee naturally led to the conclusion that the proposed election would 
be a restricted one that could not meet the international standards of universal 
suffrage.
Because the 831 decision was more conservative than any proposals made by 
pro-China political groups in Hong Kong, people were completely shocked and 
enraged. More protests flared up. Secondary and college students joined forces to 
launch class boycotts. By the end of the boycotts, some students decided to storm 
the government headquarters and occupy the civic square in front of it. Police 
responded with pepper spray and arrests. Tens of thousands of citizens besieged the 
spot to support the students and shielded themselves from pepper spray by using 
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umbrellas (why the media later dubbed the movement the Umbrella Movement). 
The confrontation triggered the Occupy Trio to kick-start the occupation on the 
spot, although it was neither the time nor the venue they had planned. Police 
attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas, but this drew even more people to 
join. The rest is history.
 Discussion
I have documented the above to show that social movements can produce and dis-
seminate alternative knowledge, as in the case of the Umbrella Movement in Hong 
Kong. The controversy’s crux in Hong Kong’s 2013–2014 constitutional reform 
was to define the problematic situation, to reach consensus on whether democratic 
reform is a solution, and to determine the form of universal suffrage that could meet 
both the constitutional prescriptions and the people’s expectations.
The definition of a problematic situation is related to public agenda setting. CY 
Leung, then CE of Hong Kong, believed that the housing and inequality issues were 
caused by the insufficient supply of land resulting from previous administrations’ 
lack of vision and determination. Although the movement did not disagree with this 
argument, it looked for a more systemic solution to ensure a more responsive gov-
ernment. The movement attacked CE’s existing election method, identifying the 
1200-strong Election Committee as the root cause of insufficient accountability, as 
its voting members are mainly from business and pro-Beijing sectors. Apparently, 
OCLP was able to affect the agenda setting by mobilizing public attentions to focus 
on constitutional reform. This was made possible by creating a sense of urgency 
through introducing the idea of civil disobedience and the trio’s determination to 
pay their personal price, including risking imprisonment.
The selection of a reform proposal meeting both the Basic Law and international 
standards was a more painstaking issue. The regime interpreted the provision of the 
nominating committee in Article 45 of the Basic Law as a way to protect China’s 
national security by screening out “unpatriotic” candidates in the CE election. In the 
regime’s eyes, there is no such thing as international standards of universal suffrage. 
The word universal suffrage is subjected to Beijing’s interpretation. The business 
community also believed that screening of candidates is a way to protect Hong 
Kong’s sound economic system from any fundamental changes. In contrast, the 
most active participants in the deliberation days were more concerned with remov-
ing unnecessary obstacles to a free and open election regardless of the provision of 
the nominating committee prescribed in the Basic Law. They believed that the gov-
ernance problem’s crux lay in the government’s lack of accountability to the people. 
They subscribed to the idea of public nomination, a system practiced in Taiwan and 
some other democracies, and could not care less about the issue of national security. 
They did not trust Beijing and were annoyed by the business community’s prag-
matic and pro-Beijing stances.
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This antiestablishment tendency also led to internal strife in the movement, as 
the moderate factions had attempted to seek solutions to resolve the conflicting 
expectations of Beijing and the Hong Kong people. For example, a scholars’ group 
suggested that the public nomination could be incorporated into the initial stage of 
the nominating processes as “public submission” to be vetted by the nominating 
committee in the second stage. These innovative options, however, were ruled out in 
D-Day 3 when the more radical groups successfully mobilized attendants to select 
only proposals with public nomination. Building consensus within the movement 
was more difficult than the Occupy Trio first expected. In the beginning, they envi-
sioned that participants would become more accommodating if they consulted 
divergent viewpoints before joining the deliberation. Instead, people’s stances 
became more rigid. One of the reasons is that the participants were the most active 
members of the opposition parties and civil society organizations, who did not rep-
resent the whole spectrum of political stances in the society-at-large. As a result, the 
venue became an echo chamber for the activists to consolidate their more idealistic 
thinking. Only in the referendum, which involved a huge number of people, did 
participants select a comparatively more accommodating proposal.
This chapter is not a venue to decide on the validity of different claims and the 
merits of different proposals. The above discussion is to demonstrate that definition 
of situation and interpretation of law could be contested, and alternative knowledge 
could be produced by a social movement in the process. In this particular case, the 
original intent of certain provisions in the drafting of the Basic Law was debated. 
The words uttered by some former senior Chinese leaders were cited to support 
respective interpretations. Choudry (2010) argues that texts are sites of real strug-
gles. The regime will organize knowledge in particular directions and from particu-
lar standpoints, which often include the containment of social movement (Choudry, 
2010; Kinsman, 1997). Sometimes, the containment is so overwhelming that creat-
ing a vision beyond the official frame is already a difficult task to be recognized as 
a movement’s achievement (Kelley, 2002). Kinsman (1997) suggests that how the 
media, different publics, governments, NGOs, and social movements read and use 
those texts in particular contexts and moments is critical to the development of 
counterhegemonic politics.
Though laymen could also produce powerful counter-expertise knowledge by 
testimony and storytelling grounded in their everyday lives, involvement of profes-
sionals in the movement could directly challenge the evidence base of the dominant 
discourses. In the present case, both sides of the struggle involved experts in the 
field. Though OCLP produced counter-knowledge, it was not in a form of counter- 
expertise, as the movement claimed that they were expert themselves. These experts, 
including scholars, pollsters, IT professionals, and so forth, played a significant role 
in altering the power imbalance in the production of knowledge by bridging the gap 
between activists and experts in the field as well as challenging the scientific base of 
the dominant discourses. The downside of expert involvement is to gear public 
debates into technical if not idiosyncratic arguments discouraging popular involve-
ments. OCLP attempted to bridge this gap by cocreating alternative knowledge 
through deliberation days and the civil referendum. They also extensively employed 
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social media to disseminate alternative views to the public, although with limited 
success among workers and less educated people. Some housewives expressed that 
they joined the occupation because of the police’s unreasonable use of tear gas and 
pepper spray. They believed that it was unjust to harm peaceful protesters, particu-
larly students, and their “mother’s instinct” urged them to protect these young pro-
testers. They were not aware of the previous discussions about international 
standards but would support democracy just to make the government accountable to 
the people (Wong, 2016). It seems that testimonies and storytelling of this kind are 
equally as powerful as theories and statistics provided by a movement’s experts.
This case supports Foley’s (1999) argument that some of the most powerful 
learning occurs when people struggle against oppression, to make sense of what is 
happening to them and to work out ways of doing something about it (pp. 1–2). 
OCLP’s role during the Umbrella Movement’s mobilization period (March 2013–
September 2014) was to provide “repertoires of knowledge practices” (della Porta 
& Pavan, 2017, p.  300), in other words, the set of organizational practices with 
which one can foster the coordination of disconnected experiences and rationalities 
within a shared cognitive system that can be used to provide a common orientation 
for making claims and acting collectively to produce change. The cognitive system 
here comprises the understandings of the international standards of universal suf-
frage and the honorable tradition of civil disobedience as a strategy for fighting for 
justice. It is a shared system because the understandings were cocreated through 
deliberation days and the civil referendum. Even though the movement was unable 
to change the political system as people wished, the movement itself demonstrated 
the capacity of human beings to produce alternative worldviews, interpretations of 
reality, and policy proposals. The experience of this “subjectivity” is both psycho-
logically and politically liberating. Thus, the most prominent slogan printed on the 
backdrop of the stage in the Umbrella Movement was “self-determination,” a sign 
of moral autonomy.
 Prologue
As I am writing this chapter in the summer of 2019, Hong Kong is under a reign of 
terror after China imposed the National Security Law to crack down on subversion, 
secession, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces regardless of whether vio-
lence is involved. Provoking hatred towards the Chinese or Hong Kong government 
in relation to collusion with foreign forces (under a very broad definition) could be 
a crime. A special court has been established with judges appointed by the Chief 
Executive. No jury will be set up in the trial and media attendance could be denied. 
Serious cases could be extradited to China for interrogation and trial. The penalty is 
up to life imprisonment. The community was once again shocked by this blatant 
violation of the One Country, Two Systems policy, in particular the damage caused 
to the common law system.
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Using COVID-19 as an excuse, the authorities have permitted no rallies to 
express people’s objections to the law. They have arrested activists for alleged sub-
version or secession just for expressing views condemning the regime or supporting 
Hong Kong independence. Hundreds of policemen raided the office of Apple Daily, 
the only prodemocracy newspaper in town, and arrested its founder Jimmy Lai and 
senior management staff for alleged collusion with foreign forces and other finan-
cial crimes. Prof. Benny Tai, the cofounder of OCLP, was sacked by Hong Kong 
University regardless of his tenure appointment. The university gave no explanation 
to the community except that Arthur Li, the Chair of the University Council, told the 
media that a “criminal” should not be allowed to teach in the university (Chan, 
2020). Later on, Benny Tai was arrested and detained by the authority for his alleged 
violation of the National Security Law by organizing a primary election among pro- 
democracy candidates.  Back in May 2020, the government lashed out at Hong 
Kong’s examination authorities for “seriously hurting the feelings” of Chinese peo-
ple who had suffered under Japanese occupation by asking history paper candidates 
if they agreed that Japan did more good than harm to China in the first half of the 
last century. In fact, the question covered the period from 1900 to 1945, a time when 
Sino-Japanese relations was more complicated than just the war. Although more 
than 5000 students had answered this question in the concerned public examination, 
the examination authorities were forced to cancel the question just to demonstrate 
their “political correctness.”
These recent crackdowns on independent newspapers and liberal scholars, and 
tightening control over schools and curricula, are moves to block the production and 
dissemination of alternative knowledge in Hong Kong. Social movements as reper-
toires of knowledge practices are also barred under the national security law or the 
emergency laws due to the pandemic. The regime is determined to back up the 
hegemonic discourse with white terror. How people unlearn dominant discourses 
and produce counter-knowledge under such a repressive regime will be an interest-
ing topic to study, but more importantly a vital task to preserve people’s sense of 
moral autonomy and will to change.
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Chapter 12
Epistemic Activism in the United States: 
Examining Meetings Across the Silos 
of Civil Society
Jen Sandler
 The Challenge of Conceptualizing Civil Society’s 
Radical Multiplicity
Researchers of civil society face an ontological problem, well described in the 
ambiguous introductions to almost all of their major journals and canonical texts: 
What exactly is civil society? What boundaries on the field of civic action ought to 
be delineated so that some modes of organization can be analyzed as distinctly civic 
phenomena?
Howell and Pearce (2001) in “Civil Society and Development” offer a compel-
ling distinction between two “genealogies” of civil society. In order to account for 
the ethical and epistemological ambiguity of concepts of civic action in the develop-
ment world, Howell and Pearce argue that one must distinguish between a “main-
stream genealogy” and an “alternative genealogy.” The mainstream genealogy is the 
hegemonic intellectual history of a sphere of civic activity that is separate from the 
state and the market, in which citizen participation is the driving force. A healthy 
civil society is said to be functional for democracy, according to the mainstream 
genealogy, and the question becomes how civil society can be made to thrive, pro-
vide the grist for democratic life, and balance out the ethical indifference of 
the market.
But what of social protest against dominant political and economic structures? 
What of civic critique with which one attempts not to complement but to reveal and 
shape the landscape of power in a particular context? The civil society that operates 
from this mode of critique, Howell and Pearce offer, has a different genealogy. 
Those adopting this alternative genealogy seek a critical counter-hegemony, in 
Gramscian terms. It is an epistemic apparatus for making sense of an ever- expanding 
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range of collective projects, not simply a vantage point for engaging the center from 
the margins in perpetuity. The dreams of many scholar-actors working within this 
genealogy today are of variations on an anti-unified field that morphs perpetually on 
an ever-shifting bedrock of radical multiplicity (e.g., de la Cadena & Blaser, 2018; 
Escobar, 2020; de Sousa Santos, 2018; Visvanathan, 2006).
In this paper, I lay out and demonstrate the utility of a radically pluralist “big- 
tent” approach to the study of civil society. Such a project will require appropriating 
the critical epistemic lens Howell and Pearce have suggested with their alternative 
genealogy, and which scholars of other fields have elaborated in the intervening 
decades, to engage with equanimity the entire field of civic action. Once researchers 
have broadened the field conceptually, the methodological intervention I suggest is 
to focus on relational and epistemic practices that center around meetings to illumi-
nate diverse civil society projects in a new way.
 Bringing Civil Society into Epistemic and Relational Focus
My interest in the “big tent” of civic action stems from my lived experience across 
a broad landscape of overlapping civil society projects that permeates the United 
States, in each major metropolitan area and at state and federal levels as well. I see 
a wide swath of this landscape in my various roles as researcher, engaged teacher, 
and civic actor. My work takes me into the worlds of applied social scientists, grass-
roots organizations, social movements, civic engagement projects, national and 
transnational networks, community care/healing groups, economic cooperatives, 
traditional labor unions, new labor projects, interfaith base-organizing groups, and 
policy advocacy organizations. The groups I work with are distinct in ideology, 
political stance, social identities, structural positionality, organizational structure, 
resources, and vision.
Most of the robust civic action I find interesting and important appears as highly 
fragmented and often obscure to the majority of the educated public. The illegibility 
of the field of civic action as a whole is largely due to the tendency of both main-
stream corporate-run media and critical/leftist media to center a narrow range of 
questions about civic life, which are almost exclusively focus on ideologies and 
interests. These questions include: What do people believe? What do they want? 
What determines whether they get what they want? Such essentialist, positivist, and 
ideological questions are distinctly unhelpful for broad inquiry into the richness of 
civic life and are particularly unhelpful when considering diverse local contexts. 
Researchers must find ways to cut the field differently, to think across realms of 
action. The reasons for doing so are as much empirical as theoretical.
The current field of civil society is not a single field of inquiry or practice, but 
many. Civic action is organized, both conceptually and administratively, in silos 
along several lines: type of organization (social movement, foundation, non-profit); 
topical focus of organization (public health, housing, food, violence, education); 
politics (radical, reformist, technical/managerial, neoliberal, reactionary, etc.); and 
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scale (local, statewide, national, transnational/international). That these silos orga-
nize how researchers engage with and conceptualize civic action is a problem for 
several reasons. First, actors—both human and non-human—easily move across all 
of the currently constituted practice fields, institutional silos, and even political ide-
ologies. Social movement leaders become nongovernmental executives and then 
policy advocates or even policy makers. Analytically and ideologically distinct proj-
ects are interwoven through people’s relationships. Within disciplinary silos, the 
situation even more absurd. Life is lived—and civic action is constituted—in the 
complex interplay of experiences of health, education, poverty, immigration, and so 
forth, and analytical or disciplinary convenience is no justification for ignoring peo-
ple’s lived experiences. Long critiqued, the boundaries of civic silos are not only 
simplistic; they are epistemically dishonest, obscuring the ways that people engage 
and become with and through intermingled projects, and vice versa.
Upending the silos brings up all sorts of new challenges. Researchers need meth-
odologies with which to interrogate diverse civic projects in an honest way. Without 
specific ethnographic methods for engaging the field, one cannot see, for example, 
how development processes are met, in real time and in diverse places, through 
conferences to legal proceedings, local governance processes and NGO board-
rooms, encounters around kitchen tables and in the streets, as part of the same broad 
civic dialogue about food, or state violence, or climate crisis. Researchers need 
methods to see, not simply theorize, “multiplicity” in civil society. Once one does 
away with the conceptual apparatus of silos and honestly faces the field of civil 
society in its multiplicity, questions of ideology recede and epistemic concerns 
about sense-making come to the fore.
An integrated approach to civic projects requires different questions. Returning 
to Howell and Pearce, those developing questions from the mainstream genealogy 
of civil society hold that civil society’s main role is to balance competing interests, 
agendas, and beliefs. My questions, coming out of almost twenty years of engage-
ment with different sorts of civic projects, are primarily epistemic and hail from the 
alternative genealogy: How do people come together to push upon the major struc-
tures of society—state structures, capital structures—to reframe how human thriv-
ing is understood? How do groups of people teach power to see and understand their 
grievances and designs the way they understand them? How do people make struc-
tures conform to their visions, or contest their legitimacy and posit alternatives? 
How does alternative world-making engage with particular existing worlds?
I find that efforts to shift the states’, institutions’, and various publics’ knowledge 
practices (Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, & Powell, 2008; Osterweil, 2013)—which I 
think of as both ways of making truth(s)/knowledge and making it matter—lie at the 
core of many of today’s most interesting civil society projects. I call such efforts 
“epistemic activism.”
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 From Participation to Epistemics
In an important way, this approach stems from the limitations of the frame and cri-
tique of “participation” in scholarship of civil society and development. For the past 
80 years, since the initiation of the global power system delineated following the 
Second World War, one of the primary tasks of civil society advocates has been to 
show the virtues of independent citizen participation for democracy. This project 
was reconfigured with the breakdown of the USSR and the rise of neoliberal global 
development plans, and notwithstanding debates about its relevance, it continues to 
animate funders and international bodies. During and following the decolonization 
period of the mid-20th century, scholars began to call attention to the epistemic 
violence of the colonial project of citizenship that underlies traditional notions of 
civil society (Fanon, 1963; Spivak, 2003). Finally, from the 1970s through the “par-
ticipatory turn,” one of the key projects of critical scholars in both the Global South 
and North has been to object to the failure of the development industry to produce 
real or meaningful participation-based projects (e.g., Cooke & Kothari, 2001).
Civil society researchers have recently been fixated with the participatory turn 
that has unfolded since the early 1990s. The participatory turn comprises the fact 
that global governance, the development industry, and many large private founda-
tions have taken up participation as a primary objective, mandate, and/or metric 
(see, e.g., the special issue edited by Bherer, Dufour, & Montambeault, 2016). Many 
critical scholars have engaged in nuanced assessment of the participatory turn, 
revealing how it serves to shape civic life in such a way that citizens are often used 
to accomplish essentially Western global economic and political agendas, and also 
revealing its promise and potential (Williams, 2004). How do we depart from civic 
participation as a frame for civil society?
The conductors of the major civic action projects of our time are not focused on 
participation per se, but on advancing other values and ways of thinking: particular 
philanthropic orientations, “evidence-based” policy advocacy, education and health 
frameworks, and many of the ecological movements, spiritual movements, and radi-
cal social movements. Such diverse re-framing projects would appear obviously 
analytically incommensurable, and I argue that this is due to their conductors’ dis-
tinct relationships to civil society’s core participation concern. They stand in a dif-
ferent relationship to participation, to be sure: structuring it, demanding it, 
embodying it, eschewing it, strategizing to get it, innovating it, advocating for it. 
But they also do other things; they are not just detailing various modes of participa-
tion; they are advocating for ways of knowing rather than ways of participating or 
doing. How can we hone the conceptual and analytical resources to see such proj-
ects in a more helpful way than the participatory frame allows?
In this paper, I delineate a particular slice of the landscape of social change work 
in the United States cut along the epistemic dimension. Such projects are interven-
tions into how power constructs the relationship between knowledge and the public 
good. I think about such efforts as organized “epistemic activist” projects and use 
this concept as a way of viewing the field of civil society from a different angle.
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Civil society around the globe involves a great deal of epistemic activism. It is 
well understood that the legacy of the post-structuralist, post-colonial, post- 
modernist movements is not a strong political framework or program, for that failed 
under the weight of myriad critiques (of irresponsible moral relativism, insufficient 
materialism, insufficient capacity to engage with rights-based demands, among oth-
ers). But there is a strong legacy that pervades based on a stubbornly useful descrip-
tive set of insights—Foucault’s core insights: that power is inextricable from 
particular knowledge regimes, that governance entails at its center a relationship 
between knowledge and power, and that the particular cultural-historical structure 
of this relationship is a persistently useful field of inquiry. But although the allure of 
postmodern (and adjacent) theories may have faded, actual projects whose conduc-
tors offer alternatives to modernist logics have proliferated. I argue here that this 
insight is actually incorporated into so many political projects, across silos, that it 
has been difficult to trace. It is articulated and demonstrated by the multitude of 
civic projects coming from every possible margin (indigenous, queer, feminist, neo- 
colonial, scientific, religious fundamentalist, spiritual, ecological). My project 
stands on this critical epistemological foundation. Following scholars like Shiv 
Visvanathan (2006), Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012), Arturo Escobar (2008, 2020), 
and Boaventura de Sousa Santos and his colleagues (2007, 2018), the concept of 
epistemic activism is a notion of civic world-making as a contested, historically 
contingent project that is multiple to its core.
 Knowledge Practices Within Social Theory
In this paper, I examine civil society (and the cross-field subcategory of epistemic 
activist projects) as a set of practices, not as a structural object or concept. The civil 
society of Tahrir Square and Occupy are easy to characterize as things located in 
space and time: There is civil society! But to say so only further mystifies what 
researchers are trying to understand. Many of the field’s researchers examine the 
role of civil society in relation to the state, examining what civil society “means” or 
“wants” in particular places and times. This, too, is mystifying: Civil society is not 
an agenda that, once discovered, can be measured and evaluated. Any robust under-
standing of such a broad concept must enable the parsing of differences, the unfold-
ing of time, the interactions among actors/actants. In a more grounded approach, 
researchers can examine any particular mass civic event as a particular consequence 
of civil society practices. The questions become not essentialist but empirical: What 
practices make this particular sort of civic project?
Practice theory comes out of a 20th-century argument, mostly within the disci-
pline of anthropology, about the relationship between human action and the codifi-
cation or analytic sense-making thereof. This project is perhaps most clearly 
delineated in Bourdieu’s The Logic of Practice (1990). Practice theory became a 
powerful theoretical and, ultimately, methodological response to structuralist 
approaches to mapping systems of power and human organization. This approach 
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was later elaborated by a wide variety of anthropologists who asserted that a par-
ticular sort of human action, resistance to domination, can: 1) best be understood 
through their everyday practices (e.g. Willis, 1978; Scott, 2008), and 2) teach the 
field a great deal about the systems and dynamics of power and domination to which 
they respond (Ferguson, 1990). In this way, the complex worlds of everyday prac-
tices become a key to understanding power, not the other way around.
A robust concept of civil society arguably requires a meaningful way of engag-
ing human intent, action, and the ways that structures are shaped by practices (not 
simply vice versa). For Sherry Ortner, one of the most attractive aspects of practice 
theory is its robust engagement with the relationship between structure and agency. 
Ortner insists that a viable practice theory, which is attentive to power, history, and 
culture, is the most powerful theoretical lens—and methodological guide—to 
studying contemporary human conditions across contexts. The virtue of practice 
theory is that it takes as its starting point the notion that the world is contingent, with 
structures in constant negotiation through human actions, “the idea that the world is 
‘made’—in a very extended and complex sense, of course—through the actions of 
ordinary people also meant that it could be unmade and remade” (Ortner, 2006, 
pp. 16–17).
Beyond its conceptual foundation, the methods of practice theorists are those 
with which they best interrogate everyday as well as intentionally collective prac-
tices of resistance. Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) takes the relationship between worlds 
and makers, infused by critical theories of power and culture, quite a bit further than 
her predecessors by examining the particular violence at work on the margins and 
in the creases of late liberalism. In Economies of Abandonment, Povinelli attempts 
“to address the question of the endurance, let alone the survival, of alternative forms 
of life in the gale force of curtailing social winds” (p. 10). There are many such 
ways to make practice theory accountable to the forces of power and history, to 
account for not only the dominant and easily-legible modes of civic action but those 
outside the moral—and, I would argue, epistemic—norms of dominant state and 
market structures.
For me, the roots as well as the reach of practice theory enable a methodological 
focus on the organization of people’s intentional encounters to make things happen 
in the civic sphere. I study epistemic activist projects through and around meetings, 
because it is there that I find it possible to access the real-time “knowledge prac-
tices” that produce epistemic projects.
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 Meetings as Site and Lens
In a concrete sense, the practices of civil society can be described largely in terms 
of who meets, in what setting, and how. The collective relationality of the meeting, 
which I define as an intentional encounter of people for a purpose,1 is the primary 
container for the production of collective knowledge and power outside the state 
and markets.
In some sense, this is so obvious as not to be worth stating. But in another sense, 
scholars often ask questions that circle around the importance of relationality with-
out attending to its actual practices. They make much of the networked character of 
social movements and civic organizations alike, to mapping and measuring who 
knows and influences whom. Major public events or civic campaigns are described 
in painstaking detail, often through the work of journalists who interview some 
combination of assigned spokespeople and whoever happens to be on the scene of a 
main event (protest, press conference, riot, court appearance, etc.). But the mic-
ropolitics of interaction in meetings—the events that form the architecture for every 
civic event—usually remain uninterrogated. Often, neither reporters nor scholars 
even bother to let on whether planning meetings or post-event meetings occurred, 
let alone the who, when, where, and how of such meetings. And almost never do 
scholars of social movements or civic projects reveal the meaning-making processes 
of smaller factions within the projects: the side-meetings, the conspiratorial deci-
sion-making, the grumbling, the meetings to strategize otherwise. Indeed, the col-
lective processes of sense-making and identity-making often seem of far less 
concern than the sense-making of the researcher or reporter who is there to tell 
the story.
To be sure, ethnographers of civil society organizations and movements often 
describe project meetings and micro-politics. But by the time they engage in sector- 
wide analysis (spanning, e.g., the relationship between donors and NGOs and 
movements), researchers usually lose this focus on everyday practices, or reduce it 
to the mapping of nodes of connection and largely speculative interpretation into 
what these connections signify or produce. Such network analysis is necessary and 
useful to map knowledge diffusion, and to answer questions about the scale and 
structure of a particular civil society project. Yet network analysis does not enable 
scholars to see the relationship between different project iterations across both 
structure-based and field-based silos of civil society.
Below are brief sketches of two extremely distinct civil society projects. These 
are projects that would not ordinarily be combined in a single social scientific or 
theoretical project. Their actors do not encounter one another in competition for 
1 The definition of meeting is controversial: Many meeting scholars and practitioners believe three 
people are necessary to constitute a meeting, and some believe that meetings require particular 
rules related to decision-making and dialogue. For a discussion amongst diverse anthropologists 
and sociologists about this topic, please see the introduction to “Meeting Ethnography” (Sandler 
& Thedvall, 2017).
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resources or in collaborative endeavors; they do not network with one another or 
attend the same meetings. They inhabit distinct silos. In many ways, the boundaries 
of these silos make sense: They correspond to many concrete differences. Yet despite 
the differences that have justified the development of academic, funding, and popu-
lar consciousness silos, these silos elide vital similarities that I aim to address with 
this project.
I argue that the most salient similarities among these three projects are their 
knowledge practices, the specific ways that their actors make truths and make truths 
matter. It is impossible to see knowledge practices by looking at a project’s func-
tion, attempting to measure its effectiveness, mapping its internal structure, or 
deconstructing and interpreting its aims or discourses. Knowledge practices are in 
essence politics, ways of mobilizing epistemic agendas, and as Richard Freeman, 
Steven Griggs, and Annette Boaz note (2011), politics must be examined in terms of 
practices. The only methods that serve are thus ethnographic—one must “read” 
epistemic activist projects from the inside.
Meeting ethnography is a method for doing so. Once one has looked through 
meetings as a way of tracing the epistemic dimension of civic action, I suggest one 
might see, across the broad field of civil society, a great diversity of projects whose 
actors are engaged in a struggle not over what power thinks, but how.
 Case 1: Demonstrating Epistemic Unity 
in a U.S. Reform Coalition
 CLI: A Civic Reform Coalition
Civic coalitions are a form of civil society particular to municipalities in the United 
States. Their specific politics vary, depending on the ideologies and positions of the 
individuals involved, but they typically consist of local business, civic, professional, 
and volunteer interests coming together to improve life for people in a particular 
geographic area. Coalitions are sometimes issue-based, particularly if they were 
developed out of a particular philanthropic or government funding stream (e.g., in 
response to drug abuse or violence). But many are standing civic coalitions whose 
members address a wide range of issues that people in the local area face. The epis-
temics of civic coalitions are distinctly localist: that solutions to local problems 
must emerge from local experiences and knowledge. Civic coalitions produce “local 
knowledge” through particular data-gathering practices. These may occur through 
official settings like town halls or issue forums, where community members volun-
tarily provide input. But most coalition leaders are committed to broader “participa-
tion” and recognize that this requires more active or direct methods.
The Coalition for Local Initiatives (CLI, a pseudonym) is one such organiza-
tion. CLI was started in the early 1990s by business executives from the large and 
diverse city of Crossroads (a pseudonym) who attended a “public-private 
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partnerships”-inspired seminar with state government officials. They became 
upset that millions in tax dollars were allocated for their community without any 
significant participation or consultation of local people. Over the course of several 
years, they developed a coalition consisting of renegade bureaucrats, high-profile 
business executives, and civic and community leaders. To ensure broad participa-
tion of community members, the coalition staff engaged community organizers to 
train neighborhood site coordinators to engage low-income neighborhood people. 
As the board president (an international corporate executive) put it, site coordina-
tors were trained to become “case managers for the neighborhoods: an extraordi-
nary model!”
CLI had become a large and powerful organization by the time I encountered it 
in my 2006–2007 fieldwork. But a large and diverse local coalition organization is 
inherently unstable. In order for coalitions to act as collective bodies, their members 
must constitute themselves continually through projects, through the doing. They 
become and remain real only through their collective constitution. This is where 
meetings come in. Meetings, I argue, are the key technologies for bringing the coali-
tion into this being-through-doing.
A wide variety of meetings are designed to provide the “architecture” (Sandler & 
Thedvall, 2017) of CLI (Sandler, 2017), including:
• 1–1 meetings to build relationships and leadership
• internal meetings to build and influence collective agendas
• internal meetings to develop and influence coalition strategy
• meetings with outsiders to spread localist and “bottom-up” methodology
• meetings to hold public officials accountable
• a perpetual stream of meeting-planning meetings and meeting-debrief meetings
• demonstration meetings
In the next section, I will describe in detail a relatively rare but quite important 
type of coalition meeting: a demonstration of a successful project, in this case the 
funding of a school-based health clinic. With this meeting, I illustrate the epistemic 
project of the Coalition for Local Initiatives.
The most interesting aspect of CLI is the diversity of actors brought together 
through its projects. Notably, CLI’s diversity includes social identities, access to 
power, structural interests, and also ideologies. CLI’s actors espouse a very wide 
range of politics and ideologies, including ardent beliefs in both weak and strong 
government, more and less corporate power, public and private solutions, empower-
ment and sanction of the marginalized. Through interviews conducted with the 
actors who attended the demonstration meeting, described below, I discovered a 
particularly wide range of motivations and ideologies for supporting the school- 
based health clinic, including: Addressing the specter of urban violence (the board 
member quoted “the rough beast” of Yeats’ poem); empowering the Black commu-
nity; building the kingdom of God on Earth; redistributing government resources in 
a more effective way; building a community self-help culture so that people would 
not rely on the government; increasing civic engagement; aiding gentrification and 
economic development; redressing corporate greed, addressing health disparities, 
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and promoting women’s leadership. In CLI, as we shall see, everyone is left to their 
own ideology; what is shared is an epistemic commitment to local knowledge. 
Periodically, this shared commitment must be demonstrated.
 The Meeting
It was 6pm in a low-slung one-story wing of a large Protestant church in an urban 
neighborhood of a major metropolitan area. Twelve years earlier, an eight-lane 
highway had cut this neighborhood off from the rest of the city. In 2006, when this 
meeting occurred, it was difficult to get in or out of this neighborhood. Most public 
and private services had located on the other side of the highway, where gentrifica-
tion was uneven but possible and customers were more assured. On the night of the 
meeting, people began to arrive at the church to discuss the development of a public 
school-based health clinic that would bring medical, dental, and mental health 
screening services to the neighborhood for the first time since the highway, and that 
would make them affordable for neighborhood residents and free for school chil-
dren and their families. This meeting was the culmination of hundreds of smaller 
meetings over the course of two years of organizing. The sense of anticipation and 
build-up was palpable in the intentionality of the meeting design.
Three coalition staff members—business casual in pressed khaki and button- 
down shirts—stood near the door. There were rectangular folding tables set up at the 
back of the room with food: boxes of pizza, a bowl of fruit salad, a plate of carrots, 
bags of Chips Ahoy cookies, cups and juice, Styrofoam plates and napkins. 
Neighborhood families with children who filed in were given programs by a coali-
tion staffer who they knew. They were directed to nudge their children to the back 
to pile food on plates, after which the children were hushed and shuffled away to a 
separate childcare room. A white man and woman in what I could only discern as 
old-money-nice clothing—both uber-wealthy Coalition board members—came in 
and were immediately greeted by coalition professional staff, then handed programs 
and gently guided the other way from the food tables, to seats at the front of the 
room facing the podium. The coalition’s deputy director, a middle-aged Black 
woman, placed her coat next to them, effectively assuring they would not have 
unknown seat-neighbors. Meanwhile, two executives of a private hospital, both 
wearing drab business suits, had walked in, found the one coalition staffer one of 
them knew, shaken hands stiffly, and sat down as near the door as possible. A woman 
in a gray skirt and cotton sweater, with a bulging briefcase, rushed in as the program 
was about to start and smiled apologetically at one of the coalition staffers, col-
lapsed in a heap in the nearest folding chair, and took out her laptop. She was the 
state program officer overseeing the large government grant for the health clinic, 
and the only person who seemed to know no one.
The school-based site coordinator, a white male community organizer with the 
coalition who had been working with the parent leaders on this project for three years, 
beckoned two parent leaders (both Black women) once they emerged from dropping 
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off their children. He quietly huddled with them as they expressed anxieties, went 
over prepared talks, and calmed one another’s nerves with words of encouragement. 
Other parents made their way from the food in the back to the back rows of chairs and 
took seats, smoothing their dresses or pants and fiddling with the one-page programs. 
The neighborhood church pastor and the school principal, both of them Black men, 
came in separately and each seemed to make a show of greeting as many people as 
possible individually. They each walked through aisles to formally shake hands with 
all the people in suits, said hello to a parent or two in each aisle, backslapped the male 
coalition professionals and hugged the female deputy director. They were constantly 
in motion, each separately leaning in to talk conspiratorially with coalition staff, 
walking to the back to grab food, walking around and crouching down to speak with 
different neighborhood folks who were seated, and getting back up again to get more 
food. When they and the khaki’d coalition door staff were the only people standing, 
all but one staffer took seats and the pastor strode to the podium, welcomed guests to 
this special event, and offered a short Christian prayer for the food.
Before I describe anything about what went on during the meeting, it should be 
clear that the substantive assertion of any sort of collective identity was impossible 
in this context. Any attempt to assert collective interest, to tell a collective story, to 
create a sense of forced solidarity, would have exposed fractures that were not under 
the surface but were apparent to all through the aesthetic presentation and bodily 
comportment of the diverse actors. From the outset, it was clear to all that each of 
these actors was there for his or her own self-interest, and there was an uneasy sense 
that the project might not be able to hold the diversity of these interests. The “work” 
each contingency had done had varied so greatly. The local parents had been orga-
nizing one another and pressuring their city council representative to help get zon-
ing changed. The elite board members have made their direct phone calls to 
encourage the passage of an unprecedented package of state grants. The hospital 
executives had been half-blackmailed with lawsuits and half-bribed with sweetened 
contracts to join the deal. CLI staff had been managing each of these pieces, and 
many more. And most of these people had never encountered one another directly. 
They had different stakes, leveraged different forms of power, held different visions. 
In this room, for a moment there, it seemed that there might be no center to hold.
The program itself was short. There were many brief, carefully-crafted acknowl-
edgements that without each contingency’s work, this clinic would not be built. The 
core of the meeting, for everyone, was the three neighborhood women leaders’ 
speeches. They were extraordinarily well prepared, both in their language and deliv-
ery. The first presented a sort of testimonial-style account of what it is like to live in 
a part of the city that has been geographically and structurally cut off from all health 
services. She attested to her own children’s school absences for lack of dental ser-
vices, her four-bus-ride experiences traveling to the hospital emergency room with 
her toddler for complex ear infections, how her own mother died of cervical cancer 
because no one in their neighborhood knew where to get affordable gynecological 
exams. The next speaker talked about the group of parents that came together to 
study different models of health clinics. She did not talk about the study, only the 
group; how much they learned, how capable they felt. The third talked about what 
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her life was going to be like once the clinic went in; that she might be able to keep 
a job for longer than from the end of one child’s flu to the beginning of the next; that 
she wouldn’t have to choose between going to work and taking her kids to the den-
tist; that her asthmatic ten-year old wouldn’t ever again nearly die because she 
couldn’t keep an appointment across town with a doctor who would give them a 
renewed inhaler prescription.
These were carefully crafted statements. There was no discussion of personal 
obligation, of deservedness, of the role of the government, of rights or responsi-
bilities. There was no blame or demand—and no thanks, either. Just moving sto-
ries of what had been the reality without the clinic, and what would now be 
possible with it. After the women spoke, one of the coalition’s most elite board 
members got up, shook each of their hands, and said a few words about how the 
Coalition was about bringing people together around amazing stories like these. 
He thanked them for sharing and said he was glad to hear their words and be a part 
of this project with everyone in this room. This elite board member—a billionaire, 
in fact—did not take credit, appropriate, condescend, or provide any framework 
for the women’s statements, beyond the importance of all coming together around 
local needs. The lack of specificity was quite deliberate; what was not said created 
space for everyone to feel more at home in their folding chairs, to imagine the 
project as their own.
After the meeting concluded, the health clinic project development was done. 
Each of these so-different bodies could move back out into their own worlds and 
worldviews; building the clinic would commence immediately, and the coalition 
would go on to work on its many other projects.
 What the Meeting Made
CLI demonstration meetings such as this one are where the local knowledge that has 
been produced (through a tapestry of other meetings) is assembled in public. It is a 
demonstration that the project resulting from this local knowledge assemblage—the 
health clinic—does not become an ideological cudgel. No one owns the meaning, 
and the project can thus remain sutured to each actor’s diverse ideologies and inter-
ests. The demonstration meeting enables CLI’s core epistemic project to serve as the 
glue that holds the coalition together.
Furthermore, when one looks at this meeting as an ethnographer, it is clear that 
CLI’s core practices are not any of the things proponents of the mainstream civil 
society approach would have them be. Their core practices are not “rational delib-
eration,” nor anything resembling the communicative action central to a Habermasian 
public sphere. They are not decision-making occasions, either nominally or sub-
stantively. Nor are CLI’s meetings anthropological ritual performances of the legiti-
macy of hierarchies or solidarity. Instead, CLI’s core meeting practices are epistemic 
events. Large meetings such as these, at the end of a project, are vital occasions for 
CLI to constitute—to “make”—the coalition as a whole, by demonstrating the 
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epistemologically unified, performatively singularized “local” subject to the multi-
ple wildly diverse actors who comprise it.
Hegemony, as Gramsci noted a century ago, is never total; it requires constant 
sense-making work through “intellectual and moral leadership” of both individuals 
and institutions (Gramsci, 1971, p.  57). I would characterize CLI as a counter- 
hegemonic project of a particular sort. Its particularly vigilant knowledge practices 
are necessary for the coalition to survive the constant pull of the hegemonic notion 
that the world is divided based on ideological interest, material interest, or neolib-
eral measures of efficiency and outcome. Through diverse meeting forms, CLI shifts 
how people produce knowledge about the conditions of urban social suffering. 
Coalition participants know, all together, that the health clinic is necessary based on 
the experiences of those who will use its services. Each is free to believe the clinic 
advances their own interest-laden ideologies of the state, the private sector, philan-
thropy, and cultural politics. This contingent, ever-becoming coalition is thus con-
stituted in and through practices of believing differently and knowing together.
 Case 2: Place-Based Movements and the Epistemic Politics 
of Listening
I now turn to a more ideologically cohesive, social movement form of epistemic 
activism. Many social movements aim, as Raúl Zibechi (2010) says, to “disperse” 
power directly to people struggling for lives of dignity, rather than to consolidate 
power in intermediary institutions or representative bodies. These movements’ form 
of participatory democracy involves an insistence on mass-impact and yet human- 
scale social and political relations. Although ubiquitous and largely legible to the 
general populous in many parts of the world, in the U.S. place-based social move-
ments have taken hold in a particularly hybrid-American form. These are move-
ments that coalesce not around an abstract idea or funding silo (health, education, 
housing, immigration, etc.), but around the particular experiences of a specific 
group of people in a struggle to stay, return to, or protect their homes, communities, 
and/or land and natural resources. There are many such movements and organiza-
tions in the United States. However, they are generally outside the public eye. To 
date, there have been virtually no serious mainstream media reports of Black-led 
farms and land trusts,2 prison abolition movements, indigenous sovereignty proj-
ects, or local municipal movements to occupy or collectivize control over space.
In U.S. cities, these local movements coalesce around the notion of 
anti- displacement, the right to stay in one’s home and neighborhood despite 
2 Two notable examples of Black-led land projects include the Black- and Indigenous-led farming 
project Soul Fire Farm (Penniman, 2018) and Jackson Rising, a comprehensive, anti-neoliberal, 
alternative economic project in Jackson, Mississippi, to build the collective ownership and power 
of the city’s majority Black poor residents (Akuno, Nangwaya, & Cooperation Jackson, 2017).
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capitalist and imperialist threats. Anti-displacement movements3 are generally 
either ignored or wildly mischaracterized within the dominant media of the United 
States. There is extremely little coverage of collective resistance to eviction, fore-
closure, lack or erosion of local ordinances protecting renters, and the predatory 
banking and real estate development industry that controls these mechanisms of 
displacement. Even when they cover large public protests, the U.S. media do not do 
the work of communicating to the public that the people involved—not their leaders 
or advocates but their members—conceptualize themselves as part of a broad and 
interconnected social movement, intimately connected to other anti-displacement 
movements around the world. When seen at all, mainstream institutions generally 
dismiss such movements as uncompromising, radical, and distinctly illiberal, or as 
naively romantic.
In this section, I describe one such group: Movement for Justice in El Barrio, an 
anti-displacement movement comprised mostly of low-income immigrant women 
in East Harlem, New York. For place-based movements like Movement for Justice 
in El Barrio, the vision is one of both autonomy and solidarity, “a world in which 
many worlds fit,” as the Zapatistas say, a logic of multiple forms of collective thriv-
ing whose adopters eschew capitalist, imperial, and colonial “global designs” 
(Mignolo, 2000). This vision can be seen in practice through the particular dynam-
ics of diverse movement meetings. Through meetings, movements mobilize their 
epistemic agenda: that what is true, and what to do about it, can only be understood 
through deep listening. Listening is the core epistemological practice that Movement 
for Justice in El Barrio mobilizes through its particular meeting landscape and leads 
to all other—more visible—movement practices.
 Meetings to Mobilize Listening
Movement for Justice in El Barrio engages in at least four types of meetings.4
First, they have a range of internal meetings. I have not been to any of these 
meetings, because I am not a member and am not conducting research inside the 
organization. I know only that they happen, because they discuss the ways these 
meetings structure their work in their pedagogical meetings (see below). Internal 
meetings take place with people who are “in the struggle,” that is, who are directly 
3 See the Right To The City movement, which consists of many organizations made up of people 
fighting foreclosure, gentrification, development policies, predatory landlords, and so forth. See 
Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer (2012), and https://righttothecity.org/.
4 My relationship with Movement for Justice in El Barrio has been to facilitate their members’ and 
organizers’ access to universities to teach about their work and introducing students and colleagues 
to their work through both invitations and visits. My reflections in this section stem from what I 
have learned as a colleague and friend of the organization. Movement for Justice members and 
organizers have read and approved each draft of this section and have contributed information to 




affected by gentrification and the threat of displacement. In Movement for Justice’s 
situation, the problem of displacement involves bad landlords, bad government, bad 
zoning policy, and other threats to the rights of people in El Barrio to live with dig-
nity in their community. Movement organizes building by building (in East Harlem, 
apartment buildings are large). First, a person with a problem related to their hous-
ing approaches Movement for Justice to meet, and the organizers ask if they are 
willing to organize people in their building. If so, the organizing looks like going 
door to door through the building to have brief 1–1 meetings, where they listen to 
tenants’ problems and inquire as to whether they want to work with their neighbors 
toward solutions. The majority of a building’s residents must then attend a meeting 
in the lobby of the building and vote (twice) to become members of Movement. 
Movement’s buildings then hold regular meetings to listen to their neighbors and 
make decisions about how to struggle together, what fights to take on, and so forth. 
In addition to building-level strategy meetings, Movement for Justice holds large 
monthly member meetings to share experiences and make organization-level 
decisions.
Like many movement organizations, Movement for Justice operates on the prin-
ciple of self-representation—“each person has voice and vote,” as they say—and 
there is a focus on speaking and listening in order to arrive at collective, consensus- 
based solutions. David Graeber chronicles some of the issues that arise when radical 
consensus-based meetings are held by mostly white, relatively nomadic global jus-
tice direct action groups (Graeber, 2009). But such meetings look rather different 
among people like the women of El Barrio, who face a shared set of threats to their 
homes and shared community.
When home, community, or land is at stake, meetings tend to look less like a 
protracted debate over ideas, identities, strategies, and logistics, and more like a 
layered set of testimonies to personal experiences and concerns. Arguments are 
interwoven with testimony, over time, to form a sort of tapestry comprised of many 
intimately positioned political opinions. In this way, sense-making more so than 
linear decision-making characterizes these collective meeting spaces. The method-
ology of sense-making requires a meeting form crafted to give absolute priority to 
unmediated testimonial and collective listening. I have experienced such general- 
assembly style meetings as a guest and occasional participant in various North 
American movement settings and have also seen video footage of many movements 
that seem to be striving toward this general-assembly form.
Movements based on shared struggle for place also have to consider how to 
invite in outsiders to that place, what the outsiders’ roles should be, and how to seek 
and accept support. What do such solidarity meetings look like for place-based 
movements? Movement for Justice in El Barrio invites people in similar struggles 
across different contexts to share stories of their struggles through mass meetings 
called Encuentros, inspired directly by the methods of the Zapatistas in Chiapas. 
The only goal of Encuentro-style meetings is the development and demonstration of 
solidarity, a form of relationality based on listening in order to develop and demon-
strate empathy with one another’s struggle. Unlike other epistemic movement dem-
onstration meetings, those holding Encuentros make no space for collective 
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sense-making or persuasion. Mutual recognition is the task, and this happens 
through sharing stories of struggle. In addition to Encuentros, Movement for Justice 
members also takes their testimony directly to others by sharing documentary films 
and answering questions with what they call “people of good heart” in various cit-
ies, organizations, and universities. Their goal in these visits is both recognition in 
the struggle, and also to raise funds in support of their work.
Third, Movement for Justice in El Barrio holds pedagogical meetings for outsid-
ers. These take the form of free workshops in their neighborhood each summer, and 
locally sponsored workshops when they travel. Movement’s workshops are explicit 
teaching-style meetings, using popular education methods to provoke reflection on 
various elements of their actors’ organizing approach. The most interesting of these 
to students, from my observation in several rounds of offered workshops, is “the 
politics of listening,” a participatory workshop that involves sharing the Zapatista’s 
2006 listening campaign and applying its lessons to participants’ own work. Placing 
listening front and center introduces a radically different epistemology. Students 
must speak only from their own perspectives, not from above or outside. The struc-
ture all but requires a humble curiosity about displacement, rather than argument or 
critique, in order to open up space to continue listening. In my experience of 
Movement’s workshops at my university, a wholly distinct interactive atmosphere is 
created when the skills of listening are prioritized.
Finally, for Movement for Justice in El Barrio the struggle itself often involves 
meeting-based encounters with structures of power. In these encounters, Movement 
for Justice members (not outside allies) occupy public spaces and meetings, making 
visible their demands for recognition and structural capitulation or accommodation. 
In each action, members demand not simply a particular policy change, but a differ-
ent logic than that of those in power. This logic is that of constantly and systemati-
cally listening to the people most affected, or what the Zapatistas call “governing by 
obeying” (mandar obrediciendo). The Zapatistas, as Mariana Mora shows in her 
ethnographic work with them, organize manndar obrediciendo in a very systematic 
way; it is a challenging logic of governance (Mora, 2017). When Movement for 
Justice in El Barrio members confront power directly, they expose the broad gap 
between local rule and mandar obrediciendo; they do not request to be heard, but 
demand that government obey their communities.
Movement for Justice’s protest politics to expose this gap and counteract the 
displacement forces that affect them often include disrupting “normal” liberal dem-
ocratic meetings, where the logic of collaboration between capital and elected rep-
resentatives is on display. For example, Movement for Justice members decided to 
strategically disrupt a local Community Board meeting. “Community Boards” in 
New York City are appointed by elected officials and tasked with discussing and 
giving input on proposed city policies. Community Boards have no legislative 
power; their positions are symbolic. Furthermore, participation on a Community 
Board is often seen as a stepping-stone to elected office. Because members are 
appointed, do not necessarily live in the neighborhood, and serve at the will of 
elected officials, there is a strong incentive for CBs to approve—and thus provide a 
neighborhood-level stamp of legitimacy for—whatever city policies are proposed. 
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Thus, it was unusual when in 2017 Community Boards began taking positions 
against the liberal Mayor’s re-zoning plan. The media began paying attention to 
these incidences of “community” pushback. In El Barrio, Community Board 11 was 
not expected to take a strong stand against the Mayor’s re-zoning plan, which would 
likely result in the displacement of many of the low-income immigrant families who 
lived there. Movement for Justice members wanted it known that the interests of 
people who lived in the community were not being represented, so they decided to 
strategically attend this meeting. Captured on video, a large group of women with 
their children showed up to the meeting, held in a small room. They did not partici-
pate in the mode of liberal governance on display, but instead began stating their 
experiences as an interruption, making it clear that their collective demands were 
being ignored. When the board was forced to make clear that “compromise” with 
capital and placation of local residents was in fact the agenda, Movement members 
chanted (in Spanish) “we demand a firm ‘no’” over and over, eventually marching out.
Movement members have also highlighted the gentrification designs of both 
greedy landlords and a progressive mayor in the streets and to the press. They have 
traveled to Europe, with the support of international allies, to proclaim the cruelty 
and greed of a British developer who sought to purchase vast amounts of property 
in their Harlem neighborhood and displace them. Their listening campaign in the 
UK ultimately prevented the sale. And they have driven out several other predatory 
landlords by similar means of public declaration that is in effect a shaming: Those 
who govern must listen to the people or be shamed for their failure to do so. The 
community’s experiences must not be ignored in the development of their neighbor-
hood. As Movement’s members put it in their vision statement (which they often 
share in videos and at events): “[T]he houses belong to the people who live in and 
care for them…no one should own more houses than they can live in.”
 Listening Leads and Mobilizes New Agendas
Listening, not a static mission statement, has led Movement to choose which strug-
gles that affect members of their community to take on. Members have conducted 
many consultas del barrio or neighborhood consultations in several formats to learn 
what issues the community faces and for the community to decide what should be 
at the center. Through community surveys, they organized testimonial-style town 
hall meetings with members of the community, which led the movement to new 
agendas. Movement has also decided not to take on campaigns, such as a city policy 
that threatened the income of local street vendors, based on listening to those who 
were directly affected.
Movement for Justice has also taken on new activities in recent years based on 
its internal listening practices in combination with emerging political events. For 
example, in 2018 and 2019, Movement members turned their attention to the 
Cayuga Centers, a local nonprofit organization that they discovered through an 
investigative journalist’s report had been contracted by Homeland Security and 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to receive and hold migrant children 
who had been separated from their families. Detention, deportation, and the specter 
of family separation threatens many Movement for Justice in El Barrio’s families; 
when the members discovered that children were being sent to be detained in their 
own neighborhood, they felt compelled to center solidarity with the children and 
their parents and held several actions to ask that their solidarity be heard.
In March of 2020, COVID–19 began to hit Movement’s members very hard. 
Most Movement members support their families with low-paid, contingent work. 
Many work as home aids, in restaurants and food trucks, and as house cleaners and 
custodians. When the pandemic hit, some were deemed “essential” and were also 
among the least protected workers. Many have lost jobs, with no access to unem-
ployment assistance or federal stimulus aid due to their undocumented immigration 
status. Many others have fallen quite ill, with little access to medical care aside from 
hospital emergency rooms. Tragically, several members died from the virus during 
the first half of 2020. Movement members immediately pivoted their work to 
address this crisis, for the first time coordinating basic services such as food, health 
information, support for sick and grieving families, and other necessary aid. In addi-
tion, during COVID–19, Movement for Justice in El Barrio has continued to call for 
the freedom of all immigrants detained in New York.
Movement for Justice has quickly made this major—if temporary—shift in its 
orientation from anti-displacement policy and protest campaigns to work focused 
largely on direct aid to families; indeed, I know of no other non-profit organizations 
that enacted such a dramatic pivot during the early months of the COVID–19 crisis. 
Movement’s actors did so because it was impossible to sideline their members’ 
urgent needs when listening was at the center of their approach to the work. Their 
work during this time has remained true to a politics of listening. They have listened 
internally to members’ stories and needs in order to learn what their work should 
consist of during the pandemic. They have held both private and public pedagogical 
meetings to provide allies with opportunities to listen to members’ lived experi-
ences, support them, and help them engage more people. For allies such as myself 
and my students, listening to Movement members’ lived experience and analysis 
has exposed the current iteration of the gap produced by a government that fails to 
“govern by obeying” the people. Movement for Justice in El Barrio aims its epis-
temic politics of listening at keeping in sharp relief the gap—and exploitative 
dependence—between middle-class U.S. citizens, whose experiences of the pan-
demic have been mediated by government aid, food and service delivery, and ample 
opportunities to work and learn from home, and families with mixed immigration 
status, “essential” low-income work status, and no access to capital, whose experi-




I have outlined two quite different sorts of epistemic activist projects operating 
within a broadly conceived field of civil society in the United States. By attending 
to how each produces its truths and makes them matter, I hope to suggest the utility 
of using the epistemic activism concept as a lens through which to see civil society 
in a different way. I have suggested that “meeting ethnography,” in particular, is a 
methodology for looking through that lens, for making inquiries across a diverse 
field of civic projects.
With this relational approach to epistemic activism, I focus on the way projects’ 
proponents communicate what their projects are, not as static narratives but as rela-
tional practices in time and space (whether physical or virtual). The ethnographic 
mapping of narrative practices through meeting ethnography catapults scholars out 
of obfuscating silos without allowing researchers to fall into an abyss of abstraction. 
I hope that this project increases the field’s capacity to look across civil society’s 
ever-shifting silos (albeit awkwardly, much as actors move across them), ultimately 
to begin to make inquiries across the field of civil society as a whole. By using rela-
tional events—meetings—as a methodology for mapping epistemic activism, I sug-
gest that one may be able both to examine extraordinarily diverse projects in the 
vernacular of their particular practices and also to consider them within the same 
theoretical frame. Taking epistemic activism as the object of study has enabled me 
to engage civic projects that range from the two described in this paper—a large 
municipal coalition and a grassroots place-based movement organization—to the 
scientistic movement for evidence-based social policy, emerging movements for 
epistemological pluralism, and movements against state violence. I expect that this 
approach should also enable scholars to engage alternative economic movements as 
well as what are now called “alt-right” movements.
Elizabeth Povinelli (2011, p. 10), whose examination of alternative social proj-
ects in “Economies of Abandonment” is a selective guide to civic projects that grow 
in the neglected folds of late/predatory/disaster capitalism, asks:
If the possibilities of new forms of life dwell and are sheltered within the variation between 
the force of existing and the power of acting within these intensified zones of being and not 
being, then what does immanent critique demand of those who live in these zones?
I argue, ultimately, that it is the role of civil society scholars to describe and con-
tend with the various “forms of life,” or social projects, that emerge from the varie-
gated pressures and structures of our time. Contending with the epistemic critiques 
that animate such projects requires drilling down to their relational practices. Civil 
society scholars are thrust into the intensified zones of the projects we engage 
through “meeting ethnography,” ethnography of and through meetings, through 
which the ethnographer focuses on mapping civic projects that enact diverse models 
and modes of being (and not being, and becoming, and answering the question “for 
whom?”). It is in these intensified zones that one witnesses the proliferation of zeal-
ous resistance against hegemonic ways of knowing, as well as the emergence of 
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alternative narratives whose proponents may engage and even produce new forms of 
life, if given the chance.
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The “#RhodesMustFall” and “#FeesMustFall” protests of 2015 and 2016 became 
the largest student social movement since the dawn of South Africa’s democracy in 
1994. The protests emanated from two major challenges facing higher education: 
alienation and access. The #RhodesMustFall movement, in which students at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) demanded the removal of a statue of Cecil John 
Rhodes, captured the alienation of the largely black student population at UCT and 
reflected valid concerns about institutional racism and/or the slow pace of transfor-
mation at all of the country’s universities. The #FeesMustFall movement, whose 
principle concern was access for poor, black students to affordable, quality educa-
tion, began at the University of the Witwatersrand and spread across the country, 
culminating in a march on the Union Buildings where former President Jacob Zuma 
conceded to a 0% fee increase for 2016. However, what began as a social justice 
movement with widespread support from across society soon turned into violent 
protests that undermined the university as a safe and free space for ideas. The stu-
dents lost support and the university activated security protocols, which ultimately 
led to demobilisation of the movement. The question to be asked then is what les-
sons can be learnt from the strategies and tactics of social movements such as 
#FeesMustFall.
In this article, I address this question as part of the broader thematic investigation 
into knowledge and civil society. Extrapolating lessons from the empirical experi-
ence of #FeesMustFall—which I have extensively detailed in the book Rebels & 
Rage, from which this article flows—builds the global knowledge base on social 
movements, which can in turn enhance the effectiveness of social justice struggles 
in the future if activists sufficiently internalize them. I discuss the value of social 
mobilization in effecting change, but demonstrate that this is only sustainable if the 
protest is structured within certain strategic and ethical parameters. I then proceed 
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to interrogate the issues of violence, the framing of the struggle and outcomes, the 
decision-making processes associated with the protest, and the importance of ethi-
cal conduct by leaders and activists. I conclude by underscoring the legitimacy of 
the social justice struggles, but insist that these must be more effectively conducted 
if they are to culminate in the establishment of a more humane social order.
I am of course not an impartial observer or assessor of this movement and its 
challenges and successes. Instead, as vice-chancellor of the University of 
Witwatersrand and the chairperson of University South Africa during the crucial 
years of 2015 and 2016, I was a central actor in the struggle of #FeesMustFall. This 
positionality must be understood for both its strengths and weaknesses. I observed 
the struggle and the conduct of its leaders and activists from the vantage point of the 
university’s executive, which skews my interpretation and analysis in significant 
ways. Yet this same vantage point allows for a unique insight into how institutional 
and system decision-makers operate, the influences on their internal deliberations 
on when to permit and how to contain social struggles, and how to effectively use 
them for the reform of the system itself.
#RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall were, as I suggested earlier, the largest 
student social struggles in South Africa’s democratic era. Its causal pathways lie 
very much in the policy choices and behavior of the post-apartheid government in 
the massification of higher education and the resultant decline in per-capita subsidy 
to universities; in university executives’ lack of responsiveness to students’ acclima-
tization to their environment; and frankly in the political opportunism of post- 
apartheid political elites who spoke with forked tongues, articulating social justice 
concerns on party platforms while simultaneously promulgating conservative policy 
prescriptions in government. Their focus on enabling access for poor and middle- 
class students, and addressing these students’ alienation from the universities’ insti-
tutional cultures and architectures generated enormous sympathy across society and 
throughout the world. The social struggles as such shook the very foundations of the 
political and postsecondary education system, and led to significant reforms in the 
financing of higher education. They also have prompted significant reflections on 
the movement, its legitimacy, and strategy and tactics from a variety of political 
perspectives and actors, including among others university executives, student lead-
ers, academics, and journalists (Booysen, 2016; Chantiluke, Kwoba, & Nkopo, 
2018; Chikane, 2018; Habib, 2019; Heffernan & Nieftagodien, 2016; Jansen, 2017).
Social justice has to be advanced in the world that exists, not the one activists 
wish existed. This obvious statement is perhaps the single most important lesson 
that advocates of social justice need not only to realize, but also internalize. Radical 
activists of a variety of ideological persuasions, including of the Marxist tradi-
tions—Lenin, Trotsky, Luxembourg, and Gramsci—devoted more than a century of 
study to strategies and tactics for challenging the political and economic order and 
advancing social justice. Many in the social justice community, including theorists, 
now recognize that the overthrow and/or transcendence of the political and socio-
economic order will not be a single event, but a drawn-out process of advances and 
retreats. Thus, for social activists who are committed to change, strategies and tac-
tics are paramount. They should develop strategies and tactics not from what they 
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think is fair in an abstract worldview, but rather from what will work in the realities 
of the current context. This does not mean forgetting their ultimate goal, but rather 
understanding the possibilities of achieving their goals not from a rule book or for-
mula from a time that is past, but from the contextual realities of the present. Too 
often, too many demand reforms that are compatible with an alternative social order, 
rather than those that are viable in the present, and yet push the boundaries of what 
is acceptable to enable a political dynamic of continuous social change—what 
Hardt and Negri (2017) describe as a strategy of antagonistic reformism.
Perhaps this has to do with the fact that most activists are often so emotionally 
invested in their cause that they cannot imagine that there are others who are not the 
enemy, but may not share the same strategies, or even passion, for the social justice 
issue at hand. It is often said that anger and rage are essential in mobilizing against 
injustice, but what is often forgotten is that it also blunts actors’ ability to dissect the 
forces arraigned against them critically and determine how to neutralize or demobi-
lize these to register social gains. All of this was evident in the #FeesMustFall 
movement. It may be valuable to extricate the movement’s lessons, not only for the 
advancement of the struggle for free education, but also for those associated with 
other social justice causes.
 Social Mobilization
Perhaps it is best to begin this reflection with a recognition that mass action and 
social mobilisation is an essential component of the strategic arsenal required for 
changing the world. This is the most obvious lesson to emerge from the #FeesMustFall 
movement. As I have explicitly and publicly stated on a number of occasions, the 
students achieved in ten days what vice-chancellors had been debating for ten years. 
The difference between these two interventions was that the students’ engagement 
took the form of social mobilization. In the process, they redefined the systemic 
parameters of what was possible and opened up policy options and financial conces-
sions that had not been seriously considered in normal daily engagements. Some of 
these outcomes exceeded those expected by the student leadership themselves. For 
example, the Wits Student Representative Council (SRC) president’s original pro-
posal to the University Council was not for no fee increase, but rather for a more 
measured one in the region of 9%. When the protests kicked off, this demand shifted 
to no increase; when this was achieved, it shifted again to free university education. 
This was not the first time that these demands had been made. Indeed, they had been 
made regularly across the country for some time, but government and, more particu-
larly, Treasury and the Presidency had not been responsive to them. But when the 
2015 protests erupted and took on the scale that they did, generating widespread 
support from stakeholder groups across society, not only was a significant financial 
concession made, but a policy process was also initiated to change the financing of 
universities fundamentally.
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Similarly, the insourcing of vulnerable workers was never on the agenda until the 
2015 protests fundamentally changed the environment. The Wits executive had rec-
ognized for years that outsourcing practices were exploitative and incompatible 
with the institution’s human rights obligations. Addressing outsourcing would 
require trade-offs that internal stakeholders were not collectively willing to agree to 
at that stage. The student protests changed this, again by opening up the systemic 
parameters and allowing options to emerge that had not previously been considered. 
The collective willingness to incur these costs was not always present; it only 
emerged in the wake of the #FeesMustFall protests.
In both these cases, then, social mobilization was essential for putting policy and 
financial options that had not previously been available on the systemic agenda. But 
its value cannot be unqualified. Social mobilization is incredibly important for 
opening up systemic parameters, but some forms of mobilization can also under-
mine the possibility of social justice being realized. This was evident in the 
#FeesMustFall movement. As social mobilization became more violent and increas-
ingly started to violate the rights of the institutional community, it also became 
more factionalized and lost the broader support of the public. As importantly, it 
forced authorities, both institutional executives and national government, to begin to 
activate security protocols in an effort to protect universities and the broader public. 
The net effect was that, in a number of institutions—including Wits—stringent 
security measures contained the violent social mobilization. This created huge con-
troversy, not only between institutional executives and student protesters, but also 
within the broader progressive community itself.
Social mobilization on its own does not translate into progressive social out-
comes. For such outcomes to be realized, social mobilization needs to be institution-
alized through processes of deliberation and policy formulation. It also requires the 
presence of intra-institutional actors who are willing to use the opportunities that it 
enables to craft new social policy. Again, this was evident in the #FeesMustFall 
movement. The fact that it occurred within a democratic society, and in a context 
where the governing party was deeply polarized, ensured responsiveness from some 
institutional actors. South African society’s democratic character and the civil soci-
ety’s vibrancy meant that options such as all-out repression were not on the agenda, 
as would be the case in more repressive societies. It is also worth bearing in mind 
that the student protests emerged soon after the Marikana massacre, where police 
killed 34 workers in a mining labor dispute. This event traumatised South Africans, 
deeply delegitimized the police and parts of the government, and paralyzed the 
police in their management of the student protests. South African society’s demo-
cratic character, the divisions within the governing party, the widespread support of 
the social movement, and the paralysis of policing in the aftermath of the Marikana 
massacre all created a resonance for the demands of #FeesMustFall within the insti-
tutional apparatus of the state itself.
None of what I am suggesting here would be unfamiliar to those well versed in 
the literature on social movements. Scholars writing in the traditions of political 
process theory and political opportunity structure, such as Charles Tilly (1978, 
2003), Doug McAdam (1983), Sidney Tarrow (1994), and Donatella della Porta 
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(1995, 2013, della Porta & Diani, 2006), have for some time explored the dynamics 
of how political systems and institutional actors significantly influence, and are in 
turn conditioned by, the evolution of social movements and their outcomes. But 
social movement actors and their leaders have never understood this sufficiently 
well. Even their academic supporters, some of whom are familiar with the literature 
on social movements, have neither sufficiently internalized this nor allowed it to 
inform their practice. This is urgently required if movements are to become more 
effective in achieving social justice outcomes.
 Violence as Strategy
Effective social struggle depends on more than a simple reflection of the dynamics 
of the struggle and the complex interplay between social and institutional actors. It 
also requires deep consideration of the strategies deployed by social movements 
themselves. Perhaps the most important of these for consideration is the use of vio-
lence to achieve desired outcomes. It must be said that, at least at the rhetorical 
level, most of the leaders of #FeesMustFall professed a commitment to peaceful 
action. Peaceful mobilization also seemed to be the substantive intent of the vast 
majority of its supporters. But it is also indisputable that the movement, or at least 
elements of it, became substantively violent in the course of the struggle itself.
Activists and even their supporters have suggested that this violence was inspired 
by the actions of the police and security. Although the behavior and actions of police 
and security personnel may well have caused individual incidents, the general pic-
ture is one of police and security being deployed only when some protesters had 
begun to perpetrate violence and/or when the widespread abuse of rights was 
becoming evident. In 2015, for instance, police were only deployed on campus 
when the bookshop and a vehicle were burnt on the evening of October 27th. In 
January 2016, private security was only brought in when protesters repeatedly 
refused to allow registration and continued to assert that if there was “no free educa-
tion, there shall be no education at all.” Similarly, the university only embarked on 
a comprehensive security response in October 2016 after the failure of repeated 
attempts to negotiate with the protesters, through the mediation of previous leaders 
of the SRC and the Black Students Society.
Some academics, particularly within the university, were highly critical of the 
security response but were unable to provide coherent or unified responses as to 
what the university should have done instead. Jane Duncan, for example, argued 
that instead of calling private security, we should have used “the least restrictive 
means [which] would be to prevent the perpetrators from registering, punish them 
through the disciplinary process and lay charges against those guilty of criminal 
conduct, to dissuade others from following suit” (Duncan, 2016). But herein lies the 
problem with her suggestion. The essential issue with what she recommends is that, 
when Wits acted along these lines, this same collective of academic supporters 
accused the university of authoritarian behaviour and violating the right to protest 
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action. Indeed, when student activists became violent in August 2015 and the man-
agement suspended them, this same group of academics essentially criticised the 
response as too heavy handed. Others, when asked what they would have recom-
mended as an alternative to deploying private security, answered not for the suspen-
sion and rigorous deployment of disciplinary processes against perpetrators, but the 
closure of the campus and the suspension of activities—in effect, capitulation to the 
protesters’ demands, even if the vast majority of the community was against this and 
it impacted negatively on the poor.
It should be noted that at no time in January 2016 or even later in the year were 
protests or meetings not allowed at Wits, as was the case at some other universities. 
Indeed, Wits continued to allow for protest and its coverage by journalists; during 
the events of January 2016, private security was simply mandated to secure the two 
buildings where registration occurred and to regulate access to them. Private secu-
rity was deployed, and not police, not only because the latter could not commit for 
a long period of time, but also because, in the case of private security, the Wits 
management could specify that no serious weapons would be carried. Was this, 
then, not acting in the least restrictive of ways as required by the Constitution? Yet 
this same collective group of anarchist-oriented scholars opposed our measures and 
tried to disrupt them.
But the problem is not simply one of coming to terms with the need for security 
in selected circumstances. It is also some leaders’ actual advocacy of violence. 
There is no doubt that resorting to violence was, in part, facilitated by strands of the 
movement that deliberately adopted it as a strategy. In fact, violence and arson were 
particularly romanticized by some of the movement’s activists and leaders. This was 
cogently and evocatively expressed by student leaders at a Ruth First lecture at Wits 
University in August 2016. Unsurprisingly, the speakers’ central message was that 
black people are confronted with structural violence daily, as they have to experi-
ence the consequences of inequality, poverty, and corruption. In their view, it is 
therefore legitimate to respond with black violence to protest this structural vio-
lence. In one of the student leader’s evocative words, violence is the “aesthetics of 
rage” (Fikeni, 2016). Although his original reference was throwing feces at the 
Rhodes statue at UCT and the “fuck white people” graffiti at Wits, in the course of 
the engagement he spoke approvingly of the burning of university infrastructure, 
seeing all of these acts as “a common aesthetics” to the movement, “an insistence 
on moving beyond the boundaries of ‘civil’ discourse towards attacking the symbols 
of white supremacy through disruptive acts of rage” (Fikeni, 2016).
In discussing rage and violence, another student leader highlighted “a genera-
tional fault line” (Naidoo, 2016), in which she held that:
the spectre of revolution, of radical change, is in young peoples’ minds and politics, and it 
is almost nowhere in the politics of the anti-apartheid generation . . . Many in the anti- 
apartheid generation have become anesthetized to the possibility of another kind of society, 
another kind of future . . . And they can no longer be trusted with the responsibility of the 
future. When they dismiss the student movement’s claim on the future, its experiment with 
time, when they belittle it, shoot it down, well, then pain becomes anger, anger becomes 
rage, even fire. (Naidoo, 2016)
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Ignoring the fact that the claim of revolutionary consciousness being present 
among young people and absent among the anti-apartheid generation has no empiri-
cal basis, what is notable in this student leader’s argument is her highlighting of the 
generational challenge. There is indeed a restlessness among young people across 
the world—in the Americas, Asia, Europe and Africa—that is reflected in contradic-
tory phenomena like #BlackLivesMatter, the Bernie Sanders movement, the rise of 
the far right, and the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Some of this restlessness 
does have structural dimensions, in particular the rise of insecurity among young 
people as a result of the technological shifts of the global economy and the unem-
ployment it portends for those with no or limited skills. A generational conflict that 
has not been seen in fifty years is, indeed, possible—and may even be necessary. 
But it does not have to be violent, and yet this is exactly where some want it to go. 
Student leaders are fond of quoting Frantz Fanon’s celebrated remarks that “each 
generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission” (Fanon, 2007, 
p. 145). However, as Mangcu (2017) reminds us, Fanon follows this statement with 
another:
We must rid ourselves of the habit, now that we are in the thick of the fight, of minimizing 
the action of our fathers or of feigning incomprehension when considering their silence and 
passivity . . . if the echoes of their struggle have not resounded in the international arena, we 
must realize that the reason for this silence lies less in their lack of heroism than in the 
fundamentally different international situation of our time. (Fanon, 2004, pp. 145–146)
A humbler and more measured response may be required if student leaders want 
to honor Fanon’s words.
It needs to be noted that the rationality of these arguments for violence breaks 
down when it is subjected to even a little scrutiny. First, Fanon (2004) and 
Biko (2002) wrote about revolutionary violence in the crucible of the colonial strug-
gle. Is it legitimate to transpose these ideas onto a democratic era which, however 
flawed, provides the space not only for protest, but also the right to vote out the 
political elite? And even if one did believe in the legitimacy of violence given 
Fanon’s criticisms of the compromising and profiteering character of the newly 
emergent nationalist elite, what of Arendt’s (1969) searing critique of both Fanon 
and Sartre’s views on violence when she suggested that violence inevitably con-
taminates and destroys the end for which it was originally deployed? Essentially, 
comparing democratic South Africa to colonial societies is not only intellectually 
unsustainable, but also suggests that student leaders are incapable of distinguishing 
between different types of political systems and the forms of protest that can be 
legitimately deployed against them.
Second, how is the struggle against structural violence advanced by attacking 
other students and destroying university property that is intended for housing and 
teaching the students themselves? If anything, such actions are likely to consolidate 
the very effects of the structural violence against the poor and marginalized. Indeed, 
if the presence of structural violence can legitimate individual acts of violence in a 
democratic society, the consequences are too horrendous to contemplate: It could 
justify not only violent attacks on any public authority or their representatives, but 
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also rape and murder against any individual simply on the basis that a perpetrator 
belongs to a community that is historically disadvantaged, and the act is committed 
against someone who belongs, by accident of birth, to a community that is histori-
cally advantaged. It would, in essence, violate the very social pact on which demo-
cratic society derives its philosophical legitimacy. Finally, as a result of this very 
social pact on which democratic society is founded, violent actions compel the state 
to respond with force to protect public property and the rights of other citizens, 
thereby creating a securitized atmosphere that works against the immediate interests 
of the protesters and the legitimacy of the protests themselves.
Part of the problem with much of the writings and reflections used to advocate 
for or condone violence is that their authors confuse violence with rage. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between the two. Feelings of rage can be important and useful if 
they inspire collective action against injustice and drive progressive social change. 
Canham (2017) argued in an essay in the Du Bois Review: “Black rage [can be] . . . 
seen as an expression of black self-love in that it is the ultimate cry for freedom” 
(p. 442). Yet he also cautions against romanticizing black rage because it has the 
potential to harm the poor and vulnerable, and not only the system. As importantly, 
one must never confuse explaining and understanding black rage with condoning it, 
especially when it works against the agenda of freedom. My own view is that black 
rage need not be violent in our present circumstances to achieve positive outcomes, 
as the national student protest in 2015 demonstrated. Moreover, rage must not cause 
leaders to act emotionally and impulsively. It must not blunt them from critically 
assessing the forces arraigned against the social justice cause, and determining how 
to overcome these without compromising the end goal itself. Rage is necessary, 
violence is not; when the two get confused, the cause of social justice itself maybe 
delegitimized or defeated.
The same can be said of contentious politics and social struggles. Activists and 
radical scholars often refer to the importance of disruption in enabling change. This 
is entirely valid. Yet, as Martin Luther King Jr.’s ideas and practices reflect, social 
activism must impose systemic costs to create the political will among decision- 
makers to enable social change. But he also states that this must not be violent, for 
it then becomes immoral and self-defeating (Luther King Jr., 1968/2010). This 
understanding poses an important question for the leaders and supporters of 
#FeesMustFall. Would resorting to a permanent shutdown of the university not have 
entailed a cost that exceeds what is socially acceptable, given the fact that its imme-
diate victims were the poorest among the student community and it did not auto-
matically create the impetus for change among the institutional decision-makers? 
Moreover, was resorting to violence not unacceptable in these circumstances? Did 
violence as a strategy not become self-defeating?
It is worth noting that the issue of violence is not only about social movements’ 
deploying it strategically, but also about how the social justice community 
approaches policing in a democracy. During the protests, Mbembe (2016) ques-
tioned whether all security arrangements are inimical to freedom. The automatic 
opposition to policing by so many in the social justice community suggests that too 
many would respond affirmatively to this question. But as Mbembe (2016) 
A. Habib
283
suggests, this is untenable—freedom does not automatically lead to security, so 
there is a need for decision-makers to act pragmatically, to contextually analyze 
each moment and incident. A de facto, automatic response is neither legitimate nor 
appropriate for a democracy, for it would violate the very essence of the social pact 
on which a democratic society itself is founded.
Perhaps the dilemma and how it was addressed can be better understood through 
a reflection of the scholarly work of della Porta and Diani (2006), who suggest that 
social movements become violent under two conditions: when police are deployed 
and engage in a repressive response, and when movements are factionalized and 
compete with each other to claim victories. Scholars used their work and its conclu-
sions to suggest that police should not have been deployed at the universities, even 
if violence was being committed. But again, this conclusion was flawed; it was mor-
ally problematic and did not logically flow from a nuanced understanding of the 
empirical facts. As indicated earlier, the violence at Wits preceded the deployment 
of police, largely as a result of the second factor that della Porta and Diani identify. 
But their first causal factor was also evident, because the violence did indeed esca-
late immediately after the police deployment and subsided only a few days later, 
after those who had committed it had been arrested and restrictive security protocols 
had been activated, at least temporarily, to stabilize the situation.
The question that emerges is this: What is the responsibility of institutional and 
societal decision-makers in a context where protests turn violent as a result of the 
second factor, the factionalizing of the movement? Can responsible leadership 
refuse to deploy the police because of the fear of the first causal factor, the escala-
tion of the violence as a result of the deployment? Our answer as institutional execu-
tives at Wits to this question was not to concede to the framing of this debate. To 
refuse to deploy police would have enabled the violation of the rights of the vast 
majority within the university, and would have made public institutions and society 
vulnerable to any group that was willing to commit violence to realize its ends, an 
untenable situation in a democratic society. Even in the context of a lack of adequate 
police training, the answer was not to deny their legitimacy to manage security chal-
lenges. Rather, the appropriate strategic response in the medium term is to urge their 
training and organization so that they can fulfil their constitutional responsibility in 
a democratic society. In the interim, the mitigation measure was to urge them to act 
with restraint through an engagement with police leadership and the political 
authorities to whom they reported. The mitigation was also in the recognition, pub-
licly expressed in my review of the 2016 protests (Habib, 2016), that a security 
solution was not sustainable in the long term, which influenced our interventions to 
find a political solution through both institutional initiatives negotiated with the 
SRC and student leaders, and systemic ones such as the National Education Crisis 
Forum (NECF) and the Heher Commission.
Finally, it is worth noting that the broader progressive community has never 
developed a coherent approach to the matter of security in a democracy. But this 
agnosticism is no longer tenable, especially given the violent character of South 
African society and the rising populist threats to it. Bringing violence under control 
in this society, which is essential for the sustainability and vibrancy of democracy, 
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will require concerted action on the part of both social movements and societal 
stakeholders, and the police themselves. All stakeholders need to become the col-
lective agents of the future they desire and claim to want to build.
 Framing Social Justice Outcomes
The struggle for social justice must contain within itself the imagery of the outcome 
it desires. This means that it should be framed in a language, and its activities should 
be organized in a way, that is compatible with the intended social justice outcome. 
This strategic principle has a particular resonance for #FeesMustFall: It is here 
where the movement floundered, which influenced its trajectory dramatically 
towards factionalism and violence. In 2015, the movement was largely framed and 
organised in antiracist and nonracial terms. The protests’ goal was lowering the cost 
of higher education, thereby enabling the poor and the middle classes to access 
universities more easily. Its marches comprised students from across class and racial 
lines, and drew support from stakeholders across the political spectrum. As political 
parties tried to intervene to gain control of the movement, it became more factional-
ized and racialized. Some students started to wear t-shirts bearing racialised state-
ments, whereas others began to frame the movement in explicitly racial terms. As 
this happened, and other parts of the movement refused to condemn and marginalize 
these elements, broader groups of students withdrew. The net effect was that the 
2016 protests had neither the nonracial flavor nor the broad support that the move-
ment had experienced a year earlier.
This is why it is so important for those interested in social justice to frame their 
movement in explicit antiracial or nonracial terms. There are two reasons for this. 
The first is an instrumentalist rationale. If a social movement is to be successful, it 
must draw on the support of the vast majority of society. In the language of the UDF 
of the 1980s, one needs to maximize support for the movement and minimize that 
for the advocates of the status quo. Framing the movement in more racial terms with 
explicit racist and/or prejudicial statements and activities weakens support for the 
movement and allows adversaries to caricature it as an agent of division and hatred.
The second rationale is perhaps even more fundamental, for it speaks to the 
desired social justice outcome. A central political tension that confronts all oppressed 
communities in their struggle is whether the movement should be framed as a retreat 
into nativism, where the previously oppressed become the master, or as progress 
towards the construction of a nonracial, cosmopolitan society in which all have a 
future. This political divide was perhaps most dramatically evident in the struggle 
for the allegiance of the African-American community by Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Stokely Carmichael’s (Kwame 
Ture’s) Black Power movement. Too often, however, the divide is caricatured as one 
between mainstream integration and co-option on one side and radical exclusionary 
politics on the other. Yet, as he demonstrates in his “Where Do We Go from Here: 
Chaos or Community?”, Luther King Jr.’s (1968/2010) ideas were much more 
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complex and defied this simple caricature. In this book, Luther King Jr. criticises the 
segregationist and militaristic impulses of the Black Power movement and advances 
a vision of radical change that is more cosmopolitan and inclusionary. Yet the radi-
calism of his ideas speaks not only to racial integration, but also to socioeconomic 
inclusion, calling for a guaranteed income for all citizens in an effort to banish 
poverty in the United States. Moreover, as indicated earlier, Luther King Jr.’s mobi-
lizational and organizational strategy was not one of appeasement, as is often sug-
gested. Indeed, with his brand of contentious politics he recognized the importance 
of disorder and disruption for there to be systemic social costs to create the impetus 
for change. But he also drew an explicit boundary at violence, which the Black 
Power movement too often ignored. This book, Luther King Jr.’s last, is worth going 
back to in these fractured times, when social inclusion and fundamental change are 
back on the global agenda.
Scholars in other settings have also reflected on this central political tension in 
the struggles of oppressed communities. In “When Victims Become Killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,” Mamdani (2001) tries to 
develop an understanding of the Rwandan genocide by exploring how colonial 
authorities manipulated tribal divisions in Rwandan society, framing the Hutus as 
subjects and the Tutsis as citizens. The Tutsis were thus constructed as settlers by 
colonial authorities and by the Hutu administration in the postcolonial era. Once 
this defining and labeling happened, the genocide was a logical consequence. It 
was, Mamdani maintains, not an ethnic but a racial cleansing in which newly estab-
lished citizens were ridding themselves of the settler presence. This work is a timely 
warning of the long-term societal consequences that can emerge from present-day 
political choices and behavior.
These cases essentially underscore the fact that the path a society takes—towards 
nativism or towards a nonracial common humanity—is not crafted at the point of 
victory when one ascends to political power. Rather, it originates from the character 
of the movement that led to that point, and the strategies and tactics its members 
employed. Hardt and Negri (2017) remind us about the following:
Rather than asking only how to take power, we must also ask what kind of owner we want 
and, perhaps more important, who we want to become . . . We must train our eyes to recog-
nise how the movements have the potential to redefine fundamental social relations so that 
they strive not to take power as it is but to take power differently, to achieve a fundamentally 
new democratic society and, crucially, to produce new subjectivities. (pp. xiii–xiv)
Essentially, the new society’s imagination is seeded in the struggle itself. Acts of 
racial prejudice, or silence in the face thereof, are not simple theatrics of social 
struggle—they are the building blocks of consciousness that will ultimately define 
the very character of the society that is to be born. Ultimately, the trajectory of the 
#FeesMustFall movement reveals that antiracist framing and organization is essen-
tial if social justice struggles are to contain within them the nonracial, inclusive 
community that social justice activists desire.
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 Mass Organization and Structural Considerations
The final strategic consideration that the trajectory of the #FeesMustFall movement 
warrants is the argument of some in its leadership that representative institutions 
and vertically organized structures of leadership are no longer compatible with 
social justice struggles and outcomes. This was reflected in the demands of some 
elements of the #FeesMustFall movement to locate decision making solely in the 
mass meeting and disband or reform all governance structures, including the 
Council, Senate, and SRC. Part of the motivation for this lay in some of the activ-
ists’ deep fear that individual leaders are too easily co-opted by business, govern-
ment, and institutional elites. But the insistence on making decisions in mass 
meetings was also driven by a political logic in which small, fringe political groups 
could easily dominate proceedings through a “politics of spectacle”—one that 
silenced ordinary, pragmatic voices. Lacking political acumen and experience, the 
leadership of other student groups were incapable of challenging these voices and 
repeatedly found themselves on a strategic path more compatible with the agenda of 
competitor political parties. And so, whether by design or default, an anarchist tradi-
tion of decision making, captured in the language of participatory governance, took 
root in the #FeesMustFall movement.
This tradition is not as democratic as it professes to be. Many students who sup-
ported the #FeesMustFall campaign but wanted to return to class were harangued 
and intimidated in mass meetings by a group of self-appointed political commis-
sars. Individuals who proposed measured and pragmatic solutions were labeled as 
sellouts, betrayers of a generational cause. Extreme choices were deemed as radical 
and were enabled in the meetings through demagogic speeches and rhetorical fer-
vour, where sloganeering dominated and complex issues were trivialized. Essentially, 
the mass meeting was as much a mechanism of silencing ordinary, pragmatic voices 
as it was of mobilizing others.
The lesson to be learnt for the social justice community is that greater thought 
needs to be given to how to structure decision making so that it can be more socially 
accountable. Hardt and Negri (2017) use their concept of “assembly” to make a 
number of proposals in this regard. Although I am sceptical of their recommenda-
tion to locate strategic decision making in the multitude and confine leadership to 
tactical considerations, they do nevertheless enable thoughtful deliberation about 
the matter. We need further considered engagement along these lines, especially 
between multiple stakeholders, so that the reform of governance structures within 
the university does, ultimately, manage the tensions between different forms of 
decision making and organization. Only then will we be able to develop universities 
and public institutions that are socially accountable, yet progressively pragmatic 
and practical, focused on being responsive to both the short-term needs of different 




 Maintaining the Ethics of the Movement
A final set of deliberations that the evolution of #FeesMustFall poses for the 
advancement of social justice is whether there should be an ethics in the conduct of 
social justice struggles. Perhaps the most important ethical value to underscore is 
the importance of movement leaders being consistent in their public and private 
engagements. Far too many of the leaders of the movement acted duplicitously. 
Many claimed publicly that executive management was not willing to meet them 
when they had personally met me and other executives, and pleaded with us not to 
reveal these engagements. Many who interacted with me on a face-to-face basis 
were utterly charming and respectful, but their personas seemed to change funda-
mentally on Twitter. There, they engaged in the most virulent, extreme manner, 
which was frankly reminiscent of far right behavior. One student leader repeatedly 
made the most scurrilous remarks about me and my family, but then sent me an 
SMS to say that he respected me and that his actions were not personal. In interac-
tions outside the university, other student leaders also suggested that their actions 
were not personal, apologized for any discomfort that they may have created, and 
then promptly behaved even more obnoxiously in the months that followed. Some 
repeatedly criticized the presence of private security and police, but then indicated 
in personal discussions that they understood why we needed it and felt safer as a 
result. A few who had called for a boycott of lectures and examinations privately 
approached individual executive managers and asked whether they could write their 
examinations in secret, so that other students would not see them. This kind of 
behavior was not exclusive to Wits University. Vice-chancellors and executives 
across the system had similar experiences and interactions with student leaders of 
all political persuasions.
The problem with much of this behavior is not simply the individual duplicities, 
but that it seems to emanate from a belief that astute politics involves saying one 
thing in public and doing another in private. Student leaders across the spectrum 
seem to have become captured by a politics of spectacle, believing that they are 
obliged to be extreme, rude, and obnoxious in public, and pragmatic and polite in 
their engagements outside the public eye. There is also the belief that the overriding 
goal is to win through any means. This kind of duplicity should be of particular 
concern to all of us. It suggests that, despite their criticisms of the existing political 
elite, some of the prominent leaders among this new generation of activists are dis-
playing behavioral traits that are typical of the most venal of South Africa’s current 
politicians.
The leaders and activists of the #FeesMustFall movement have also displayed an 
astonishing level of intolerance. On many occasions, student leaders have tried to 
implicate one another and get the university to invoke its disciplinary processes 
against others in an effort to rid themselves of potential political and electoral rivals. 
Students outside the movement were treated with far more disdain, and those who 
dared to organize formally outside the #FeesMustFall fold were harassed, threat-
ened, and often pilloried as stooges of white interests or executive management. 
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This intolerance was also reflected in the disruption of meetings—numerous univer-
sity executives’ meetings were disrupted across the system, as were national meet-
ings convened by government and even the NECF. Essentially, some #FeesMustFall 
leaders and activists shared a widespread belief that anyone who did not fully share 
their views was a legitimate target for silencing.
These incidents were not exclusive to Wits University. Academic, professional, 
and administrative staff, students, and executives across the system have increas-
ingly reported similar intolerance. But the challenge also extends to external stake-
holders. Some academics outside South Africa undertook lazy solidarity action in 
which they pronounced on a course of action by the university, at the prompting of 
an academic colleague, without any independent investigation of the issues on the 
ground. When confronted, very few even bothered to engage further. Similarly, pro-
gressive public lawyers refused to think through the political implications of their 
legal representation, pleading that their profession required a political agnosticism 
of them. Finally, civil society activists, even notable ones who had demonstrated 
incredible bravery in the struggle against apartheid, remained silent in the face of 
student leaders’ intolerance, while at the same time privately communicating with 
me about how unacceptable their behavior was. Most of this was inspired by a mis-
taken belief that they could earn student leaders’ trust and then slowly encourage 
them to behave in more acceptable and principled ways. These activists had forgot-
ten that, if left unchecked, these behavioral patterns could generalise themselves 
across society, consolidate a new generation of venal politicians and, in the process, 
compromise the very social justice outcome that the protest desired.
The challenge of these ethical violations among leaders, activists, and supporters 
of #FeesMustFall is not only that they delegitimize the social movement, but also 
that they consolidate a cynical view of politics within broader society. People come 
to see all politics, politicians, and political activists as duplicitous and unprincipled, 
saying one thing and doing another. As I suggested earlier, a movement seeds an 
imagining of the alternative society that it envisions. This requires not only that its 
strategies are compatible with the outcome, but also that its participants practise a 
politics that is distinctive, and more ethical than that which prevails in the current 
political system—one that can incubate an alternative behavior that is compatible 
with the social outcome that the movement desires.
 Lessons for Advancing Social Justice
If there is one lesson that the trajectory of #FeesMustFall can impart, it is that the 
dynamics, strategies and practise of politics in a social justice movement must be 
very different from what the political system normally practises. This is a lesson not 
only for South African social movements, but also for social struggles across the 
globe. It is worth noting that, in many ways, South Africa is two worlds in one: an 
advanced, competitive, and successful world, surrounded by another that reflects 
underdevelopment’s most tragic features. Its contradictions, then, are as global as 
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they are local. It is fair to say, perhaps, that social struggles are more accentuated in 
South Africa and that, as a result, political fault lines are more dramatically exposed. 
This makes South Africa a centre of political protest, but also an incredible social 
laboratory from which to investigate global challenges and potential solutions.
The struggles of #FeesMustFall—the high costs of education, minimum wages 
and inhumane working conditions for vulnerable workers, and socially inclusive 
communities—are not unique to South Africa. Indeed, they are the global struggles 
of this era. As a result, movements similar to #FeesMustFall have emerged across 
the world, including in North America and Western Europe. The social struggles 
that these movements organize, and their success, are essential to heal our world, 
address its inequalities and political polarization, and build more inclusive cosmo-
politan communities and societies. To do this, there is a need to learn from past 
struggles in both the local and global setting. If reflections on #FeesMustFall can 
help at least a little in this regard, then the protests, and the difficulties that accom-
panied them, would have been worth it—for South Africa and the rest of the world.
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Chapter 14
Civility, Education, and the Embodied 
Mind—Three Approaches
Heinz-Dieter Meyer
In 1998, reflecting on the atrocities in Srebenica, Bosnia, the philosopher Richard 
Rorty published an essay entitled “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” 
in which he considered the ease with which heretofore peaceful people were mobi-
lized to participate in genocidal violence. In the essay, Rorty pointed out that an 
education focused on reason alone does not get us past the kind of “person whose 
treatment of a rather narrow range of featherless bipeds is morally impeccable, but 
who remains indifferent to the suffering of those outside this range, the ones he or 
she thinks of as pseudo- humans” (p. 124). He suggested that such “primitive paro-
chialism” cannot be overcome “by using that paradigmatic human faculty, reason” 
(p.  124). Rather, an answer, Rorty argued, must inevitably have recourse to the 
shaping of the sentiments—that complex of feelings, perceptions, preferences, 
tastes, sensibilities, and inclinations—which includes the capacity to feel empathy 
and compassion in the face of suffering—our own and others’—and respond accord-
ingly. The sentiments are crucially involved in shaping how we experience the 
world, but play little to no role in contemporary education that is focused with 
increasing exclusivity on cognitive skill and competence alone.A similar idea was 
expressed by Albert Einstein in 1938. Five years after many in Germany applauded 
the National Socialists’ ascent to their rein of terror, Einstein wondered how we 
could make our education powerful enough so it would “withstand the pressure of 
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[H]ow can we make our teaching so potent in the emotional life 
of man, that its influence should withstand the pressure of the 
elemental psychic forces in the individual?
(Albert Einstein, 1938)
The sage gives free rein to his desires and fulfills all of his 




the elemental psychic forces in the individual,” including such “primary impulses” 
as “pride, hate, and need for power.” “If men as individuals surrender to the call of 
their elementary instincts, avoiding pain and seeking satisfaction only for their own 
selves, the result for them all taken together must be a state of insecurity, of fear, and 
of promiscuous misery.” These observations prompted Einstein to ask: “how can we 
make our teaching so potent in the emotional life of man, that its influence should 
withstand the pressure of the elemental psychic forces in the individual?” 
(Einstein, 1938).
The reflections of these eminent scholars are à propos at a time when the readi-
ness for violence in the public sphere—by means of speech and conduct—is again 
dramatically on the rise. For just one example, according to one US study, the num-
ber of Americans who feel “justified to use violence to advance political goals” has 
risen sharply and alarmingly during the past three years from under ten percent to 
33%.1In light of these reflections, we are entitled to wonder how much hope there is 
for a stable civil society unless nonviolence and self- government in our external 
affairs is coupled with and buttressed by nonviolence and self- government inter-
nally—in our ability to regulate, govern, and harness our affective selves. In fact, 
this seems to me the challenge of education par excellence: How to train our senti-
mental and cognitive faculties, our heart and minds, so that we are able to listen to 
our better angels especially in times of stress and conflict.
In this respect we should derive great encouragement from the currently emerg-
ing confluence of philosophical and cultural traditions which point to a profound 
agreement on key points that our dominant educational model does not now recog-
nize. One of them is that reason alone does not guarantee right conduct and that in 
order to educate men and women who are able to reason, reflect and reconcile well, 
they must learn to also properly develop their affect. In other words: Education must 
reach the heart. It must be minimally embodied. It must go beyond the cognition- -
centered learning that now dominates our competition- and economic- growth ori-
ented educational practices (Meyer & Benavot, 2013).
 The Embodied Mind: A Confluence of Traditions
Given how deeply our Western (and increasingly global) model of education is 
focused on training the rational faculties, it is exciting to see how the long held 
assumptions about the individual’s ability to rationally self- govern are now being 
challenged from a number of directions representing lines of thought that were, 
heretofore, noncommunicating. According to many researchers now at work, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that there is, in fact, a relationship between the 
rationalist- centered approach to education and the ease with which we observe 
well- educated people slipping into conduct espousing hatred, greed, and violence. 
One of them is the psychologist Robert Sternberg, who coined the term “smart fool” 




and points that people fail in career and life more because of a lack of wisdom than 
a lack of IQ- type intelligence (Sternberg, 1990, 2001; Sternberg, Reznitskaya, & 
Jarvin, 2007). The thus educated person is clever, “smart,” or “rational” but not 
“wise.” Other leading psychologists are similarly working on understanding the 
relationship between moral character, intellectual learning, and subjective experi-
ence of happiness (Duckworth, 2016; Haidt, 2006; Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, 
Reivich, & Linkins, 2009).2
Of the growing number of writers working on redressing this imbalance, many 
do so by returning to Aristotelian and Socratic philosophy more broadly (e.g., 
Dunne, 1993/1997; Jacobs, 2001; Snow, 2015; Steel, 2014). Their efforts have 
yielded a robust body of work on the intersection of virtue ethics and education 
(Carr, 2018; Dunne & Hogan, 2004; Kristjánsson, 2015), showing how far our con-
temporary utilitarian educational ethic has strayed from the moral development and 
character- oriented educational ethic of those forebears. Much of this work—espe-
cially the groundbreaking “Back to Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the 
Lure of Technique” (Dunne, 1993/1997) and Steel’s (2014) “The Pursuit of Wisdom 
and Happiness in Education”—have yet to find their proper reception in education 
scholarship.
There is, however, a more recent development that I shall highlight in this 
paper—one that is prompted by and important for the possibility of a global civil 
society. This concerns an emerging confluence of Western and Eastern moral tradi-
tions, which, perhaps for the first time, offer the possibility of what Einstein (1938) 
called “a universal moral attitude”—a moral and civil stance that might unite people 
across different traditions and world views and that would be of great significance 
for our ability to live in harmony in a global world. If we can identify areas of obvi-
ous agreement among these traditions, this would greatly assist an “embodied” 
reorientation of education. By engaging that confluence, we can not only attain a 
sense of the degree to which our modern rationalist education is aberrant; but also 
some pointers as to the direction in which we might find a reorientation.
In what follows I’ll explore these areas of intersection regarding the integration 
of head and heart, affect and reason, and sentiment and cognition as pursued in three 
distinct traditions:
• the Confucian and Daoist debate on the relationship between “hot and cold” 
cognition in the process of self- cultivation or “inner cultivation” as recently 
reconstructed in the pioneering work of Edward Slingerland (2014);
• the idea of sophrosyne or self- regulation in accord with wisdom that was for 
many centuries the chief educational ideal of the Greek cultural cosmos (North, 
1966/2019).
2 Scholars in the field of “positive psychology” like Seligman and Duckworth tend to use “happi-
ness” in the sense of “life satisfaction.” This is different from happiness as advancing on a path of 
moral development. The latter involves a reordering of tastes and preferences leading to a transfor-
mational change of character that will change our preferences and our readiness to forego a limited 
(e.g., sense) pleasure for the sake of a higher pleasure of inner peace. For a discussion of these 
differences, see Edelglass (2017).
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• and the Buddhist- inspired idea of “mindfulness” which is now finding wide-
spread use in education.
All three, I will suggest, agree on a for our contemporary debates crucial point: 
That the reliably “civil” person is one whose moral development has matured to a 
point where their intellectual and moral capacities, their heart and mind achieve a 
degree of balanced integration. As the commonalities of these traditions are coming 
into view to a global community of education, we have a perhaps a historically 
unique opportunity to recover a deeper sense of education that goes beyond the mere 
technical and instrumental competence that now preoccupies educational thought, 
especially in globally influential reform projects like PISA. Pursuing this path, we 
may eventually develop a sense of education as the kind of moral universal that 
Einstein (1938) sought, sufficiently “potent in the emotional life of man” that it can 
withstand and transform the more destructive “elemental forces” in the individual.
 The Embodied Mind (I): Inner Cultivation. Integrating Hot 
and Cold Cognition
One of the most compelling demonstrations of the need for a principled shift in our 
thinking about moral and educational formation comes from Edward Slingerland’s 
(2015) pioneering reinvestigating of key debates in Chinese philosophy, issuing in 
the conclusion that “abstract thought is not a strong enough foundation to support 
morality” (p. 115).
Drawing on both Confucian and Daoist classics, Slingerland usefully distin-
guishes between two systems of cognition—hot and cold—and suggests that much 
modern (Western) conceptions of moral formation rest on the faulty assumption that 
“cold can go it alone” (p. 63). This is flawed because rational control is, as he sum-
marizes, “physiologically expensive, fundamentally limited in nature, and easily 
disrupted” (p. 65). The dysfunctions of “cold only” can be seen, for example, in 
research on “verbal overshadowing” where an emphasis on rational analysis (for 
example, by asking subjects to verbalize and reason about an experience) weakens 
their judgment. Similarly, a task like the Stroop Task (where subjects are asked to 
read words like LOWER and upper, but say the case, not the word) prove to be dif-
ficult and effortful because it pits the cold cognitive system against the hot one, 
rather than making them work in tandem (p. 33).
Over against this effortful repression of hot by cold, Slingerland seeks to recover 
the Daoist ideal of wu- wei (variously translated as nonaction or effortless action), in 
which hot and cold are balanced and integrated. Unless individuals achieve such an 
integration, their conduct is likely to be at the mercy of untamed hot cognition. 
Compared to the “relatively puny” parts of brain that control executive functions 
“the rest of the brain is very much like a team of wild horses or a surging river of 
water” (p. 64). The problem is that in the disembodied mind the hot system over-
powers the cold one any old day.
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Jonathan Haidt (2006) takes a similar approach to distinguishing the two voli-
tional systems in human decision making: one visceral and powerful, the other 
rational but weak. He uses the elephant and rider metaphor to compare the two, the 
elephant representing our hot or visceral impulses, the rider the rational ones: “when 
the elephant really wants to do something, I’m no match for him” (p. 4). Similarly: 
“Reason and emotion must both work together to create intelligent behavior. . .” 
(p. 13). We pay too much attention to “conscious verbal thinking” and leave the 
education of sentiments out of the picture. This is, in Haidt’s memorable simile like 
taking “the rider off the elephant and train him to solve problems on his own . . . The 
class ends, the rider gets back on the elephant, and nothing changes at recess” 
(p. 165). Haidt concludes: “Modern theories about rational choice and information 
processing don’t adequately explain weakness of will” (p. 4).
By contrast, the proper aim of education is a state where “the mind is embodied 
and the body is mindful; the two systems—hot and cold, fast and slow—are com-
pletely integrated” (Slingerland, 2014, p. 29). “As with large wild animals and riv-
ers, the answer lies in domestication: channeling the flood waters, or taming the 
wild animals” (2014, p. 65).
The studies of both Slingerland (2014, 2015) and Haidt (2006) issue in a strong 
indictment of those forms of education that are almost exclusively focused on 
“cold only.” These ideas go significantly beyond traditional notions of “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1957, p. 198). In bounded rationality the emphasis is on the 
limitations of cognitive and information- processing capacity. The view of rational-
ity as bounded (limited in its ability for information processing) orients us to seek 
compensatory organizational and computational capacities and intelligence to 
compensate for rationality’s natural shortcomings by means of organization and 
technology and, for the rest, be content to “satisfice” (rather than maximize) or 
“muddle through.” What Simon and colleagues ignored was that our rational mind 
is not merely limited in its information- processing and decision- making capacity, 
it is easily flooded and hijacked by our hot cognition. This capacity to be over-
whelmed by our hot cognition is not addressed by expanded computational power 
or more modest “satisficing” aspirations. The ideas of embodiment, by contrast, 
point to the need to work on integrating hot and cold cognition by learning to tame 
the elephant and make room to use the capacities of rational cognition to its full 
potential.3
There is some debate as to how “effortful” the process of heart- mind integration 
could or should be according to the Chinese classics. While Slingerland presents the 
idea of “wu- wei” (effortless action) as a Daoist critique of over- effortful Confucian 
practice focused on regulating external conduct in accord with filial propriety, 
Kirkland (2004) cites more recently discovered Daoist texts like the Nei- Yeh 
3 A forthcoming study by Christopher Gowans on “Self-Cultivation Philosophies” extends the 
scope of this argument to further non-Western philosophies. The introduction to that book is avail-
able at “christophergowans.com/what-are-self-cultivation-philosophieshttps://christophergowans.
com/what-are-self-cultivation-philosophies”.
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(“Inward Training”), that exhort the practitioner to daily diligence in the pursuit of 
“biospiritual” practices like meditation (Kirkland 2004, p. 43).
 The Embodied Mind (II): Self-Regulation in Accord 
with Wisdom: Sophrosyne
In the West, a major source for the rejection of mere cleverness as a sufficient out-
come of education is Aristotle (trans. 1999). For him “smartness” is a tool that can 
be used for good and ill: “Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but 
if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness…” (Nicomachean Ethics 1144a 
23). The merely clever person lacks wisdom. They cannot distinguish reliably 
between good and bad. For Aristotle, moral and intellectual excellence was insepa-
rable. He would likely have been bewildered by our modern practice of educating 
the rational faculties of cognition and leaving the affective, embodied side to the 
student’s private endeavors. As MacIntyre (1984) puts it: “For Aristotle excellence 
of character and intelligence cannot be separated. Here Aristotle expresses a view 
characteristically at odds with that dominant in the modern world” (p. 154).
For Aristotle, the rational person is defective in two ways: a) being merely clever 
or “smart,” they cannot distinguish reliably between good and bad. But the lack of 
practical wisdom (phronesis) in the thus educated person is not their only deficit. 
Another hallmark of this mere technical rationality is akrasia or weak- willedness. 
Even where the akratic knows right, they often do wrong (Ovid: “I see and approve 
of the better, but I follow the worse”). To counter- act the limitations and fragile 
nature of mere rational self- control or “continence,” Aristotle lays out a path of 
moral development in the course of which people become “properly affected” 
(Burnyeat, 1980) issuing in a state of uncoerced self- regulation and self- restraint or 
“sophrosyne” (North, 1966/2019).
For Aristotle, moral development was not complete until it issued in a degree of 
self- mastery or temperance whereby the person experienced a transformation of 
their affects that would lead them to a harmonious balance of reason and appetites, 
head and heart. The goal is a balance of character where reason and appetites, logos 
and passions, are both transformed and joined harmoniously. This is notably differ-
ent from mere rational self- management that uses rational stratagems (epitomized 
by Ulysses tying himself to the mast to better cope with the allure of the Sirens) to 
keep untamed appetites in check. At the point of sophrosyne, a person becomes 
properly affected and reliably chooses the right thing for the right reasons (Kosman, 
1980). Aristotle was very clear that cleverness or instrumental reason alone does not 
guarantee right conduct. He called for a process of moral cultivation that would 
move us beyond the stage of akrasia by transforming a person’s affect (Oksenberg 
Rorty, 1980).
The Aristotelian alternative to the education of mere rationality or smartness was 
always a package deal involving virtue, wisdom, and contemplation (theoria). 
Characteristically and consequentially, the life of theoria (contemplation), 
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designated by Aristotle as the highest life, has frequently been mistranslated as “life 
of study” or even “theoretical life,” thereby negating Aristotle’s essential dimension 
of spiritual cultivation. To me, this idea of self- regulation in accord with wisdom 
and self- knowledge promoted by theoria- contemplation is the most important edu-
cational idea suggested by Aristotle and one of the most under- utilized discoveries 
of our forebears (for the theoria as contemplation concept see Hadot, 1995; Jacobs, 
2001, 2012; Pieper, 1952/1998; Smith, 2001; Steel, 2014).
To appreciate Aristotle’s thought, it’s important to see that his continuum of 
moral development does not stop at mere continence or rational control of the appe-
tites (see Fig.  14.1). Aristotle distinguishes between incontinence (wantonness, 
license, lack of control) and continence (control), but also between continence and 
temperance (Sanderse, 2015). The latter distinction refers to the person who no 
longer needs to engage in self- coercion to control their appetites. Thus, there is an 
important distinction between the akratic and enkratic person on the one hand and 
between the enkrates and the sophron on the other. The akrates and enkrates both do 
battle with the untamed appetites. While the akrates fights and loses, the enkrates 
fights and wins the battle. But the enkrates still needs to fight and use various means 
of self- coercion. The point is that the enkrates is not free of inner self- coercion 
where they need to employ their cold cognition to force the hot system into compli-
ance. They must, in other words, rely on forms of more or less strong internal vio-
lence that, given certain situational stresses, may burst to the surface.
 Reason Does Not Guarantee Right Conduct
A key implication of Aristotle’s idea of moral development is that exclusive reliance 
on reason or rationality do not guarantee right conduct. Where the educational ideal 
of rationality implies that freedom is the result of the effective suppression of the 
appetites by means of reason, Aristotle teaches that such a state is still unstable and 
vulnerable to internal and external violence. It leads at best to oligarchic man’s abil-
ity to restrain his passions for the sake of another passion: avarice, so as to prevent 
our passions from getting in the way of our greed. As Albert Hirschman (1977) has 
shown in his essay on “The Passions and the Interests,” this reinterpretation of ava-
rice as the benign passion of self- interest that could be relied upon to keep the more 
destructive passions in check is, indeed, what the founders of modern political phi-
losophy deemed to be the high- water mark of modern man’s moral psychology (see 
Fig. 14.2).
Akrates    Enkrates                    Sophron
------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------
Incontinence Continence Temperance
Fig. 14.1 Stages of self- regulation. Source: Design by author.
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While enkratic man remains at war with his inclinations, the sophron has suc-
ceeded to transform their affect so that they only want what they ought to want.
Notice, that sophrosyne is not “self- restraint above all,” but self- restraint in 
accord with self- knowledge. The rule of virtue is unstable and liable to extremes 
unless virtue is balanced by self- knowledge and wisdom. History is littered with 
instances of violence perpetrated in the name of virtue (“let justice be done if the 
heavens may fall”). So sophrosyne is neither a timid moderation, fuelled by fear of 
what one may find on the other side of passionate excess or by the boy scout’s need 
for praise. Nor is it the terror of virtue that mercilessly doles out punishment to 
transgressors from an (often) hypocritical sense of purity. As North’s (1966/2019) 
meticulous reconstruction shows, sophrosyne is far more than what Werner Jaeger 
called a “humdrum doctrine of peace and contentment,” (as cited in North, 
1966/2019, p. xii). It is self- restraint in accord with wisdom, supported and guided 
by insight- knowledge. It is based on the idea that ultimately only the self- restraint 
that results from self- knowledge and self- insight is free and noncoercive. Insight 
into the push and pull of the inclinations is the precondition for a kind of self- -
restraint that is not (self- ) coercive (although the process may, initially, require will-
power to get going), but which is the free accession to the realization of the kinds of 
actions which lead to lasting peace and well- being.
While it is often thought that the key step past the akratic’s impasse is the firmly 
self- controlled person, this is not what Aristotle teaches. The enkratic is still doing 
battle with their appetites and inclinations. They still depend on successfully using 
various means of self- coercion to avoid transgressive conduct. To get past this point, 
there is a need for training, guarding, and reordering our tastes and impulses so to 
become properly affected and want only what we ought to want. The temperate 
mind is, finally, capable of opening to reason. As North (1966/2019) puts it: “The 
special importance of sophrosyne in the process of education becomes clear with 
the assertion that unruly passion is the chief obstacle to learning—because it deaf-






















Fig. 14.2 Conduct and coercion. Source: Design by author.
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 The Embodied Mind (III): Mindfulness
The recent explosion of mindfulness across Western and, indeed, global popular and 
academic discourse is increasingly noticed by social and political scientists (see, 
e.g., Mariotti, 2020). It has begun to reshape professional practice in many domains, 
including health and medicine, business, social work, and, alas, education. Some 
writers go as far as arguing that mindfulness has the potential to take the place of the 
Protestant Ethic—now that the latter seems to have shed all ascetic self- restraint and 
collapsed into unrestrained money making.
My interest here is limited to exploring the parallels between mindfulness and 
the above two practices of integrating head and heart, or hot and cold cognition, and 
how this might form the basis for a dialogue that can bring forth the shared educa-
tional concerns in these major traditions of moral development.
Although it has entered widespread, even inflationary, usage in the West, the 
original Pali term sati (Sanskrit smrt) is actually not easily rendered in one English 
term. In fact, as Gethin (2011) points out, the term mindfulness was somewhat of an 
awkward placeholder, arising from the fact that more straightforward translations of 
sati as “calling to mind / bearing in mind / remembering / constant presence of mind 
/ turning one’s attention to” are awkward and unwieldy. Often thought of as a 
moment- to- moment awareness of feelings, thoughts, and mental states (“direct 
observation of mind and body in the present moment,” p. 267), the contemporary 
uses of mindfulness are often connected to practices aiming at stress reduction, 
anxiety and other health benefits. These uses shape, in part, the current understand-
ing of the term as a readily available method of lessening one’s reactivity and devel-
oping a greater sense of calm and ease. This understanding, however, does not 
capture the full range of the term, incorporating, as it does, several qualities that are 
not usually combined in a single term in the Western vernacular. There are, in fact, 
a number of qualities or functions that the term mindfulness combines:
• a quality of awareness and vigilant self- monitoring;
• a quality of guarding and regulating the mind;
• a quality of developing and deepening the mind.
Olendzki (2009) describes the monitoring quality as a “presence of mind that 
remembers to attend with persistent clarity to the objects of present experience” and 
“a mode of awareness that is paradoxically both intimately close and objectively 
removed” (p. 42). The scholar Bhikkhu Bodhi (2011) describes it as “reflexive con-
templation of one’s own experience” of body, feelings, states of mind, and phenom-
ena, a continuous observation of the object of experience and a “lucid awareness” 
that is connected to and facilitative of “clear comprehension” (p.  21). Likewise, 
Bhikkhu Anālayo (2003) ascribes to sati the aforementioned functions of monitor-
ing and observing (p. 58), restraining and regulating (p. 56), recollecting and keep-
ing in mind (p. 46) as well as investigating and probing (p. 64) and steering and 
supervising (p. 55).
An image frequently used in Buddhist scholarship is that of taming and training 
the mind through mindfulness as a post or anchor to which the mind- in- training is 
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hitched. There is, for example, the simile of the taming of the elephant by way of a 
post that restrains him. He is then further trained by the tamer’s calming words who 
also provides him with the food that nourishes him. The training includes teaching 
him to follow commands and standing his ground against attacks (Discourse on the 
Tamed Stage, MN III 128).
Importantly, this mindfully trained mind is not limited to perfecting one’s cogni-
tive powers or to merely calming the mind, although that is an important first step. 
Rather it includes developing, deepening and transforming the mind towards 
embodied qualities of “attention that is at once confident, benevolent, generous, and 
equanimous” (Olendzki, 2009, p. 42). Bhikkhu Bodhi (2011), likewise, holds that 
“mindfulness and clear comprehension serve as a bridge between the observational 
function of mindfulness and the development of insight” (p. 34).
A common thread here is the idea of a self- generating (auto- poeitic) mind, capa-
ble of self- regulating and self- shaping in the process of self- monitoring based on its 
own innate capacities and powers. This is not an empty vessel mind to be filled with 
content from the outside; nor is it simply the romanticists’ mind that “follows the 
heart” wherever it may pull. It is a well- trained, well- tamed mind—one that accom-
plishes this training ultimately by relying on its own, ever deepening powers. This 
self- generating and self- shaping quality of the mindful mind is expressed nicely in 
this passage of the Visuddhimagga:
Sati is that by means of which [the qualities that constitute the mind] remember, or it itself 
is what remembers, or it is simply remembering. Its characteristic is not- floating [non- -
distraction, hdm], its property absence of forgetting, its manifestation guarding or being 
face to face with an object of awareness; its basis is steady perception or the establishing of 
mindfulness of the body, and so on. Because of its being firmly set in the object of aware-
ness, it should be seen as like a post and, because it guards the gates of the eye and other 
senses, as like a gatekeeper. (Vism XIV, 141 as cited in Gethin, 2011, p. 272)
A person’s mindful development progresses as the practitioner becomes aware of 
and gradually overcomes obstacles including, in the Buddhist conception, the five 
hindrances of restlessness, sloth, greed, aversion, and skeptical doubt. One result of 
this development is “clear comprehension” which means, among other things, that 
practitioners are increasingly unable to deceive themselves. As Gethin (2011) 
puts it:
. . . if you consistently ‘remember’ what it is you are doing in any given moment, you will 
truly see what it is you are doing; and in truly seeing what it is you are doing, those of your 
deeds, words and thoughts that are motivated by greed, hatred and delusion will become 
impossible for you. (p. 265)
Self- deception as an impairment to reason and rationality has been discussed in 
the literature on rationality (see, especially, Elster, 1986). In our context, it can be 
seen as a hindrance to moral development. As it deepens, mindfulness makes self- -
deception about one’s intentions and motivations increasingly difficult.
What becomes apparent in this brief consideration of the range of the term mind-
fulness is that it describes a complex, layered understanding of mind and mental 
development that brings into view the mind’s self- generating capacity for 
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self- regulation and insight. While the “present- moment awareness” as which it is 
often described captures an important part of the term, much of the deeper under-
pinnings that come into view as the self- generating mind develops include the trans-
formative deepening of the mind whereby moral conduct and wisdom arise as 
emergent by- products.
Mindful contemplation thus plays a critical role in moral choice and moral devel-
opment in at least two ways. First, it assists in practically wise (phronetic) action in 
the here and now, by facilitating the agent’s awareness of mental or emotional 
obstructions to clear seeing and acting. Secondly, mindfulness facilitates a receptive 
opening and sensitizing the mind for the limitations of self- view, thereby aiding in 
inclining the mind toward a natural and genuine interest in the well- being of others.
In all this, mindfulness develops qualities that require the integration of hot and 
cold cognition and run parallel to the idea of sophrosyne. In fact, in this perspective 
it makes little sense to uphold the strict distinction of heart and mind, emotions and 
cognition that so strongly characterizes Western thought. Buddhist thought talks 
instead of the heart- mind (citta). Both operate together and need to be developed 
together.
 Summary: Educating the Heart-Mind
The three traditions surveyed above share several key concerns regarding education 
as a process of moral development focused on the formation of the heart- mind—a 
“faculty” that is distinctly different from the modern Western conception of educa-
tion as focused on the intellect only. The heart- mind is known to all the traditions 
considered here as the seat of our experience and action. It is the ensemble of affec-
tive and intellectual, moral and cognitive faculties that undergoes transformative 
change as people learn about their external and internal world.
There are several assumptions that distinguish a heart- mind focused education 
from that which targets the cold cognition or intellect only:
• reason (or cold cognition) does not guarantee right conduct;
• there are stages of moral and intellectual development. Continence—that stage 
in which a person is able to refrain from harmful external conduct—is an unsta-
ble half- way house on this continuum;
• effective education involves both intellectual and moral development and must 
reach the affective sentiments;
• a key mechanism of moral development is the cultivation of self- knowledge 
through mindful self- awareness and self- monitoring.
In practice, this means that a good education must include a nontrivial element 
of contemplative self- awareness and somatic, embodied practice. Education that 
wants to reach the heart must include a somatic and contemplative dimension. It 
must be embodied.
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A Note on Heart-Mind as that which Needs Education
Major non- Western (and early) Western traditions share and employ a core 
concept by which they designate the faculty that requires education as the 
heart- mind—which is distinctly different from the modern Western emphasis 
on rationality and the “rational” faculties. I will merely adduce some exam-
ples without elaboration to give a sense of how these traditions coincide on an 
understanding of the heart- mind as the core faculty to be trained by education.
Confucianism. Roger T. Ames (2016), in his translation of the classical 
Confucian commentary “The Great Learning,” uses the term “heartmind” 
(one word in the original) to connote the faculty at which education is aimed 
(p. 24). Confucius famous passage about the stages of learning also has the 
heart- mind as that which learns: “From fifteen, my heart- and- mind was set 
upon learning; . . . from seventy I could give my heart- and- mind free reign 
without overstepping the mark” (see Lai, 2016, p. 79).
Goldin (2018) argues that the heart- mind is the key concept in the work of 
the influential Confucian philosopher Xunzi: “In many respects, the heart- -
mind is the keystone of Xunzi’s philosophy, the one piece that links together 
all the others. The Chinese word xin means ‘heart’, but Xunzi attributes such 
strong and varied mental processes to this organ that one has to construe it as 
not only the heart but also the mind. (The mind was not located in the brain in 
premodern Chinese philosophy.),” “. . . the heart- mind is the organ that we use 
to discover the Way” and it is “the only organ that can command the others” 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xunzi).
Buddhism. In Pali, the language of the early Buddhist teachings, the heart- -
mind is citta—the seat of experience and of volition. Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000) 
explains “[c]itta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the 
subject of thought, volition, and emotion. It is citta that needs to be under-
stood, trained, and liberated” (pp. 769–770).
In Tibetan the term for heart- mind is kun long—which is, according to the 
Dalai Lama (1999), the place “from which all our actions spring” (p. 81).
A classical passage from an early Buddhist Sutta illustrates the importance 
of citta as heart- mind. To the question “[b]y what is the world led around? By 
what is it dragged here and there? What is the one thing that has all under its 
control?” the Buddha replies “The world is led around by citta; by mind it’s 
dragged here and there. Mind is the one thing that has All under its control.” 
(Saṃyutta Nikāya.I.62- 2).
Greek Philosophical Tradition. The corresponding concept for heart- mind 
in classical Greek thought is soul which, in Plato requires training to achieve 
the union of logos (reason / intellect) and eros (affective desire). As discussed 
above, the development of sophrosyne through education aims at both the 
rational and irrational elements in the soul. (North, 1966/2019, p. 208).
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Heeding the lessons about the inherent fragility of the civil society and the essen-
tial role of countervailing moral and spiritual forces (see Chap. 2 by Meyer) requires 
that we dramatically expand our conception of education from a dominant focus on 
learning about the external world to an equally important focus on learning about 
our mind. To develop this kind of knowledge, education cannot be limited to con-
ventional learning from texts and lectures. It needs to involve experience through 
somatic practices that bring the student face- to- face, as it were, with their heart- -
mind. Only as we advance in “knowing our minds,” are we likely to realize the 
benefits of building and developing it towards not only epistemic knowledge but 
wisdom. The distinction between book- knowledge and wisdom (and their corre-
sponding types of learning) is famously brought home by Montaigne who points out 
that we can become knowledgeable with other people’s knowledge, but we cannot 
be wise with other people’s wisdom. Wisdom is something we have to develop bit 
by bit on our own.
Long- standing traditions and recent research on mindfulness, wisdom and self- -
cultivation in education (Ergas, 2017; Peters 2020; Steel, 2014; Sternberg, 2001; 
Zajonc, 2009) converge on this point. The right kind of education and schooling that 
leave room and guidance for mindful self- awareness can initiate students into habits 
of self- awareness and insight that can lastingly shape their ability of self- reflection 
and self- regulation.
Can Kindness be Taught?—Education as a Wisdom Culture
Back to Rorty’s (1998) “featherless bipeds” who wouldn’t dream of harming 
a member of their flock, but thoughtlessly visit violence on people who look 
or behave different. Can a different kind of education make a difference? Can 
kindness be taught?
To staff off a possible misapplication of the above: What is not needed is for 
“Kindness” to become part of national curriculum, where it is “taught” along-
side algebra and French grammar. Armies of finger- wagging teachers instruct-
ing students in “universal kindness” may undermine any actual transformative 
education—an education that reaches the heart. It is an axiom of political phi-
losophy that civility- virtue cannot be legislated without lapsing into mental tyr-
anny. Nor, once achieved, can it be taken to be self- perpetuating or self- sustaining. 
Virtue is a plant that withers under the whip of political coercion as much as 
under the true believer’s totalizing ambition. In short: it cannot be generated by 
means of actions that directly aim at it. It can only arise as a by- product of types 
of action and forms of institutions that do not directly aim at generating it.
What is needed and is possible, by contrast, is that education develop a 
wisdom culture, an institutional prioritizing of beliefs and norms that make the 
development of kindness, compassion and a host of other moral excellences 
more likely. Sean Steel (2014, p. 293), one of the few to give thought to this 
idea, enumerates friendship, play, and contemplation as three key factors of 
such a culture. We need friends to help us see ourselves fully. In Jacobs’ (2001) 
(continued)
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memorable phrase: “the excellent agent is a living norm” (p. 77). This is why 
“associating with the wise” is a precept in all moral traditions.
A wisdom culture that cultivates friendship, play, and leisure can be devel-
oped based on many wisdom traditions, including those surveyed in this 
paper—or on a pluralist openness to all of them. In fact, a deep pluralism that 
honors one’s own tradition all the while acknowledging and demonstrating 
the deep interconnections with other traditions (Vélez de Cea, 2013) would 
seem to be a key requirement of a global educational community. By thus 
encouraging ourselves and our students to honestly cultivate our minds in an 
awareness of the shared fund of moral aims we may have as good a chance as 
human effort can procure for the seeds of human benevolence that we will 
find in our own minds to grow, so that, when “the other” crosses our path and 
perchance needs a helping hand, we know what to do.
Widening Circles of Empathy. As an example, consider the idea of teaching 
universal empathetic kindness in three different traditions. There is the story 
of Mencius who, encountering a brutal tyrant, teaches him kindness by 
reminding him how he, the tyrant, felt pity when he saw an ox in distress as 
he was led to slaughter. Mencius asks the tyrant to similarly notice that his 
own subjects live in fear and distress and to relax his demands on them just as 
he decided to spare the ox.
Similarly, there is the story of King David, who, desiring Bathsheba, sends 
her husband Uriah into battle where he will be killed. When the prophet 
Nathan tells him the story of the rich man who, upon meeting a hungry trav-
eler, takes not one of his own sheep to feed the traveler, but a poor man’s only 
sheep, David is enraged by the injustice, but comes to see his own unjust deed 
in the rich man’s conduct. Finally, in the Buddhist Metta Sutta, this theme of 
cultivating a “boundless heart,” of developing goodwill for oneself, one’s 
friends and neighbors, and ultimately for all sentient beings, is similarly made 
the subject of continuous reflection and meditation.4 In all these stories—and 
more could be cited from other traditions—moral instruction starts where the 
“students” are and expands their empathetic and compassionate horizons in 
ever widening circles. Can this principle of “growing the seeds” of universal 
empathy and compassion become a building block of education today?
4 Metta Sutta: “Wishing: In gladness and in safety, May all beings be at ease. Whatever liv-
ing beings there may be; Whether they are weak or strong, omitting none, The great or the 
mighty, medium, short or small, The seen and the unseen, Those living near and far away, 
Those born and to-be-born—May all beings be at ease! Let none deceive another, Or 
despise any being in any state. Let none through anger or ill-will Wish harm upon another. 
Even as a mother protects with her life Her child, her only child, So with a boundless heart 





 Educating the Heart-Mind Mind for Embodied Civility—A 
Basis for a New Global Dialogue?
The questions raised by Rorty (1998) and Einstein (1938) above show that the expe-
rience that our education does not reach deep enough, that it does not reliably put 
even our best and brightest on a path to an embodied, affective self- regulation in 
accord with wisdom, are not new to our current condition. But we may today be on 
the cusp of an encouraging difference: we enjoy today access to ideas from a variety 
of global traditions that share a common concern for education as the development 
of the heart- mind. This common fund can help us transcend two sizable obstacles 
that have, to date, hindered progress along this path. Firstly, it can help us overcome 
the overt or latent Eurocentrism that can be found in many contemporary discus-
sions, where the problems discussed here are considered only within the tight limi-
tations of European thought and traditions.5 Secondly, it can also help us realize that 
questions of moral development are not synonymous with religious framing. They 
need neither be couched in religious or theistic terms; nor need they be hostile to 
such a framing.
What emerges here is the possibility of a global coalition for education as a proj-
ect of moral development, fuelled by the coinciding insights of a family of philo-
sophical and wisdom traditions all of which emphasize the need to develop the heart 
as much as the head, the sentiments as much as cognition, the affect as well as the 
intellect. While they differ in important ways that are not to be dismissed, this area 
of overlapping consensus could prove an important resource of global peace and 
prosperity—especially in the decades ahead in which global peace may hinge in no 
small part on our ability to develop cooperative relations between East and West. 
What is emerging, in fact, is the possibility of a global community of educators, 
each starting from their own tradition, but with a sincere desire to cultivate coopera-
tion with the members of other traditions. This global community could work 
towards the building of a global coalition which can include all traditions facilitat-
ing the development of the heart- mind. Where education has thus far been couched 
in terms of nationalist priority or of a merely economic cosmopolitanism in projects 
like PISA, it can instead be couched in terms of the kind of moral universalism that 
Einstein invoked many decades ago. Civility can deepen from mere politeness or 
external conformity of conduct to a disposition towards wise and compassion-
ate action.
By neglecting the sentimental dimension of education in theory and practice, we 
allow that our aspirational default in education reverts to a kind of externally ori-
ented instrumental fitness, an adaptation of human cognition and psychology to the 
imperative of efficient functioning in established institutions that does nothing to 
5 See, for example, the view of Joseph Ratzinger: “No doubt, the two main partners in the correla-
tionality [of reason and faith] are Christian belief and Western secular rationality. This can and must 
be said without false eurocentrism” (Ratzinger, in Habermas & Ratzinger 2018, p. 57, own trans.).
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that prized faculty of “critical thinking” because it leaves the critical thinker victim 
to the vicissitudes of their untrained minds.
As long as civility is understood as mere external nonviolence or politesse, we 
hope in vain to close the doors on incivility that are always ajar. Under conditions of 
the civil society’s inherent fragility (see Chap. 2 by Meyer), even minor differences 
of ethnic or racial membership can appear as intrusions on the individual’s private 
sovereignty and bring in their tow an opening to overt incivility.
Exterior pacification without a corresponding interior moral development is 
inherently unstable. Rather than producing a sustainable form of peaceful self- -
governance, it produces prosperous, but restless, self- reliant, but anxious individu-
als whose jealousies are aroused by otherness and whose abiding dissatisfaction 
with their condition is tenuously held in check by a habit of merely continent self- -
coercion. This is the person who will be an easy prey for demagogues and authori-
tarians who promise the kind of purification in the external world that we have been 
unable or unwilling to cultivate in our interior.
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